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Abstract 
It is my claim that Gilles Deleuze’s expressionism allows for a new theory and praxis of reading 
called Immanent Reading, different from both his own Schizoanalytic praxis and the referential 
and ontological theories informing Literary Theory. Immanent reading, I propose, following 
Colebrook’s readings of Deleuze, offers an ethics of reading emphasising the pure immediacy of 
relations, including those expressed by life. It is upon this primary vector that this thesis 
progresses: the broad articulation and creation of a theory of Immanent Reading. To achieve 
this, I claim that the expressionist metaphysics exposed by Deleuze in Spinoza and Leibniz is 
altered by Deleuze in his own conceptual creations (as with becoming and immanence) and 
persists as a properly Deleuzian expressionism. The degrees of expression I propose belong to 
immanent reading are, without necessary order, the written-body, the reader-body, and a milieu 
of becoming that composes them together and transforms their affective and perceptive 
compositions. The written-body distinguishes itself as a creation of percepts and affects in 
writing, the reader-body through its involvement of pliable perceptions and affections, and 
becoming through its transformative capacity on these affective and perceptive complexes. The 
concept of immanence subtends this expressive composition, drawing reading into pure 
immediacy while articulating it as a process of unnatural encounters for “a Life”. To avoid 
representations of life in demonstrating the praxis, this thesis engages with speculative 
literature. Deleuze has made use of speculative writers, such as Lovecraft and Asimov, to create 
his (with and without Guattari and Parnet) concept of becoming. Here I engage with Le Guin, 
McCarthy, and Stanley Robinson amongst others. The consequence of composing an encounter 
with speculative literature for immanent reading is multi-fold, with this thesis theorising an 
expressionist logic in the creation of speculative sensations and the becomings they herald.        
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Introduction 
 
Reading is a relation of bodies. It presupposes the relation of one body and another: the reader-
body and the written-body.1 Herein the relation constitutes the bodies, is presupposed by the 
bodies as the process of reading, and thus demonstrates itself as inherently ethical. It becomes 
ethical not because some moral element is necessarily drawn from the writing to create a moral 
framework for the reader. Nor is it ethical due to any transcendental principle that comes to be 
applied to the relation. Ethical lessons learned elsewhere by the reader that come to be applied 
to reading, or to the nature of the writing they encounter, would constitute this transcendental 
approach. Rather, it is immediately ethical in the sense in which Baruch Spinoza produces an 
ethics because it posits a relation of processes, or of bodies. Gilles Deleuze claims that a Spinozist 
styled ethics observes “a typology of immanent modes of existence” and relations characterised 
by “the qualitative difference of modes of existence” (1988, 23). For Spinoza it is the bodies of 
“man”, or of “animal” and the ideas (adequate and inadequate) they effectuate, that are 
implicated in the ethical relation.2 Despite the seeming necessity of the ends of “man” or 
“animal”, the problem of a more general sense of bodies and their (affective) power is created in 
this ethics. Reading presupposes the bodies of the reader, and of writing, and the manner in 
which these are presupposed determines the sense in which they can exist, and the nature of 
their relations. Conversely, also, the bodies involved in reading presuppose the relation such that 
reading always appears as an open set of contingencies: of writing and reader, of the relation 
that inheres, of a flow of modifying forces that distribute the bodies, of degrees of 
transformation that dictate an ethics. Thus, insofar as there is a relation of reading then it is 
always an ethics, but one or the other body may modify the relation in their presuppositions 
such that the ethics becomes a morality, becomes prescriptive, or otherwise breaks down 
entirely as when a body ceases to read (Deleuze 1988, 23).  
                                                          
1 The “reader-body” and the “written-body” are terms developed with specific connotations for this thesis. 
The terms are used to conform to the metaphysics of expressionism established herein. By written-body I 
refer to those bodies composed of signs and consisting of events of sensation. Where I speak of the 
written-body I am in general referring to the speculative written-body proper to this thesis. By reader-
body I refer to those bodies composed of flesh, brain, and actively and passively modulating perceptions 
and affections. Indeed, the reader-body I speak of also has a consistency of events. This latter concept of 
the reader-body avoids a definition of human, since I cannot from expressionism strictly determine such a 
restrictive border. I would speculate that any body that is capable of actively modulating their affections 
and perceptions through an encounter with signs is implicated in the concept of the reader-body. 
2 On the notions of adequate and inadequate ideas see Chapter Two of this thesis where I discuss the 
notions regarding explication. For a synoptic account of these, as used by Deleuze’s in his reading of 
Spinoza, see Simon Duffy (2006, 163-164).   
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 Louise M. Rosenblatt, originally writing in 1938, has noted that “when the student has 
been moved by a work of literature, he will be led to ponder on questions of right and wrong, of 
admirable or antisocial qualities, of justifiable or unjustifiable actions” (1995, 16). Rosenblatt 
considers the possible judgements one might apply to the text, or the moral code that may be 
transported from the writing in a transaction (xvi) between the reader and the writing, and thus 
her claims immediately posit the relation of bodies. The student is moved in relation to the 
writing, and both bodies must be observed.3 But while Rosenblatt notes an essentiality of each 
body for the reading process, and occasionally gestures to an ethical relation of reader and 
writing (8), the relation itself is unvoiced in favour of positing a moral coding belonging first to 
the bodies involved. In this thesis I argue that reading as an ethical process concerns the 
relation, and only the relation, not beginning with the moral content of either body, but rather 
with the composition of their expression. This is the sense of the ethical drawn from Deleuzian 
expressionism which finds its inspiration in Spinoza.4 Rosenblatt observes this relational ethic in 
a brief flash of understanding, an awareness of the living expression of writing, in the movement 
between bodies of writing and the reader that transforms the reader (and presumably the 
writing), but this sense is quickly quietened in the presuppositions of judgement and prescriptive 
morality.  
Consider that when the reader-body selects a written-body (a book, a poem, a play, a 
paragraph, etc.) there are already influencing factors, albeit not always strictly determinate. The 
act of selection is violent in the sense that the reader-body instantiates a cut or a rift amongst 
the entire written milieu, from Gilles Deleuze to Jeff Noon, from Virginia Woolf to Ursula K. Le 
Guin.5 Investigating the aetiology of the reader-body’s selection by observing the specific cause, 
or by observing a broader field of causes, can characterise this action. In each instance there is 
an observation of the reader-body’s drive, her reasons for her selection. But in expressionism, 
from Spinoza to Deleuze, to think only aetiologically presupposes the necessity of a specific logic 
of causes, the necessity of a formal transcendental structure that characterises by submitting 
real actions to prefigured (presupposed) and well-formed predicates.6 The broad scope of this 
3 Rosenblatt uses the concept of transaction to express the relation of writing to reader. See Literature as 
Exploration (1995, xvi) for an introduction to the term.  
4 See Ronald Bogue who argues that Deleuze’s ethics is immanent. This, he argues, is due to the capacities 
for affecting and being affected that inhere in all bodies (regardless of size or degree or composition), and 
which are universally pervasive (2007, 15). This is an adequate reading and supports the claims made in 
this thesis, except insofar as it does not address the phase of pure immanence in Deleuze’s expressionism.  
5 These writers are more or less present to this thesis in various ways.  
6 In Logic of Sense Deleuze claims that “One of the boldest moments of the Stoic thought involves the 
splitting of the causal relation” (2004b, 194). This thesis is not “Stoic” in any specific sense, although some 
inspiration is implicated from Deleuze’s conceptual predecessors which include Stoic philosophers. What 
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observation accounts for the existence of genre in literature, importantly in the presuppositions 
of reader’s that determine their ability to interact with writing (i.e. by producing hierarchies, 
judgements, preference, etc.). It is easy, for instance, to claim that one does not enjoy science 
fiction or fantasy if the genre is well-defined, if it is structurally ensconced as the cause of the 
reading or writing itself, these causes making her ill-disposed to the form.7 However, as I will 
indicate below, while genre proceeds from a presupposition of definiteness – from what I refer 
to as the ontological imperative or necessary Being – its ability to define itself or even be defined 
is inherently limited. I draw attention to this since I am engaged throughout this thesis with a 
collection of written works that I broadly term “speculative literature”. And, since I am engaged 
in the act of selection myself, awareness of this level of the ethical problematic is beneficial for 
understanding my choice of writings here, and for my move to expressionism in articulating the 
relation of reading. 
 Investigating the presuppositions, which is the domain of metaphysics, in any interaction 
or in regard to any process that is determined to have existence (by whatever means) places the 
certainty of that process into question. The books that sit before me, with coloured covers, or 
removed covers, with their lines of writing and pages, with language and syntax (English but 
some French), all arrive not from a single necessary cause but from an ecology of perceptive and 
affective material. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, “we paint, sculpt, compose, and write with 
sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations” (1994, 166). Further still, they 
claim that “sensation is pure contemplation, for it is through contemplation that one contracts, 
contemplating oneself to the extent that one contemplates the elements from which one 
originates” (212). Excusing for now sustained arguments on sensation, it remains that sensation 
is not the cause of what is written, nor is contemplation.8 A single cause, the writer or even the 
material, is already multivalent. In Deleuzian expressionism, writing is the accretion of an 
immense variation, sensations and the act of contemplation (contraction), each collapsing upon 
variable lines to reveal their elements: an array of intensive elements are implicated in the 
writer, as they are in the materials of the writer.  
Further still, the books that sit on my desk presuppose something which is not strictly 
causal, the writing inherent in the books also pertaining to presuppositions such as meaning or 
                                                          
Deleuze here indicates is the removal of causal necessity that would plot a single causal lineage to any 
particular event. 
7 On the critique of genre being a limit and structurally integrated, see David M. Higgins who notes a debt 
in the critique to Derrida but also frames a history of the critique of genre for science fiction (2013, 147, 
270n.3).   
8 The most sustained version of this argument on sensation and contemplation is in Chapter Three – 
“Concept of the written-body” – where the notions of percept and affect are examined as the degrees of 
sensation.  
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an apparent truth – on the human condition for instance, or on the nature of reality. 
Interrogating these presuppositions reveals an ongoing process inherent to the production and 
creation of writing, one that is not at all stable and that is perpetually revealing. That is, 
immanence inheres in all writing and reveals the presuppositions of all writing, presuppositions 
that are further encoded by their own presuppositions. This persists to the point where the 
stability of the writing before me implicates a reality that allows it some degree of existence, but 
undermines it at the same time, placing any sense of truth or necessary meaning into radical 
flux. For instance, the relations composed in this thesis determine the subsistence of a 
“speculative literature”. This, however, is only revealed as a partial presupposition of 
“speculative fiction”, “science fiction”, and “fantasy” as genres whereby their situatedness as 
genres limits the possible expression of speculative sensation. In this thesis I configure such 
argumentative lines by means of expressionist metaphysics, with an emphasis on developing 
Deleuze’s analysis and implementation of expressionism. In this manner, it is apparent that in 
their encounter, bodies modify one another for better or worse. The reader’s selection takes no 
transcendental law, and makes no overarching principle, and nor does a principle make itself 
available for transaction from the written-body. In this thesis, it is only claimed so far that there 
are bodies changing one another, and that what is immanent to either body may not appear as a 
solid artefact. Indeed, even following a categorical entrance into the written-body, through 
genre for instance, is to encounter an immanent composition of expression in defiance of a 
category, a strict cause, or even a single and static idea. For the genre of speculative fiction, its 
immanent expression is revealed to have little to do with fiction, and more to do with the 
process of speculation and its composition as writing or literature (especially insofar as sensation 
is concerned).9  
 I propose in this thesis a theoretical intervention into the process of reading that is 
Deleuzian but not strictly spelled out in Deleuze’s philosophy. More specifically, I intervene on 
representational reading practices, which implicate many theories of reading including 
Rosenblatt’s exceptional transactional approach and begin in all cases with the risk of an 
ontological imperative or the well-defined sense of writing and reader as objects and subjects 
following a necessary being. I claim here the creation of a praxis of immanent reading which 
begins nowhere except the immanence of the writing and the relations that produce the reader 
                                                          
9 Deleuze frequently calls upon speculative works as sites that move toward becomings of all sorts. One 
persistently finds Kafka, Lovecraft, and Asimov in his writings. See Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 290). On 
other possible links of Deleuze to science fiction and speculative literature, see Simon O’Sullivan (2016) on 
the notion of myth-science. 
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and the writing.10 Which is to say that immanent reading does not begin but rather finds its 
manner of expression amongst the act of reading, amongst an encounter of bodies, and 
amongst the expression of bodies. Immanent reading will be shown in this thesis to concern 
itself with the immanent creations of literature; chiefly amongst these being the sensations, the 
percepts and affects, of that writing. But, further still, immanent reading demonstrates 
transformations that are created in the bodies of writing and the reader (reader-body and 
written-body) by means of becoming. The importance of this final concept to the process of 
immanent reading to be developed in this thesis demonstrates the debt the present thesis owes 
to the work of Gilles Deleuze and his collaborators (chiefly Félix Guattari and Claire Parnet).  
As will be examined throughout the subsequent chapters, it is from Deleuzian 
expressionism, itself inspired by Spinoza and Leibniz, that immanent reading gathers its logic. 
Deleuze discovers in Spinoza and Leibniz a concept of expression which he both explains and 
deploys. His explanation is multivalent. In Leibniz he discovers the process of substances 
expressing while the expressed never actually becomes exterior to substances. In Deleuze’s 
words: “the world does not exist in itself, the world is uniquely the expressed… there is no world 
in itself, the world exists only in the individual substances that express it… it’s the expressed of 
all individual substances, but the expressed does not exist outside the substances that express it. 
It’s a real problem!” (Deleuze 1980, sect. f). Here the argument for expression is delivered after 
an uncontroversial description of Leibniz’s metaphysics is given: a plurality of substances as 
possible worlds. Deleuze begins to identify the metaphysics of expression as subsisting in this 
plurality by observing the relations, and no longer analysing the substances or the resulting 
world. The logic is equivalent in Deleuze’s study of Spinoza, again in his words: “each individual is 
a singular essence, each singular essence expresses itself in the characteristic relations of the 
differential relation type, and under these differential relations, the infinite collections of the 
infinitely small belong to the individual” (Deleuze 1981, par. 23).11 Deleuze here is no longer 
                                                          
10 I do not, however, have a claim on naming the process as this belongs to Claire Colebrook (2002, 95). 
Antony Larson (2008) has also made some steps to articulating an expressionist inspired reading practice 
from Deleuze, even deploying the critical concepts of encounter and affect to articulate the relation of 
reader to writing, especially insofar as this conditions an ethics. Larson, however, neglects to demonstrate 
the logics of expression attend to the practice of reading. While I am concerned here with demonstrating 
the complex process of plication in expressionism, I believe a general attention to the relations of 
sensation and life, and of becoming and transformation, would be useful additions to Larson’s claims. 
Nevertheless, there is a positive resonance between what I produce here and in Larson’s writing on the 
concept of the reader, beyond our mutual engagement Deleuze and his Spinoza. 
11 Given the emphasis on relations and the process of extension, and indeed how this is taken up in 
Deleuze’s broader conceptual domain such as with pure immanence, it is surprising that Deleuze continues 
to be cast as a philosopher of mimesis. See for instance Michael Mack who remarks “by focusing on the 
idea and by conflating the work of the imagination with that of representation, Deleuze perpetuates a 
mimetic account of literature from his perspective of philosophy” (2012, 45). This is a remarkable claim 
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speaking of substances. Although it is true that the logic of expressionism works equally for 
plural (Leibniz) or singular (Spinoza) substances, he is rather concerned with a notion of the 
individual for Spinoza. Here Deleuze coordinates the expression of relations from singular 
essence — the relations that compose individuals as an expression of something else (Nature) — 
to those of the composition that includes relations with other individuals (that implicate nature 
in their own way, constituting their own essence). The logic is retained that in expression what is 
at stake is the manner in which a process can be of another, can be different to yet others, and 
yet have no metaphysical anteriority. Deleuzian expressionism certainly begins here, but as I 
argue in this thesis it is with the concepts of becoming and immanence that one can finally speak 
of a directly Deleuzian instance of expressionism.  
Immanent reading, I claim in this thesis, posits the relations between bodies as ones of 
becoming. These are relations that persist in in the absence of well-defined ends, without 
necessitating the presuppositions of subject and object or the logic of being that instantiates 
them, and relations that encounter writing in its expression and not in the sense of its categories 
(organs such as narrative, theme, character – see Chapter Seven in this thesis). Becoming, a 
concept I here rebuild following Deleuze, places its emphasis on transformation and the quality 
of the encounter. The degrees of relations involved in becoming are again inspired by Spinoza, as 
per the above short passage, except insofar as essence and substance are concerned. Deleuze’s 
becoming is relational, it is necessitated by expression, but the unique expressionism it carries 
eschews substances (both plural and singular) altogether in favour of a process of pure 
immanence or A Life (see Chapter Six in this thesis). By way of cursory definition, this is a process 
of spatiotemporal immediacy that implicates relational bodies, a process of internal differential 
creation (or what I am calling endoheterogenesis), and a process of implicated consciousness.12  
                                                          
not least of all because Mack himself notes a difference between representation and repetition, noting 
explicitly a Deleuzian instance of delineation from the former term (39). Mack claims that Deleuze has 
attempted in parts to do away with the imagination, but this works only insofar as Deleuze does away with 
Mack’s concept of imagination (which is conflated with “Idea”, a conflation belonging to Kant). Deleuze 
himself repeatedly produces the concept of an “image of thought” through which to deal with the 
problems of idea: “a concept which itself goes beyond the possibility of experience and which has its 
source in reason” per Kant (Deleuze 2008a, 7) and (the faculty of) imagination. Mack’s argument hinges on 
a version of Deleuze that is untenable, and perhaps falsely outsourced to Beth Lord (whose preface to the 
edition in which Mack’s article is collected is an exceptional reading of Deleuze’s Spinoza), which sees 
Deleuze as an active Kantian-Spinozist-Nietzschean. Strictly speaking, Deleuze writes on Kant not as an 
allegiant or potential site of creative expansion. As he puts it “I did it as a book about an enemy that tries 
to show how his system works, its various cogs – the tribunal of Reason, the legitimate exercise of the 
faculties” (Deleuze 1995, 6). Regarding Mack’s deference to a Deleuzian concept of simulacrum, to 
support his notions of a slippage in the Deleuzian concept of repetition, it would be advised to read 
Deleuze on Lucretius and Epicureanism (Deleuze 2004b, 314-315).       
12 This is my own modification of Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term heterogenesis to describe the 
manner in which a concept consists of “variations ordered according to their neighbourhood” (1994, 20). 
Heterogenesis captures the sense of differential or variable genesis, whereas I have added the prefix 
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With such inspiration from expressionism, I will here show my theory of immanent 
reading to eschew the formal qualities or contents of a piece of writing (such as character or 
narrative). Instead, the material of sensation and milieu of relations that are implicated in the 
broader reading composition constitute the site of investigation and observation. From 
Deleuze’s claims on writing in What is Philosophy? (with Guattari, 1994) these sensations are 
shown to be expressions of life. In its movement, immanent reading is a genre destroying 
reading methodology. For instance, where speculative literature is a cursory orientation point of 
this thesis, what remains in the final conceptual creation is only speculation and the manner of 
its expression as an event of sensation. In this thesis, then, I propose a shift in the 
presuppositions of reading from the ontological imperative to expressionism. As I will show, this 
indicates an immediate modification in how one thinks of reading, but the change in 
presuppositions means that a more profound modification is made to the perceptions and 
affections of the reader.  
The exploration of speculative sensations that subtends this thesis necessarily 
encounters problems of representation that are prevalent in science fiction studies (popularized 
as SF by some critics).13 Brian Attebery, reading Samuel R. Delany, exemplifies this problem as 
the idea that a reader apply “knowledge from outside the text” (2013, 6). His repeat of Delany’s 
analysis of the “blue sun” presumes “knowledge” of both these sensations, blue and sun, 
representations that when combined would, further, represent something. The expressionism I 
propose to use here in development of a praxis of immanent reading contends with this, and its 
Deleuzian inspiration shows the familiar empirical problem: how does our sensation of the sun 
(or blue) become knowledge of the sun (or blue)? Equally, Attebery’s concept of the parabola 
assumes that the sensations occupy only the space between the pages, and that the reader is 
invited to “find applications outside the text” (22).14 In short, the reader is asked to enter into a 
transaction with the work, to bring representation into the written-body, and to bring it from the 
written-body. It is, conversely, my contention in this thesis that such calls to referral alienate the 
                                                          
endo- to indicate the necessarily internal or immanent expression of variation. This evokes the notion of 
immanence, while maintaining the familiar process of difference. See also the entry on heterogenetic 
systems in Daniel W. Smith (2012a, 38). See also Miguel de Beistegui on onto-hetero-genesis, and on 
ontogenesis (2004; 2012, 42).   
13 It is true that a minimum of representation is configurable in Deleuze’s philosophy, but representation 
remains a problem insofar as it passes into all the domains of experience and closes off less restrictive 
encounters with processes, such as the experience of a sensation without coding it entirely in knowledge 
production or other configurations of representation. On the problem of representation in Deleuze see 
Levi R. Bryant (2008, 4).  
14 The third tier of this is the megatext of science (Attebery 2013, 21-22). Attebery demonstrates his 
transcendentalism here by noting that awareness of the scientific apparatus that subtends a sensation in 
science fiction will make the experience more subtle and significant (22).  
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reader from their immediate experience of the sensations, and that the contemplation of 
speculative sensations is conducive to powerful changes in the reader-body without recourse to 
knowledge: changes in affection and perception. One can still fuse one’s experience of blue and 
of sun, but can remain aware that knowledge is not at stake, that the immanence of a sensation 
and the relations it draws in the written-body are not well formed facts for extrapolation and 
application, being rather immediately expressive of a specific composition of that sensation.   
 Reading in immanence is the main vector of orientation in this thesis, one that develops 
its voice amongst a milieu of problems regarding representation, but that is created by means of 
expressionism. It does presuppose other problems especially concerning the necessary meaning 
of instances of writing. Where representation, for example, queries truth and meaning, by either 
prolonging or extending it (deconstruction), fixing it for extraction (psychoanalysis and 
transactional reading), or simply affirming it (representational notions of sensation), immanence 
coordinates vectors of expression. And rather than draw the reader to a category, such as 
“speculative fiction”, to which a correlate is necessarily made by representation (there is 
potential for a presupposed category), immanent reading proposes expression at all degrees in 
writing. With reading in immanence, I propose an expressive world, a world of creation to which 
some writing contributes as a necessarily speculative mode of production. Further, I propose 
that immanent reading configures ethical encounters of written-bodies and reader-bodies, 
encounters that potentially amplify each of the bodies in some manner (herein sensation) or 
deplete them. The following expressionist claim on bodies from Spinoza is where the definition 
on the body (written and reader) starts in this thesis, albeit with significant changes in the 
Deleuzian uptake: “By ‘body’ I understand a mode that expresses in a definite and determinate 
way God’s essence insofar as he is considered an extended thing” (Spinoza 2002, 244 [Ethics P.2, 
Def. 1]). Consider, of course, that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s expressionism concludes that 
the concept is not revealed by way of its definition but in a relation inherent to the concept of 
expression: “the idea of expression is neither defined nor deduced by Spinoza… it defines neither 
substance nor attribute… the idea of expression seems to emerge only as determining the 
relation into which attribute, substance and essence enter” (Deleuze 1992, 19-20). It is thus from 
an internal relation that bodies, including concepts, will be better understood and not directly 
from definitions. Where relations demonstrate the abilities of bodies, definitions tend only to 
ontological limitations. 
This thesis thus attends in primacy to the creation of a concept and praxis of immanent 
reading. Of particular interest for this creation are the modes of existence or bodies of 
speculative literature and the sensations of their composition, a focus that yields a number of 
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problems concerning the identity and individuality of its own expression (not least of all the 
problem of genre). Yet further interest is upon the relations that compose bodies, and that 
subtend bodies in the becoming of immanent reading. As I have indicated, I argue that 
immanent reading finds its chief progenitor in Gilles Deleuze, but more specifically in the 
expressionism that inheres in Deleuze’s conceptual milieu. Immanent reading will be revealed as 
a creative and pragmatic reading practice that seeks the immanence of all degrees of the 
relations of reading: the immanence of sensations, the life of writing, and the affective and 
perceptive compositions between reader and written bodies.15 Finally, as I will show, the specific 
case of speculative sensations that inhere in speculative literature are vibrant dimensions for the 
transformation of all bodies involved in the process of immanent reading.  
 
  
Encounters with Gilles Deleuze   
Before, however, unfolding the progression of my argument, what must be made clear are the 
key conditions for making use of and developing the concepts of Gilles Deleuze in this thesis. The 
first important point to make is that a significant amount of what I have written herein is 
indebted to both Deleuze and Félix Guattari.16 It is from their collaborative work A Thousand 
                                                          
15 Beth Lord’s definition of affectivity is close to my own use of affective: “the ways physical bodies (and, in 
parallel, minds) interact and combine with one another through feeling” (2012, 8-9). I develop this along 
multiple lines in this thesis, using complexes, networks, weaves and other encounter centric terminology.  
16 Félix Guattari collaborated with Gilles Deleuze on the two tomes that comprise Capitalisme et 
schizophrenie: Anti-Oedipus (2004) and A Thousand Plateaus (2013), originally published in French in 1972 
and 1987 respectively. They also produced a short work on Kafka, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986) 
originally published in French in 1975, and have numerous interviews published. In Desert Islands (Deleuze 
2004a) see ‘Deleuze and Guattari fight back…’, ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’, ‘On Capitalism and Desire’; 
in Negotiations (Deleuze 1995) see ‘Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus’; and in Chaosophy 
(Guattari 2009) see ‘Capitalism: A very special Delirium’, ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’, and ‘In flux’ (each 
of these interviews was published in Desert Islands, but only the second has retained the same name in 
both publications). Their final collaborative work is What is Philosophy? (1994), originally published in 
French in 1991, which was drafted by Deleuze in correspondence with Guattari. Guattari’s own works 
have an immense scope with a markedly different set of problems to those of Deleuze. I am not directly 
engaged with Guattari’s work in this thesis in a major way, but his works do appear here to clarify and 
develop some concepts such as “transversality” and “heterogenesis”. See for instance the concept of 
“endoheterogenesis” in this thesis, Chapters Six and Eight, which is based off heterogenesis: “in other 
words, processes of continuous resingularization. Individuals must become both more united and 
increasingly different” (Guattari 2014, 47; 105 n.49). The most thorough study of the relations and cross 
pollinations of Deleuze and Guattari is François Dosse’s Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives 
(2010). In this work Dosse suggests that following the Deleuze and Guattari encounter in writing, Guattari 
always appears as a sort of ghost in Deleuze’s solo writings, like an infection, albeit one that does not 
deplete Deleuze’s body in any significant manner. Dosse’s analysis of their relationship is notable since it 
engages with their conceptual and their personal relationship. It is also one of few works that takes a 
thorough look at the context the writers were working within, the socio-political circles they inhabited, 
and presents an image of Paris in 1968 as eponymous for their encounter. On the bifurcation of reading 
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Plateaus that I draw the concept of becoming which is central to my argument on reading in 
immanence: as I will show it constitutes the “reading” by means of an encounter that privileges 
alliance and transformation. The collaborative work titled What is Philosophy? (1994) has also 
presented me with an array of concepts surrounding sensation that informs my understanding of 
a written-body and the nature of artistic compositions. In seeking to develop my understanding 
of these concepts and processes that proliferate in Deleuze and Guattari’s works, I follow 
concepts such as immanence, expression and body back through Deleuze’s other projects and 
find a broad field of concepts suited to creating a novel manner of reading written compositions. 
By observing how these concepts unfold, it becomes clear that Deleuze is an expressionist in the 
logical style of Spinoza and Leibniz.  
The above points lead me to my first condition for choosing to maintain an encounter 
with Deleuze throughout this thesis. This is that Deleuze persistently argues that philosophy, or 
even thinking in general, is a creative and collaborative process. In Spinoza: Expressionism in 
Philosophy (1992), for example, Deleuze bears witness to the creation of the concept of 
expression in Spinoza.17 For Spinoza, the concept behaves in a minor sense insofar as Spinoza 
himself has very little to say on the matter, to such a degree that it is dubitable to suggest it is 
one of Spinoza’s concepts.18 Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, however, not only attributes the 
                                                          
Deleuze with or without Guattari, the different vectors this produces in the conceptual analysis, and the 
necessity of thinking “difference” as active inconsistency, see Claire Colebrook (2010a, 6-7).  
17 The French title is Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (1968). It is a curious decision to neglect “le 
problème” in the translation since in What is Philosophy? a problem is one of the vectors in the production 
of concepts. Given that Deleuze mentions “expressionism” infrequently in the former book, and at once it 
is in inverted commas, it is a strange negotiation regarding the pre-existence of the concept of 
“expressionism”. Is it a concept? Is it a problem? The conclusion, however, is subtitled l’expressionnisme 
en philosophie translated as “expressionism in philosophy” (321) at which point it is clearly considered a 
concept but with reference not only to Spinoza but also to Leibniz. The translator has clearly taken the 
conclusion as the model for the title but placed an emphasis on Spinoza (perhaps in order to make room 
for a follow up Expressionism in Philosophy: Leibniz). For this thesis I take expressionism as the concept of 
expression as it is created in multiple sites. For instance, on the problem of speculation, I propose that 
Ursula K. Le Guin is an expressionist given her arguments on “speculative” writing and the problem of 
truth. See also my persistent claims on Deleuzian expressionism. Unless explicitly stated, expressionism is 
here a concept (rebuilt) following the Deleuzian logics of his encounters with Leibniz and Spinoza.    
18 The notions of minor and major tell a series of important stories in Deleuze’s works. The major, or 
majoritarian (also molar) constitute dominant and totalising systems, often despotic, and at least a 
process of categorisation. Deleuze makes it clear that in any domain of experience, there will be a well-
defined system that codes, or at least attempts to code, that experience. In literature Deleuze and 
Guattari call this a major literature, which constitutes the employment of established systems of signs, 
symbols, and may even extend to syntax (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 18). Minor literature refuses both 
the standard organisations of language and the standard processes of interpretation. Instead it seeks a 
different composition, amongst language, amongst symbols, images, in a process of deterritorialisation 
that modifies and breaks down the territory within which it occurs, establishing a new territory: “we might 
as well say that minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every 
literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature” (18). This includes “minor 
practice of major language” (18). In A Thousand Plateaus the notion of minor also comes to inform 
scientific discourse, and extends itself to metaphysics (2013, 420-421). Deleuze identifies expression as a 
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concept to Spinoza, and Leibniz, but takes it as a crucial component of Spinoza’s thinking before 
illustrating a detailed and nuanced concept of expression. The concept thus requires the 
collaboration of Deleuze for its creation. Deleuze argues that expressionism is the presupposition 
of Spinoza and Leibniz, built as an anti-Cartesian or post-Cartesian philosophy (1992, 335), 
despite considerable difference in how they conceptualize substance and nature. This concept of 
expression is followed by a Deleuzian instance, whereby, unlike with Spinoza, the concept is 
directly and persistently analysed – for instance, in relation to Spinoza (Deleuze 1992), to Leibniz 
(Deleuze 2006), to Melville (Deleuze 1997, 69), Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 1986), and many 
others. Deleuze does not, however, claim to articulate the concept of expression relative to his 
own project. I argue in this thesis that, despite this, Deleuze’s philosophy is a philosophy of 
expression, starting from a Deleuzian expression machine that does not make use of any 
particular substance (as with Leibniz and Spinoza) but is rather an endoheterogenic 
expressionism, that is, expression immanent to any substance whatsoever where substance is 
taken as sensory matter.19 Philosophical expressionism is hence Deleuze’s as much as it is 
Spinoza’s since his reading of Spinoza turns into a collaboration between Spinoza and Deleuze – 
a creation that belongs at once to both parties alone and together, a collaboration capable of 
bringing to light the fields of presupposition that suffuse Spinoza’s work and that inspire 
Deleuze. The Deleuzian expression machine is a philosophy machine insofar as Deleuze is 
engaged in the creation of concepts, but also insofar as this creation is infused with cuts of 
various degrees: i.e. - cuts that connect (to problems), conjoin (with conceptual persona), and 
disjoin (from other concepts). Deleuze (with and without Guattari) has persistently argued that 
                                                          
minor aspect of Spinoza’s system, which has the potential to disrupt the major components of his system 
that are the regular sites of analysis. As Deleuze says, this is “a discontinuous volcanic line, a second 
version underneath the first, expressing all the angers of the heart and setting forth practical theses of 
denunciation and liberation” (1988, 29). See on major and minor in Deleuze see Constantin Boundas 
(1993, 16).        
19 The concept of an expression machine is produced by Deleuze and Guattari in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature (1986). The concept links the concepts of expression and machine, the former of which is 
explored more thoroughly in Chapter Two of this thesis, the latter of which I will briefly indicate now. The 
concept of a machine for Deleuze and Guattari is indicative of a series of movements that act upon and 
produce the flows of reality. In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, specifically in Anti-Oedipus, the concept of 
machine is articulated as movements which are cuts or schizzes, but which are also synthetic operations: 
“a machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks (coupures)” (2004, 38). There are three 
cuts: disjunctive synthesis (or cuts that connect elements from heterogenous series – such as when a 
chainsaw is cutting a tree, the blade of the saw is connected to the saw dust of the tree), connective 
synthesis (cuts in a series – such as a break between a branch and a tree), and conjunctive synthesis (cuts 
that conjoin series and connect them to a world through the production of residue– such as sexual 
reproduction, or the production of saw dust from the tree as residual). The expression machine makes use 
of this array of movements. The expression machine that Deleuze and Guattari identify for Kafka is also a 
literary machine, which amounts in simple terms that words, writing, language, syntax, sensation, etc. 
constitute the matter of the expression.  
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“philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (1994 2).20 It is thus with 
the possibility of generating new thinking, of creating new concepts, while paying clear attention 
to reasoning and homage to those who have attempted to create similar concepts before, that I 
am inspired by the expressionism of Deleuze.  
The Deleuzian expression machine is explored further in Chapter Two of this thesis, by 
means of the concept of expression, but the sense in which I speak of a machine requires a 
further articulation here. Felix Guattari (1995) makes the clear indication that a machine is not 
necessarily a technological artefact, that in fact a machine denotes a society, a human, a book, 
and so on. But this is only insofar as there is a composition of different elements forming a body, 
and further still that it maintains a degree of heterogenesis or differential production: creation 
through difference and radical singularization. Guattari indeed claims that “the least structured 
pieces of a machine acquire the status of a proto-machine” (1995, 35). The indication here is to 
the instability of a machine, one that phases itself toward decomposition, tends back towards 
the conditions of its composition – its proto-machinic phase. A machine remains a “system of 
interruptions”, coupures, for Guattari, but he places an emphasis on its genetic and creative 
capability. He argues that for an understanding of machine, the same which I deploy here, a 
merging of the autopoietic and allopoietic is required. That is, a merging of the sense of 
specifying one’s own relative limits and organisation, with the sense of creating something other 
than one’s own composition (39). The Deleuzian expression machine, then, has these conditions, 
to express something beyond what it creates as its own body. This is a multivalent articulation 
that speaks itself as an event, while producing events in-exterior.21  And, indeed, the expression 
20 See also Difference and Repetition (1994, xx) where Deleuze argues for viewing the philosophical project 
of empiricism as concept creation contrary to seeing empiricists as opposing the concept (whence 
conflated with “idea”). Elsewhere Deleuze has lauded empiricism, and even develops the concept of 
transcendental empiricism in his later works which is arguably his method of interacting with matter in a 
metaphysical manner. The debt to David Hume on this concept should not be understated, but nor should 
rationalist metaphysics. On Deleuze and empiricism, see Gregory Flaxman (2015). On the particular 
relation to Hume, and a reading of his writings on Hume, see Jon Roffe (2016).   
21 See Chapters Three and Five for my argumentation on events relative to immanent reading and 
expressionism following on from Deleuze. Briefly, however, it is worth noting here that most of what 
Deleuze says on events concerns their behaviour, what they can do, rather than tend toward a definition. 
This “can do” is the same as his and Spinoza’s logic behind bodies and their affects. Nevertheless, a clear 
image of events is produced in numerous places in Logic of Sense (2004b), as well as a provoking chapter 
in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (2006). In Logic of Sense Deleuze invokes Gilbert Simondon to 
articulate a sense of events: “singularities-events correspond to heterogeneous series which are organized 
into a system which is neither stable no unstable, but rather “metastable,” endowed with a potential 
energy wherein the differences between series are distributed. (Potential energy is the energy of the pure 
event, whereas forms of actualization correspond to the realization of the event)” (2004b, 119). On the 
one hand an event happens, is the upspring (realization) of a future and a past that enact a degree of 
contortion. On the other hand, the torsion or compression (realization) that happens is inseparable from a 
“pure event”, a suffused life, that is also happening, but at different degrees and different rates. A wave 
on the ocean is a “form of actualization” that contorts or compresses the potential energy of the “pure 
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machine constitutes the machining of matter (in writing this matter is syntax and sensation 
suffused with a-substantial life).  
It is the possibility of having encounters, and ultimately collaborations, with an array of 
conceptual creators that further compels me to interact with Deleuze in this thesis. For Deleuze 
thinking is creative, and philosophy is the creation of concepts; it seems then that in the 
production of new knowledge Deleuze will be well suited to this thesis. The contribution to 
knowledge here amounts to a creation of knowledge even insofar as stable and well-defined 
knowledge is troubled by the speculative sensations of literature.  The second condition for 
Deleuze’s role in this thesis relates to my proposal that a reading in immanence can be created 
and be of epistemological novelty and utility to the world. The concepts that pervade Deleuze’s 
works that I pick up here and develop further are already well suited to the proposed theory and 
praxis of reading in immanence. After all, Claire Colebrook has written that Deleuze “asks that 
we read immanently and intensively, asking how a text works and what it does and produces, 
and not what it means” (2002, 95). And while Colebrook is at lengths to describe this process, 
bringing to the fore many of the conditions I pick up later in this thesis, a developed theory of 
immanent reading (or reading in immanence) in light of its proper name remains to be 
expressed.22 It is in the purview of this thesis to develop this theory, from its presuppositions to 
the process itself. On the notions of ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’ I defer to Deleuze who, in discussion 
with Foucault, claims: “praxis is a network of relays from one theoretical point to another, and 
theory relays one praxis to another. A theory cannot be developed without encountering a wall, 
and a praxis is needed to break through” (Deleuze 2004a, 206). In this sense the theory and 
                                                          
event”, the ocean. The claim can be spatiotemporal, such that actual and virtual, aeon and chronos, and 
so on, are evoked. History and future scallop or fold to form events by degree of actualization, whereas 
history and future and event all constitute the pure event. History and future coexist insofar as they 
suffuse the event. Metastability enters where multiple actualizations, though different (such as successive 
waves having different heights), share in the potential energy (ocean) that suffuses them. They do not 
have to be co-incidents, both only need share in the pure event. There are also events of sensation that do 
not take the pure event as necessarily spatial or temporal but as “life” – see Chapter Three of this thesis.  
22 I perceive little dissonance between my own work and that of Colebrook in this claim, except insofar as 
the term text is concerned. I propose text is too coded and broadly applicable to be adequately usable for 
immanent reading which favours a metaphysical and conscious immediacy. See Chapter One for a 
sustained argument on this term and my turn to written-bodies. On proper names refer to Deleuze (1992, 
44; 2006, 144) and Deleuze and Guattari (2004, 95) where the following statement is made for an 
expressionistic theory of naming a process: “the theory of proper names should not be conceived of in 
terms of representation; it refers instead to the class of ‘effects’: effects that are not a mere dependence 
on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs” (95). I use “proper” in 
the sense above of designating or inscribing an event or body with those elements that appear to be 
composed as part of its expression, as occurring here in the very least. This is not a moral comportment, a 
statement on necessary action, but rather on apprehending a zone of immediacy by a name. The proper 
name of an event such as the Saturn-event, as explored in Chapter Eight of this thesis for instance, gathers 
both Voltaire and Robinson. While Robinson is the proper name of a becoming-cloud which is further 
attributed to the Saturn-event. 
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praxis are entwined, and at times indistinguishable. Theory is already an action, praxis is the 
action of theory, but they are more like mutual appendages in a network than opposites or 
otherwise exterior: in creating a theory it is always already applied as a force to another domain. 
Although this thesis is Deleuzian, I do not here portend to announce any definitive 
results regarding the nature of Deleuze’s own concepts except to note Deleuze’s expressionism 
inherent therein. Where Deleuze’s concepts are deployed in this thesis, they are no less rebuilt 
to avoid them being understood as well-formed or inheritable. This stems from the 
DeleuzoGuattarian thesis on concepts, involving Nietzsche, which states: 
Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for 
concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing 
without their creator's signature. Nietzsche laid down the task of philosophy when he 
wrote, "[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and 
polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. 
Hitherto one has generally trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry 
from some sort of wonderland," but trust must be replaced by distrust, and philosophers 
must distrust most those concepts they did not create themselves. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 3-4) 
It seems to me a tragedy or a sadness of relations that anyone should read Deleuze (and his 
works with Guattari and Parnett) and feel compelled to make his metaphysics clearer, his 
concepts more palatable, or to provide definitions for his concepts.23 This is because I think that 
Deleuze has become increasingly coded with a logic that is external to his own work, an analytic 
logic which pushes for the absolute fixation of terms wherein Deleuze becomes a mere signifier. 
It is confounding when it is argued that something is missing from Deleuze that needs fixing, or 
that Deleuze is not entirely forthcoming in his delivery of concepts and that something further is 
needed for him to be understood.24 Deleuze is a sober and thorough thinker, perpetually coming 
back to his concepts to expand their abilities. Further still, it is confounding that others wish to 
fix Deleuze to a concept or a particular metaphysics: Deleuze as philosopher of becoming, 
                                                          
23 See for instance Eugene B. Young (2013), who criticises the conflation of Deleuze with those he has 
written about, such as Leibniz or Foucault, but goes on to “clarify” Deleuze and attempt to strip the 
“jargon” from his concepts (5-6). Understandably Young’s text is a dictionary of sorts, perhaps an attempt 
to indoctrinate the novice into Deleuze and Guattari, and it performs its function in a fine manner. It does, 
however, depart with some of the more general advice Deleuze and Guattari give a philosopher: invent 
concepts yourself, invent them anew.  
24 In his introduction to a reference work on A Thousand Plateaus, Brent Adkins (2015) builds a new 
thematic with which to begin reading: continuity vs. discontinuity. Adkins’ articulation on continuity as a 
persistent theme for Deleuze is admirable and plots a new path forward for reading Deleuze, one that 
necessarily builds a new concept. To show how the plateaus work, and not necessarily what they “are”, is 
an awareness that is foreground in his introduction as the problem of “What is…” (3). This latter point is 
what I, in this thesis, term the problem of the ontological imperative. Adkins’ book is an appropriate site to 
observe the tension between clarifying Deleuze (and Guattari), building the concepts anew, and adding to 
Deleuze (as with continuity).  
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Deleuze’s mathematical-biological-immanent ontology, Deleuze as philosopher of difference, 
etc.25 I am sympathetic to what Paul Patton has called “the grunt work of philosophy”,26 which 
appears to be the work of situating Deleuze in the history of philosophy through sustained 
analysis. Nevertheless, and despite my attempts to secure a Deleuzian expressionism relevant to 
immanent reading, and to be Deleuzian insofar as his concepts require rebuilding, in this 
instance relative to the environment of reading (in general and with regards to speculative 
literature), a definitive and ontologically secure Deleuze is not the Deleuze of this thesis. One will 
find here, rather, a mutant and mobile Deleuzian expressionism. 
Beyond the situation of his work in the history of philosophy, another sense in which 
Deleuze has become important in early 21st century (and indeed the late 20th century) theories 
and intellectual work is through the application of his concepts. This is evident in Editor Ian 
Buchanan’s Deleuze Connections series of books published by Edinburgh University Press, and 
the journal Deleuze Studies.27 These are indicative of a broad uptake of Deleuze (and Guattari) 
ranging from the disciplines of architecture, social science, and literary studies to athletics and 
even environmental science and mathematics.28 This is a sufficient act to be Deleuzian by 
increasing the domains of affect of the concepts that Deleuze has built. But some care is 
warranted. It is my reasoning that the student and scholar of Deleuze, if wanting to be 
Deleuzian, should never accept Deleuze’s concepts as pre-packaged and ready for application (as 
                                                          
25 Samantha Bankston (2017) is emblematic of the trend to call upon “ontology” to explain Deleuze’s 
metaphysics variously deploying “constructive ontology” (3), “univocal ontology” (2), “differential 
ontology” (13), and so on. While Bankston’s reading of Deleuze on becoming, with an emphasis on “dual” 
notion of time, is commendable, the distinction between metaphysics and ontology is spurious. See also 
Levi Bryant (2008) and his phrase “ontology of immanence”. I contend in this thesis that in immanence, 
being (and thus ontology), is no longer a concern. That an ontology occurs in Deleuze is without a doubt, 
but its relation to the process of immanence is unclear and non-equivocal. Difference in itself, too, 
modifies ontologies but in what manner would this be considered an ontology itself? On Deleuze’s 
“relational ontology” see Kathrin Thiele who links immanence to relational ontology under the amended 
title of “onto-ethology” and constructs her argument using Deleuze’s notion of dramatization (Thiele 
2016, 118). In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari emphasise at several points a move to “uproot 
the verb ‘to be’” (2013, 26). See: the discussion of être (to be) and et (and), or est (is) and et (and) (114), 
and their discussion of to be as “empty expression, taken abstractly to designate the sun total of definite 
modes and tenses” (307). While there is a linguistic sense to this, expressionist metaphysics, including the 
notion of becoming, presents an alternative to the ontological (logic of being) tendencies in their writings.   
26 In response to my question regarding this matter and Deleuze’s arguments regarding philosophy as the 
“creation of concepts” at International Deleuze in Asia Conference 2014 Manipal, India. On Paul Patton as 
reader of Deleuze, and specifically on the renewal of concepts, see D.W. Smith (2012a, 344). 
27 As of 2018 this is the Deleuze and Guattari Studies Journal. 
28 Beyond the “Deleuze Connections” series, on Deleuze’s application to architecture see Rajchman (1998): 
“what if it then happened that constructions in architecture and philosophy discovered provisional points 
of contact and alliance, as though together speaking a new and foreign idiom no longer belonging to the 
recognized languages of either?” (9). Rajchman is acutely aware of Deleuze’s constructivism and 
pragmatism as a conceptual creator. Principally, Rajchman is indicative of the sense of applied Deleuze 
wherein the process of folding is preserved, where the pli of ap(pli)caiton persists in the novel territory. 
Rajchman is one of the earliest examples of Deleuze being applied to architecture.    
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though for the price of a book one has gained access to a conceptual library to be used and 
deployed at will). That Deleuze’s concepts are themselves well-formed and definite although 
hiding within themselves a vast field of unacknowledged matter (not unlike the hidden iceberg) 
is antithetical. In this sense then I must claim that one can never be Deleuzian, that one rather 
has events that are Deleuzian. What amounts to a good relationship with Deleuze would, I claim, 
be to seek to produce again, though with particular and specific differences, the concepts that 
Deleuze has produced, relative to new problems.29 Further yet, Deleuze’s concepts should 
themselves be decoded to make their materials available, and to make their problems clear. And 
finally, I propose that in composing a good relation with Deleuze’s concepts the relation will 
necessitate the creation of new concepts, making the Deleuzian event that one experiences a 
pragmatic one.30 It is this Deleuze I present here, one that threads the analytic with the applied 
(insofar as “applied” carries the logic of plication set out in Chapter Two of this thesis) but adds 
the domain of creation back into the mix. By the final movement of this thesis amongst the 
praxis of immanent reading, in Chapters Seven and Eight, this is precisely the aim: to create a 
concept of speculation, and from encounters with speculations of literary expression to create a 
suite of concepts proper to the events of those encounters.   
Despite these qualifications, Deleuze’s conceptual apparatus is present in this thesis 
through a novel composition and in the thesis structure. The structure of this thesis adheres to 
the proposal of problems, for which concepts are then produced. Deleuze and Guattari establish 
this by noting that “all concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no 
meaning and which can themselves only be isolated and understood as their solution emerges” 
(1994, 16). The concepts built from Chapters Two through Eight are thus connected to the 
problems outlined in Chapter One. But, importantly, the problems there are not presupposed by 
the concepts, they rather emerge as the theory and praxis of immanent reading, subtended by 
expressionism, take their seat in the broader domain of theories of reading and, more 
specifically, an ethics of reading. The corplication of bodies, for instance, demonstrates text as a 
problem but only by showing its preference for eventality (see Chapter Two). Beyond Chapter 
One, each chapter utilises a concept or set of concepts that constitute a vector of orientation 
and a site for continued development. Readers of this thesis will be able to observe 
recompositions of the processes of expression and sensation (Chapters Two and Three), 
                                                          
29 This is in accord with Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that “those who do not renew the image of thought 
are not philosophers but functionaries who, enjoying a ready-made thought, are not even conscious of the 
problem and are unaware even of the efforts of those they claim to take as their models” (1994, 51). 
30 On Deleuze as pragmatist, and with links to the tradition of American pragmatism (specifically Pierce), 
see Jeffrey Bell (2015). 
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becoming and event (Chapters Three, Four, and Five), and finally immanence (Chapters Six and 
Seven), wherein Deleuze’s (and Guattari a minorī) concepts form the basic matter for extension 
and development in novel circumstances: the development of a praxis of immanent reading, the 
creation of a concept of real speculation¸ and the creation of a concept of wild speculation. The 
means of extending a notion of immanent reading from Deleuze’s expressionism, and Claire 
Colebrook’s identification of this as a potential reading methodology, is in the recognition of 
written-bodies and reader-bodies. Bodies are perfectly sufficient to demonstrate immanence, 
and are neatly attributed to a Deleuzian expressionism and the resultant notion of immanent 
reading. Bodies also, as I explain in Chapter One, and extend in Chapters Two to Five, remove 
the complications of the ontological imperative in literary theory — its tendency to observe the 
necessary being of the text, or the being of its creation and its significant meanings — even in 
the malleable concept of text. Suffusing this immediate structure of problem-concept is a more 
mobile and evental logic. This is a wandering logic that allows for the appearance of concepts 
outside of their particular zones of development. Chapters Seven and Eight constitute the final 
composition of this logic a majori, insofar as these complete the logic of the praxis of immanent 
reading while opening a dramatic domain of new vectors of perception and affection. What now 
follows in this thesis introduction is a justification for the use of speculative literature, an 
identification of the possible shift to a stylistics over genre given the emphasis I begin to place on 
sensations rather than forms, in order to engage the theory of immanent reading. This is then 
followed by the chapter structure of this thesis as it adheres to the dominant structure of 
problem-concept. 
 
 
Deviations to a ‘Style’: Speculative Literature 
To view speculative literature as a genre, or even as a marketing term used to sell books, is to 
place transcendental limitations and well-defined borders on styles of writing and expression. No 
writing necessitates categorical coding which means that writing does not inherently satisfy the 
conditions of a well-formed reality that precedes its own creation. Nor do categories inherently 
or immanently code written sensations such that genres such as fantasy and science fiction 
(broadly speculative fiction) naturally occur.31 It is only the being of writing, taken as necessary, 
which produces this sense. However, it would be naïve to say that in the 21st century “genre” is 
dead, and that categories of writing are dead. In the milieu of advanced capitalism, broadly 
                                                          
31 See again David M. Higgins on genre in the structure (2013). 
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construed, where major book publishers dictate the storefronts and shelves of book vendors the 
effect of genre is clear. Walking through most bookshops is to witness an onslaught of labels, 
names, genres, subgenres, and categories of writing. It is undoubtedly an era for writing that is 
problematic, and the crucial problem stems from the insistence that categories are of some 
application or are in some manner a natural production. This is increasingly clear in scholarship 
surrounding speculative fiction (including science fiction, fantasy, horror, weird, and so on).  
If there can be anything remaining of “genre” as a concept, given the critique of 
immanence, then it would only be through a complete overhaul of the concept that dismisses 
any degree of transcendence. What would be required is that genre be presented with an 
immanent logic, a logic that does not portend to encode written expression from the outside – 
from beyond the writing or even its milieu of production. Gary K. Wolfe moves furthest in this 
direction for speculative fiction studies. His description of fantasy as “the affective sense of the 
impossible” (2011, 73) coordinates an immanent logic of the writing given a particular 
expression: affect. Wolfe claims broadly that genre is waning, “imploding” or evaporating, noting 
the existence of a “postgenre path” for writing to proceed down (51). And while he 
acknowledges that “‘genre’ itself has accrued almost too many meanings to be useful” (53), it 
still behaves as a transcendental means of individuating the expressions he studies. Deleuze’s 
claims on style offer an alternative route for the observation of expressions in writing, and 
without seeking to include or exclude any particular writing from an aleatory category. What 
style achieves, that genre cannot (even in its evaporation), is a recognition of transverse 
expressions that identify writing as distinctly singular (regarding sensation) and as immanent to 
the reality of that individual (bodily consistency).32 Insofar as sensations are concerned, style is 
an inherent synthesis of the affects and percepts (via resonance or otherwise) of disparate 
events. Style is also relevant here since it explains the array of disparate written-bodies in the 
thesis that are composed as speculative expressions. What follows, then, is the degree upon 
which speculative literature presents a style. Adjoined to this, and equally as important, is why 
speculative literature is presented here for the production of immanent reading. By way of 
introduction to expressionist metaphysics, and the benefit it will have for researchers of 
speculative sensations (as “fiction”, or literature) beyond the transcendence of genre, I here 
briefly develop the Deleuzian notion of style. 
To speak of style rather than genre is, according to Deleuze, to acknowledge the 
expressive distribution of sensations from life. He says, “syntactic creation or style – this is the 
                                                          
32 See Chapter Three of this thesis for the notion of “consistency” with regards to the notion of events. On 
transversal see Guattari (2009, 163) where he gives the sense of an event (a fascist event in this case) that 
is capable of functioning in a different manner given its occurrence in different environments.  
19 
 
becoming of language” (1997, 5). So far in this thesis there is a cursory explanation of becoming 
as an encounter and a transformation.33 Style thus orients a relation, of becoming, between 
language and another vector (life or literature itself) depending on the instance. That style is 
equated with syntactic creation is the suggestion that not only is style expressive, but also 
inventive within and to language.34 This allows Deleuze to claim a “strangeness” to the style of 
(mathematician) Desargues and Spinoza without resorting to the ordinates of an x style that 
would designate a singular operation. An observation of style then will be specific to an event of 
writing, as I claim here of speculation, and will be plotted upon its inventiveness.  
With Claire Parnett, Deleuze makes some abrupt claims on style that indicate the 
necessity of inventiveness in the expression of writing, and the disruption of categorical notions 
arriving from abstract levels (as with genre): 
This is not a signifying structure, nor a reflected organization, nor a spontaneous 
inspiration, nor an orchestration, nor a little piece of music. It is an assemblage, an 
assemblage of enunciation. A style is managing to stammer in one’s own language. It is 
difficult, because there has to be a need for such stammering. Not being a stammerer in 
one’s speech, but being a stammerer of language itself. Being like a foreigner in one’s 
own language. Constructing a line of flight. (Deleuze and Parnett 2006, 3) 
There is a long list of vectors for consideration here, the immediate being the dismissal of a logic 
of representation, then of ideology (spontaneous inspiration), then of well-defined composition. 
The positive and real definition of style is then claimed as an assemblage of enunciation which is 
a creation, such as the monument of sensation in a written-body, insofar as this is an expression 
with some agentic force (in French the term used is agencement which compounds the agentic 
with the sense of an arrangement or cooperation of relations – even if this cooperation is not 
realised in the effects of that body).35 A style is observed in the degrees of difference it carries 
                                                          
33 See Chapter Four for sustained explanation. 
34 On the relation of style to expression see Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 383). 
35 Regarding the assemblage and style see Colebrook (2002). Herein Colebrook qualifies the assemblage 
relative to writing (books and texts) as compositions of “unexpected, disparate, and productive 
connections that create new ways of thinking and living” (76). Further she notes for Deleuze that “style is 
productive of the very form of our thought” (51). The assemblage is a composition of “connections” but 
these connections automate the creation of novelty as a single expression. In this way it has a sense of 
agency, of thinking for itself, or at least as itself. That style is productive of the form of “our” thought is 
indicative of the necessary relation, affectionate in both directions, between expression in writing and 
thinking. It is productive of insofar as it comes from and returns to thinking, establishing multiple vectors 
of becoming. Jane Bennett has gone furthest in explicating the expressionist sense of assemblage, 
including the agency of an assemblage, which is found in Deleuze. Her definition is worth repeating here: 
“assemblages are living, throbbing confederations that are able to function despite the persistent 
presence of energies that confound them from within. They have uneven topographies, because some of 
the points at which the various affects and bodies cross paths are more heavily trafficked than others, and 
so power is not distributed equally across its surface… their ability to make something happen… is distinct 
from the sum of the vital force of each materiality considered alone” (Bennett 2010, 23-24). Bennett’s 
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from a common milieu, such as a shared language, whence it is felt to have diverted, to break 
down, to rebuild, to compose anew, the elements of that language: to stammer in language 
itself. But this is not a call to radical experimentation, though Deleuze and Parnett are here 
concerned in part with that, but rather the denotation of style observes a radicality of the 
expression of life. Language amounts here to a strict organization of life, a disorganization of 
which might lead to death. But the radical expression irrupts organization, discarding organs 
altogether (and as such there is little use for bios), in favour of creation.  
Where language ordinates relations, a style draws a “line of flight” (Deleuze and Parnet 
2006, 3), or a rapid movement of expression between the life suffusing all language and the 
possibilities of a life. Deleuze and Parnet make an evocation for writing: “let us create 
extraordinary words, on condition that they be put to the most ordinary use and that the entity 
they designate be made to exist in the same way as the most common object” (2006, 3). 
Expressionism will allow for this creation to be the site of becoming itself in immanent reading, 
but for the claim on style it is important to note the reciprocity of the ordinary with the 
extraordinary. This is another sense of the stammer, in which the extraordinary constitutes this 
radical change but feeds back to the ordinary. The stammer is a possibility of language in a direct 
creation, but it implicates language and demonstrates some of its absurdities (such as its 
abstract and inherent limits) in the same movement.36  
To say of speculation that it is a style is to adhere in part to these conditions of style. 
Speculative literature is the literature of creation wherein truly absurd and extraordinary entities 
(sensations) take centre stage. It is not strictly a manner of stammering in language for 
speculative literature, but a manner of stammering in sensation in order to invent futures, 
creatures, waves, magic, and environments for becomings. The invention is artificial, but it is 
artificial or artifice insofar as it creates a new degree of life that is not the experience of the 
ordinary or the personal. The sense of speculation pluralizes when writing is configured in 
relation to life. As Deleuze and Parnet note “style gives writing an external end [fin] – which goes 
beyond what is written… life is not something personal… the only aim [fin] of writing is life, 
                                                          
definition, part of a broader claim for the agency of assemblages, makes explicit the diversity of relations 
involved in an assemblage, and the creative expression they enact. Importantly, the assumed agency of 
any particular “point”, where “point” may be taken as a possible confounding energy in Bennett’s own 
logic, does not itself rise to coordinate the agency of the assemblage. Rather, the agreement of the 
relations, which is not an agreement of principles (such as a Church group), remains genitive and produces 
necessary effects. Bennett’s vitalism, too, is one of the most recent versions of expressionism that is 
inspired from Deleuze and Spinoza.     
36 On the stammer in a use of language, as a minor use of language and pluralisation of connections, see 
Deleuze (1997, 113). Deleuze also uses stuttering, and claims this is a pushing of language to its limits. On 
the relation of stammering and stuttering to minor literature, and sensation, see Simon O’Sullivan (2009).   
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through the combinations which it draws” (2006, 4). Writing here expresses life, but not life as a 
subjective experience (personal life). It is life as suffused within all expressions, equally, or as 
combined in the particular expression before it finds its vectors for producing becomings.37 
Speculation will then not amount to an x, a single style of writing sans other styles, but is an 
inventive event of writing that can encompass an entire composition (as with the majority of 
selections in this thesis – Kim Stanley Robinson’s grand speculation of 2312 for instance), or can 
emerge in spurts and smaller uprisings within other degrees of style (historical fiction for 
instance). The stammering of sensation proper to speculative literature is the invention of 
sensations, in writing, that escape the ordinary (personal) and create an image of life as 
extraordinary but no less real, a future of life in the immediate. Where genre formulates a 
problem of inclusion and exclusion, style exposes the immanent link of the written-body to the 
life of which it is an expression. 
“Speculative fiction” is a genre synthesizing genre, but still a genre and not a style, which 
constitutes an apogee of speculation in writing. The written-bodies presented herein are what I 
claim to be speculative literature and it is a broad spectrum I have chosen. For instance, I have 
chosen to engage with Jeff Noon in some instances. Noon is a decidedly reclusive and 
underground British writer who has seen some commercial success but is very much 
underrepresented in scholarly research.38 His writing is experimental, highly sensuous, 
destructive, divisive, and bizarre. His book Falling out of Cars (2003) is exemplary of this in that 
the stability of any sensation is perpetually in question and destabilised. Consider, for instance 
an experience of one of his characters reading her own notebook:  
all I had to do was look through the pages, read the words; I would start to make sense 
of myself once again, find the proof of myself, by doing this, by reading. And yet, the 
book was filled with some kind of alien language, page after page of indecipherable 
markings; all the words crawling around the paper, merging together, separating, and all 
the time losing themselves before my eyes … the story, lost … mess of ink. (Noon 2003, 
212)  
Noon is a speculative writer, but as with many caught by this category his writing erodes the 
fictive while also betraying truth of an exterior world to which his writing might correspond. 
Reading for some may well be an experience of a “mess of words”, or for some the story may 
not be lost. Nevertheless, the sensation here is a speculation that does not necessarily 
correspond to the world it inhabits.  
                                                          
37 See Chapters Six through Eight of this thesis for a discussion of the relations of writing to life beyond this 
cursory step. 
38 There is notable engagement from Steven Shaviro (2003, 23). See also Katherine Cockin (2016), and a 
broad scope of his works in Emma Nicoletti (2014).  
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Next to Noon I have also included writing from Cormac McCarthy, Ursula K. Le Guin, 
China Miéville, Jeff Vandermeer, and Kim Stanley Robinson (amongst others). I consider these all 
writers of speculative literature even though they are irreducibly heterogeneous in terms of 
category or genre. Their difference is attended to easily at the level of sensation: Le Guin writes 
mages and dragons (Le Guin 1993; 2001a; 2001b), and (con)fusions of gender (2010); McCarthy 
writes desaturated milieus with colourful interventions (2006); Vandermeer writes of horrific 
mushroom bodies/societies (2011); Miéville writes sentient and bodied artworks at war with 
Adolph Hitler (2016), and thaumaturgically “remade” creatures, and monsters (2011); and Kim 
Stanley Robinson writes encounters with planets and aliens (2013). None of these are complete 
statements on their works, and none of this qualifies their work as speculative literature since 
the speculation is through sensation. That is, there is nothing in these sensations that becomes a 
well-defined quality that they share. The sensational composition does, however, denote 
immediate difference. It is their style that enables them to be considered as speculative 
literature. Importantly this is not unifying, or at least, it is only unifying in their production of 
difference itself. That is, they modulate difference in the production of reality and the expression 
of life. Speculative literature consequently amounts to a style of expression insofar as it is 
concerned with a manner of speculation or speculative creation.39 Speculation does not oppose 
itself to truth or falsity, it is a creative act capable of producing either.40 In the same sense, 
speculation does not favour fiction over non-fiction. However, where speculation does excel is 
from having degrees of expression which do not automate representation. 
The above mentioned writers and works will have a significant effect on people with 
prior knowledge of the works and their situation in contemporary genres. Immediately the 
genres of “fantasy” and “science fiction” will be brought forth, perhaps even “horror” or “weird 
fiction”. In some cases, a broader stroke would be to designate these as “speculative fiction”. 
However, all of these categorical approaches are problematic beyond their function as 
hierarchical and exclusive genres. In the case of science fiction, for example, the “fiction” aspect 
of the category casts it aside from reality whereby the writing itself, including its expressions, are 
                                                          
39 The terms “expression” and “expressionism” are proliferating terms in this thesis. The full argument and 
articulation of these terms is carried out in Chapter Two of this thesis. It should be noted here, however, 
that “expression” is used in a philosophical sense, as a conceptual apparatus, and should not be confused 
with literary or artistic movements that share the name. Although it is possible that there is an interesting 
connection, it is not in the purview of this thesis to speculate on this connection.  
40 See, for instance, William Gibson’s invention of the web in Neuromancer (1984) before the internet 
popularised the nomenclature. This is an example of a speculative truth. Steven Shaviro gives a Deleuzian 
reading of Neuromancer noting the manner in which it speculates on the use of connected technology in 
relation to the power of the body that is notable, albeit brief (Shaviro 2003, 248). There are few other 
Deleuze inspired thinkers that have brought Deleuze to science fiction and fantasy, or speculative, writing. 
Notable examples are Bogue (2011) and Hall (2016). 
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alien to some presupposed normal reality – regardless of one’s inability to determine what that 
might be. “Fantasy” too produces unwanted connotations in a similar vein whereby it is seen as 
being at a distance from the real world: impossible or discontinuous insofar as “the rules of 
everyday experience do not apply” (Gunn 2005, 9). “Speculative literature”, the phrase I adopt in 
this thesis, is a broad approach at applying a proper name to a specific style but succeeds in 
articulating the expression of pieces of writing as being novel but not immediately “unreal” or 
“fiction”. In fact, I argue in this thesis that speculative literature is a creation in and of reality, 
and of truth insofar as it is non-correspondent. There will be no need for definition, the only 
necessity is to demonstrate how the expression is working, what its sensations are. 
Importantly, style will not mean that anything transcendental is shared amongst the 
bodies. That is, speculative literature must always be something created by the writing itself as 
creative immanence. And, indeed, it is non-categorical. Rather, style denotes that between 
written-bodies there is resonance in their particular expression. What resonates between 
instances of speculative writing is an attitude toward reality wherein they are not the same in 
their desire to produce its transformations, and the sensations reject, in some manner, the 
notion of a well-formed and representable reality. What this means is that the specific manner 
of expression of each written-body generates forces that coordinate their univocity. To say of 
speculative literature that it is stylistic due to resonances, even resonances of completely 
disparate dimension, is to argue for a name that is proper yet not encompassing. Its properness 
is attended to by an ability to identify the particular processes inherent to its singular and 
specific modulation of evental reality.41  
I speak of modulation at great length from Chapter Three of this thesis when 
individuation is raised as the crucial manner of distinguishing between events, between bodies. 
Yet I will say here that modulation is the process of events that ensures their ability to transform 
their materials and present the event as having a particular manner, or specific manners of 
expression. In Deleuze’s expressionistic metaphysics, the question of a single unified substance 
as the basis of reality is posed with Deleuze dismissing a material ground (such as Spinoza’s 
substance) in favour of ungrounded immanence. And, yet, modulation remains insofar as 
immanence still generates forces that wobble, transform, and configure based upon their own 
internal expressions. For instance, the materiality of a written-body is discovered in its syntax 
and sensations; or rather syntax and sensation are the very materials of writing. They are not 
single well-formed materials, but they are material insofar as it is a perpetually active process 
                                                          
41 See Chapter Three of this thesis for the sustained argument on this claim. 
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that is modified. If a written-body is the expression of a series of sensations as writing, then 
those sensations determine the changes, of flow or line, of that written-body. 
For speculative literature, this is literally the manner in which the writing changes, the 
observation of its movement, the identification of its forces and its transformations, and the 
points of view that are created as zones of becoming. The resonances that produce a style called 
speculative literature are indicated by a cooperation between bodies that allows them to 
achieve harmonies, produces dissonances, and so on. The style of speculative literature itself 
treats reality as insufficient, in one way or another, and so sets about transforming reality by 
producing dragons, aliens, remade humanoids, populated star systems, grey dystopias and all 
manner of sensations that divest of the popular desire to “represent” reality. What is available 
with speculative literature, and which is not obvious or always present in other written 
compositions favouring truth and “non-fiction”, is a use and production of reality that moves 
with terrific intensity: a writing of reality, reality written.  
It makes sense then, given the expressionist presuppositions of this thesis, to 
extrapolate and produce this concept of style as a displacement of genre, and as a manner of 
still retaining an identifying procedure for speculative sensations. This provides a way of noting a 
singularity to speculative literature that preserves its heterogenesis and its deviations from 
reality, which preserves its irreducibility to transcendental genres. Throughout this thesis I 
maintain a constant relationship with speculative literature. It is important here to indicate the 
nature of the presence of speculative literature in this thesis since it has multiple roles. 
Speculative literature gestures to stylistic resonances in writing. Beyond truth being unnecessary 
for the style, speculative literature deliberately operates, at least some degrees of its 
compositions, outside of representation by retaining and emphasising the sense of speculation. 
For instance, Jeff Vandermeer is a speculative writer who creates a city called Ambergris that is 
built upon the remains of a humanoid mushroom kingdom (Vandermeer 2009). In the several 
works he devotes to creating the world in, around, and beneath this city, Vandermeer introduces 
fungal technologies (such as mushroom weapons), tree dwelling humans, and processes of 
transformation resulting in fungal-humans. If this is read with the ontological imperative as the 
basis of its reality, the habit of objectifying writing (and other processes) as well-formed beings 
that conform to transcendental operations such as genre, these pervasive reading 
methodologies will see anything created therein as an abstract representation of the “real” 
external world. Some of these readings will be useful ways of looking at problems such as 
colonialism or notions of humanity. While these may yield interesting results and become useful 
for political or other existential reasons, they are often readings that use writing as a vehicle, as 
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something to be controlled and interpreted by a reader.42 This is an ethical problem because in 
the relationship between a reader-body and a written-body, the writing is used, is subordinated 
to the despotism of the reader, is controlled, and is unable to distribute itself within reality on its 
own terms – it will always be a slave to a transcendent meaning (even if these are plural in 
nature), and it will always have a limit of its expression.43  
Beyond the first chapter, which is focused on the problem of the ontological imperative, 
this thesis begins developing the theory and praxis of immanent reading, including developing 
the notion of speculative sensations in writing and the metaphysics of expression which favours 
immanence. At times in this thesis it is important to contrast the novel concept with the problem 
and clarity is contingent upon creating encounters with speculative sensations. When I am 
demonstrating the nature of the ontological imperative (Chapter One), elements are taken from 
written bodies and used as representations. When I am developing the praxis of immanent 
reading, especially in Chapters Seven and Eight, however, the representational function of 
exemplification will be insufficient and so I selectively extract sensations from a written-body to 
demonstrate the process at that particular point. In essence, insofar as there are examples, they 
should not be taken as representations but as instances of an expression. I will not show how 
one character has a becoming with another except insofar as this becoming is retained for the 
reader-body. This then means that written instance is not an abstract example of becoming but 
is a case of becoming for the reader-body and the character. Given the potential for confusion 
when speculative literature is encountered, I am at pains to make it clear as to how the literature 
is being encountered in that specific instance. With the concept of style offering now an 
alternative to genre, and introducing expressionism to the study of speculative sensations for 
immanent reading, I will now outline the progression of my argument for the theory and praxis 
of immanent reading.44 
 
                                                          
42 Consider Joseph Margolis’ relativism and interpretation (Margolis 2000).  
43 See Rosenblatt’s criticism of ‘reader-response’ theory (1995, xvi). 
44 Given the presence of sensations and the attention to these in literature that I propose it is important to 
acknowledge an alternate vector largely unexplored in this thesis regarding the “literary aesthetics”. Peter 
Lamarque creates the concept of appreciation to indoctrinate the aesthetic dialogues of philosophy into 
literary analysis (2007, 30). His work goes a long way to bring sensations into the consideration of literary 
theory, including the problems of perception and affection, though without a sustained develpment. 
While what I produce here resonates with his work, and his broader projects, I remain removed from this 
vector insofar as I am content to redesign the metaphysics of reading (using expressionism) to produce a 
decidedly different take. Where his notion of appreciation is trained reading (30), what I produce here is 
more closely aligned with a (Spinozist) natural reading insofar as the reader-body and the written-body 
are both expressions in a sensational milieu.   
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Problems, expressionism, immanent reading 
What should be evident at this stage is that reading always constitutes a field of relations – a 
complex or complication of heterogeneous forces – in the encounter of bodies. The nature of 
these relations, and the bodies composing the relationship, are determined by the metaphysical 
presuppositions that are assumed by one of the bodies already within the field of relations. This 
presupposition concerns the nature of (at least) the other body; the relation itself may never be 
considered. In many reading practices and methodologies, the pervasive presupposition is 
ontological in nature and begins from the point of view of the reader. The result of this is an 
anthropocentric ontology that turns what is being read into an object, something fundamentally 
other than the reader, and the reader into a subject. This ontological imperative of reading has 
resulted in some of the most pervasive reading practices to emerge in the 20th century and 
which still remain popular in the burgeoning 21st century. Those that I address in this thesis in 
Chapter One are: reader-response by way of transactional reading, psychoanalysis, and 
deconstruction. These are undoubtedly useful practices that allow readers to do a number of 
interesting things to writing. But, as I will show, these practices possess an array of ethical 
problems that constitute the limits of their ability to maintain a good relation with writing for 
the reader, and vice versa. In transactional reading not only does the reader determine the 
metaphysical nature of the writing, determining and judging the fidelity of its representations, 
but also what is to be included in the field of relations. This constitutes the nature of the 
exchange between reader and writing, and also the specific well-defined meaning of any writing 
(even when this is extended in a process of referral – as with deconstruction). This is equally true 
of psychoanalysis and is one of the motivational forces that generated Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004).  
Deconstruction perhaps comes closer to immanent reading, but presents itself as a 
problem to immanent reading insofar as a perpetual system of reference is established that 
ensures writing is never experienced in its immediacy. In the first chapter of my thesis this 
comes under examination as ethically problematic insofar as the possibility of good reading is 
concerned. That there is the possibility of a good reading, without a moral prescription, is the 
initial problem with which I proceed and this is configured under the aegis of the ethics of 
reading. The nexus of the problems that I identify in the opening chapter is the relation of reader 
to writing, with the good reading later (in Chapter Four) posed as an expression of the relation 
rather than a prescription. The ethics of reading exposes the presuppositions that persist in 
transactional, psychoanalytic, and deconstructive praxes of reading. Explicitly, these 
interpretative frameworks produce a necessary ontology of writing as stable and well-defined. 
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Even when the book itself is open to a referential (or deferential in the case of deconstruction) 
system, what is presupposed is stable. Crucially, the process of interpretation in these systems 
brings writing under the complex aegis of text which exposes an ontological imperative despite 
the critical work performed by Barthes and Derrida to view texts as open multiplicities. I will 
claim in Chapter One that by replacing the ontological imperative of a well-formed being, or 
chain of being per deconstruction, with expressionism opens the process of reading to 
immanent reading. This in turn is capable of emphasising the relations in reading and composing 
them in a good manner, that is, of preserving the transformative immediacy of the reading 
process. This notion of good is developed herein by means of expressionism, calling upon the 
Spinozist sense of the term to articulate relations that encourage the growth and development 
of bodies (rather than their depletion).  
As I have already noted, this thesis is primarily a philosophical creation that develops a 
theory and praxis of reading. By “philosophical creation” I am referring to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
What is Philosophy? (1994) where they argue that “philosophy is the discipline that involves 
creating concepts” (5). The role of philosophy, or at least the manner in which it proceeds, is not 
caged in the ability of philosophical thought to be brought to other domains in order to think 
them or think for them. Rather, philosophy is itself a creative process and the processes that it 
creates are concepts. Again, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of philosophy’s role is as follows: 
“concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can 
themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges” (16). The nature of a 
concept as a creation of philosophy and its relation to problems suffices for the present 
statements concerning this thesis but included in this thesis is a more thorough inquiry into 
concepts and problems as seen by Deleuze and Guattari. That concepts are related to problems, 
indeed that their creation is contingent upon problems, explains the presence of the first 
chapter in this thesis. The ontological imperative is a problem, as is a genre of speculation, and 
they implicate further problems, such as the text. The problem with the ontological imperative is 
that it barely contains doxa, that it invokes the will of the subjective reader or the objectivity of 
writing, and that in doing so it represses writing by privileging representation. Where the 
ontological imperative produces text, the problem changes and becomes one regarding the 
encounter itself and the inability to sustain an immediate encounter with the present writing. In 
response to this, in Chapter Two of this thesis I outline and deploy a concept of expressionism 
that is modified as the thesis progresses. The expressionism found in this thesis is Deleuzian, 
although, as I will elaborate, it is expressionism as found in the process of plication or “folding”. 
Expressionism acknowledges chiefly Spinoza and Leibniz before it takes on a properly Deleuzian 
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sense in later chapters (Four and Six) whence the concepts of becoming and immanence are 
explicated.  
The progression of expressionism, which I begin in Chapter Two, attends to the theory 
and praxis of immanent reading which is persistently built in each chapter of this thesis. 
Immanent reading is an attempt to reconfigure the presupposition of reading, to reimagine the 
relations of reader to writing, of reader-bodies and written-bodies, using a metaphysics of 
expression developed in Chapter Two. This is in order to open the relation of reading to a good 
composition of affections and perceptions, executed in the final chapters of this thesis. In 
response to the ontological imperative and its potential ethical problems when reading 
literature, I propose this reading in immanence. The metaphysics that Deleuze develops in his 
reading of Spinoza and Leibniz is a vital counter-operation to an ontological imperative. In 
Deleuze’s encounters with Spinoza and Leibniz he identifies and develops a non-principled 
metaphysical degree to their thought that he calls expressionism. Later in his writings with 
Guattari this metaphysical operation becomes sufficiently Deleuzian in that it can no longer be 
said to belong strictly to those who have inspired him. From Spinoza and Leibniz expressionism 
has three phases: explication, implication, and complication. A fourth phase, inherence, 
designates the process of immanence in expression. Deleuze’s explication of Leibniz and Spinoza 
indicates a redundancy of the primary material of reality, or rather, indicates that Deleuzian 
expressionism is not dependant on a specific metaphysical substance. In Deleuze’s writing with 
Guattari, and certainly in his encounters with various compositional forces such as cinema and 
literature, expressionism gains a machinic dimension that utilises processes of cutting, 
connecting and collaboration.45 It is here that Deleuze’s expressionism gains a full development 
through the concept of becoming. In my thesis the ontological imperative is not just overtaken 
by a new metaphysics, a replacement of presuppositions, but is persistently pulled apart for its 
inability to use adequate presuppositions for the growth of writing and of the process of reading. 
Chapter Two of this thesis consequently deals with the concept of expression in an effort to 
articulate the main vectors and possible expansion into immanent reading. Expressionism is 
                                                          
45 See Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus which argues for the three degrees of the machine, disjunction, 
conjunction, connection (2004, 45). These are the three manners in which machines modify and produce 
reality, and submit reality to its processual nature. Deleuze and Guattari use this to express a notion of the 
body that cannot be strictly taken as the sum of its parts, but through the manner of its relations: the 
body-without-organs. This has a specific relationship to schizoanalysis which is a concept composed in 
relation to psychoanalysis. The present thesis avoids this inquiry since it is composed in relation to the 
problems of ontology, text, and the ethics of reading, and as such requires the metaphysics of expression. 
The schizoanalytic program begun in Anti-Oedipus is certainly an aspect of Deleuzian expressionism, as is 
the body-without-organs, though these constitute a different domain of expression to the theory of 
immanent reading.   
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capable of not only detailing very interesting and novel concepts of literature (as with real and 
wild speculation in this thesis), readers, and the process of reading, but is also able to 
persistently destabilise assumptions at the level of primary substance. The expressionism I build 
herein, following Deleuze’s own trajectory, performs both of these tasks by being at once both a 
non-centralised and non-hierarchical process and also by deploying a process of immanence that 
is always attending to and enabling the decomposition of presuppositions. 
Chapter Three of this thesis will argue that the written-body is a real composition of 
signs as sensations arriving from both words and syntax while retaining the logic of plication 
foregrounded in Chapter Two. While setting up this argument, by extending the notion of reality 
in expressionism as compositions of bodies, I recall the problem of the use of text as the 
individuation of any written works.46 This notion of text is a result of the ontological imperative 
and values a referential individuation with easily found ends and edges – whether these ends are 
language, definitions, correspondent truths or meanings, and so on. To break down this notion 
of text, which is the popular notion, I employ Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida who also 
problematize this use of the term text. While I do not strictly align Deleuzian concepts with 
Barthes or Derrida in Chapter One, they make clear the problems around the use of text as an 
individuation of writing and are of significant benefit when moving to Deleuzian expressionism 
to explicate written-bodies in Chapter Three. My major concern with text is that it retains 
meaning as a transcendent or anterior operation of writing while decomposing the immediacy of 
processes of reading. In adopting and developing the Deleuzian notion of writing, and indeed all 
art, as a composition of sensations I am able to cease the eternal search for meaning and truth in 
reading and move toward a creative reading practice that acknowledges the internal creations of 
writing as processes of reality production and transformation (affective and perceptive). The 
notion of sensation that I deploy in the third chapter of this thesis is also Deleuzian and is based 
on the idea that sensation is a ‘bloc’ composed of percepts and affects. 
As I have shown, the logic of expressionism and the argument for its use form the basis 
of the second and third chapter of this thesis once the problem of the ontological imperative is 
established in Chapter One. Chapter Three of this thesis makes partial use of the concept of 
                                                          
46 On the notion of individuation see Deleuze’s “On Gilbert Simondon” in Desert Islands (Deleuze 2004a). 
Here individuation is a process that is coextensive with a pre-individual environment where the individual 
is not a necessary result. “Individual” appears to attend a strict numerical account of processes under 
consideration whereas individuation constitutes only a “phase-locking” in the development of processes 
(88). Deleuze (and Guattari) utilize a notion of individuation that appears similar to this account of Gilbert 
Simondon’s concept. See Anne Sauvagnargues who argues for the importance of Simondon for Deleuze 
especially concerning individuation, via the concepts of modulation (2013, 39, 68), and haecceity (196n.1). 
Wherein individuation is used in this thesis, unless it is explicitly claimed otherwise, it is this sense I wish to 
retain.   
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immanence which is, I claim, an endoheterogenic process, the internal production of difference 
upon which expressionism is dependent and which can be deployed by any particular body at 
any phase of their existence. Further, Chapter Three concerns itself with the production of an 
evental logic of the body, consisting of the events of sensation and speculative creation that are 
activated by the concepts of immanence and expression in bodies. Deleuze’s expressionism 
makes use of a philosophy of immanence as a processual suffusion rather than an ontological 
grounding (which I argue in Chapter One risks suppressing speculation) which results in events 
and bodies contra objects and subjects. Chapter Three produces this sense while making a major 
claim of the thesis, the involvement of written-bodies which necessarily result from 
expressionist metaphysics and immanence. Written-bodies are articulated in the chapter as 
worlds of signs, events of sensation, and sites of real speculation.   
While Chapter One of this thesis establishes the problems, and Chapters Two and Three 
counterpoise a metaphysical expressionism to the problems’ presuppositions, raising the first of 
the bodies in the reading relation, Chapter Four posits a logic of becoming that articulates the 
relation of written-body and reader-body in immanent reading. In this chapter the problem of 
translation is taken up, illustrating that the concept of becoming does not transport from French 
(devenir) to English verbatim. Rather, the implications of the translation are themselves of 
expositive interest for a new concept of becoming that is developed significantly in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (2013). The result is a composition of the necessity of 
encounters, with a sense of temporality that removes linear progression and privileges the 
passage of a duration (following Bergson). This chapter, then, arranges an encounter between 
written-bodies and reader-bodies wherein the bodies are necessarily transformed in the 
becoming. Becoming, it should be noted, amounts to a complicated process of transformation 
insofar as the bodies involved are able to grow, or otherwise deplete. Thus, the affective degree 
of becoming is also present in this chapter.   
As I have stated, in Chapter Four I claim for immanent reading that it posits an 
encounter and a complex relation of bodies. In particular, I propose that the relation of written-
body and reader-body is that of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari have created the concept of 
devenir which has been translated in English as becoming. In Chapter Four I demonstrate the 
importance of noting this transition since it imbues the concept with dimensions of time (as 
duration) and compositional transformation of affective power. Beyond this, the chapter will 
persist with an illustration of the concept of becoming while placing the emphasis on the 
cooperative encounter on which a becoming insists. As such, I explore in this chapter the notions 
of symbiosis and alliance as an exemplary presentation of becoming and am thereby able to call 
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the same notion up for the theory of immanent reading. The concept of becoming I establish in 
Chapter Four articulates a nuanced sense of the encounter that will see dimensions (perceptive 
and affective powers of the bodies) added and taken away from those bodies produced by the 
encounter.47 Becoming also stabilizes the manner in which a relation composes bodies of 
different orders and the milieus from which they emerge on their own. For example, a written-
body is composed within a milieu that does not necessitate the reader but which incorporates 
things like systems of signs (for better or worse), and sociological systems, physical processes 
(like decay) and so on. Becoming is a necessary concept for Chapter Four not only to ground the 
following chapters, but also due to the expressionism that lies at the core of my thesis. That is, 
since the metaphysics of this thesis cannot resort to beings or well-defined processes, the 
relations between bodies cannot be anything other than an ongoing process of modification and 
transformation. Becoming satisfies these metaphysical conditions. 
The written-body and the reader-body are two of the three important individuations in 
the process of reading in immanence (the third is the becoming or encounter itself which runs 
between them). I have already indicated the basic argument for the written-body that is present 
in Chapter Three, with Chapter Four demonstrating the domain of encounter for written- and 
reader-bodies. Chapter Five thus begins the argument for the individuation of the reader-body. 
Instead of a being, or a subject, which are the tenets of the ontological imperative, I argue that 
the reader-body is evental, that is, is a haecceity. The term ‘haecceity’ is Latinate and utilises the 
Latin stem ‘haec’ or ‘hec’ which roughly means ‘this’. In the interpretations of John Duns Scotus, 
who maintains the first consistent usage of the term, it is argued that haecceity (haeceitas) 
comes to mean “thisness” (Noone 2003, 119). Haecceity is picked up by Deleuze and Guattari as 
a means of individuation that favours a fourth-person point of view capable of attending to an 
evental notion of what it means to say ‘I’. The same concept can be used, they claim, to 
individuate a storm, a swarm, or a season (2013, 306). What is important within this concept is 
the ability to say of a process that it is one without resorting to a quantitative or qualitative 
definition. The reader-body, to use an example I will further extrapolate later, is capable of being 
understood as individuated despite the constantly changing cellular, molecular, ideological, 
conceptual, and intensive dimensions of their body. Not only this, but as I draw this thesis 
towards the praxis of several readings in immanence it becomes apparent that when the reader-
body is considered using this concept of haecceity it is able to have its dimensions modified 
(added to, changed, subtracted) without surrendering an ongoing individuation. The final 
importance of utilising this evental concept for the reader-body is that it also places an emphasis 
                                                          
47 On Deleuze’s reading of power in relation to the encounter, see Colebrook (2002, 173). 
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on the collection of compositions within which the reader-body acts (as in where it is situated, 
its environment of influences and conditions, or simply its milieu). This will illustrate that the 
reader-body’s milieu creates an ongoing and contingent domain of transformation for that body 
and the others that share this domain. The argumentation for affection, perception, and 
understanding insofar as they inhere in the reader-body will be included in this chapter. 
It is the process of immanence that configures the essence of my notion of reading in 
immanence and helps to explain the individuation of writing, readers and reading as processes 
that have no anteriority. Chapter Six marks a transition from the theory to the praxis of 
immanent reading, albeit in a demonstration of their inseparability. With Chapter Six I will 
articulate the role of immanence with specific relevance to the process of reading, opening a 
pragmatic turn in the trajectory of the thesis for the final chapters. With the concept of 
immanence I will be able to propose that meaning does not transcend writing, or it is not outside 
of what is immediately encountered. In fact, following on from expression, the concept of 
immanence will illustrate that there is no transcendental operation in reading but rather that the 
reader and writing are endogenic processes of the same (de)compositional processes. At 
degrees of composition (including decomposition) this process is called reality, but suffusing 
these degrees of reality is ‘pure immanence’ or ‘life’. Chapter Six implicates the extensions of 
expressionism into immanence providing the basis for immanent reading in a purely immanent 
mode which concerns immediacy (a term which I have variously already used in this thesis so 
far), purity, planification and inherence. Here even meaning as a necessary creation in writing is 
called into question as having to be necessarily created internal to the work itself, or to the 
becomings underway in the process of reading. The concepts of inherence, univocity, and 
involution are explored for their potency in immanent reading as elements of immanence. In 
Chapter Six these concepts are put to use to demonstrate the manner in which life suffuses the 
real creations of the body, in particular the written-body. But further to this is the emphasis on 
the immediacy of immanence and how that can be taken up by the reader-body, in 
consciousness, as a composition of the relation of reading. The sensations of the written-body 
are immanent to that body, but their immanence also inheres a life that exceeds the particular 
expression. From this Chapter Six will be able to lay the foundation for Chapters Seven and Eight, 
and the demonstrative work of immanent reading in relation to a variable selection of 
speculative literature. 
Chapters Seven and Eight constitute the body of my pragmatic argument surrounding 
the notion of reading in immanence. In Chapter Seven I propose the becoming of a reader-body 
with a written-body at the level of sensations as the essential vector of immanent reading. This 
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takes the argument established earlier that a written-body is a composition of non-anthropic 
sensations and opens this up to specific becomings with the reader-body. Specifically, I bring into 
view the percepts and affects of the speculative written-body The Road (2009) by Cormac 
McCarthy. Here I will first create a becoming-desaturated by looking at the play of colours which 
The Road contemplates. As I will show, colour in this event is desaturated to create a plane upon 
which a vibrancy is able to populate and rupture. Herein the colours do not connote anything 
but are rather linked to the internal becomings of the points of view created in the written-body. 
The characters are positioned as personae and figures through which to have becomings, but so 
too is the landscape. Sound is also considered in these initial steps as having a becoming with 
the colours such that it is also desaturated before immense saturations unfold. The becomings 
demonstrate relations of the percepts to particular expressive modes of the individuals that 
populate the body. Beyond this, a theoretical base is built in The Road as an immanent creation 
that necessitates the arrangement of the reader-body with the written-body. This appears as the 
manner in which the The Road speaks of a life as inherent to its sensations.  
Finally, Chapter Eight takes the single vector of becoming with speculation apparent in 
Chapter Seven and expands it along a broader terrain allowing for the articulation of a concept 
of wild speculation. The encounter with wild speculation is an encounter with a trans-evental 
distribution of sensations as they are composed in multiple written-bodies. A Saturn-event is 
proposed as subsisting in the disparate bodies of 2312 (2013) by Kim Stanley Robinson and 
Voltaire’s Micromégas (2014 [1752]). Each of these bodies again produces internal becomings 
that are attributed to the points of view in relation to the sensations of a Saturn-event. One 
salient example is the attempt to produce a sensation of the rings of Saturn, and to place various 
points of view onto the rings (from a nearby moon, alighted upon, and also surfing the F-Ring). A 
continual effort to retain the immanence of these sensations is undertaken here to ensure 
allusion does not force becomings with anything other than what is implicated in the immediate 
experience of the written-body.  
The affective sensation is clear in Chapter Eight insofar as it most easily demonstrates 
the becomings of the reader-body. It is concluded in that chapter – and the thesis – that given 
the relation, the addition of the images of the affects (powers or dimensions) of the written-
body to the affections of the reader-body, the reader-body will begin to contemplate these 
images in their own affective and perceptive eventality. Therein lies the final claims: immanent 
reading constitutes changes that come over each of the implied bodies insofar as each is moved 
by the other, that is, insofar as the percepts and affects of written-bodies can be added to the 
perceptions and affections of the reader-body to transform them. Here the reader-body’s 
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changes become too broad to count, but I speculate upon these so as to provide an opening for 
the force of immanent reading as it may be taken into an increasing array of encounters and 
unlimited becomings for speculative literature. 
This thesis concludes on a brief coda which re-establishes the trajectory of the argument 
while offering an alternative view of the connections that can be made in its reading. Here I 
restate the importance of a Deleuzian expressionism, the importance of expressionism to 
immanent reading, and indeed the novelty that expressionism provides for exploring the 
eventality of speculative sensations. Although the thesis arguments will close in this coda, I also 
deem it necessary here, given the manner in which immanent reading opens itself to speculation 
throughout, to include a brief moment of expansion. This expansion constitutes a site for further 
exploration in the immanent reading of speculative sensations. Thus, the conclusion of this 
thesis is a suggestion of events of speculation as sites of new becomings, new explorations, and 
new changes to the reader-body. These sites will constitutes a survey of the immediate 
expanded zone of immanent reading relative to speculative sensations.   
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1. A regime of problems 
 
Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: 
not to be unworthy of what happens to us. (Deleuze 2004b, 169)  
 
Ethics of reading 
Following a scathing critique of what he considers the contemporary milieu of literary studies, 
and the study of writing more generally, Joseph Hillis-Miller makes the following statement:  
Should I read or teach this poem now? My answer is that there is no “should” about it, 
no compelling obligation or responsibility. I can read or teach it if I like, but that decision 
cannot be justified by anything beyond the call the poem itself makes on me to read it 
and teach it. (Hillis-Miller 2016a, 25) 
Hillis-Miller here is speaking about a poem by Irish poet William Butler Yeats. But his claim is 
broader than the poem, aiming at both the study of literature and practices of reading in 
general. In addressing the “should” of his own question, a question presumably configured by 
the milieu of an increasingly vocational society, Hillis-Miller returns the problem of reading to its 
relationality, and the question of an ethics or morality of reading persists as it has in Hillis-
Miller’s oeuvre for nearly 30 years.1 In the above passage, a prescriptive morality is eschewed, 
“there is no ‘should’ about it”, in favour of what I am calling an immanent ethics based on 
immanent creation: “the call the poem itself makes on me to read it”.2 Hillis-Miller goes further 
into an immanent ethics of reading, an ethics that tends to the specificity of the encounter and 
                                                          
1 1987, the year The Ethics of Reading is first published, can be considered Hillis-Miller’s first foray into 
articulating the ethical encounters of a reader with writing. In a strange or absurd moment attempting to 
articulate the relations of philosophy and literature (in particular literary theory) with regards to ethical 
theory, Martha Nussbaum indicts those theorists of literature who speak in general about literature for 
not engaging with ethics, for it being entirely absent save for a select few. She claims that while 
epistemology (from philosophy) is taught willingly in literary theory, ethics is mostly lacking or absent: “if 
one turns from criticism to more general and theoretical writing about literature, the ethical vanishes 
more or less altogether” (2005, 100). On the one hand her pantheon of great moral and ethical 
philosophers seem to go uncited in literary theory, on the other hand she appears only concerned with the 
representations or “moral content” of literature. It is a remarkable claim in its ignorance, both of J.L. 
Austin and Hillis-Miller who have been working on the ethical relation in literature since at least the 1980s, 
and of the possibility of an ethical relation with the work’s immanent expression (as a work beyond 
content). The latter possibility here of course would recognise Hillis-Miller and Rosenblatt (even if 
Rosenblatt slips from the expression itself to the moral content of the work). 
2 On Deleuze’s “immanent ethics”, which includes not only the debt to Spinoza I expose here, but a debt 
to Nietzsche, see Daniel W. Smith (2007). See also Ronald Bogue who notes “to be worthy of what 
happens is to will the difference, multiplicity and chance of the virtual” (2007, 9). Bogue also notes the 
process of vice-diction as the manner in which one implicates those processes that exist anterior to their 
own immediacy.  
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the creations of each body therein by evoking Kant: “Reading the poem or teaching it is, 
however, a good in itself, an end in itself, as Kant said all art is” (25).  
Although productive in its insights, Hillis-Miller offers here only a limited sense of an 
immanent reading practice and presents a confused regime of thought insofar as ontological or 
metaphysical commitments are concerned. Consider the following:  
The mystical poet Angelus Silesius (1624-77) affirmed, in The Cherubic Wanderer, that 
“The rose is without why.” Like that rose, “The Cold Heaven” is without why. The poem, 
like a rose, has no reason for being beyond itself. You can read it or not read it, as you 
like. (Hillis-Miller 2016a, 25) 
The writing is thus without a “reason for being”, it has no beginning or end that would serve as 
its cause. Despite having no beginning, no cause, the writing has a call and an itself, which 
produces a tension on the notions of ends in reading. Is the poem itself an end to which the 
ethical relation is formed? Is reading an end given that it is a good in itself? The tension of 
lacking causes, which would be ends, and being ends, is not resolved immediately, or clearly, 
despite Hillis-Miller presenting the reality of the poem and the relation as being of primary 
ethical concern. The conflict remains insofar as a presupposition persists in Hillis-Miller’s 
thinking, that of the certain being or itself of writing, of the poem, or of reading. Certainly, I 
agree that there is no end to writing, and indeed there is no necessary reason (or cause), as with 
the rose, but this does not constitutively give Kant a foothold in the arena of ethics of reading. 
For Hillis-Miller reading is “a good in itself, an end in itself” (25), but it appears so insofar as this 
end constitutes its being. That is, there is a being of the relation with writing, which is its end, 
regardless of the absence of other sorts of ends. I contend, rather, that there is no end, that 
writing is not an “end in itself”, nor is reading, but that these have a specific reality. That is, 
reality as the expression and composition of sensations (as I will show with Deleuze) with which 
our interactions, our contemplations as readers, are necessarily concerned. Despite the force of 
his thought, and the exceptional delivery of ethics to the domain of reading as such, Hillis-Miller 
remains committed to the language of an ontology that is at an impasse with his immanent 
thinking: “you can read it or not read it, as you like” (25), so long as there is a being involved. 
Goodness in immanent reading, rather than being and end, will concern only the composition of 
reading, and the manner in which a body modifies another: “goodness is a matter of dynamism, 
power, and composition of powers” (Deleuze 1988, 23), rather than inherent ends.         
There exists an immense body of research on reading practice, or praxis of reading, that 
accrete upon the more specific problem of an ethics of reading. Textual studies, for instance, has 
made a critical move to the materiality of writing though it exhibits a utilitarian impetus to 
ascribe or extract value from writing, to explicate its use, and to put that value into the service of 
37 
 
a human.3 This is a moral approach, albeit with the possibility of a removal of judgement, to an 
ethics of reading insofar as it promotes prescription through the use of values. Deleuze’s 
distinction between the moral and the ethical, founded in Spinoza and which I here adopt, 
eschews a moral order (of prescribed or ascribed values, for instance) in favour of an ethics 
arriving from metaphysical presupposition (Deleuze 1988, 22). The good and the bad do not 
reside in the values inherent in a reader or writing, but in the way that relations are composed, 
and what the powers of each body do in the relations. This thesis aims to produce a praxis of 
reading called reading in immanence or immanent reading which will provide novel implications 
on the ethics of reading. However, before outlining and illustrating the nature of this novel 
praxis which is adapted from Gilles Deleuze’s thinking on literature, and indeed a philosophical 
expressionism, along with the synoptic power of Claire Colebrook who identified the Deleuzian 
impetus to “read immanently” (2002, 95), I here claim that the ontological imperative pervades 
the broader study of the ethics of reading. Where Hillis-Miller, for example, commits to an 
ontology of writing and reading, or where textual studies seek values for moral application, the 
expressionism I will be presenting in this thesis is evental, processual, and ethical by means of 
the composition of relations in reading.  
Hillis-Miller’s deconstructionist approach to reading aims at a productive or creative 
manner of interacting with a text. In The ethics of reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, 
and Benjamin (1987), Hillis-Miller organises a series of encounters with philosophy, literary 
theory, and literature itself in order to investigate the possibility of an ethics of reading.4 The 
problem that he establishes, of what an ethics of reading might entail, hinges upon a similar 
premise to that with which I began this thesis: reading in some manner constitutes at least a 
single relation between text and reader, if not more. In Hillis-Miller’s terms:  
                                                          
3 See for instance Rafe McGregor’s The Value of Literature (2016). Here he distinguishes between 
relational and non-relational value as a means to sidestep the familiar problems of instrumental and non-
instrumental value (2016, 10). His notable shift is to acknowledge the influence of context on the value of 
literature, presumably attempting to displace the anthropocentric. Immanent reading does not seek 
anything anterior to the sensations of the writing, preferring the immediacy of the perceptive and 
affective encounters. Writing, then, has no value and is not dependent on value for its transformative 
power. I address this here as an example of textual studies, of acknowledging the importance of the 
material of writing (which McGregor does address), but also in order to limit further engagements with 
the field. It would be impossible to acknowledge all of the aleatory resonances that an “in itself” claim for 
immanent reading will create with other praxes of reading.    
4 Peter Poiana suggests the possibility of engaging with Hillis-Miller on the question of an ethics of reading, 
as well as Sartre, and Jauss (Poiana 1995). While I am concerned with how expressionism produces and 
ethics of reading, namely from Deleuze, I note the broad possibilities for an ethics of reading given 
different metaphysics and relational theories. It seems to me that Hillis-Miller inaugurates a salient study 
of relations with literature that bring the appropriate problems into view which expressionism can explore 
and conceptualise. A further alternative to the ethics of reading consists with Derek Attridge (2004a) who 
also brings the notion of singularity and/or event into the relation, albeit with a lineage that inheres 
Levinas.   
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the ethical moment in the act of reading, then, if there is one, faces in two directions. On 
the one hand, it is a response to something, responsible to it, responsive to it, respectful 
of it … on the other hand, the ethical moment in reading leads to an act. It enters into 
the social, institutional, political realms. (1987, 4)  
It is notable that the set of relations here constitute a reader and the specific productions of 
literature. The relations, however, are not isolated and indeed respond to the milieu of external 
relations. For example, while reading writing in a park, the reader is indeed responsive to the 
writing, the signs, the syntax, the characters, and so forth. But the process of reading is also 
situated insofar as the park influences the reading, the dogs and exercisers running past, or the 
even broader milieu of contemporary capitalism that incites publication, builds economic and 
reviewed contexts for the text, or, on the other hand, suppresses a text due to its unsaleability.  
Hillis-Miller seeks the ethical dimension in reading and in doing so further illustrates it as 
a problem. He notes that in seeking to produce an ethics of reading, he is uncertain as to where 
or how it might occur in the relation. This speaks again to the specificity of the “call” the writing 
makes upon the reader, and thus to the immediacy or immanence of the process. Undoubtedly, 
as I have also discussed earlier in the thesis Introduction, it concerns a good relationship with 
writing, but does the ethical moment of reading come from the characters in the book, such as 
when a character behaves badly? Does it arrive from a transcendental operation (for instance of 
moral theory) that determines the relation from above or from without? Is it specific to each 
piece of writing or can the ethical moment be learned in one piece and taken to another? In his 
reading of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (2011 [1785]) Hillis-Miller makes a 
decision, at least in that instant, to allow the text to answer these questions. With Kant, Hillis-
Miller finds a connection of ethics to narrative which at least justifies his investigation. Through 
Kant’s reading of himself, Hillis-Miller also begins to note that an ethics of reading — for 
instance, of how a reading might proceed with a good set of relations — might result in negative 
implications for the text in question. Moving from Kant to Paul de Man the problem of the 
transferability of ethics across writings is also faced.5 
In a 2005 interview, Hillis-Miller claims for immanent reading an immediate and specific 
ethics relative to texts. He says, first, that “every reader has theoretical presuppositions” (Hillis-
Miller, Río Álvaro and Rodríguez 2006, 24), following this with a claim that any practice that 
simply affirms these presuppositions in the act of reading is deplorable:  
                                                          
5 On de Man he notes that reading “includes not just reading as such certainly not just the act of reading 
works of literature, but sensation, perception” (1987, 58), and becomes ethicity. The notion retains a 
degree of judgement on the relations involved (54). I am certainly concerned with the ethics of reading 
sensations, but this from speculative literature, and certainly without preformed judgement bearing on 
the relations.   
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when an interpretation is actually made, what is, I would say, scandalous about this act 
is the recognition that the interpretation of the literary work, which presumably says 
something about the specific text in question, looks like it ought to be constative, that is 
to say, a statement of fact (25). 
There appears here a sequence from what a reader brings to the reading, to an informed act of 
interpretation, an act that further becomes a general claim on the work itself. This may also 
extend further still, as though the “statement of fact” might inform an ideology produced in the 
writing but that belongs to the world in general. Hillis-Miller concludes that the process is not 
necessarily “good” if the presuppositions of the reader are intact; “good reading contradicts the 
reader’s theoretical preconceptions, his or her expectations about what will be found in the text 
read” (25), and that because the process amounts to a performance (not a fact). This “good” 
reading attends to immanent reading insofar as it belongs to the encounter. But the problem in 
this version of an ethics of reading is in the passage of causes. The concern is that a reader 
dictates the reading, and the writing does not. And here the problem is two-fold wherein Hillis-
Miller counters a bad interpretation with the “good” coming from the writing and effecting a 
change in presuppositions. The ethical moment slips out of the encounter, can no longer remain 
immanent such that one might experience the writing in a more intense way given the changes 
on the reader, and is forced to be extrapolated in the effects to the socio-political domains of 
existence (as if they were not already here). It appears to claim that a change in presuppositions 
is good. However, what good inheres when the immediacy of a text presenting slaughter should 
alter presuppositions that are counter to that, such as in McCarthy’s The Road (2009) and its 
roaming bloodcults? The transformation of presuppositions alone is not sufficient for the good, 
especially insofar as expressionism is concerned. As I have claimed in the introduction to this 
thesis, in expressionism the good expands the composition of relations, promoting changes in 
the powers of the body. A good that comes through a depletion of the body, which would result 
from directly confronting presuppositions in a negative act, requires the being and value of the 
new presupposition that comes to replace the old presupposition to be inherently good and 
capable of destroying the bad (which is, also, to say nothing of the relation). This is a problematic 
impasse insofar as Hillis-Miller can be noted for his contribution to immanent ethics and the 
specificity of the text in an ethical encounter. Undoubtedly, with immanent reading, the 
presuppositions are engaged but only to demonstrate the limitations and possible depletions 
they themselves unfold, in short their state as problems. In an attempt to take the problem as a 
zone of creation, rather than as a site of conflict or confrontation, the immanent reading I will 
propose speculates on the novel presupposition of an expressionist metaphysics to be added to 
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those otherwise persisting. Any transformation from there will proceed by contamination, from 
an immanent decomposition given the presence of the new presuppositions, not by conflict.         
I wish now to bring the problem of an ethics of reading into greater focus and make a 
series of claims that show how I will differ in my approach to that of Hillis-Miller, specifically by 
the use and development of expressionism in immanent reading. Expressionism, as this thesis 
unfolds, will reveal a directly immanent reading practice that modifies at the level of sensation, 
and that avoids the impasse of a transcendental ethics (such as is implicit in Hillis-Miller). For 
instance, where Hillis-Miller uses the language of text, I am compelled from the metaphysics of 
expression to speak of bodies, or at least expressions. As I will further show in this initial chapter, 
the ontological imperative drives readers to view what they read as an object and while readers 
such as Hillis-Miller are aware of how text is used by Barthes (and Derrida, in the sense that it 
refers not to an object but a condensation of deferred existential relations), such uses still inhere 
the sense of the concept which equates a body of writing with an object. As will be argued 
throughout my thesis, but most concisely in the second chapter, expressionism does not specify 
the closure of an object, and is thus averse to considering writing as an object (consequently, I 
am here writing of written-bodies and text is often stressed in order to keep this aversion in the 
foreground of my own reader’s mind).6 Another important dimension of difference concerns 
Hillis-Miller’s tendency to conduct his arguments on a linguistic process, whether by attention to 
narrative or the relation of language to ethics. For example, in noting that Kant relies on a 
narrative to demonstrate the production of categorical laws from every person’s point of view, 
Hillis-Miller identifies a contingent relation between ethics and language. While I am 
sympathetic to this reading of Kant, it is exemplary of the tendency of deconstruction to make 
language a primary metaphysical material. One reason for my sympathy is that this is an 
effective if limited demonstration of a theory of immanent reading, following the cues of the 
writing itself to teach the reader how the writing is to be read. What I theorize as immanent 
reading aims to lead, however, the reader through the writing into a life that is complicated in 
                                                          
6 The notion of text as object is a theme for Paul de Man who I do not here engage with. Claire 
Colebrook’s’ introduction to de Man in Theory and the Disappearing Future does, however, touch upon 
some of the aspect of the present thesis that I would like to address. Firstly, insofar as I speak of the 
assumption of language as a metaphysical system for deconstruction, I do not accept this system as a 
“ground” (2012, 7). Nor, however, do I consider my own development of immanent reading accepts “life” 
as a ground, or that reading constitutes a “return” to life (18). I am concerned, rather, with the eventality 
of life and its inherence in literature, and, indeed, with how it is the reader might engage the events 
through the contemplation of sensations (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 6, 212). I believe on this front, then, 
that there may be some synthesis between my own position, following Deleuze, and those inspired by 
Derrida and de Man. At the level of the problem, I, throughout this thesis, note the possibility of 
maintaining text, though I am here, in this Chapter, noting its possible tendency towards a necessary being 
or ground.     
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the creation of the writing’s specific reality, while also attending to an affective and perceptive 
transformation of the reader-body. That is, where Hillis-Miller is concerned with language, and 
changing preconceptions or the way a reader thinks, I am concerned to examine the process of 
immanence and the immanent sensations in the composition of writing. Hence, I do not concede 
that reading’s finality is with language (which I should note is also the dominant theme of his 
reading of de Man). Rather, as well as exploring how writing changes ones thinking, I seek 
primarily to show with immanent reading how writing changes the manner in which one feels 
and perceives.7 
Moving a little further into Hillis-Miller’s ethics of reading, especially his reading of Kant, 
helps clarify the problematic of the text as object and implicit prescriptive relations. He 
proposes, in part, that an ethics of reading might proceed through the work of analogy. This is an 
expansion of the previous point regarding the contingency of language and narrative, 
introducing now a narrative morality to ethics. There is a sense to Hillis-Miller’s reading that the 
text, through the use of narrative, can be used as either an allegory or an analogy of relations 
constituting the ethics between a reader and writing. In the sense that a text be used as 
allegorical, the reader looks to the narrative and the behaviours of the characters to determine 
what ought to be done with the text. In the sense of analogy, the text is to be treated in the 
same manner as another human given the presuppositions of a categorical imperative or self-
constituted transcendental law. I draw attention to these specific points since they are internal 
problems to the ethics of reading itself and foreground the problem of the ethical as such. It is 
not fair to say that Hillis-Miller has a prescriptive ethics for reading, one that is generally applied 
to all of his readings, except that the pervasiveness of deconstruction imparts a type of ethics as 
determined by its metaphysical presupposition to the ontological imperative. Rather, Hillis-
Miller’s immanent readings, insofar as they are immanent, seek ethics that are proper to each 
instance of text. It is thus different for his readings of de Man and Kant as well as his literary 
selection. What is clear is that the analogue of the human for the subject of the text presupposes 
the metaphysical necessity of systems of reference and representation – both at the level of 
language and of understanding (if these two can be disjoined). I am disinclined to follow such a 
claim since representation (and indeed reference) is exposed to a critical attack in this thesis due 
to the presence of a metaphysics of expression, that is, expressionism. Systems of 
representation, following the Spinozist, and later a DeleuzoGuattarian metaphysics, are 
                                                          
7 See James Williams for an argument, following Deleuze, that brings the notion of expressionism together 
with an ethics that includes sensation (2005, 34-35).  
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oppressive to both the bodies – represented and representing. Nevertheless, the question of the 
ethical is constantly in the foreground and the analogue of the human makes this clear.  
I have claimed already that by ethics I mean the presence of a set of relations between 
bodies. This is insofar as expressionism comes to bear on the ethics of reading. Hillis-Miller’s 
claim that ethics has to do with what is necessary in relations is a useful addition since it 
indicates that a relation is not merely an existential fact, but one that requires maintenance for 
its persistence. When I speak of ethics in this thesis, when the term is not coded by theorists 
such as Hillis-Miller, I am again speaking to the relations of bodies insofar as the reader is a body, 
a reader-body, and the writing is a body, a written-body. Further to this, I am speaking of the 
types of influences that one body has on the passions of another. These two terms, body and 
passions, found in Spinozist metaphysics, are given new life, or at least significant modification, 
in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. As I will show in Chapters Two and Four of this 
thesis, the influence of one body on the passions of another might tend in such a manner as to 
encourage the growth of those passions and thus the body, or it may tend toward limitation and 
eventual decay. What is interesting here is that the question is not “what ought the reader do?”, 
but rather concerns what constitutes an increase or decrease in the passions of a written-body 
or reader-body, what the powers of these bodies would be, and how to articulate an ethical 
encounter sans moral principle. In this way, expressionism makes it clear that all reading is 
inherently ethical, that no encounter between bodies can be removed from the experience that 
either feels of facing depletion or growth given the encounter. To be clear, the ethics of reading 
orients the problematics of the relations of reading, and the possibility of a reconfiguration of 
the experience of reading from the metaphysics of expression. This is not to proceed “merely by 
comparing experiences” (Kant 2011, 11) in order to produce a morality of reading, but to 
invigorate the experience of reading without, in the process, poisoning the bodies involved.  
From here I now progress to address the problem of text specifically, and with regards to the 
risks of an ontological imperative, as it is expressed through Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida. 
While this discussion will not amount to a rejection of text, so much as a demonstration of the 
limitations (including the manner in which it posits written-bodies and reader-bodies as objects 
and subjects – or beings), it will provide the problematic conditions for the conceptual 
production of immanent reading. 
 
The sad risks of an ontological imperative: Text 
In order to escape the signifying regime of signs, and those other regimes that forge the 
alternate trajectories of signification (post-, counter-, pre-) I must take issue with text as the 
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individuation of bodies which are encountered by readers. In addressing the ontological 
imperative I lay here the reasons for a move away from using text in literary theory. A text is a 
manner of, I propose, coding a process and placing it into a specific configuration. Specifically, 
and where the major problem occurs, text is symptomatic of a sad habit of reading that, if 
retained as reading becomes immanent, limits the immediacy of the reader-body’s experience. 
This is because the concept of text carries its various presuppositions into any statements 
concerning the process of reading. I do not wish to discard the entire tradition that concerns 
itself with understanding the reality of the reading process or the reality of that which the reader 
encounters in reading.8 I simply intend to explore, throughout this thesis, immanent reading as a 
process that results from expressionistic metaphysics rather than the ontological imperative of 
such reading processes as psychoanalysis, transactional reading (and reader-response), and 
deconstruction. As will be shown, where the ontological imperative of reading privileges the 
cardinality of written-bodies, with its emphasis on the numerically singular being of the text, 
immanent reading privileges the inherent non-numerical multiplicity of writing – of both its 
consistent dimensions and its existent dimensions.9  
Elizabeth Grosz, while developing the work of Félix Ravaisson (and other vitalist 
philosophers), makes a relevant claim regarding habit: "Habit is a change in behaviour, a virtue 
that is activated whether it is called for or not, a permanent or semi-permanent modification of 
the agent of action" (Grosz 2013, 221). In her investigation, she also notes that habit is a process 
of transformation that modifies both bodies and environments of bodies. She further notes a 
                                                          
8 Niall Lucy claims that this is perhaps the major transformation that "literary theory" has produced in 
regard to literature. Literary theory appears, in Lucy's preface to his text Postmodern Literary Theory: An 
Introduction, to be a rupture that produced the question "What is Literature?" (1997, viii). His claim is that 
this questioning upset a set of disciplinary assumptions regarding the nature of literature as possessing an 
essence, or as being a definable object of study. Postmodern theory appears to be present in this rupture 
and turns literature into just another 'text' among a culture of texts. Lucy, however, shows that any 
presence of the term text in the study of literature is supposed to destabilize the idea of a central object of 
study - text is supposed to question a centralized and stable ontology of literature (its essential being). I 
demonstrate in this thesis that a manner in which this ontological imperative can be overcome is through 
a metaphysics of expression and becoming. 'Text' fails because it lacks the specificity of writing, materiality 
is ignored, and the written-body is exposed to innumerable overcodings and sadnesses.  
9 On the notions of consistence and existence refer to Chapter Three of this thesis regarding “Events of 
Sensation”. I use the term cardinal here to refer to mathematical and numerical ontologies. Alain Badiou, 
one of Gilles Deleuze’s more significant interlocutors, is an exemplary user of cardinality. It is clearest in 
his notion of “count-as-one” which posits the countability of any “set”, or collection of processes 
(heterogeneous or not), as a unified whole: “any one-effect is the result of an operation, the count-as-one. 
Every situation (+) is structured by such a count” (Badiou 2007, 504). My use of cardinal refers to all 
countability, which is to say, all numerical accountings of being. I would argue, at a tangent to this thesis, 
that ontology tends in this direction, although without conceding that all individuation is inherently 
numerical.    
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"pathological excess" as one possible vector of habit (220).10 This is what I call a sad habit: a 
modification of the body that tends toward the pathological and favours form over change, and 
a disassembly over complementary composition. Grosz notes that the tendency to form is the 
definition of habit prior to the overcoming of representation as the base of thought. A sad habit 
is this same tendency to form except insofar as it modifies other bodies in a sad manner. This is 
to say that the habit of reading in such a way limits the writing to its form and formal qualities, 
its characters and themes, and thus restricts its ability to grow or expand given its relations of 
sensation.11 As Deleuze notes, and as I clarify at multiple points throughout this thesis, “the bad 
[sad] is when a body decomposes our body’s relation, although it still combines with our parts, 
but in ways that do not correspond to our essence, as when a poison breaks down the blood” 
(1988, 22). So, the sad habit of the ontological imperative is to fix form, to restrict its growth, 
and to decompose the body (through signification, or deconstruction), patterns that reveal 
nothing of the life of the body, only what is coded in transcendence.  
Identifying pieces of writing as texts introduces a series of habitual ethical problems into 
the process of reading. In the first case, I propose that text lacks specificity. This arrives from the 
notion that everything, every real process, can be considered as a text. Roland Barthes notes 
text to be a “fashionable” term that has been used to denote any object whatsoever (1997, 156). 
It is problematic when writing appears to deliver the same signs as any other text — as in 
painting or a political event — because the signs are not the same. This use of text ignores the 
sense in which a sign is connected to, moves through, and is composed by its environment (as 
Barthes’ himself claims). Suppose I am walking through the bush and I come across a cluster of 
mushrooms. If I treat the mushrooms as a text, then I have to begin reading the appearance of 
mushrooms as a sign. This in itself is not entirely problematic since it indicates an ability to read 
the mushroom cluster, to allow the mushroom cluster to link itself to a milieu of signs. Yet as a 
non-specific text the mushrooms fail to hold onto their materiality. The process of calling 
something a text overcodes it with a process of reference and representation, a desire to attach 
it to a set of well-formed and certain meanings that may impede the ability of the reader to 
encounter the multiplicitous unfoldings of these specific mushrooms. The problem does not lie 
entirely in what is read from the mushroom cluster: it may be a very good indicator of healthy 
tree roots and fertile soil. Rather, calling the mushrooms a text introduces the real possibility of 
focusing too heavily on one dimension (or sign) and its readability relative to a specific other 
                                                          
10 Grosz is attending to a productive concept of habit, instead of understanding habit in itself as arresting 
(2013, 217). I acknowledge this move, and my use of sad to augment the notion of habit is only to achieve 
the reintroduction of this arrestment, and any resultant depletion on the body, to the concept. 
11 An analysis of the relation of text and sensation, in Deleuze, can be found in Ronal Bogue (2009). 
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dimension (its meaning). One may only see the verticality of the mushrooms, or their colour, and 
miss their rubbery skin, and their operation of expressing health in the local ecosystem. The 
problem is clearest at the level of language where text attests to nothing of its composition or 
materiality.  This means that in one sense any image of a mushroom has the same textual 
possibility, a cluster of mushrooms and an image of mushrooms in a book (such as in Jeff 
Vandermeer’s writings) have the same composition of signs. It is clearly not the case that, as 
signs, both of these instances of mushrooms would create the same sensations.  
This denotes a further problem that is ethical in nature. In the process of overcoding a 
piece of writing with the term text I risk restricting the ability of its sensations to grow; it would 
be a sad action on writing. That is, applying text to writing exemplifies the problem of applying 
readymade concepts to expressions in such a way as to provide them with a transcendental 
axis.12 This is a suppressive manoeuvre that a reader does to writing in order to achieve 
whatever goals they bring to it. It is thus not only a process of homogenisation, where material 
differentiation has little or no importance than the signs something is capable of producing, but 
it is also a process of control.13 There is a sense of despotism in this that assumes an ethical 
hierarchy where the reader is more important than the writing, or the cluster of mushrooms in 
the bush. This assumed importance manifests as a power relation whereby the power of reader 
always stands above and distributes itself onto whatever is being called a text. If writing, for 
example, is assumed to have any power, it is a power that is infinitely modifiable by the reader, 
its expression limited at the will of the reader. I do not oppose the idea that a reader has power, 
nor that writing has power, only that the power of the reader should always be privileged in an 
anthropocentric despotism over writing. This is the basic sense in which I oppose the use of text 
to denote anything whatsoever and to use it as the axis of reading.  
What Barthes (1977, 156) terms the “fashionable” use of text is indicated in many 
academic introductions to the term, all of which more or less maintain the same sense: “in 
recent years text has become the preferred term for referring to a literary or other work (not 
necessarily linguistic or verbal) stripped of traditional preconceptions about autonomy, authorial 
control, artistic or aesthetic force, and so on” (Hawthorn 1998, 244). The sense here is a 
conflation between a work and a text, a conflation I will shortly indicate is problematic for 
Barthes. In conflating these two notions the fashionable sense of text exalts an objective 
                                                          
12 See Deleuze and Guattari on overcoding and arborescence (2013, 13). 
13 On textual studies and materiality see Nathan Jung’s “The Aesthetics of Material Textuality” (2013). Jung 
notes both an emphasis on material and, relevant to my claims of immanent reading, a reluctance to 
engage in aesthetics from textual studies and literary criticism. I do not wish to develop this since it is 
tangential and only further illustrates a pervasive habit of presumed ontological fixity in praxes of reading. 
Jung’s article is, however, notable for its attention to the history of materiality in textual studies. 
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metaphysics of writing that attains radical openness with zero specificity in matter or 
environment (milieu). The further sense is that any process is open to the same critique, that 
signs that resonate (have similar centres) be encountered as if they are the same sign 
(mushroom painting, written mushroom) and are thus closed. I propose that an objective 
(cardinal) ontology that makes any process an object, closing it down in its self-same false 
openness, is implicated in the decision to individuate using text. That is, with or without 
acknowledgement of that belief, the deployment of text has the well-defined presuppositions of 
a world of things or objects.14 The methodology of immanent reading aims to suspend well-
defined presuppositions, substantiating my desire to (re)construct an expressionist metaphysics 
of written-bodies.  
The debate between Jacques Derrida and John Searle illuminates the salience of 
attending to the metaphysics of a piece of writing, or written body. It is particularly useful here 
since it also attends to the current problems around text and its objectification of works in the 
sense of false openness. In this debate Searle misunderstands Derrida’s claim in Of 
Grammatology. Derrida’s claim in French reads “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” and is translated as 
“there is nothing outside of the text” or “there is no outside-text” (Derrida 1997, 158). Derrida 
clarifies this point by attempting to show that language does not refer itself to some higher or 
lower metaphysical power, stressing that any reading of a text is held within the networks of the 
text itself, or further yet within language itself (160). Consider a piece of writing: “I also saw a 
few peculiar eruptions of moss or lichen, rising four, five, feet tall, misshapen, the vegetative 
matter forming an approximation of limbs and heads and torsos” (Vandermeer 2014b, 96). In 
this instance, under Derrida’s claim, what is written runs a referential system within its milieu as 
a broader system of culture, including the inscriptions of culture. Even when something such as 
lichen is mentioned, Derrida will argue that this is already inscribed in writing, that its reality is a 
written one and that it does not refer to real lichen but rather real lichen is a textual artefact. 
Indeed, rather than being capable of encountering what is immediate, which I claim is the 
sensation encountered in immanent reading (see Chapter Six of this thesis), Derrida will 
                                                          
14 Alain Badiou has indicated that he is working toward “revivifying the idea that it [philosophy] does not 
take as its point of departure words, but things” (2003, 50). While directed at language and philosophy, in 
reaction to postmodernism, his statement is indicative of his broader project and ontology. I would 
contend, however, that philosophers have produced a metaphysics beyond things not of the strictly 
linguistic sort. Those that have, amongst whom I would include the expressionist aspects of Deleuze, place 
process or event in the place of things (one must separate things and events in Badiou’s own works). I 
would further contend that taking the thing as the point of departure is only a demonstration of 
ontological commitment, and will result as all axioms do, in the contingency of the thought on the axiom. 
See for instance the axiomatic that lead Badiou to criticize Deleuze as producing a metaphysics of “the 
One” (Roffe 2012, 5). On the notion of text in relation to thing see Colebrook (2014). I do not seek to 
overcome text, as it is a problem to which the corplication of the written-body is ensnared.  
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persistently return this immediacy to history in the “regulated exchanges” of the textual 
infrastructure which makes the present a trace of history (163-164).  
Searle reads Derrida’s claim that there is “nothing outside the text”, or “there is no 
outside-text” (Derrida 1997, 158), to mean that everything is text. He states that “[Derrida] 
simply declares that there is nothing outside of texts … he says that all he meant by the 
apparently spectacular declaration that there is nothing outside of texts is the banality that 
everything exists in some context or other” (Searle 1995, 159-160).15 Without delving too far into 
this exchange, it is notable that, for Derrida, text can be seen, as I show below with Barthes, in 
the manner of its etymological sense as weave (which would give it some usability in immanent 
reading). If seen in this sense then the written word, the mark, is either produced or at least 
sutured to the world within which it exists. That there is “no outside-text” can simply indicate 
that there is no element of reality that escapes relationality. I will pursue this problem further 
with Barthes, but the sense of text that arrives from the Searle and Derrida exchange draws 
attention to the inherent readability of the world. The problematic is not here within the 
readability, but is rather within the lack of specificity as the term takes up a popular connotation 
to individuate a thing that is read, or insofar as a text defers to its context, delays the immediacy 
inherent in immanent reading.16   
                                                          
15 There is a broader context for this argument/debate (see Alfino 1991; Derrida 1988). The initial 
exchange involves Derrida and Searle attempting to articulate each other’s stance on the nature of signs 
and writing in general. I will not go into this here except to say that what I have considered herein appears 
to be a second phase of the exchange where Searle is addressing Derrida’s Of Grammatology rather than 
the earlier phase, which is summarised by Alfino, which sees Derrida and Searle responding to each other 
in a series of published journal papers (and one in a popular news press). See also Colebrook and McHoul 
(1996), whose article addresses the first phase and defends the limited determinability of the notion of 
context for Derrida in response to Jeff Coulter.      
16 My move to written-bodies and reader-bodies concerns expressionist metaphysics, the reaction to text 
is the concern that it poses a risk to the immediacy of experience. I defer to Claire Colebrook on the recent 
epoch’s of theory in order to demonstrate my singularity. Colebrook notes, in a complex argument, that 
textuality (of the Derridean sort) had become superseded by a return, in theory, to life, to bodies, and so 
on (such as with Judith Butler). She further argues that these aspects are already implicated in notions of 
textuality (2012, 198). I oppose, in this thesis, only the use of text to designate the individuation of 
literature, and the potential it has to draw immediate experience into a deferred experience. Text as 
substance, I have little say on and would consider this positive site for expansion of my present theories, 
should the defence be warranted. Colebrook’s own vitalism (although she would potentially disagree with 
this epithet), which appears inspired by Deleuze and de Man, but finds numerous avenues to expand itself 
in her writing, is, I consider, one of the new vectors of expressionist metaphysics in theory. Consider, for 
instance, her works on the Anthropocene that produce a weft of Agamben and Derrida to articulate a 
genitive “being of the cosmos” for “man” (207). Her arguments here attend to an expressionist vision, 
beyond the scathing critique of humanity as “geological force” (198), of an active engagement in lived 
experience insofar as the apocalypse (the destruction of the future to come), is in fact an immediate 
process of bare life, an active de(con)struction of the present. While the implications of a “being of the 
cosmos” has an escapist tendency, and a negative valence in her paper insofar as the persistence of man is 
concerned (least we spread ourselves amongst the stars), it also constitutes a plicatory vision of man 
decomposing, of being folded upon the earth, within the earth, within the cosmos. This attains an 
immediate sense of our ability cease in our existence, and to consist (as we do immediately) as an event, a 
48 
 
Barthes’ writings on text in Image, Music, Text (1977) complicate my position and it is 
important to draw out his argument here in order to clarify my argument for written-bodies and 
immanent reading more generally. Specifically, in ‘From work to text’ (1977, 155-164) he notes 
several points that clarify my above claims regarding the problematic conflation of text with 
object or thing. Above I have noted that text has a transcendental sense in which it is applied to 
any real process (any composition of reality) and turns it into an object. Barthes’ position on this 
is that text itself is not an (computable) object but rather “a fragment of substance” (156), a 
process like a work of art or a piece of writing that is seen and occupies space. Despite this, 
Barthes risks an ontological commitment that orients text as an object. He claims that “Text is a 
methodological field” (157), thereby suggesting that any piece of writing cannot automatically 
be considered a text, and that text and work are not interchangeable. Adjoined to this he argues 
for the pointlessness of assuming that text is attached to a certain type of creation that has 
some chronological specificity. Nevertheless, he claims that “there is now the requirement of a 
new object, obtained by the sliding or overturning of former categories. That object is the Text” 
(156). There is some difficulty, then, in finding or attributing the language of text to any 
particular process, yet Barthes retains the notion of object (even if it is an object that cannot be 
computed – or is not quantifiable) (156). Its objectness emerges insofar as it is contingent, at 
least partially, upon the work for its “demonstration” (157). If text must operate under the 
conditions of both object and methodology, then a reasonable claim would be that Barthes uses 
text to denote a domain of relations. In this sense, text is both not in a work of art, a piece of 
writing, and nor does it stand outside the possible relations of that piece of writing. Barthes also 
notes that Marxism, psychoanalysis (Freudianism), and structuralism have made it necessary to 
consider these possible relations arguing for “the relativisation of the relations of writer, reader, 
and observer (critic)” (156). I certainly agree that the relations of a piece of writing should be 
considered when an encounter is undertaken. However, I would also contend that the 
resonances of text and object run counter to the relational necessities that Barthes identifies.  
Barthes appears to favour an etymological sense of the word text in that it is a weave, a 
texture, except that he is not referring to “a work” as this weave, but rather the manner in which 
the work is in a relation with its readers and its world (1977, 159). In focusing on the relations of 
the work to the world, which passes through relations in language and the immediate milieu of 
readers, Barthes makes the process of reading an ethical concern. In this Barthes and I have the 
same project, but I contend that object is insufficient to the task of an ethics of reading arriving 
                                                          
movement of the texture of reality that moves on without us, even beyond the immediate sphere (Earth) 
of our geological influence. This is not a vision of the future, nor of the past, but of expressive immediacy 
and immanence that belongs equally to Spinoza, Leibniz, Deleuze, and Colebrook.  
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through expressionism. Barthes makes his claims due to ontological presuppositions that are 
difficult to locate but appear to be evoke a categorical system, or at least implicate 
structuralisms use of signification. I maintain that this may destabilize a good ethical encounter 
of a work with its world of relations (including the reader) and reinstate the reader as a despot, 
or otherwise limit the immediacy of their encounter with the sensation of writing.  
The problematic status of text as object or not exposes the problem of an ontological 
imperative, even if the concept splits itself between a commitment to ontology and the 
discarding of ontology. The sense in which it discards ontology, is the sense in which text 
constitutes the practice of “deferred action” (Barthes 1977, 158), deploying the “perpetual 
signifier” (158). Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, which is one of the essential domains for the 
construction of expressionist metaphysics (see Chapter Two of this thesis), claims that,  
the Platonic paradigm of weaving [tissage] as interlacing remains at the level of textures, 
and does not extract the formal elements of the fold. This is because the Greek fold … 
presupposes a common measure between two terms that are mixed together, and thus 
it operates through circular movements that correspond to a repetition of the 
proportion. (Deleuze 2006, 42 trans. modified)17 
Whether this is read as the circular movement of text and context, or of two directions of the 
text in deferred action, this indicates that text is nevertheless incapable of accounting for the 
expressed sense of writing. 
Barthes also illuminates on ‘text’ in regards to the power relations of desire, or what he 
distinguishes as play. I propose that, as far as writing is concerned, any attempt to individuate 
writing should acknowledge writing as a body. This is because doing so acknowledges material 
and metaphysical specificity of the writing, attending to the sensations composed as writing. In a 
more radical manner, by refusing to name writing as a text, and referring to its individuation as a 
body, it is possible to demonstrate an alternative set of presuppositions that foreground clearly 
the necessity of producing ethically concerned encounters with writing from the point of view of 
the reader. Barthes’ notion of play illuminates the problem that text has with ignoring this 
ethical dimension. His notion of play is twofold and is an attempt to counter the problem of 
consumption in encounters. He indicates that when writing is considered as a work it is based on 
the idea of consumption whereby the reader, for example, is positioned such that they can 
either take the meaning of a work or not. This sense is problematic and I am sympathetic to 
Barthes on this point since it privileges the pre-existence of meaning in an encounter. It further 
                                                          
17Modified based on the unauthorised translation in circulation, by Daniel W. Smith. 
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creates the problem of utility whereby a work can be deployed in a society because it has 
specific functionality. Against this notion of consumption, which arrives from attending to works, 
Barthes suggests that text favours a notion of play. Text for Barthes is networked such that the 
work and its world, specifically language and reader (inscribed in language), are woven together. 
Meaning, in this situation, is produced anywhere, given the mobility of the signifier, along the 
network: 
the text itself plays (like a door, like a machine with ‘play’), and the reader plays twice 
over, playing the Text as one plays a game, looking for a practice which re-produces it, 
but, in order that that practice not be reduced to a passive, inner mimesis… also playing 
the Text in the musical sense of the term. (Barthes 1977, 162) 
Here it is notable that the twofold sense of play, at the level of the reader and at the level of text 
itself, does not retain an entirely despotic or one-sided overcoding hierarchy. At the level of text, 
it is possible to read Barthes here as suggesting that the text provides movement and room for 
meaning production and is itself a producer of meaning – i.e. a machine. If Barthes maintained 
this as the privileged dimension of play then I would have little else to say other than to expand 
the notion to include all the implications of immanent speculative sensations. However, given 
that the reader is inherently sutured to this notion of play and that they are invited to play the 
text as one plays music, or as one plays a game, the privilege of relationality is overthrown. The 
text becomes, in this sense, a site of re-production and an object of utility for the reader. 
Reproduction of meaning, in that the writing that is part of the textual weave, is only capable of 
so much meaning and this is inscribed in the work or the reader for reproduction. Further, since 
text is something instrumental, it is not a mutual or even a necessarily beneficial relationship for 
the sake of the written-body, the writing, or the sensations composed in writing. On the 
possibility of novelty in meaning production, when using text rather than work or body, there is 
little more to be said here. As I will show, by using the language of bodies, relationality proceeds 
with more attenuation and can respond to such problems of novelty and move beyond 
compositions that only reproduce meaning.       
The final important problem that Barthes is able to help me clarify is the matter of 
writing considered through signs and symbols. That is, I will suggest, the use of these is 
problematically dependent on the signifier. In an interview on A Thousand Plateaus Félix 
Guattari sums up my position on signifiers thus illustrating some of the necessity in a project 
such as immanent reading (though they use the same position to warrant schizoanalysis): 
“We’ve no use for signifiers” (Deleuze 1995, 21). In this interview Guattari attests to the signifier 
being indicative of systems of control and despotism and notes that the signifier/signified 
relation is sutured to this control, “permeated by imperialism” (21). Following Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s material concerns for literature I agree in the sense that, even if the signifier is open 
ended, it is still a project of meaning production whereby the matter of writing is deferring to 
something else. Barthes, as I have illustrated above, has dimensions to his argumentation that 
attempt to avoid these power relations but the presence of signification, given the presence of 
the signifier, betray his projects yet again. In regards to what I consider to be Barthes’ proposed 
materiality of writing, signs and symbols are always referential. Whether it is a process of 
referral that is indicated, as in a history of signifieds, or a specific signified, the signifier is always 
in a despotic position. Signifiers produce meaning, certainly, and in doing so have no intrinsic or 
immanently real existential force. Barthes’ position on signs and symbols, with specific regards 
to what he is naming Text (capitalised to indicate a conceptual status), is as such: 
The Text can be approached, experienced, in reaction to the sign… [Text] practices the 
infinite deferment of the signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the signifier and the 
signifier must not be conceived of as ‘the first stage of meaning’, its material vestibule, 
but in complete opposition to this, as its deferred action. (Barthes 1977, 158) 
This sense of the deferral marks my final point in relation to text and the ontological imperative. 
Since text deploys signs, but where the signs no longer signal (in the structural sense of signalling 
the signified), it appears to be apt to immanent reading. As I will show, however, immanent 
reading does not have use for meaning except insofar as it is produced by the immediate 
composition (see my discussion in Chapter Seven where, in The Road (McCarthy 2009), ‘blue’ is 
configured in relation to light, and this to trauma). But instead of allowing for the immediate 
sensations to compose and inform one another, text has signs leading away from instance of 
writing itself. The reader-body that encounters this configures themselves to a broader milieu, 
either to contemplate something other than the writing, or to infuse into the writing this 
broader milieu of being. Text, in the sense of the weave, is also obviously a step out of the issues 
posed by Deleuze and Guattari with regards to signification, but its pathway to the infinite posits 
the immediate body of writing as a transcendental object following an ontological imperative. 
One never encounters life, only the sign of a life that perpetually slips away.  
The expressionist conception of problems as it is found in Deleuze and Guattari will help 
to clarify the ontological imperative, and the adherents of text and object as problematic. In 
short, these are problems that present blockages to the flow of expression, both the expression 
of the writing, and the expression (reader) that writing encounters. Concepts are connected to 
problems, and Text is a concept insofar as it is connected to the problems of truth and meaning, 
or, as Barthes has indicated, the work.18 Similarly, as I will explore in Chapter Five, subject 
                                                          
18 On the expressionist notion of problems and its relation to limits see also Deleuze (1992, 223); and 
Deleuze (2006, 54-55).  
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becomes the problem of the concept of the self, the I.19 In each case the contingency shows a 
reliance on an ontological imperative, the is-ness or definite being of each process. And in each 
case, as the concepts find a new domain, such as an expression in a new metaphysics which 
constitutes a new plane, they cease to be concepts and become problems. Expressionism 
becomes the concept for the problem of ontology, the written-body is not contingent on the 
problem of the work or truth so much as the text (though truth, work, meaning all occupy the 
milieu of text as problematic), and the concept of the reader-body takes the subject (and the 
haecceity to a degree – see Chapter Five) as its problematic (which itself implicates the self or I). 
The ontological imperative subtends these problems, but expressionism moves beyond these 
problematic blockages and displaces the contingencies therein, exploring in turn a persistent 
plicatory, or foldable, variation.20 By expanding into the conceptual domain of expression, and 
forking the contingencies of the ontological imperative, I will be able to, in the words of Deleuze 
and Guattari, “show how thought as such produces something interesting when it accedes to the 
infinite movement that frees it from truth as supposed paradigm and reconquers an immanent 
power of creation” (1994, 140). With this in mind, and the problems and sad risks of 
presupposing an ontology for writing, and indeed the writing as a transcendent object of that 
ontology, I now make my arguments for the pragmatic intervention of immanent reading 
beginning with an elaboration of the metaphysics of expression.   
 
                                                          
19 See Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 48). 
20 On the notion of contingency see Quentin Meillassoux (2008, 39-46) with the caveat that I am here 
concerned less with knowledge of the absolute than with the process of immanent or immediate 
experience. This thesis moves toward becoming with speculative sensations in order to transform 
perception and affection, and as such concerns itself with the immanence of these processes to the 
encounter itself (in this case with reading speculative literature). Since it takes a creative vector, given the 
presence of becoming, there is little need to “identify the faultline in the correlationist circle that would 
allow us to cut through it towards the absolute” (60). The pragmatic aspect of expressionism will bring 
absolute immanence into the argumentation, but this is no longer knowledge of the absolute, or the 
absolute as thinkable (ground, or transcendence), but rather an immediate sensational experience of 
infinite expression (see Chapter Six of this thesis), for both its inconsistency (fragmented eventality – see 
Chapter Three) and its consistency (eventality – same chapter). It is for this reason, the emphasis on the 
thinkability of the absolute in terms of knowledge sans contemplation of sensations, that I also reject the 
brand of speculation that Meillassoux allows.   
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2. Three degrees of expression and the corplication of bodies 
 
This chapter is primarily focused on establishing an expressionist metaphysics and consequent 
logic for reading such that it is capable of operating immanently, that is, in accord with 
immediate sensations of the event of reading. This will enable the freeing of potentials in the 
encounter of reading, the explication of “another line of life” as it is expressed from the written-
body (Colebrook 2010a, 52).1 I thus work to build here the expressionism that will compose a 
corplication — the folding of bodies — of the written-body and reader-body. This corplication is 
a result of exploring a philosophical expressionism that is found in Deleuze through his readings 
of, amongst others, Spinoza and Leibniz. In particular, I observe here that plication, the process 
of folding, is an essential movement of expression that Deleuze finds amongst his forebears. I 
also note here the beginnings of Deleuzian expressionism as one of the new vectors in what has 
become a continuous lineage in the active use of expressive logics and concepts.2 Expressionism, 
I propose, has an essential function equivalent to ontologies (such as Spinoza’s substance), albeit 
with different metaphysical concerns such as movement. Expressionism will come to account for 
the plications or folds of multiple evental bodies in the creation of the events of immanent 
reading, and I explore this sense of expressionism below. The remainder of this chapter expands 
upon these claims by exploring the triad of expression: explication, implication, and 
complication. In Deleuze’s most direct address of expressionism, in Expressionism in Philosophy: 
                                                          
1 See also Colebrook: “Is reading best thought of as consumption for self-maintenance, assimilating texts 
to the image we already have of ourselves, or as an encounter with a power not already our own that 
might open new images of thought?” (2010, 53-54). 
2 On the notion of a specifically Deleuzian expressionism see Audrey Wasser (2007). In contemporary 
Deleuze scholarship the claim for his expressionism has largely overlooked the process of plication, 
especially insofar as it might inform his own concepts. Wasser, for instance, begins a claim for Deleuzian 
expressionism and briefly encounters the process of plication but it is a fleeting encounter that reduces 
the broader process to a movement of only complication and explication, a “double containment of 
elements” (59). In this case implication is compressed into the concept of either explication or 
complication. These should all be taken as different movements. Indeed, they are joined by others. Her 
analysis brings Deleuze’s notion of difference into focus as a possible expression by folding. However, 
rather than explore this in other concepts, in his own (and collaborative) hand, to observe if expressionism 
persists, she assumes that Difference and Repetition (1994) is the highpoint of Deleuze’s own philosophical 
and conceptual development. Further still, she mistakes, I would argue, immanence for substance. The 
limitation of her analysis appears to be her focus on the concept of difference, and Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza (1992), in the absence of other works and important concepts. Simon Duffy (2004), on 
the other hand, notes the three movements of plication (explication, complication, and implication – see 
present chapter of this thesis) as “the defining problematic” (57) of Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza in 
Expressionism in Philosophy. Joughin, Deleuze’s translator, as I propose in-text below, makes the pli of 
these plications more explicit. Although, Duffy too limits his analysis of a broader scope of Deleuzian and 
DeleuzoGuattarian concepts.  
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Spinoza, he introduces three degrees of plication as crucial to expressionism: “expression 
comprehends all these aspects: complication, explication, inherence, implication” (1992, 175). 
While he is making his argument for the link of expression to immanence (immanence is brought 
to expression via inherence), as indicated by the lines that follow this claim, it is clear here that 
plication be understood with its triplicate movements in mind.3 In my reading, I make these the 
explicit vectors of expressionism.   
 
Immanent Reading and the three plications of expression 
Immanent reading is not a simple task insofar as many processes are already engaged when a 
reader is composed in reading. It is a complex process that unfolds amongst a field of influences 
and possibilities. None of the possibilities are determined but extend from the event of reading, 
which is always a becoming, in every direction. Colebrook (2010a) has claimed a Deleuzian “ethic 
of reading” that I consider being in accord with immanent reading: “reading is not a question of 
accuracy, correctness or copying. Reading is the opening of potentiality” (52). This potentiality is 
opened in immanent reading through an awareness of both how one encounters the written-
body, and also how the written-body implicates life, or, is an expression of life. If reading were 
simple, it would have very few dimensions and could even absurdly be a case of taking note of 
two dimensions that form a unity: reader and writing, or statement and (correspondent) life. 
Saying that reading is not simple is an acknowledgement that reading is not resolved – the last 
word has not been cast. In noting the complexity of reading, the multiplicity of dimensions 
involved therein are immediately assured. Even if the nature of these dimensions is questioned 
or composed in novel ways, which is certainly an aim of this thesis, the sheer increase in 
dimensions that ‘complexity’ introduces is worth consideration for the process of reading. 
Immanent reading is complex, as I demonstrate throughout this thesis, because it complicates a 
multiplicity of bodies into an immediate event. With the complication, however, is a greater 
array of plications than the corplicatory movements that compose bodies.  
The complexity of reading invites multiple phenomena to occur within the event. For 
one, ‘complexity’ has a rich etymological stratafication that in part illustrates its operation: -plek 
                                                          
3 The attention here is on plication. “Inherence”, which also appears, is still a useful tool but is better 
expressed with regards to immanence and as such it is considered in Chapter Six of this thesis. The most 
thorough study of the relation of immanence to the triad of plication I explore here is in Miguel de 
Beistegui (2012, 37-39). There is a local points that address the plicatory process directly in Beistegui’s 
work, as well as the consideration of the broader scope of immanence and expression given the genetic 
capabilities of plication (though this term, plication, is explored indirectly by means of the notion of 
folding).   
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meaning ‘to plait’ or weave, com- having to do with bringing together multiple “things”.4 
Etymologically the relation to “complication” persists given the component -plek which increases 
the presence, in the event of reading, of a weave. But as shown in the previous chapter with 
text, the weave risks a double, even if it maintains multiplicity. In the case of (com)plication, -
plicare (a Latinate root of ‘complication’) is introduced, that is, a process of folding is 
introduced.5 I make the folding process of plication more metaphysically obvious in throughout 
this chapter on expressionism, but it is worth the brief note here since it provides a link for this 
intimate and encounter situated process, to the subsistence of immanent life, not as the 
formation of substance but the immanent process of all movement (that may or may not result 
in a texture, a fabric, a substance, and so on). Plication, as I will argue in this chapter, is a crucial 
process in the expressionist metaphysics of the reader-body and written-body in immanent 
reading whereby processes of plication not only compose the bodies, but also the encounter 
between bodies (I describe this encounter in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis). The concept of 
plication I unfold here can be ascribed to Deleuze, but only, as I outline, by means of his reading 
of the expressionism inherent in Spinoza and Leibniz. 
Bodies constitute the corporeal vectors of immanent reading explored in Chapter Three 
and Five of this thesis (bodies that consist as events). The sense in which bodies are to be 
understood here includes the manner in which they exist and are expressed as bodies. I here call 
this their corporare, corporative dimension, or their corplication. This amounts to what their 
capability is, their affective power, and their distribution throughout reality as folds of reality 
that implicate life into their composition. Reality is regarded here as those compositions that 
tend toward a saturation, a greater density, of bodies. Life, here, which has the sense of 
(Spinozist) nature or God, can be taken then as a process of compositional distribution but is yet 
permeated by decomposition as active differentiation. I will progressively qualify this sense of 
life and reality throughout this thesis. They are expressive notions, but it is important to indicate 
that they work only insofar as I implicitly create a new phase of expressionism in this thesis, and 
not as a direct reproduction of Spinozist or Deleuzian expressionism (or any other – such as the 
subtle expressionism of Ursula K. Le Guin). In a sense this equates to an amplification of 
Deleuzian expressionism in the domain of reading, especially the immanent reading of 
                                                          
4 See etymonline.com entry on ‘complex’.  
5 There is a broad acknowledgement of the etymological connections between pli (as fold) and its 
instantiation in the terminology of complication, implication, and so on, in Deleuzian scholarship. See, for 
instance, Frichot (2005, 69), and her reference to the architecturally applied readings of Deleuze by 
Rajchman. Though not a Deleuze scholar inasmuch as a genuine theorist following Deleuze, Zornitsa 
Dimitrova (2017) acknowledges the three plications composed in Deleuze’s expressionism (54). Her 
deployment of the logic is sequential rather than, as I think Deleuze’s use is, co-immanent.  
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speculative events of sensation. As such, it constitutes a new phase given the novelty of the 
problematics in this domain.  
There are several valences to expressionism and expression under consideration in this 
chapter. Expression is functional and has a conceptual development that is explained below. 
Expressionism, or expressionist metaphysics, is also presented here but has multiple sites of 
consideration: Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s expressionism; and a Deleuzian expressionism (an 
expression machine of corplication) as found in his theses on immanence and becoming. There is 
a third expressionism present in this thesis that implicates these valences, and this is 
expressionism as I unfold it in the immanent reading of speculative sensations. Each is 
dependent on the others in some manner. For instance, Spinoza’s expressionism is implied in his 
Ethics but it is arguably only in Deleuze’s articulation that it gains its sense and practicality, just 
as Deleuze’s is given its articulation through this thesis regarding becoming and immanence.  As I 
show throughout this chapter, where the expressionism of all three instances merge is upon 
plication as a shared logic of expression, although the differences, while multiple, are easily 
identified at the level of substance (single or multiple for Spinoza and Leibniz, a-substantial for 
Deleuze, and what I am calling life for this thesis).6 Indeed, it is this logic that I claim for 
immanent reading (including the observation of the different instances involved) and this logic is 
the manner in which modes, monads, and bodies (for instance) are expressed that I wish to 
retain without a major increase in their articulation.7 Of course, I do here begin the argument for 
an expressionism of the reader-body and written-body, which will imply events, but I do not 
consider these creations to be verbatim Deleuze (or Spinoza, Leibniz, or anyone else). They exist 
in this thesis as concepts in relation to the problems explained in Chapter One. Expressionism, 
then, is at once singular-multiple insofar as it articulates a singular movement that is contorted 
by multiple vectors (the present thesis included).  
There are several critical sites in which Deleuze identifies Spinoza and Leibniz as the 
progenitors of expressionism. In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1992), for example, 
Deleuze indicates the anti-Cartesian link that expressionism creates – see specifically “The 
Theory of Expression in Leibniz and Spinoza” (321). In Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze 
makes clear distinctions between the respective theses of substance in Leibniz and Spinoza while 
                                                          
6 Importantly the expressionism presented here is not that of artistic movements such as “German 
Expressionism”. It is entirely possible to make claims synthesising what is developed here with the artistic 
movements but that is not in the purview of this thesis insofar as I am focused on metaphysical concept 
creation and the sensations of (speculative) literature. A project on the artistic movements of 
expressionism linked to the metaphysics here would no doubt be interesting for another project, and 
perhaps another author. 
7 On Mannerism in Deleuze see Sjoerd van Tuinen (2009). Deleuze’s direct claim on mannerism is in The 
Fold (2006, 41-43). 
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insisting on their articulation of substantial expression. And, also, in The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque (2006), the concept of expression in Leibniz is clearly addressed relative to the process 
of folding substances. Expressionism takes on a Deleuzian, and/or DeleuzoGuattarian, sense 
within these works, but it is in Deleuze’s collaborative works with Guattari — specifically A 
Thousand Plateaus (2013) and What is Philosophy? (1994) — where the concepts of immanence 
and becoming are built. It is, further, in his later writings on immanence and literature — in 
Essays Critical and Clinical (1997), for example — that a properly Deleuzian expressionism is 
unfolded. In each case, however, an expressionism becomes conceptualised through the 
presence of plication. I propose to voice here, then, the concept of corplication as the Deleuzian 
expression of the body, the compositive plication of immanent bodies, but one that already 
implies Spinoza’s expressionism: “God ‘complicates’ everything, but all things explain and 
involve him … nature at once comprises and contains everything, while being explicated and 
implicated in each thing” (1992, 16-17). Here expression arrives with the vectors of explication, 
implication, and complication.  
Indeed, there is some care in this instance to avoid claims concerning the ontology of 
bodies since, as implicated in my claim on the ontological imperative, ontologically understood 
bodies speak directly to the being of a body. Deleuze and Guattari set up expressionism, 
especially the notion of becoming, as a metaphysics that subverts the definiteness of being when 
they argue that the verb to be operates as an “empty expression, taken abstractly to designate 
the sum total of definite modes and tenses” (2013, 307). Take, for instance, Heidegger’s claim 
that “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be 
itself or not to be itself” (2011, 16). To be itself, or not to be itself, amounts to a definite body of 
itself under Deleuze and Guattari’s claim. Regardless of the possibility of the definite body 
escaping this finitude, given that possibility speaks to the a priori condition, the itself is definite. 
So, when Heidegger proposes that “Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’” (17), the itself configures 
ontology as a definite mode. Of course, Heidegger’s arguments are more nuanced and this is a 
selective encounter, however the risk of identifying a limitation for ontology is present.8 
Becoming, on the other hand, following expressive metaphysics, avoids the risk of the definite 
mode by also addressing the movement of the mode, and its fluid composition in external 
relations — as I demonstrate in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Reading in immanence has two bodies of specific concern although they are not the only 
bodies relevant to the process: written-body and reader-body. Within these bodies, and 
                                                          
8 Consider that Heidegger uses the phrase “pure expression of Being” to designate Dasein (2011, 16). This 
would indicate an expressionism as nascent in his theory of Dasein, though it would still be, I would argue, 
incompatible with Deleuze’s notion of pure immanence. 
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adjacent to them, and expressed from them, are other bodies of various degrees that can be 
taken into account at any instance in immanent reading practice. I will show how this works in 
practice in Chapter Three concerning the expression of events of sensations, but for now it 
suffices to indicate the nature of the bodies’ relational composition given their expression. For 
instance, the body of a flea in the hair of the reader-body, or the body of a dog that has 
slobbered all over the written-body, will potentially modify any reading and alter the possible 
transformations affected in all bodies therein. Furthermore, the bodies involved in immanent 
reading, bodies that are rolled or folded into the reading composition, are transformed in their 
relations, both novel and pre-corporeal. 
 The written-body is a real body, and it pertains to the same reality as the reader-body or 
to any other body. It is real insofar as it is a composition, albeit a composition of higher or lower 
density, which is to say of less or more expression. Further, as a real composition it also 
implicates life insofar as it is a living process itself that draws upon an evental life that is 
implicated in all bodies (I return to the question of life in the final chapters of this thesis). It is the 
reality of bodies by means of compositions of folds, of plications, that concerns this chapter, and 
this is addressed through metaphysical expressionism. More specifically, I address the creation 
of bodies through the process of plication which I observe as a critical and necessary aspect of 
expressionism upon the three valences of explication, implication, and complication. This is an 
expansion of the expressionism that is identified by Deleuze in his studies of Spinoza and Leibniz. 
However, I do not claim that this thesis contains a strictly Deleuzian metaphysics, or that 
Deleuze’s metaphysics can adequately be apprehended by means of expression alone. It would 
be a disingenuous reading of Deleuze to suppose he manifests a definite metaphysics and indeed 
that this can simply be appropriated for another purpose. Expression does, however, present 
itself as a necessary dimension of Deleuze’s metaphysics. 
 There is a consequence to my claims regarding written-bodies and reader-bodies as real 
bodies which will no doubt seed some discomfort. This will be due to the pervasiveness of a 
contemporary dialectic, present in consumer culture (the sale of genres) and marketing, of 
having some writing which is real (non-fiction) and some writing which is not real (fiction, 
fantasy, etc.). The particular creations of some written-bodies, such as fantastic or speculative 
creations, no doubt tend toward the absurd if writing is understood as only operating at the 
level of representation, as pitting reality against fantasy. But writing is also the creation of 
sensations, in an ongoing expression of life into and as a composition of reality (see Chapter 
Three of this thesis). An example of the pervasive dialectic would be, for instance, an 
autobiography being considered real (despite the truth/untruth of the events therein) compared 
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to a fantasy having no reality (or of having a reality only in an abstract or extrapolated sense 
using themes etc.). This has a particular relevance for speculative literature since the sensations 
it is composed of are often argued to be “extrapolations” of the present, or past, making 
speculative sensations a written act of representation.9 As Le Guin claims, “though extrapolation 
is an element … it isn’t the name of the game” (2010, xiv). That there are real expressions such 
as “grey-cap” technologies (mushroom guns for instance) that populate reality beyond their 
creation in Jeff Vandermeer’s Ambergris novels seems absurd in the logic of representation.10 
Equally, fantasy worlds such as Ursula Le Guin’s Earthsea might be understood as lacking some 
reality whereas the city of Melbourne is real.11 Expressionism, however, as I will show, flattens 
the conditions of reality, of real bodies, such that it will be no longer possible to deploy the 
language of real against fantasy. Rather, expressionism awakens the experimentation with 
reality, both in creating the written-body and the composition of the written-body with the 
reader-body. In Le Guin’s words again, “in reading a novel, any novel, we have to know perfectly 
well that the whole thing is nonsense, and then, while reading, believe every word of it … when 
we are done with it, we may find — it it’s a good novel — that we’re a bit different from what 
we were before we read it” (xviii). 
Deleuze indicates for Spinoza, and for expressionism, that “it involves no fiction to 
consider modes in their infinite variety as properties jointly deduced from the definition of 
substance, and attributes as points of view internal to the substance on which they are so many 
views” (1990, 22). In the expressionism I develop and deploy in this thesis, written and reader-
bodies are not strictly modes of a substance, nor are they deduced from a definition of 
substance such as Deleuze foregrounds in the initial chapters of Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza (1992). But an immanent logic, as Deleuze gestures towards, is retained here such that 
the reality and implication of life in these bodies does not involve a fiction. The Deleuzian 
inspired expressionism I here activate takes the plane of immanence as the absolute vector of 
presupposition, even if it does not adhere to a regularly implicit logic of Absolute. Fictions will 
only emerge if there is a disagreement of bodies, a disjunction in the affective network of the 
written and reader body. The real/unreal, or real/fiction, or fiction/nonfiction, distinctions are 
oppositions which will remain in the domain of representation, and the logics it necessitates, 
and will do not arrive by metaphysical necessity in this thesis. Material difference is not going to 
                                                          
9 On the notion of extrapolation and its use in studies on speculative literature, and its history, see Gary K. 
Wolfe (2005, 16-17). Wolfe notes the term is malleable and critics have employed it in variable ways. 
10 Vandermeer’s Ambergris novels include Shriek: An Afterword (2006), and Finch (2011). 
11 The Earthsea Quartet (1993) collects the first four of the Earthsea writings in one volume. The final 
Earthsea novel not included is The Other Wind (2001a). Further short stories set in Le Guin’s Earthsea are 
compiled in Tales From Earthsea (2001b). 
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be enough. I am rather concerned here with the problem of an expressed reality. Through the 
exposition of expressionism, broadly, it becomes apparent that the sensation of written-bodies, 
the percepts and affects, which may or may not be speculative, are nonetheless real when 
considered from the point of view of expressed bodies. The sense that Deleuze creates an 
expressionism is that of living expression where expressionism operates as concept articulating 
the folds of life, from chaos to reality. It is a metaphysical concept established at the ordinary 
levels of presupposition. This means that it is assured of some degree of mobility, undecidability, 
indefiniteness, and is necessarily produced in a relation – i.e. with a problem. There is indeed a 
specific problem to which Deleuze produces the concept of expression, and thereby his own 
expressionist metaphysics which, I claim, is the definite being of a fixed ontology.  
Deleuze’s expressionism is not that of his predecessors. I propose in this chapter to 
develop Deleuze’s expressionism and to locate the necessary concept of plication as the 
multiplicitous act of folding that creates bodies, or specific expressions. Deleuze claims that 
“expressionism in philosophy finds its high point in Spinoza and Leibniz” (1995, 147).12 It is in his 
first book on Spinoza, a companion thesis produced for his doctorate, that Deleuze begins to 
outline the operation of plication. Indeed, Deleuze’s translator of Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza (1992), Martin Joughin, indicates that the process of plication is essential to 
expressionism. For now I will claim only that plication is a process of folding, and concerns the 
manner or act of folding compositions or dimensions of compositions in the creation of bodies. 
Joughin draws upon the major terms that concern Deleuze regarding plication which will 
contribute to Deleuze’s identification and creation of both a process of plication, and indeed 
metaphysical expressionism: implicatio, explicatio, enfolding, unfolding, implication, explication, 
implying, explaining, involving, evolving, enveloping, and developing (Joughin 1992, 5). These 
Joughin links to the French terms impliquer and expliquer, suggesting that these terms enable 
Deleuze to draw a direct genetic link to the Latin term plicare retaining not only the naming of a 
process (noun) but also the active sense of that same process (as verb). Certainly, it is around 
the common root of these terms, the pli (Latinate) or plek (proto Indo European), that the sense 
of plication as folding is produced.13 Or, since expressionism will trouble ordinary linear and 
                                                          
12 Deleuze acknowledges a broad and uncontained lineage for expressionism in philosophy that gains 
considerable importance in the Middle Ages including in the work of Boethius and Nicholas of Cusa (see 
Deleuze 1992, 175, 376 n.12). 
13 See etymonline.com entry for “*plek-“. Further, while Joughin’s analysis is functional, processing the 
introduction of plication into expressionism, the particular neglect that Joughin has over compositional 
folds, as with complication, problematises his reading. It is not enough simply to focus on plication and the 
folding of reality, but it is necessary to observe the specific manners in which folding occurs given the 
appropriate prefixes. Crucially, complication reveals the immanence of expression to any aleatory process 
insofar as that process is already multiple. Neglecting the aspect of complication in the ongoing movement 
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isolated logics of limited causality, as I claim in this thesis, it is better say that plication implicates 
its Latin and proto Indo-European senses of folding. I will demonstrate in this chapter that 
plication persists in Deleuzian expressionism. In contrast to the singular substance of Spinoza, or 
the multiple substances of Leibniz, despite the concept of plication arriving out of Deleuze’s 
encounters with Spinoza and Leibniz, Deleuze’s expressionism is an a-substantial expressionism, 
whereby events as unformed, plicative, and differential matter take the place of any substance. 
The present chapter will provide the foundation for this claim, which is explored again in 
Chapters Four and Six regarding the concepts of becoming and immanence.    
 Along with the three degrees of plication (ex-, com-, im-) Deleuze illustrates several 
more in his works. In particular it is worth noting in Difference and Repetition (1994) the 
inclusion of perplication and replication. In Deleuze’s words: “‘Perplication’ is what we called this 
state of Problems-Ideas, with their multiplicities and coexistent varieties, their determination of 
elements, their distribution of mobile singularities and their formation of ideal series around 
these singularities” (280). While perplication evokes ‘perplex’, as in “this Idea is perplexing”, as a 
connotation, Deleuze is careful to break with some of the connotation by claiming that 
perplication “designates something other than a conscious state” (280).14 Perplication does, 
however, appear to, in some manner, consider the perceiving or thinking body that approaches 
and must create concepts for these problems even if this is not centralized. Deleuze’s claims lead 
to the consideration that Ideas-Problems are conditionally or circumstantially synthesised which 
means that while they may not be linked to other Ideas or Problems, they are produced with 
some degree of relation (even if this is pure difference).15 The body of a thinker, or reader (or 
any other stance of a body), is included here by the relation of corporeality to incorporeality 
introduced by the prefix per-. (Per)plication, considered from the view that per- is used to 
illustrate a move forward, or to be in front, or even to be near or against, is suggestive of a 
neighbourly synthesis. Ideas-Problems are near to one another, occupy a zone, but are also near 
                                                          
of plication is troublesome as doing so, I suggest, fails to acknowledge the folding together of completely 
heterogeneous individual expressions through the movement of a process that includes but exceeds these 
expressions. In other words, Joughin risks missing the movement of difference that occupies both the 
individuals and the environment they occupy and further risks placing plication under a dialectic. Deleuze 
says “implication and explication … precisely because the two concepts are not opposed to one another, 
they imply a principle synthesis: complication” (1992, 16).     
14 See also: “not that the corresponding connotation of ‘perplexity’ signifies a coefficient of doubt, 
hesitation or astonishment, or anything whatsoever incomplete about Ideas themselves” (1994, 187). 
Doubt, hesitation and astonishment are conscious processes that would apply to Ideas or be ascribed to 
Ideas. In removing these anthropic productions from the Idea-Problem formula Deleuze is making room 
for an individuation of problems and ideas that exceeds their being perceived by a subject. As regards 
other instances of plication in Deleuze’s work, one might make some advances by looking at application 
and reduplication (see 1988, 82). 
15 See my discussion of the problem of purity in Deleuze in this thesis (Chapter Six). 
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to other ideas and problems.16 Further still, these are not the purview of a perceiver, but are 
proximal to the corporeal body as incorporeal folds of reality, they are out in front or ahead of 
the body, the forward movements of a body (reader, written, social, geological). Adjoining the 
prefixes per-, and re- (about which Deleuze is rather quiet), are other possibilities for plication 
including (ap)plication, (multi)plication, and even more speculative and less established folds 
such as (sup)plication, (anti)plication, and amplification. This is not a complete list, of course, as 
there is an experimental aspect to the creation of concepts which allows for the suffixes and 
prefixes to be interchanged with others in order to modulate the base concept of folding.  
 It is with Deleuze’s discussion on Leibniz, written much later than his large work on 
Spinoza, that he encourages the primary consideration of the three folds: “explication-
implication-complication form the triad of the fold following the variations of the One-Multiple” 
(2006, 25).17 The three degrees of plication proposed by Deleuze for expressionism are taken in 
turn in this chapter where I argue that explication constitutes unfolding, complication is a folding 
together, and implication is the process of folding in or enfolding. Plication is thus demonstrated 
not to be a first principle or the primary substance of life or reality, meaning that as a 
metaphysical process it is multiple in primacy. Plication is a process contingent on the 
movements of expression. Deleuze directly addresses the sense of ontological primacy that 
might infect expressionism and turn any of its components into a primary substance. He claims, 
regarding Spinoza, that “rather than expression being comprehensible in terms of explication, 
explication in Spinoza as in his forerunners seems to me to depend on some idea of expression” 
(1992, 18). This raises the problem of the relation of plications, in this case explication, to 
expression. It appears that any plication will constitute an expression and depend upon this for 
its definition and understanding. This is further problematic if expressionism is taken in any way 
as equivalent to the reading of Spinoza as monist or pantheist.18 Yet in Deleuze’s claim is a 
configuration of dependence, and not necessarily one of causal necessity. Neither expression nor 
plication are given primacy, or equated with a primary substance. They do not hold an a priori 
                                                          
16 On the notion of perplication in Deleuze, specifically its instance in Difference and Repetition, see 
McDonald and van Tuinen (2010, 9, 22n.5). Their broad analysis of perplication with relation to ex-, com-, 
and im- plications are in agreement with the analysis present here albeit with a marginally different focus. 
17 Some dispute regarding the translation of the end of this claim is apparent. In Daniel W. Smith’s 
unpublished translation for Deleuze’s Le Pli he translates the same phrase as “following the variations of 
the one-multiple relation” (Deleuze 2006, 25 trans. modified). Note that Smith’s translation has placed an 
emphasis on the relationality of the one-multiple and has dropped the capitals. This is a significant move 
since it makes Deleuze’s thoughts on ontology much clearer. Rather than indicate that there are two 
beings, One and Multiple, for which there is then a relation, Smith draws attention to the relation that 
constitutes the individuations of one and multiple. I leave Tom Conley’s translation of the same text in the 
thesis body here for ease of attributing the process of folding to the metaphysics, but also for referencing 
purposes. 
18 For the sense in which Deleuze might be read to obscure Spinoza’s monism, see Gillian Howie (2002). 
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relation, but are contingent upon one another. Plicatory processes can be explained in terms of 
expression but it is plication that organises the distributions and compositions of expression. 
Consequently, all expressions are in some sense folds (not simply unfoldings – explications), but 
these folds do not provide the full definition of expressions and expressionism as such. It follows 
that neither expression nor explication, nor any other plication, constitute a metaphysical first 
principle, even if expression operates as presupposition of the existence of bodies and events.  
I will now illustrate the three degrees of expression in turn, beginning with explication, 
in order to illustrate the corplication of bodies for immanent reading. Since I am concerned 
primarily with the expression of speculative sensations in literature, as I work to explicate the 
Deleuzian sense of expression, I will anchor the demonstrative imagery of the concept in works 
of speculative literature.  
 
Explication 
Explication is a process of unfolding that its own etymology, as indicated earlier with –plicare 
and the notion of folding, illustrates in its most basic aspect. However, the etymology is never 
enough to secure a concept or even an element or dimension of a concept. Consequently, the 
process of explication is limited in its conceptual capacity if it is just unfolding and must be 
articulated in terms of its dimensions and its movements. In Spinoza, as Deleuze observes, 
explication takes place regarding God/Nature as nascent substance of reality. As Deleuze writes, 
“explication is always self-explication, development, an unfolding, a dynamism: the thing 
explains itself” and, later, “God complicates all things, while each thing explains and implies 
God” (1988, 68, emphasis in original). Here God is an actor, a complicator, that while assembling 
“things” through the movement of complication is always explaining/explicating himself. All 
“things” in Spinoza, which is to say objects, subjects, beings, and so on, are the unfolding of the 
same single substance: God. But, as I have argued here, there is no need to situate the 
discussion of plication with a necessary substance; such an argument leads back to the 
ontological imperative. In fact, the formula works suitably for any well-formed substance as well 
as for any process that is not formal, as with Deleuze’s expression machine acting on and within 
life through pure immediate immanence.19  
Deleuze demonstrates the transverse uptake of expression by taking up Leibniz’s 
monads and demonstrating the same process despite the absence of a single unified 
metaphysical substance, instead noting Leibniz’s substance as “the inner unity of an event, the 
                                                          
19 Refer to Chapter Six of this thesis for the discussion on “pure” in pure immanence.  
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active unity of a change” (2006, 63). In short, substance becomes the movement of movement, 
its immanent condition, and not its activation in things that move. It is thus possible to say of 
explication that it is contingent on a process that allows it to do something, to modify or 
manipulate, to change, to progress. God explicates itself as things, for better or worse, all things 
being unfoldings of God. The “thing” explains itself as expression of God. While there is some 
contingency to explication, this contingency is only a demonstration of the necessity of 
multiplicity. That is, it does not matter what is unfolding as it will be necessarily operating 
relative to some other process(es), corporeal (substance) or otherwise (abstraction). This is 
observable even without a thorough critique of “things” which would only serve to extend the 
multiplicity. The contingency of explication, that it appears with some other process, is also 
attended to by its conceptual kin such as implication and complication. The plicatory movements 
will always appear together, even if they are obscured in any direct sensible relation, to 
accompany explication in its activities. As above, if things are explications of God, a result of 
God’s complications, then they also implicate God and God can be witnessed in the thing. For 
instance, the arbitrary substance Jeff Noon (which is not at all a well-defined being) writes A 
Man of Shadows (2017) and in doing so unfolds himself, as writing and sensation, and in this 
writing or sensation he is implicated (although one gains here only a qualitative sense of the 
substance Jeff Noon, and not a strict causality of authorial intent). The contingent movement of 
explication is a vital observation because, with attention to immanent reading, it shows the 
necessity of a multiplicitous arrangement of foldable bodies in an otherwise singular process of 
unfolding.   
 At this degree of expression, explication has interesting operational registers for 
immanent reading. The written-body, I argue, is an explication of life. It is life, or a particular life, 
unfolding itself into a novel domain of reality. It carries with it a life implied as well as the 
dimensions of its complication – the trace of its complication registering as these dimensions. 
But further yet is the written-body’s own explications: its unfolding of the dimensions of its own 
existence. That is, from the abstracted point of view of viewing the written-body, it can be seen 
as life unfolding. But, on its own terms, within the configuration of its elements such as its 
syntax, its rhythms of language, the written-body unfolds itself. The strange result of this is 
haptic in nature as the reader-body is compelled to unfold the cover, unfold the pages of writing, 
and in doing so committing a very real act of explication. And yet explication is sustained as the 
reader-body stares upon each page, flat and punctuated with writing, an admixture of white and 
black, white outlining black letters or black letters explicated from white pages. And in the same 
event a different degree of explication is again instanced as the sensations of writing make 
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themselves encounterable to the reader-body who further complicates them. This absurd 
configuration of explication, one that is life becoming anterior or extended as it speaks again of 
life through the creation of sensations (each sensation follows the pattern back to life as an 
unfolding – Kermit says it is not simple being Green), and thus persisting as thoroughly interior, 
is a critical aspect of the phasiology (logic of phases) of expression and its contingency. It does, 
however, make its apprehension difficult and so I will make an addition to the concept that 
mitigates the problem: exo-plication. To be clear, the particular register of exo-plication (folding 
out) will allow for the situation of a point of view exterior to explication, that of another 
expression, but ensconced in its contingent dimensions as the surface of its own expression.   
 That a written-body and reader-body are an explication of life, and thus an expression of 
life, is a nuanced notion that tempts being considered as mundane and may be mistaken as an 
unnecessary shift from representation. But where representation makes writing a copy of life, 
placing writing deep beneath the aegis of an abstract “Idea” (per Plato), expression puts writing 
on the same surface as the idea. There is no depletion of the power (affective and perceptive) of 
writing in relation to life with expressionism, as Deleuze’s (1992) explanation of Spinoza’s 
projected relation of modes to attributes demonstrates. Representation can either fail to 
capture life, producing a fiction, or succeed and produce a correspondent truth or non-fiction. 
Expression, instead, never fails or succeeds in its expressiveness but particular expressions will 
face these (and other) problems from other expressions. Nevertheless, life will always be 
retained in expressions. Deleuze says of Spinoza’s modes: “modes, implicating these same 
attributes that constitute God’s essence are said to ‘explicate’ or ‘express’ divine power” (1992, 
92). Insofar as a body participates in the attributes of a milieu that unfolds it – as, according to 
Spinoza, our own body shares attributes with God – that body will unfold degrees of that 
milieu.20 Writing is an explication of life, each unfolding contorting in a composition of sensation, 
and so what amounts to any degree of divine power in life is further expressed in writing.21 I 
thus reach the conclusion on external determination that Deleuze finds in Spinoza, whereby the 
                                                          
20 On a direct articulation of “participation”, its conception in Platonic logic by means of the “participated”, 
and the post-Platonist to Spinozist transformation of the problem, see Deleuze (1992, 169-176). 
21 From Spinoza to Deleuze this “divine power” can be equated with affect or affection, but with Deleuze 
the sensation includes the percept. Consider the claim that “God produces as he exists” (1992, 102), which 
is a claim regarding the expression of affections. His existence appears in Spinoza to be affective power, 
which suffuses the attributes which a shared of both God and the expressions of God. Deleuze notes that 
for Spinoza there are an infinity of attributes but only two claimed: Thought, and Extension (59). On 
explication, see also Deleuze’s discussion on “adequate ideas” as explications demonstrating “conformity 
of the idea with something it expresses” (133). Adequate ideas belong to God, insofar as God expresses 
these ideas in his expressions these can be maintained as adequate (insofar as they retain quiddity) or 
become inadequate (insofar as the essences becomes confused, or a new essence is implied belonging to 
another substance).  
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body observed for its power ceases to be observed for its composition alone: “when modes are 
posited extrinsically they cease to exist in the complicated form that they have while their 
essences are contained solely in their attribute. Their new existence is an explication: they 
explicate the attribute” (1992, 214). This logic is to be retained for my development of immanent 
reading, although I propose the replacement of attribute with sensation. A complication will 
concern itself the essence of the body folded into it, by means of the attribute which 
participates, whereas explication constitutes the folds of the body itself and the power of its 
expression. With sensation, the essence of sensation in life is left behind and one’s experience of 
the written-body in turn concerns itself with the sensations that erupt from the pages, from the 
words, and indeed from the syntax.  
 The written-body is a mode of existence as per Spinoza, but it is, as I argue in this thesis, 
one that is necessarily encountered from without, from the point of view of another body. 
Insofar as it is still an explication of life, the external determination requires some attention. 
Again, Deleuze’s Spinoza is instructive: “When a mode comes into existence, it is determined to 
do so by a mechanical law that composes the relation in which it expresses itself, which 
constrains, that is to say, an infinity of extensive parts to enter into that relation” (1992, 212). 
The composition of the body here is not dependent on a primary cause, an essential cause, that 
would see a well-formed body spring from nature. In its explication, a milieu does not directly 
unfold a body but rather a cohort of relations that persists in gathering parts and arranging a 
body. There is a strict determination (mechanical law) of specific relations, not of parts, that is 
mechanistic and is established outside of the essential cause (213). Deleuze changes language to 
indicate that the mechanical law is also a manner of distinction, “extrinsic distinction” (214), that 
preserves the explication of nature (essential cause) in the body while attending to its 
persistence as an individuation that composes itself of the relations and parts that exceed its 
own expression. That is, the body is composed of relations, firstly as an explication of nature 
(through essence and attribute – of God), secondly from relations that exceed it but are 
composed into it, and thirdly as the composition itself.22 
 As I have indicated previously, Deleuze’s claims on explication for Spinoza are part of a 
broader move to identify an expressionism in Spinoza’s writings that is not entirely forthcoming 
or developed. Indeed, the expressionism of Spinoza is here felt in the relations with which the 
body is composed in a multivalent manner (at least the above three relational degrees). Of 
minor note is the absence of a “partial” generator, as though a soul or a despot could be added 
                                                          
22 On Deleuze’s use of essence as expressive see Claire Colebrook: “essences are not things that we can 
point to as already determined; the essence of philosophy is not what philosophy is but its specific mode 
of becoming” (2002, 75). 
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to the body as a part in order to run the composition. But, again, I will claim that Deleuze is only 
inspired by this version of Spinozism, and that the expressionism he himself creates is not 
verbatim Spinoza. And nor is his expressionism exactly his own version of Spinoza. For instance, 
where he finds in Spinoza a functional mechanism, in his own conceptual creation he prefers 
machine.23 He claims for Spinoza that: 
mechanism is referred to something deeper, but through the requirements of an 
absolutely immanent pure causality. Causality alone leads us to consider existence… 
Spinoza relies on such causality, properly understood, to endow things with a force or 
power of their own, belonging to them precisely as modes (1992, 233). 
“Properly understood”, meaning insofar as cause is not strictly essential but is also in a process 
of extrinsic determination and distinction, causality is involved in the composition of bodies. 
Mechanism is in the relations. It indicates a degree of systematic function of the relations and 
the parts in the operation of the body, but it is still systematic or “a physics of extensive 
quantity” (233). When Deleuze joins Guattari and invents the machinic, the cumulative sense of 
a body’s power (and distinction) is exceeded by the power it exercises as “a system of 
interruptions or breaks (coupures)” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 38). They note that these 
interruptions “operate along lines that vary according to whatever aspect of them we are 
considering” (38) meaning that they are still immanent operations and not entirely separate 
from the processes they act upon. Cuts will, after all, constitute at minimum a new relation for 
the lines that are cut: from one end to another end, for instance, becomes one line to another 
line since the cut pluralizes the line by cutting between the ends; or otherwise, the cut 
introduces the relation of the gap into a line.   
The logic of explication persists in the Deleuzian notion of machinic, the cuts of the body 
are an explication of its power, but insofar as the machinic be considered a physics, the 
cumulative degree of quantity is less relevant than the power of relational creation. In his 
creation of an expressionism Deleuze does not repeat Spinoza or Leibniz (there is no necessary 
ontological substance for Deleuze), nor does he repeat his own reading of Spinoza (mechanism is 
eschewed in favour of machine), but a large degree of the logic is retained not least of all the 
logic of explication.24 For instance, the concept of becoming, which is present to this thesis in 
                                                          
23 See Deleuze: “let’s be clear about the word ‘mechanism.’ The biological theory of mechanism was never 
able to understand desire and remains totally in the dark in this area because desire cannot be integrated 
into mechanical models. When we talk about desiring-machines, or the unconscious as a mechanism of 
desire, we mean something completely different” (2004a, 232). Deleuze is here in an interview, with 
Guattari, and is seeking to elaborate on the process of “cutting” that inheres in desire as its machinic 
action. 
24 On Deleuze’s relation to Spinoza, and his debt to Maimon in his reading of Spinoza, see Beth Lord 
(2011). Lord argues that Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is indebted to Spinoza (and Kant) as an 
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Chapter Four a majori, continues the relational composite of bodies that is found in explication. 
Becoming will at that instance be claimed as a clear moment in which Deleuze demonstrates his 
own expressionism. It will come to account for the expressions of dimensions of other bodies in 
the reader-body, finding a degree of novel plication in this thesis, by which I mean that what the 
reader implicates in reading becomes explicated in their own power. And while this will be 
composed relative to affect, as it is already in part here with the “degrees of power”, the minor 
logic of explication is ever present. The reader-body and written-body will never fail to unfold 
life, to explicate life, or to unfold the one in the other as the reader-body unfolds the covers of 
the book, and then the affects and percepts she becomes there with.     
 
Implication 
The process of folding in, infolding, is called implication. It is a critical movement of any body 
both in its phase as expression of some further environment, and as the expressions of that 
body. It is notable that implication is presented by Deleuze with a remarkable similarity to 
immanence and inherence, sited on the sense of “interiority”, although it is posed as a separate 
but equal component of expression: “expression comprehends all these aspects: complication, 
explication, inherence, implication. And these aspects of expression are also the categories of 
immanence” (1992, 175). I will, in Chapter Six, speak of the component of inherence but it is 
notable that inherence posits a different process of interiority than implication. In short, where 
implication still retains the fold, attending more closely to the plications of a body, inherence is 
indicative of the suffusion of other processes in the body. To inhere in a body is not the same as 
to be folded in a body. And insofar as immanent reading is concerned, it is at once relevant to 
articulate what is folded into a body, as it is to distinguish the life that inheres in the body as if 
from somewhere else. Again, the logic of the plication of bodies is what I here retain for 
immanent reading from expressionism, a logic that has minimal change as it is uncovered in 
Leibniz, Spinoza, or Deleuze (though content, such as substance, is entirely variable).  
My investigation of implication contributes to the understanding of expression insofar as 
expressions are always composed of relational phases often expressed in tandem: written-
                                                          
internal difference operating between being and thought (152). Here argument is a salient reading that is 
distinct from the one I present here. Where Lord is content to deliver the majority of her argument by 
utilising Difference and Repetition, and largely ignoring the central argument of Spinoza: Expressionism in 
Philosophy regarding the process of expression (and its components), my own attempts to unfold 
Deleuze’s Spinoza in regards to expressionism and the broader conceptual domain that occurs in his 
subsequent works. It is, I believe, the emphasis on Kant that prevents Lord from unfolding Deleuze’s 
Spinozism beyond the problem of difference, although I acknowledge Kant as the axis of her investigation 
into Deleuze.  
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bodies express life, they are expression of life, life is in written-bodies, life is expressed in 
written-bodies as sensation, sensations are expressions in reality … and so on. There is no 
expression that does not imply something else, nor is there an expression that is not itself an 
implication of some other expression. The process of implication is necessarily an internal 
operation, but it always concerns those dimensions of the body that find their cause elsewhere, 
in another body or environment. A body will imply its own milieu, complicating the causes while 
folding them into the body, or expressing the milieu in the body. As such, implication necessarily 
concerns itself with one movement of many relations, the inward movement of plications. And, 
as a further consequence, implication will be concerned with the manner in which causes 
account for and are connected to their effects, and, indeed, the point of view from which these 
causes are observed as relating to the body. Strictly speaking, if a body does not imply its causes, 
be it God or the dog, it cannot be considered as an effect nor a body.  
By way of Leibniz’s thesis on perception, Deleuze establishes the logic of implication for 
expressionism. I will present it here since, in the following chapter, the sensations of the written-
body become important. There, perception will constitute a further power of the body, 
complicated with affection, engaged in modifiable relations to the percept or material of 
sensation.25 Deleuze invents for Leibniz the domain of microperception and, in doing so, 
demonstrates a logic of implication:  
the microscopic level no longer distinguishes minute perceptions and minute 
inclinations: pricklings of anxiety [l’inquiétude] render all perception unstable. The 
theory of minute perceptions is based thus on two causes [reasons]: a metaphysical 
cause, according to which every perceptive monad conveys an infinite world it contains; 
a psychological cause, according to which every conscious perception implies this infinity 
of minute perceptions that prepare, compose, or follow it (Deleuze 2006, 99 my 
additions).26  
                                                          
25 On the complication of affection and perception see Leibniz’s The Monadology: “it does not follow at all 
that the simple substance is in such a state without perception. This is so because of the reasons given 
above; for it cannot perish, nor on the other hand would it exist without some affection and the affection 
is nothing else than its perception” (2015, 50; [§21]). Setting aside the arguments on simplicity, it is 
notable here that the simple substance, monad, requires an affection to maintain it existence and that this 
affection is perception. It is here not yet linked into a relation to the other bodies of the world, and so 
from the claim alone it appears that the two concepts are complicit. At minimum, perception and 
affection will be degrees of consciousness, based on the adjacent sections in The Monadology. The claim 
itself attempts to observe the reality of an ongoing perception regardless of a memory of an absence of 
perception, blank spots such as forgetting dreams. For expressionism I consider the complication of 
perception and affection of most importance because when they are taken as actions of the body, they 
organise both the expression of existential forces and an openness to the percepts and affects of the 
world.  
26 Daniel W. Smith in his unpublished translation of The Fold makes a few notable changes from Tom 
Conley on this claim. In the first case he emphasises the qualification of minute perceptions and 
inclinations by using an en dash rather than a colon, secondly, he translates l’inquiétude as “uneasiness” 
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Conscious perceptions imply minute or microperceptions, meaning that they are folded into the 
perceptions. Deleuze indicates that perceptions take on a molar sense, or a macro sense, insofar 
as they can be attended to as having a degree of definition and distinction. This distinction is 
only attended to insofar as they can be distinguished from one perception to the next, and 
insofar as a passage (appetite or inclination) from one to the next is observable or may be 
posited. Microperceptions still appear to belong to or are at least implicated in perceptions while 
unfolding a perception’s own degree of certainty. But the ease of distinction is lost and so it 
becomes impossible not only to denote a microperception, but also to indicate the definite zone 
of their distribution. From the point of view of a perception, the claim is that an affective 
threshold breaks down, builds up, or trails that perception. The threshold exists as a passage not 
from perception to perception, nor to no perception, but as the passage itself taken as the 
perception’s own degree of composition.  
 Microperceptions implicate in two ways which are indicated as the metaphysical and the 
psychological. As regards the implication of the metaphysical, a perception implies “an infinite 
world” (2006, 99). The perception taken as a monad, per Leibniz’s expressionism, is 
distinguished among perceptions and through a comparative logic it appears easy enough to 
find. Notably this is a relational description but it is not the relation that matters so much as the 
ends, contrary to Deleuze’s continued emphasis on the importance of the relation. The 
perception well distinguished implies an infinite world. Take an image, such as the image of the 
Sun from Mercury in 2312 (2013) by Kim Stanley Robinson: “one last look at sunrise on Mercury. 
In the ultra violet it’s a perpetual blue snarl of hot and hotter”, and another, “with the disk of the 
photosphere blacked out, the fantastic dance of the corona becomes clearer, all the magnetized 
arcs and short circuits, the masses of burning hydrogen pitched out at the night” (2). Immanent 
reading will take such images as percepts, since their reality is as written sensations, rather than 
as actual perceptions. By dint of representation, both are perceptions that compared to one 
another are then distinct. “A perpetual blue snarl” is not the “photosphere blacked out”. Both 
                                                          
rather than “anxiety”, and finally he chooses “reasons” rather than “causes”. The tendency of Conley’s 
translation is to introduce a pathological sense into perception, especially in the case of “anxiety”. 
Uneasiness has the ability here to return the logic back to an empirical logic which may be more in keeping 
with Deleuze’s broader scope, however the pathic sense of “anxiety” is suited to those who continue to 
read psychoanalysis in Deleuze’s work beyond his Guattari encounters. “Reasons” attends to the empirical 
logic, rather than a natural physics of causes, which is again preferable and more in keeping with a 
metaphysical Deleuze. Alternatively, the notion of anxiety has its links to Derrida, and Heidegger, and this 
may have implications on the reading of the term in a metaphysics of perception. On this latter notion of 
anxiety, although with a claim regarding post-metaphysics, see Jane Mummery’s analysis of the “logic of 
anxiety” (2005, 165-170). Regarding the translation, neither direction I would say is preferred in general 
except insofar as the project to which the concepts are applied is concerned. I use the Conley translation 
since it is in publication at present and will be accessible to my reader. 
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together compose a further perception and so on. But implied in this are metaphysical 
implications, the folding in of “an infinite world” contained within these images. One looks 
without definition at the edges of the perception, to which one finds a sun ill-defined, a point of 
view from an imagined place (upon Mercury in a space-suit – one day maybe), an increasing 
affect (hot), and so many other degrees to both give the sense of the perception, break it down, 
and bring a broader scope. Folded into this image too, into this representative perception, is a 
life from which is drawn sensations for recomposition. This level of perception, which is now the 
percept of a representation and no longer useful for explaining implication or microperception 
(although it contributes en masse to the death throes of the representation), is continued in 
Chapters Six and Eight. The metaphysical implication of the microperceptions and its folding 
upon the perception of an infinite world should here be clear. One takes all the senses of a sun 
which are not directly expressed in language, and discovers them as an infinity of internal folds 
that reveal themselves in the image. 
 And finally on perception, microperceptions have a psychological implication to which 
we can return to the images posited above. Specifically, the psychological is foreshadowed by a 
sense of uneasiness or anxiety. It is above all in consciousness that psychological implications 
make themselves felt. Where the “perpetual blue snarl” constitutes an image, and a perception 
by dint of expression, it implicates a degree of anxiety. It is not that one is standing on Mercury 
and feeling this as though it is the direct and immediate awareness of an objects qualities. The 
“perpetual blue snarl” of the Sun as viewed from Mercury is configured in the perceiving body 
under these conditions. Precisely, the Sun is implicated in the body of the perceiver, the reader, 
in this manner. The uneasiness becomes present in this realisation: that the Sun itself is not a 
snarl, but creates a snarl in her psyche. Here the author turns their perception “snarl” into a 
percept in a new expression, explicating the “perpetual blue snarl” while implicating their own 
perception in the percept (which is what our reader really encounters). The anxiety that haunts 
this perception due to the missing percept of the “actual Sun” constitutes a microperception in 
the metaphysical awareness of eroded truth. But a second degree of anxiety or uneasiness arises 
in consciousness when the implication of the microperceptions shows the snarl itself to be open 
to chaos and devoid of finitude. Here it is the definition that would sustain the stability of the 
perception that becomes problematic. This is insofar as the definition increases, the image being 
not only a snarl, but a blue snarl, and an ongoing never-ending snarl. Each additional element 
constantly expanding the image defined such that the microperceptions of the image push out 
from it while remaining implicated in it – implicated in their explication.   
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 At two degrees of immanent reading the process of implication becomes better 
understood: the degree of life which is always more or less chaotic; the degree of reality which is 
always more or less composed. For immanent reading one concern is no longer with the act of 
reading, an act I have and continue to show is multivalent (concerning multiple bodies), but is 
with the reality and the life of the written-body. I will return to this point throughout this thesis, 
but its situational relevance is necessary because, as I will come to show, the written-body is an 
expression in reality of life. A written-body will implicate life, and its internal expressions too will 
implicate writing, its state as body. The expressed state of written-bodies implies a life of which 
it is an expression. But it would be a fruitless exercise to preconceive a ground, a characterised 
and finite notion, for life. Such a project can only assume or guess, must hypothesise, or make an 
axiom – the truth of which is less likely since it can ensnare itself in an axiomatic free-for-all that 
will say of life that it is anything whatsoever – Badiou’s cardinal philosophy is exemplary on this 
point.27 Writing implicates life, but it folds this life into itself, adding it as another dimension to 
its own body, its individuation. This life implied by writing is, further still, not a general life or an 
absolute life, but a life specific to that expression and one which is capable of producing multiple 
expressions, including the life of the milieu that exceeds that particular body. The life implied by 
writing is as much a source for writing as it is another of the dimensions of that writing, and yet 
it is not a life of intent (at least not authorial intent). 
 Of the concept of implication there are some critical points to understanding beyond the 
claim that it is an internal fold, a process of folding in. Consider Deleuze’s following statement 
regarding the Spinozist thesis on “common notions”:  
                                                          
27 A note on Alain Badiou. While Deleuze and Badiou have similar interests, not least of all the argument 
for inherent multiplicity, Badiou diverts immediately from Deleuze when he insists on an axiomatic 
approach. Where Deleuze privileges the encounter in a mutated version of empiricism, becoming and 
transcendental empiricism, Badiou appears to define his presuppositions upon the axiom. Their difference 
in the immediate sense is that Deleuze is aware of his presuppositions and actively breaks them down in 
order to arrange good relations, whereas Badiou actively builds his presuppositions as axiom including 
such relation axioms as the axiom of separation. Badiou is consistent with his presuppositions and his 
philosophy is strong. But by proceeding by the axiom he limits any ability to demonstrate the multiplicity 
of reality (which is arguably his main goal). Badiou has written a small book on Deleuze in which he argues 
that Deleuze is a monist, a repeat of Spinoza, albeit an evental Spinoza, and his philosophy of difference is 
dependent on a notion of “the One” as an ontological necessity (see Badiou 2000, 24-26). Herein Badiou 
criticises Deleuze’s use of univocity. Badiou is in possession of a lettered exchange with Deleuze through 
which an impasse was reached regarding their synthesis or compatibility. Numerous articles and books are 
present on the Deleuze and Badiou relation. The most notable interjection is Jon Roffe’s Badiou’s Deleuze 
(2012) where he critiques Badiou’s reading of Deleuze for missing Deleuze’s broader arguments and being 
selective on his citations (and consequently much of Deleuze’s logic) (see Roffe 2012, 16-19). Badiou’s 
work on Deleuze, however, incites a very sober interaction with Deleuze who is often viewed as the 
schizoanalytic philosopher par excellence. For this alone it is notable. Roffe’s rebuttal is an acute response 
that continues this sobriety while exposing Badiou’s argument to the broader picture of Deleuze’s logics. 
See also Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2012) for a reading of both Badiou and Deleuze that preserves some 
degree of compatibility.    
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even in the case of a body that does not agree with our own, and affects us with 
sadness, we can form an idea of what is common to that body and our own; the 
common notion will simply be very universal, implying a much more general viewpoint 
than that of the two bodies confronting each other (1992, 286, my emphasis). 
Here Deleuze is articulating the passions of bodies, their potential incompossibility, and their 
compossibility in regards to a broader domain given a notion capable of being found in both 
bodies of an encounter, as with a written-body and reader-body. He here builds a sense of a 
“common notion” which he suggests, and implies here, is not absolute and therefore in all 
bodies, but is nonetheless a dimension of each body in this apparent confrontation. A view other 
than the bodies is produced, a “general viewpoint”, that is then folded into each body. But its 
supplementary existence is maintained as exceeding the viewpoint of each body, and it is only in 
the creation of a common notion, an “adequate idea” of the other body in another body, that 
this new viewpoint is folded into the bodies.28 It is with this that implication ceases to be an act 
with one move, a simple movement, and whence it gains a creative function. Implication folds in, 
but in doing so it creates yet more dimensions for the body. It is less an accumulation (which is 
actually the process of complication) of stable pieces, and more an accretion insofar as new sites 
are found in which the “general viewpoint” immerges or grows into.29 
 I later claim that written-bodies express sensations and are themselves events of 
sensation. These claims can be interrogated by the above creative sense of implication and it is 
revealed in which sense, then, that the written expression implicates colour, sound, and so on, 
while maintaining them as folded in, as new, and existing without. The written-body 2312 
(2013), by Kim Stanley Robinson, implicates a sensation of Mercury, the planet, but in doing so 
also creates a sensation of Mercury. The accretion of Mercury in 2312 is an implication of the 
Mercury that I may see now through a telescope, an empirical Mercury that suffers the heat of 
the Sun. But the implication of Mercury, the folding in of Mercury in 2312 also writes Mercury 
anew as a site of sun worshippers and walkers, a habitat for obsessed artists, a place for a 
mobile city (Terminator) to thrive. The percepts of the image itself are implications of sensations 
that do not have an exterior reality in the body of Mercury. The implications are rather of a 
process of sensation itself, of an infinite process of sensation that persists in reality but makes 
possible and real the sensations created herein. Beyond this creative sense of implication, that 
preserves a speculative and an actual sensation of Mercury for instance, there is the involution 
or the tendency to involve in the concept of implication. (Deleuze 1992, 16). I later indicate the 
                                                          
28 On common notions and point of view, especially in relation to the idea and thought, see Simon Duffy 
(2006, 165). 
29 Accretion provides for the sense of growing and adding by means of crescere, to grow.  
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relationship of involution to evolution (see my Chapter Six), Deleuze and Guattari’s confronting 
counterpoint to competitive evolutionary theory, wherein I also make explicit the complete 
sense of involution. For now, however, I continue to the final component of expression, 
complication, to elaborate the corplications of the written-body and reader-body.    
      
Complication   
The corplication of a body, the process of folding that perpetually composes a body of any 
degree, achieves its composition due to the movements of explication, implication and 
complication – what Deleuze identifies as the elements of expression. Explication appears in 
many ways such as with the written-body being an explication of life, while also explicating 
sensations and a new degree of life. Implication is also present in many ways, as with the reader-
body implicating their milieu (an immediate life) and implicating the sensations encountered in a 
written-body, and so on. Indeed, the manner of these two processes of folding never achieves a 
complete sense, but an ongoing sense. However, it is with complication that these bodies gather 
a degree of composure, as a monument and an expression. In Chapter Three I will claim that 
written-bodies are expressors of signs following Deleuzian expressionism, signs which are not 
necessarily signifiers of an exterior reality, nor engaged in a process of signification as such, but 
can be rather taken as vectors of sensation. I here set this argument up by way of complication 
which, as Deleuze says on Proust’s expression of signs, plays a role in measuring “in each case 
their relation, their degree of distance or proximity, the degree of their unity” (2008b, 58). But, 
further yet, complication presents itself as a process of stability resulting from the coming 
together of heterogeneous folds that always maintain a degree of difference.  
 Leibniz and Spinoza provide the initial sites for exploration of the process of 
complication for Deleuze, as seen with all plication, and is clearly the inspiration for 
metaphysical or philosophical expressionism as such. With Leibniz, Deleuze begins to introduce 
an evental logic, and a logic of univocity, wherein complication begins to behave as the 
composing process of “the One”:  
The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is 
inseparable from the folds that it makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it 
is developed. But its envelopments and developments, its implications and explications, 
are nonetheless particular movements that must be understood in a universal Unity that 
‘complicates’ them all, and that complicates all the Ones (2006, 25). 
Here begins for expressionism a logic that will always favour specificity, or “particular 
movements”, insofar as that specificity is itself of a greater process of specificity. Individual folds 
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are presented as processes that require a universal synthesis to ensure their specificity. Deleuze 
here has not setup his own thesis on “the One”. He is still unfolding the Leibnizian thesis, but 
inherent in his exposition is the logic that persistently traverses expressionism (including 
Deleuze’s own vectors of expression). Leibniz’s folds, the envelopments and developments that 
enable a singular process to express infinitely ad infinitum, and indeed for that process to be 
experienced as singular despite the seeming lack of finitude, are given over to a universal 
process of complication. Complication is necessarily a bringing together of folds, multiple given 
the ‘com-‘, and that a single “monad” can express itself through multiple foldings requires a 
degree that traverses the folds and makes them proximal, articulates their relation, and 
maintains the unity of their relations. It is of note that the monads have no parts, they are 
simple, but this does not preclude the inherence of multiple degrees of expression.     
 Take, for instance, the event of Venus in 2312. Here Kim Stanley Robinson expresses the 
event through a corplication, the accretion of the body of a terraformed Venus, by means of the 
initial triad of expression. There is the explication of Venus by means of what it unfolds: “the 
clouds below cleared, and he could see broken chopped jumbled ridges – the Maxwell Montes, 
apparently. They formed a giant mountain range, Venus’s Himalayas” (2013, 281-282); “Lakshmi 
had wanted to eject Venus’s frozen carbon dioxide at an angle into space, a process that over 
time would have speeded up Venus’s rotation and made for a natural day” (285); “almost all the 
landscape they could see was covered by snow, gleaming in the starlight … under their feet the 
white hills were spattered by spiky black outcroppings” (264-265). The terraformed Venus 
unfolds the sensations of snow under foot, of a giant mountain range, and the ejection of frozen 
carbon dioxide. Leaving the reality of these sorts of sensations for a later instance (see my 
Chapters Three, Seven and Eight), each of these is an explication of Venus terraformed. Venus 
behaves as the monad, each of the sensation here are extensive processes of that monad. Each 
maintains a relation of explication since without these no display, no extension of the percepts 
of Venus, would be possible. At the same time there is an implication, “now they could breathe 
the open air… breathable air – a nitrogen-argon-oxygen mix, at seven hundred millibars, and ten 
degrees below. It was like breathing vodka” (265). The explication of a snow-covered Venus 
implicates a breathable atmosphere, albeit a not very breathable atmosphere. They can breathe 
because it is folded into the unfolding of the environment upon which they stand.  
 But the Venus event is complicated. It is at once a complication of several degrees, such 
that one can say of the terraformed Venus that it is a complication and not the result of a single 
cause. Venus is terraformed in 2312 given the complications of ice asteroids (or moons) with 
Venus, and a sunshield with Venus:  
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take raw Venus. CO2 atmosphere of ninety-five bar, temperature at surface would melt 
lead, hotter even that Mercury’s Brightside. A hellish place… take one Saturnian ice 
moon – Dione will do fine. Dismantle… attach mass drivers to the chunks and send them 
down to Venus… while doing this, build a round sunshield of lunatic aluminium, very thin 
material… Concentric strips give the sunshield flexibility and allow it to tack up into the 
solar wind to hold its position at the L1 point, where it will shadow Venus entirely (117). 
The complication increases, with more forces brought together in the creation of a grand 
complication – terraformed Venus. But herein the basic sense on complication is composed 
through the image. Terraformed Venus complicates a hellish place with a bombardment of ice 
chunks onto its surface. We know the explications that are implicated are a snowy landscape, 
and the implications of the complication is breathable air (though not very enjoyable). The 
complication is a synthesis of bodies, a dismantled Dione and Venus. And indeed a further 
complication, the building and placing in orbit of a sunshield. The synthesis is itself a 
complication, a folding together of other plicatory processes, but as it continues to fold it reveals 
an increasing degree of complication such that the image itself, presented finally as a percept, is 
a greater degree again of complication. With the terraformed Venus it becomes possible to say 
that the complication is universal, insofar as it arranges a single composition or verse (this can be 
taken musically), and indeed as a process of univocity insofar as the image of Venus is delivered 
in a single voice (the narrator, for instance). The relations are attended to in order to ensure a 
proximity is maintained without that proximity itself collapsing. For example, the sunshield at 
this point is not implicated in Venus, it has not been enveloped by Venus, though this does not 
preclude a latter image wherein the plications of the image change.  
 The above image is stable insofar as it has an immanent reality, encountered by 
immediate consciousness, a process that increases the movement of folds beyond the percept 
and begins to include the reader-body. The immediacy of the image and its mobility make it an 
unstable example, of course, since one can move amongst other images and reveal further 
plications. Importantly, the Deleuzian thesis is revealed here regarding a “plane of immanence” 
that is populated by the image, as the presupposition of the percepts here explained. It is not a 
univocity of origins, not a One that transcends or immanates as numerically singular; it is rather 
a singular composition of forces taken immediately and empirically. Although, Leibniz’s monads 
are not present in Deleuze’s own thesis, for now it suffices to make only the claim that Deleuze 
inherits a logic from Leibniz, and equally from Spinoza, that foregrounds plication and 
expression. This is not their substances, and indeed not their concepts. In Deleuze’s writing on 
Proust he suggests complication adheres to Essence, an argument that is explained along the 
vectors of three linear systems of signs that are complicated by a fourth line of signs (the 
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Essential time of art) (2008b, 57-58).30 Complication is not discovered in the logic here, nor in 
those instances from Leibniz, as an essential ground. Rather, complication shows only a universal 
logic of plication that at times results in the folding together of heterogeneous bodies to create 
bodies of greater degrees, always shot through with movements of other plications. 
 Insofar as complication has a temporary stability, or even a stability obtained by another 
degree of movements (metastable), it has the potentially to erode and for other plications to 
dominate at the level of observation or experience (at least). Although I do not claim there is a 
substance for written-bodies, the plicatory logic of complication is attended to by Deleuze in his 
reading of Spinoza: “substance ‘complicates’ its attributes, each attribute explicates the essence 
of substance, and substance explicates itself through its attributes” (1992, 185). I wish to retain 
this logic of plication for a general expressionism moving forward into the explanation of a 
concept of the written-body. For this, then, I retain the formula above with some modifications: 
life complicates sensations, sensations unfold life, life unfolds itself through sensations. The 
modifications here are Deleuze inspired, and indeed the logic is as Deleuzian by degree of his 
expressionism, but it is original insofar as the theory of immanent reading is concerned, and 
indeed real speculation.  
While I have been concerned in this section with complication, it befits the transition to 
the next chapter to note that the external determination of the written-body, as seen earlier 
with explication, concerns itself only partially with the essences of sensation, but a majori with 
the powers (affects and percepts) of that body and the folding of that power into the reader-
body. Corplication exposes the folds of the body and by attending only to the body as a 
perpetual movement of plication is able to draw a relational image of the body that eschews 
form, eschews ontological stability, but retains a singular evental degree. I here consider an 
image Deleuze and Guattari create in A Thousand Plateaus (2013) that is a direct expression of 
the movement of plication (and in no way behaves as a representation or metaphor). They write: 
for the vertebrate to become an Octopus or Cuttlefish, all it would have to do is fold 
itself in two fast enough to fuse the elements of the halves of its back together, then 
bring its pelvis up to the nape of its neck and gather its limbs together into one of its 
extremities, like “a clown that throws his head and shoulders back and walks on his head 
and hands”. Plication. (2013 298). 
In this image of the concept of plication the triad of explication, implication, and 
complication is present. The vertebrate folds two elements together, complicates them, the 
body of the vertebrate becomes implicated in the new fold as it folds upon itself by retaining the 
                                                          
30 On the link to Neoplatonist “essence” and “complicatio” see Ronald Bogue (2003, 37). See also Deleuze 
(1992, 16-17). 
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vertebral structure. Eventually the folded body explicates the image of an Octopus or Cuttlefish 
while still implicating the vertebrate. In the folding process the image of a clown is further 
complicated in the Octopus or Cuttlefish by a life that precedes it, that of a writer. Of the three 
plicatory processes, manners of folding, that compose bodies out of the pre-composed 
cacophony, it is explication, or unfolding, that determines the expression of the image. 
Explication occurs at the level of composition, or the plane of composition or reality, which is not 
composed but com-possible, and forces an eruption of processes from this plane. In this sense 
explication maintains a simple identification in the extensions of the plane of composition. This 
eruption is not likened to stepping outside. Rather, it is as though the dimensions of the plane of 
composition reach a certain tension and spill, are pulled, or pushed, from the cacophony into a 
different density and complication. A volcano that bursts into the ocean, for example, moving 
lava from rock to water and so on is a perfectly adequate exemplary image. The lava, in this 
sense, should be seen as part of the composition of the volcano and then the ocean, constantly 
adding itself as a dimension of the density through which it passes, unfolding and displacing 
itself. In the next chapter I unfold this corplicated notion of the body, following the lineage of 
expressionism, with regards to the written-body. This will constitute the first vector of the praxis 
of immanent reading, and establishes a metaphysics of expression for both literature in general, 
and the more focused domain of speculative sensations in speculative literature.   
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3. Concept of the written-body 
 
In the previous chapter I have demonstrated what amounts to a concept of the (corplicated) 
body proper to expressionism. In effect that chapter provides a “nature” of the body or an 
“essence” of the body capable of being produced. The essence of the body is nothing other than 
expression itself, is individuated as a concept, and the process by which expression proceeds: 
plication. In the present chapter then, with the nature of bodies affirmed in a metaphysical shift 
from ontological imperative to expression, I here create the concept of the written-body which is 
the manner in which writing is expressed in composition. While I speak of written-bodies as 
compositions, I in no way consider them to be compositions that privilege only composition as 
their specific expression. The writing of Jeff Noon exemplifies this well in Falling Out of Cars, 
when it persistently decomposes bodies, as with the incredible instances of words decomposing 
in the protagonists notebook: “page after page of indecipherable markings; all the words 
crawling around the paper, merging together, separating, and all the time losing themselves 
before my eyes … black smoky, mess of ink” (2003, 212). Whence I speak of written-bodies I am 
providing an alternative to the use of “text” to individuate those compositions that are strictly 
written. That is, this chapter has as its sole focus the construction of a concept of written-bodies 
in reaction to the problem of “text” (see Chapter One). It is worth repeating the caveat here that 
a body is not well-defined because of the logic of plication articulated in the previous chapter. 
But a body is nonetheless composed. The concept of the body here is thus indebted to Deleuze’s 
expressionism and written-bodies take the particular valence of bodies that express degrees of 
composition in writing.1  
 A written-body can be configured at several registers and Deleuze’s writings on bodies, 
signs, and sensations (individually and collectively with Guattari and Parnett) are adequate to 
the task of creating and individuating this concept. Indeed, there is a degree to this chapter that 
outlines Deleuze’s own “substanceless” expressionism, a metaphysical expressionism of the 
plication of relations rather than the plication of substance(s) as witnessed with Leibniz and 
Spinoza.2 While I address this notion in part through the primary discussions, the locus of this 
                                                          
1 On the notion of the body from Deleuze, with specific regards to signs, see Deleuze (1997, 141). For an 
expanded analysis of Deleuze’s use of body with regards to literature and signs see Aiden Tynan (2012, 
56). Aiden’s analysis is crucial reading with regards to scholarship on the literary Deleuze. On the notion of 
the body in Deleuze, without direct recourse to the “body without organs”, see Ian Buchanan (1997). 
2 On the notion of Deleuze without substance see Daniel W. Smith: “Deleuze’s philosophy of difference 
must thus be seen as a kind of Spinozism minus substance, a purely modal or differential universe” (2012a, 
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chapter is the creation of, and articulation of, the concept of written-bodies. Deleuze’s thinking 
enables for my present insistence that written-bodies are compositions of signs. These are 
compositions of signs whose only meaning is the essence of that particular sign, and what that 
essence carries with it from the life of which it is expressed (2008b, 32). In Proust and Signs, 
which Deleuze notes has had several edits (complete and incomplete) (2008b, vii), Deleuze 
indicates that “in art, substances are spiritualized, media dematerialized. The work of art is 
therefore a world of signs, but they are immaterial and no longer have anything opaque about 
them … the meaning of these signs is an essence, an essence affirmed in all its power” (32). Art 
for Deleuze, as is a persistent discussion in What is philosophy? (with Guattari), is a creation of 
writing no less than painting, sculpture, or music. It is this “world of signs” that provides the first 
register for the concept of the written-body. Signs are composed of sensations, and are 
composed within sensation in the creation of a “bloc of present sensations” or a monument 
(1994, 167).3 The other registers that will dictate the expression of written-bodies are the 
sensations themselves, as percept and affect, and the relational role of composition. Some 
importance on the material specificity should also be acknowledged here. 
 Beyond understanding written-bodies as worlds of signs, Deleuze’s expressionism opens 
the concept of the body to a logic of events. Written-bodies, which are compositions of 
sensation, in their turn can be further recognised as having an evental register.4 The composition 
                                                          
37). I have given rather little attention to the concept or ontology of difference in this thesis. While it is a 
persistent concept for Deleuze, in Deleuzian scholarship it is a point of perpetual clarification and much 
work has been done. The movements of expression, plication, are less well studied and it is upon this 
concept I proceed with my reading of Deleuze. Difference is, for instance, explored under the aegis of the 
“philosophy of difference” (See Bell 2006; Lundy 2017, 174), and the “ontology of difference” (de 
Beistegui 2012, 41; Stark 2011; Boundas 1996, 90). I contend concerning the latter that expressionism 
troubles ontology as a possible “ground” in Deleuze’s philosophy, even if it is posited with “difference” 
and is thus a relational ground, and so the notion of “ground” would require redevelopment. Regardless, 
the concept of difference is pervasive in Deleuze (see Deleuze 1992) and is the foci of numerous papers 
allowing it to become a scholarly contestation point for adequacy and proficiency in Deleuzian 
metaphysics. Stark, for instance, considers difference as having “metaphysical primacy” for Deleuze (Stark 
2011, 5) The endless clarification and quest for certitude in Deleuze’s philosophy is somewhat at odds with 
the view of Deleuze as concept creator (see introduction to this thesis), and risks imbuing his works with a 
depth they do not require and constantly eschew (see Deleuze 2004b ‘Second Series of Paradoxes of 
Surface Effects’) See Deleuze (2004a ‘Faces and Surfaces’): “It is Reality. Oh, what beautiful things 
physicists are saying these days, concerning border phenomena-phenomena and hole-noumena. We 
would have to be scholars to understand it. Long live Pauli, long live Fermi. But we can’t understand it. So 
what, that’s even better, we’ll do the same” (283 my emphasis). Note here the distinction between 
“understanding” and “saying”. There appears to be a disjunction, on this line, between the scholar and the 
one who speaks (such as the philosopher). 
3 See Chapter Five of this thesis for a discussion on monument. 
4 Derek Attridge (2004b) has brought a logic of events to literary studies in a different manner than exists 
here. Two levels of Attridge’s argument are notable for their relation to this thesis. Firstly, Attridge claims 
that the “literary event” is experiential and posits the vectors of experience in the reader (and also the 
writer as reader) (59). The claim finalises on “an event which opens new possibilities of meaning and 
feeling”, or rather “the event of such opening” (59 emphasis in original). His claim is that the event is not 
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of the written-body is evental, meaning that it concerns a process that is happening but only 
insofar as this is a movement and a vector that implicates a set of relations. The final claim of 
this chapter concerns specific written-bodies that follow the style of speculation, wherein I 
demonstrate the manner in which speculation, and speculative literature in particular, are real 
expressions. 
Worlds of signs  
There is no sign that exists in a vacuum, all signs are modified by the constellation of other signs 
that make up their milieu, which is their world or their environment. The result of this is that a 
sensation changes its dimensions in each of its compositions (considered from the point of view 
of the sign, or via the body that gathers these signs). The written body has a specific expressive 
dimension (its materiality) that modifies how its nature is encountered while also having a 
nature as expressed. That is, signs of the written-body are at once novel, are expressions of life 
and modifications of sensations that exceed their manipulation in the written-body. It is 
important to note that these signs are signs insofar as they are expressions of life and not signs 
of other signs ad infinitum (as can be one of the results of maintaining text in the 
deconstructionist praxis). At all turns in expressionism the signifying regime has its process of 
signification turned off in order that the immanent life of the sign, its essence as expressed 
plication, be considered. Since it takes words and syntax as its material a written-body can 
compose sensation at the intensity of a sentence, a paragraph, a novel, an entire set of writings 
from an author, or even an ad hoc composition of heterogeneous writings — the cut-up 
technique and pastiche are adequate examples of this sort of ad hoc composition. 
Deleuze’s thesis on signs is most prominent in Proust and Signs (2008b), but one 
discerns it everywhere in in his work and in quite disparate manners. In Logic of Sense (2004b), 
Deleuze introduces the “pure sign” (200) and it is with this that I will begin since the pure sign is 
                                                          
an object. I agree insofar as events are not objects, and insofar as the evental sense of literature opens 
new possibilities. However, Attridge’s claims here make the event of literature contingent upon its being 
experienced by another process. As such the categorical claims for literary are eschewed, adequately and 
assuredly, but it is replaced by an anthropocentric process that gives the life of literature over to the life of 
those experiencing it. I contend on this front, using Deleuze, that literature is an event that exceeds the 
reader’s experience of it, affirmed insofar as literature consists of events of sensations which are 
themselves individuated processes in the world. The experience of the event is meaningless so long as it is 
understood in this manner, that is, the experience of the expression does not give it its eventality (as this 
thesis shows). Secondly, Attridge proposes that the signification of signs is operated by an “event of 
recognition” (56). I would contend that recognition operates against eventality since moves toward the 
ontological fixity of a well-defined object or process of relation of objects. Signs, I argue in this thesis, 
announce events, are markers of events, and are even events themselves. Not because they happen to a 
reader, but because they are expressions of life. These are minor points, but I think the contingency of 
events closes down the possibilities of transformation for the reader.  
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implicated in the construction of events and the explication of a broader sense of events: Event 
or eventum tantum.5 Deleuze states:  
sense expressed as an event is of an entirely different nature: it emanates from 
nonsense as from the always displaced paradoxical instance and from the eternally 
decentered ex-centric centre. It is a pure sign whose coherence excludes merely, and yet 
supremely, the coherence of the self, world, and God. This quasi-cause, this surface 
nonsense which traverses the divergent as such, this aleatory point which circulates 
throughout singularities, and emits them as pre-individual and impersonal, does not 
allow God to subsist. (2004b, 200-201) 
I will address this notion of “pure” again, in Chapter Six concerning the notion of “pure 
immanence”, but it will suffice here to draw forward the claim that pure concerns the immediate 
and the simple. Pure concerns, at once, time and composition insofar as time constitutes the 
vector of a fold that expresses the relation of a future to come, and a history that surges 
forward.6 The “pure sign” is considered the immediate expression of an instance that attends to 
the entire plication of reality and the life that subsists. Composition is addressed insofar as the 
simplicity refers to an unmediated relation that draws a direct line from the expression to its 
environment of expression. Where Spinoza creates God, modes that express God as an adequate 
idea express a pure idea, or sign. This is so only because there is no complication, although there 
                                                          
5 See Deleuze (2004b): “Nothing other than the Event subsists, the Event alone, Eventum tantum for all 
contraries, which communicates with itself through its own distance and resonates across all of its 
disjuncts” (201). This thesis contains the sense of the event as non-numerical singularity. Derek Attridge 
(2004b) argues that “singularity is not pure: it is constitutively impure, always open to contamination, 
grafting, accidents…” (63). Deleuze’s sense of pure would place contamination as a positive description of 
pure, especially insofar as the experience of signs and events are concerned. This is because pure attends 
to a maximal mixture wherein the event of the body enters a consistency with the eventality that subsists 
(as Event) it. In this sense, the pure is a locked phase through which one is no longer adulterated by the 
incapacities of reference, the limitations of representation, or the deference of signification. See Sean 
Bowden who suggests a connection to the notion of aion, or the “unlimited and infinitely divisible 
dimension of time” (2011, 22). See also D. W. Smith (2012a). This links the immediate event to the eternal 
event (or Event) (see my Chapter Six on the notion of immediacy with distinction to the notion of present).     
6 See Deleuze’s notions of the virtual and the actual which constitute his relational concept of time 
(1991a, 42; 1994, 208-209). Sean Bowden and Dale Clisby investigate the addition of “intensity” into the 
virtual and actual as a third vector for the understanding of the Deleuzian metaphysics of time (2017, 154). 
See also Clisby (2017, 241) who argues for centrality of the concept of intensity. And, see Mary Beth 
Mader (2017), who further argues for an “ontology of intensity” (272), and an “ontology of difference” 
(275), and an “ontology of ordinal, intensive difference” (275) demonstrating and acknowledging the 
uncertain status of order in Deleuze’s ontology. I would propose on this front, beyond noting the possible 
pragmatic exploitation of Deleuze’s inconsistencies (plotting the fragmentation of his own events or 
consistencies across writings) in his argumentation, that Deleuze’s notion of difference is better capable of 
operating a differential apparatus in expressionism, subtending not his notion of being but becoming (I 
have argued a degree of this in my thesis, see Chapter Two regarding the problem of ontology, and 
Chapter One regarding the ontological imperative). This would still make an ontology of ordinal intensity 
possible, and allow for Mader’s observations of a becoming that is “foundational” to the ontology (261). 
This is not without its problems, including the necessity of making immanence an empirical (sensation) 
metaphysical concept (See Chapter Six of this thesis).  
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is an implication, but not of something which might introduce an existential disjunction such that 
the expressions might be said to be separate or be consisting of disparate elements. Deleuze, of 
course, is done with God in the manner it is conceived of by religion.7 And one struggles to 
unpack the Spinozist version of God that occasionally subtends his arguments. Nevertheless, the 
pure sign behaves in its purity by maintaining a relation with a process of greater intensity within 
its own expression. Or, rather, it is pure insofar as its expression as a fold (explication) maintains 
a more or less general process of folding (plication). 
  That the pure sign’s composition eschews a “coherence” of the sign itself with the world, 
or the self, is partially indicative of the deployment of a latent term in Deleuze’s expressionism: 
inherence. This term is explored in detail in Chapter Six of this thesis, but the salient sense in 
which coherence is departed with is the primary absence of the sign’s apprehension in terms of 
its representative relations. Purity plots the singularity of the sign with its essence, in the case of 
“sense” this is “nonsense”, nonsense being implicated in sense. But sense does not cohere with 
nonsense because nonsense does not behave as an equivalent event – strictly speaking, they do 
not share a surface and thus cannot enter into a dialectic or other composition that would allow 
them to stick together (as equals or opposites). Coherence, then, only operates at the level of 
the expressed sign, and the pure sign of sense coheres only with another sense, and another 
sense, and so on. The introduction of paradoxes breaks down coherence, showing the surface of 
nonsense not as a negative but as a productive milieu. Allowing God to subsist here would be at 
once a placement of an unnecessary substance into the matter of that milieu, but must be 
further observed by means of Deleuze’s expressionism which identifies God’s universal action as 
a process of complication: “in a universal Unity that ‘complicates’ them all, and that complicates 
all the Ones” (2006, 25). Yet substances do not exist as separations from the bodies or events 
they express, so it is that a substance cannot be grafted onto the sign, cannot cohere to the sign, 
and therefore cannot subsist in a sign by means of coherence. 
 A sign can thus be seen as an expression, as an event, as in the case of sense. Sense here 
at once constitutes sensation by means of the percept and affect, and indeed there is no regress 
to only situate the argument in terms of “good sense” or “common sense” which would pertain 
                                                          
7 “Religions are worth much less than the nobility and the courage of the atheisms which they inspire” 
(Deleuze 2007, 364). This statement comes from a brief interview on the issue of veils in schools to which 
Deleuze makes series of claims rejecting the religious intrusion into schools. But the comments are 
nuanced. Deleuze appears to lampoon the notion of a slippery slope while expressing it, and the 
“humorous” statement on whether the girls care about veils seems to be the final point Deleuze is 
concerned with before the structure of the problem is foregrounded. The above general claim befits 
Deleuze’s broader expressionism which sees, as with his reading on Spinoza, the creation of something 
immanent but not always expressed directly in a philosophical system. That Deleuze is done with God is 
only a claim as to his being done with theism.   
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to understanding. The pure sign here also eschews the structuralist notion of signs which places 
the sign into a system of references, a coherent vertical system. That this sign is not naturally 
complicated with another sign in its own creation attests to the absence of the system of 
reference, indicating only the persistence of a logic of flows from essence to expression. The sign 
does not cohere with other signs in order to establish its instance, nor with a centre, which 
means that a sign is not a signifier that leads to a signified or other broad abstract meaning. As 
Sauvagnargues claims, “in reality, all causes are at the level of the signal; they arise from an 
encounter of bodies and involve perceptions that are individuated in real systems. Thus, the 
cause is a sign, and the sign is a real force, and not a signifier, but is an atom of sense” (2013, 
27). Signs only cohere with other signs, and inhere a milieu that contorts to express them, but 
this is not their meaning.8 A sign’s evental instance is thus not its referential coherence. 
 For my theory on written-bodies, then, the pure sign is composed such that a life is 
expressed in a sensation, the sensation constituting the explication of life at the same time as 
life is implicated in a sensation.9 The written-body, if it is to demonstrate any consistency or 
coherence does not do so necessarily with life. This means that the book, or the poem, that 
composes with a pure sign achieves its consistency at the level of the sign itself, and then only by 
means of a composition with other signs. This also means that the written-body, composed of so 
many signs, is at once inconsistent with life, even as it unfolds it. This speaks to the inability of 
writing to naturally represent life as if it were something other. Speculative literature, even as a 
style that expresses a life that is not yet history, such as the surfing of Saturn’s rings in the 
Saturn-event (see Chapter Eight of this thesis), is nevertheless an expression of life. It requires no 
coherence to carry the essence of a life. It only requires coherence to affirm its real status, that 
is, as an encounterable composition. 
 From the pure sign it becomes discernible that if meaning persists in the written-body, it 
is as essence (Deleuze 2008b, 33). One does not come into a relation with an essence as it sits in 
a substance, but rather only encounters it as it is in a sign.10 Whence taken up by immanent 
reading, it is not a return at once to an essentialism, an eternal truth of art. The creation of the 
written-body as art has essence as a “weak” (32) material that ensures it inheres life. Reading 
                                                          
8 On the general sense of the term “quasi-cause” see Roffe (2017) where he argues that quasi-cause in 
Deleuze is registered in the relation of events and in the creation of modes (bodies) but is not itself 
determined in the relation of bodies insofar as they interact with one another (290). This is not without 
some confusion since, as I will show later in this chapter, the distinction between events and bodies is 
problematic. While Roffe maintains that in Deleuze events are effects of bodies, I contend that bodies are 
also evental insofar as they are expressions. The distinction is addressed by means of immanence noting 
that there is a fluctuation of bodies and events in their immediacy.   
9 A synoptic reading of the implication and explication of signs can be found in Bogue (2003, 32, 48) 
10 On encounters with signs see Deleuze (1994, 23). 
85 
 
immanently attends to this life but in doing so observes how the work of art exaggerates and 
expands life, observing configurations of signs that drag life into ever new expressions. The 
observation of essence in the written-body amounts to the awareness of a nascent life in the 
work, and the manner in which this life is extended ever further by means of the sign. Immanent 
reading will never cease to encounter life, even when the expression is at once alien, absurd, or 
obscure. There is no return to essence, only the persistent unfolding of life. 
 The written-body accretes signs to compose a world of signs although it should be noted 
that this accretion occurs without a centre. There is no central idea, no pole, no trunk to the 
written-body. Even the essence is more of a ghost in the body than a guiding principle, a degree 
of redundancy that shows the excess of the body to be the life it implicates. The accretion of 
signs as a world is a process of convergence according to Deleuzian and Leibnizian 
expressionism. In Logic of Sense Deleuze submits the Leibnizian thesis on compossible worlds:  
the expressed world is made of differential relations and of contiguous singularities. It is 
formed as a world precisely to the extent that the series which depend on each 
singularity converge with the series which depend on others. This convergence defines 
“compossibility” as the rule of a world synthesis. (Deleuze 2004b, 127)11 
Written-bodies are not composed entirely of pure signs, at once a sign may extend its purity 
while concealing this in another presentation, a type of sign.12 But the purity of a sign, insofar as 
it simplifies a relation with an essence, persists in all signs. Signs taken at the level of their own 
expression are capable of expressing their substance, in numerous manners, but at the level of 
the expression is the possibility of composition, and thus the possibility of a world. It is in this 
sense that signs are singularities which, in Deleuze’s expressionism, means they are events: “far 
from being individual or personal, singularities preside over the genesis of individuals and 
persons; they are distributed in a ‘potential’ which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces 
them by actualizing or realizing itself” (2004b, 118). For written-bodies, signs are discovered in a 
vast milieu, a “potential” that distributes them wildly, but they are nevertheless metastable 
instances that implicate a life. In converging with other signs, or other complications of signs, 
they constitute a synthetic world. Signs here still implicate the wilderness of their prior milieu, 
                                                          
11 Note that Deleuze sees this as a general process applicable to worlds, but that with Leibniz it takes on a 
particular valence that is still restrictive. He uses the sequence of ‘Sixteenth Series of Static Ontological 
Genesis’ to ‘Seventeenth Series of Static Logical Genesis’ in Logic of Sense (2004b) to articulate this 
restriction insofar as sense is concerned. See in particular pages 132 – 133 on individuation being 
preceded by the individual (Deleuze rather prefers Simondon’s notion of individuation as pre-individual). 
Nevertheless, Deleuze retains the operation of convergence for worlds. 
12 On types of signs see Deleuze (2008b) where he distinguishes those signs that Proust produces: 
worldliness, love, sensuous (3-10). I do not wish to generalize on these signs, making a claim on their 
transferability, as if they might be extracted from the relations Deleuze expresses they hold with regards 
to Proust.  
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but as an element of a world they begin to implicate the convergence itself as a vector of a 
relation of relations and singularities. Thus the manifold of a world of signs is relational by 
multiple degrees, and is further composed of singularities that are grafted together (contiguous) 
and, in their new growth, begin to implicate ever new compositions.13 The force of differential 
relations that subtend the singular sign is increasingly mobile, and the convergence of these 
relations is explicated by the sign. Thus, a sign being read will necessarily expose its world, its 
substance (even insofar as this is chaos), and its essence (meaning). This is the result for written-
bodies that is generated by Deleuzian expressionism. 
 The bending of relations that allows for a convergence of signs is the creation of a world. 
The written-body is such a world: a body composed of signs that actualize a life. As will become 
increasingly clear, the expressionism I claim for immanent reading never does away with an 
evental logic, a decision whose consequence sees the ontological imperative denounced for its 
anti-evental sentiment. Deleuze’s expressionism, at times indistinguishable from his forebears, 
claims for bodies and events a different register.14 This is explained as a difference between the 
incorporeal and the corporeal, the incorporeal constituting the register of events and corporeal 
constituting the register of bodies. I speak here of register as a simple measurement, as one 
would divine an earthquake from a seismograph, or an audio signal from a spectrometer. But 
                                                          
13 Zornitsa Dimitrova (2017) argues for a notion of “literary worlds” using an expressionist logic derived 
from Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. Her argument for the “emergence of a literary world” (21) posits an 
expressionist ontology of immanence that is involved in the genesis of that world. The literary world is not 
the body of writing itself, but a world composed from that body, while at the same time implicating a 
larger world. It appears as though “work” follows an expressionist logic, a specifically immanent logic as, 
although the world it creates can be committed either to transcendence or immanence (or both). Further, 
these worlds impact “sense” (it is not entirely certain if she also means “sensation”), and thus constitute a 
modification of the eventality that produces them. Dimitrova’s thesis is exceptional for its singularity, as 
despite its heavy use of Deleuze it never slaves itself to Deleuze’s concepts (nor any other). All concepts 
are open. The immanence of her literary worlds appears at once to be entirely devoid of a notion of 
substance, though it appears and recedes in her logic, and entirely shot through with a commitment to 
being. This sentiment is summarized as “the ontology of unlimited groundless self-propelled becoming” 
(21) whereby the ontological is considered as “formed totality” (138) despite the actualized becomings 
that suffuse it. Her diagram (Figure 4.2, 138) of the reflexivity of sense is a notable framing of the problem. 
I would contend only on the level of being or ontology, which I have argued in the present thesis (Chapter 
One) is both the ground and transcendence, and is a restriction of expression and a grounding of 
immanence. Becoming displaces “to be”, favouring persist transformation where “to be” would constitute 
an arrest of becoming. Otherwise, I am in agreement and consider her explorations to be cognate with my 
own regarding the expression of written-bodies.           
14 See, for instance the claims in Proust and Signs (2008b) regarding “the categories of the Search” (57), 
which are implication and explication. The same categories are “aspects of expression” and “categories of 
immanence” from Spinoza (1992, 175), and two parts of the “triad of the fold” in Leibniz (2006, 25). If 
expressionism is in all of these in the same state it becomes difficult to say whether they have a nascent 
expressionism in their composition, if Deleuze adds the voice of expressionism to an immanent process, or 
if expressionism is grafted on to each instance. I suggest that expressionism is unsaid in each of these 
cases, that Deleuze brings it forward, and that Deleuzian expressionism consists in part as an exercise in 
unfolding expressive logics. I contend that Deleuze’s expressionism finds its most vocal and explicative 
point in the concept of becoming which I explore in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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there is no great delineation of bodies from events in Deleuzian expressionism, for events are in 
bodies inasmuch as they determine bodies, and bodies actualize events, and so it is that the 
mixture of bodies and events is a necessary complication.15 I claim for the written-body its 
evental degrees insofar as its composition as a world, as a relational body of signs, suffuses itself 
with an Event (a Life — both capitalised to demonstrate their more pervasive sense, rather than 
their immediate sense), and insofar as the signs themselves are events that traverse the entire 
body and bring the body’s varying degrees of actuality. What follows is to discuss the manner in 
which these signs convey events as degrees of sensation, whence writing takes over the general 
sense of the sign, and imbues the composition with sensation as a necessary quality of writing in 
particular.    
        
Events of Sensation  
Writing the written-body involves both the creation of sensations and the extension of 
sensations from life. I will soon connect these to the above sense of signs but must first look at 
the process of writing sensations and the manner in which sensations can come from life 
without it appearing as though the writer is seeking to represent a base well-formed reality 
(even in the sense of a negative representation). For this I claim that sensations are composed in 
the written-body, but the manner in which they constitute expressions of life is as events. 
Consider the following image I have extracted from Jeff Vandermeer’s written-body Annihilation 
(2014b). This will suffice to introduce an illustration of the process before I unpack both 
sensation and event in a more general and conceptualised manner. In his first book of the 
Southern Reach trilogy, Annihilation, Vandermeer writes the sensations of a growing and 
spreading moss that traverses its milieu. It is a good example to introduce now since the moss 
behaves as an expression of 'Area X', the problem proposed by the book as an unknown force 
rupturing reality. This degree of immanent reading concerns the observation of the immanent 
sensations as they are composed, but it does not yet concern the process of becoming that is 
folded upon the reading praxis.16 Moss saturates Annihilation appearing in a similar manner each 
time. In one particular instance, the sensation of moss seems to represent bodies with arms, 
legs, torso, and head. But it is precisely at this instance that a reader of this written-body can 
                                                          
15 On this point see Deleuze where he argues that Lewis Carrol and the Stoics both seek events “in the 
mixture of bodies which interpenetrate and coexist” (2004b, 11).  
16 The idea of an immanent aesthetics or immanent approach to literature is present in the work of Sabrina 
Achilles (2012, 108-109). Achilles pays attention to both the event and sensation in her writings, but is 
limited by the substantialist approach to immanence. 
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observe a breakdown of the anthropomorphising of non-human sensations. Consider the 
following passage: 
But in what had been kitchens or living rooms or bedrooms, I also saw a few peculiar 
eruptions of moss or lichen, rising four, five, feet tall, misshapen, the vegetative matter 
forming an approximation of limbs and heads and torsos. As if there had been runoff 
from the material, too heavy for gravity, that had congregated at the foot of these 
objects. (96) 
Immanent reading, I will propose, insists that becoming with the sensations of the moss, in this 
case as “too heavy for gravity”, as “eruptions”, and as fluid, leads the immanent reader to 
become moss.17 But in the same instance that this is generated, immanent reading attunes the 
reader to the nature of that particular moss sensation: as a very real expression; as real as any 
other body although composed with different material; as an event expressing a life through its 
essence. In this case the materials are signs, syntax and sensations contorting to the signal and 
composition of the writing, rather than water, carbon-dioxide or sunlight (although these may be 
present in the becoming-sensation if the page is wet, or if the reader is reading in the sun).18 
These former are the dimensions of the written-body, and when considered at the level of their 
own composition form part of the manner in which a written-body can be a ‘body’. Further, the 
sensations here form an evental instance of a trans-evental process (that includes scientific 
studies) of the moss sensation: a moss-event. This notion is only partially explored in this 
chapter a minori but Chapter Eight of this thesis, in exploring the Saturn-event, makes this trans-
evental creation more explicit.   
It is necessary, then, to situate the expressionist notion of sensation that arrives from 
Deleuze and Guattari: 
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose 
validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the 
absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is 
himself a compound of percepts and affects. (1994, 164)19  
                                                          
17 The process of becoming for immanent reading is explored in depth in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
18 These latter are some of the partial materials that go into the production of Bryophytes or Mosses. This 
is obviously not a complete list. For a better understanding of the anatomy of moss, including the 
necessary conditions of their existence, see the localaized (a Brazilian forest) study of Bryophytes by dos 
Santos, do Carmo and Peralta (2017). The analytics of individual entities, accompanied by photographs, is 
very illuminating. 
19 As a mark of the potential “development”, or unfolding, of Deleuze’s philosophy, and as an indication of 
potential inconsistency in Deleuze, consider in Negotiations (1995) that he places sensations in percepts 
rather than the What is Philosophy? instance where percepts and affects are blocs of sensation: “percepts 
aren’t perceptions, they’re packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever 
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They argue that all writing and all art consist of a combination of percepts and affects that, when 
composed, are beings of sensation: “the work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it 
exists in itself” (164). An artwork, which can be composed from innumerable materials of many 
different orders, is “a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves” 
(167). It is important to note here that the notion of sensation begins to attain a non-contingent 
and non-anthropogenic reality due to the negation of the lived (but not a life). That is, with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of sensation as presented here, sensations are in the world even 
if they are not in a relation with the nervous system of some perceiving or sensing “lived” body. 
Note that the lived is past tense and concerns a history of a body such that they might have 
previously had the experience with a sensation. The sensation needs no correlate of experience 
to establish its reality. Deleuze, in his writing on Francis Bacon, goes a little further on the 
concept of sensation in this regards:  
sensation is not in the “free” or disembodied play of light and colour (impressions); on 
the contrary, it is in the body, even the body of an apple. Colour is in the body, sensation 
is in the body, and not in the air. Sensation is what is painted. What is painted on the 
canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is 
experienced as sustaining this sensation. (Deleuze 2005b, 26)20  
Again, it is clear that sensation is produced and created in the world. Sensation is in the body, 
but only because the body is painted, composed of sensation, a being of sensation. I claim the 
ability in immanent reading to bring this same logic to bear on written-bodies.  
In this thesis I will give considerable attention to affect, largely in Chapter Five whence I 
consider the notion of affection which is already distinct from affect by belonging to the body of 
the affected. Herein, then, I will explicate the notion of the ‘percept’ in primacy. I will, however, 
reiterate a basic understanding of affect as devised from Deleuze and Guattari’s works and 
                                                          
experiences them” (137). Note that independence of the percept from perception is consistent with other 
instances, and the role of perception in experience is uncontroversial.  
20 It is important to note here that Deleuze’s writings on painter Francis Bacon occurred after his 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia encounters with Guattari. While he is writing under his own name, he 
maintained after his encounter with Guattari that Gauttari was a crucial transformation for him, producing 
“a sort of second period that would never have begun or got anywhere without Félix” (Deleuze 1995, 137). 
His writing on Bacon also occurs much earlier than What is Philosophy?. It is difficult to retain a constant 
homogeneous narrative of a concept with Deleuze and so I am reluctant to say that Deleuze has one 
theory of sensation. I am more inclined to note that he revises and renews his concepts with each 
occurrence in his works but that his articulations do make a Deleuze inspired concept of sensation 
available to his readers. Anne Sauvagnargues has drawn attention to this in Deleuze and Art (2013) where 
she argues for three phases of Deleuze’s writing, each of which pushes the relation of philosophy to art a 
little further. She argues that Deleuze’s theory of sensation follows these phases beginning first with the 
linguistic “sense” before it is expanded to encompass sensation as such in the production of “images of 
thought” which are not strictly linguistic (19). She also notes the persistence and transformation of 
Deleuze’s philosophy of signs in this progression and argues that his “Semiotics” also retreats from a 
purely linguistic function (10). 
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Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (which cements the expressionist logic) before returning 
to percepts and the manner in which they form ‘blocs’ of sensation through signs and syntax. 
Affects are, crudely, considerable as ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’. But arguing in such a manner 
ignores the type of power or force that Deleuze (at least) demonstrates in his use of the term. 
Following Deleuze into his reading of Spinoza reveals that affect has to do with existential force. 
That is, it has to do with the manner in which the body, the written-body for instance, is capable 
of increasing or decreasing its own power (conatus – striving) relative to another body: it 
“involves an increase or decrease of the power of acting, for the body and mind alike … affectus 
refers to the passage from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of 
the affecting bodies” (1988, 49).21 Deleuze and Guattari say that “the great novelist is above all 
an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming 
of his characters” (1994, 174) and, later, “artists are the presenters of affects, the inventors and 
creators of affects. They not only create them in their work, they give them to us and make us 
become with them, they draw us into the compound” (175). The sense of affect that is evoked 
with these claims is that affect is the determination of the relations between bodies, not simply 
amongst a whole written work, such as Annihilation in its entirety, but also with the bodies that 
belong to that larger body by nature.22 Despite this, affects can be localized in their immediate 
zone and observed. In the above image from Annihilation, the “eruption” and “rising” constitute 
the affect (Vandermeer 2014b, 96). This is because they indicate the passage of transformation, 
of the increase of the moss’s verticality and presence in the broader sensational milieu of the 
writing. That there is a “peculiar” (96) element to these draws upon a degree of dissonance, and 
indeed confusion, as to their image and thus expands the affect upon another line.   
It is important to note the relation of affect to becoming since I constantly maintain that 
becoming is the manner in which reading in immanence is possible. This resonates with what 
Deleuze and Guattari call sensory-becoming. They claim “sensory becoming is the action by 
which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other (while continuing to be what they 
                                                          
21 In the same entry Deleuze indicates a difference between affectus and affectio due to the power they 
demonstrate as being exercised in relation. See also, Massumi: “One always affects and is affected in 
encounters; which is to say through events. To begin affectively in change is to begin in relation, and to 
begin in relation is to begin in the event” (2015, ix). Massumi is working toward a concept of affect that 
appears to seek a departure with Deleuze and Spinoza, although I am uncertain how far this goes. 
Nevertheless, the previous citation is in accord with Deleuze and Spinoza’s thesis on affections, except 
insofar as the beginning is concerned.   
22 The notion or concept of affect as it is produced in Spinoza is receiving considerable attention and is 
worth noting here since it contributes to the notion of affect (including affection) having a power that 
exceeds its immediate individuation. See for instance Caroline Williams who notes “affect passes through, 
between and beyond the subjects who remain, to all intents and purposes, its effects, its subversions and 
its point of torsion” (2012, 19).  
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are) … sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter of expression” (1994, 177).23 In one 
sense the reader of sensations is transforming through a modification of the nervous system 
(stimulation), but this is only insofar as the written-body’s sensation and the reader-body have 
added each other to their own existential force. Becoming constitutes an encounter (see Chapter 
Four) and an alliance of bodies, between bodies, whereby the bodies are transformed. The role 
of affect in this is as an action of the body that can be restricted, set-free, or directed due to the 
nature of the becoming. Sensory becoming is becoming with the percepts and affects, affects 
modifying affection, percepts modifying perception. Immanent reading, to reiterate an earlier 
point, is concerned with the immediacy of this transformation. The peculiar affect of Annihilation 
is thus directed to the affections of the reader, not by an affirmative contingency of its own 
being, but in the praxis of reading itself. This constitutes a modification of the reader-body, a 
potential increase or decrease in their power. Ethically, the relation that increases the power of 
either body is most desirable according to the expressionist metaphysics mobilizing immanent 
reading. 
Percepts, Deleuze and Guattari argue, “are non-human landscapes of nature” (1994, 
169). The difficulty of this assertion resides in the phenomenological claim that the percept is 
bound to a particular perception. In the above example from Annihilation this would be the 
perception of the moss as communicated to the reader by the protagonist. But, to overcome 
this, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the characters are already involved, or implicated, in the 
sensational composition to such a degree that any notion of subjective perception is void. That 
is, the characters have their own becomings with processes of that landscape that allow them to 
access its percepts. An example they use is Ahab entering into a becoming with Moby Dick to 
reveal the precepts of the ocean (1994, 169). Another is of Mrs. Dalloway becoming 
imperceptible in the town and being able to articulate the percepts only because she is one of 
those percepts of the town (169). With the moss, the protagonist perceives the percepts of Area 
X because she has her own becomings with the moss, and other vegetation. She is a component 
of the configuration of Area X; she is herself caught in the milieu of sensations that are 
composed. Further salience is given to this claim in later books in the series that reveal the 
character has become a failed false copy of Area X.24 It is in this sense that the percept itself is 
                                                          
23 I return to this claim in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
24 Area X is theorised in Vandermeer’s later Southern Reach books to be a moving environment, 
potentially conscious, that takes over bodies (false copies) and deploys them back into the world as 
possible vehicles from which to expand itself. The character speaking “I” at this point is known as “the 
biologist” and later as Ghost Bird, but in the final book the body of that character is the individuation of 
Ghost Bird, her former self as “the biologist”, and an instance of Area X: “all of those eyes. In the 
multiplicity of that regard, Ghost Bird saw what they saw. She saw herself, standing there, looking down. 
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not anthropogenic, and is not dependent on perception, but rather that perception and 
articulation are dependent on the non-anthropic distribution of sensations. Readers can enter 
this at any point and become with these sensations as they wish, although some sensations 
demonstrate their importance as being of immediate value given an increased degree of 
saturation. As immanent readers, however, they will be aware of a spectrum of relations 
constituting their becomings. The becoming-moss of the reader, which is different to that of the 
character’s becoming-moss (although the character can be a useful tool), is then a means not of 
entering a written-body but of configuring oneself with that body and its various endo-
compositions.  
How is it that the percept is not attributed to the author or narrator, as idea, rather 
than, as I am suggesting, to the written-body? Deleuze and Guattari argue that in this case the 
author, and the narrator, which are undoubtedly different processes, have already passed into a 
landscape of percepts. The narrator demonstrates this by being amongst percepts, part of a field 
of sensations, a milieu of sensations. She herself is already in a relationship with the percept. The 
author too must pass into this milieu by way of a creation that forms part of their living reality. 
Vandermeer here creates ‘moss’ as a percept within his own perceptual domain. Vandermeer is 
the proper name, the way of attributing a location to a process, that belongs to this percept, but 
does not dictate how it is interacted with. Deleuze and Guattari say this clearly: “Characters can 
only exist, and the author can only create them, because they do not perceive but have passed 
into the landscape and are themselves part of the compound of sensations” (1994, 169). The 
manner in which the characters (and the author, and potentially the reader) pass into sensation, 
into percepts as non-human landscapes, is through contemplation – an encounter or a becoming 
qualified as the contraction of sensations, through perception and affection.25 Once thinking on 
the percept of moss, the characters constitute a new dimension of that milieu of percepts.   
The question still remains with percepts, however, as to their role in perception and how 
this can be a non-human, or non-anthropic, relation. That is, in what manner is the percept in 
the world prior to and after the reader encounters it? The problem can be expressed as such: 
insofar as the book Annihilation is open, its percepts are available to the reader to have all sorts 
of encounters with, but when the cover on the book is closed how is it that the percept persists? 
The response to this problem requires the disconnection of percept from perception, as a 
relation of dependence, and indeed a further articulation of the nature of a percept. Deleuze 
                                                          
She saw that the biologist now existed across locations and landscapes, those other horizons gathering in 
a blurred and rising wave” (Vandermeer 2014a, 196).  
25 On the notion of contemplation, events, and affects – especially with regards to Deleuze and the 
principle of contraction – see François Zourabichvili (2012, 118). 
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and Guattari claim that “the artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of 
creation is that a compound (le composé) must stand up on its own” (1994, 164). It is a 
requirement then of the percept that it have an existence, a reality, independent of a perceiver. 
In the case of written bodies and images this means that the percept has no dependence on the 
reader. While this is a symptom of Deleuzian metaphysics (specifically), Deleuze and Guattari are 
explicit on this point: “Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of 
those who experience them” (164). And yet it is the percept that perception must encounter in 
order for the reader to have any perceptual relation with a written-body, to create any chance of 
a becoming with a reader. That a percept is distinct from the bodies that perceive them is a 
testament to sensation composing itself in its own event. Even if that event is within the world, 
as an affection of Nature, it is not constituted by the perceiver, meaning its reality is determined 
beyond the perceiving body. Deferring to the compound is sufficient to move forward on this 
problem and attends to the haptics of reading. The compound is a complication, heterogeneous 
sensations folded together that implicate life and are explicated. The act of explication 
performed by a reader, both in the physical unfolding of the book and the process of 
interpretation (sans interpretosis), exposes the sensation and indeed the compound of 
sensations that is its immediate milieu.26 
Understanding the percept as non-representational appears to be troubled if we can 
think at least part of the percept through a memory or an adjacent image (such as a memory of 
moss when walking around a lake). Deleuze and Guattari argue on this front that the percept is 
not a thing, is not an object, but is rather a process of transition or transformation. They present 
a confusing rhetorical claim explaining this: “is this not the definition of the percept itself – to 
make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us 
become?” (1994, 182). I take this to mean that the existence of the percept brings the reader — 
in the case of the written-body — into a relationship with movements and intensities that are 
not easily accessed by the nervous system or the imagination – making perceptible the affective 
changes, and indeed the events that co-implicate bodies.27 
                                                          
26 On the notion of interpretosis and its link to subjectivity and subjectivation see Deleuze and Guattari 
(2013, 133). See also Chapter One of this thesis where I distinguish between schizoanalysis and immanent 
reading. It is variously argued in Capitalism and Schizophrenia that interpretation is the task of reading the 
signifier to attain the signified, an act that becomes interpretosis. I prefer “transcendental interpretation” 
which is offered by Deleuze and Guattari as a qualification of this process (133). This is in order to 
designate this act and distinguished it from interpretation as explication which attends to the 
expressionist logic of immanent reading. 
27 On the problem of the nervous system in the reader-body see the second part of Chapter Five of this 
thesis, specifically the reference to the brain.  
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An understanding of the independence of the percept from perception can be found in 
Deleuze’s readings of Bergson and Leibniz. With Bergson, Deleuze develops a material theory of 
the percept and the perceiver within a field of sensations – this field being the ‘image’.28 It is this 
theory I wish to maintain for the written-body since it upsets the contingency of the percept on 
perception. With Leibniz, a theory of perception is pushed beyond the corporeality of the 
percept (and thus beyond the above Spinozist claims regarding bodies), into microperception 
and imperceptibility, an otherwise evental domain of perception.29 The thresholds of perception 
are scrutinized constantly in these encounters undertaken by Deleuze. Deleuze’s encounters 
with Bergson and Leibniz in turn show how the percept stands independently of perception as a 
real (composed) process. Through Bergson, Deleuze demonstrates that to perceive is to shrink 
the field of presentation: “when we perceive, we contract millions of vibrations or elementary 
shocks into a felt quality; but what we contract, what we ‘tense’ in this way, is matter, 
extension” (1991a, 87). In the written-body I claim that the percept is an extension of life, a life 
(in accord with Deleuzian expressionism), to which an act is performed. The percept stands 
outside of this act of tension as a degree of matter, its determination beyond this act of 
perception is unnecessary to establish its reality since perception is nothing without the reality 
itself. That is, it is our perception which is contingent on a domain of percepts (images or 
matter), not the other way around, and the percept is implicated in reality just as the reader-
body is implicated.  
Deleuze’s Leibniz allows for an alternate trajectory between perception and percept to 
be observed by means of semblance: “here the relation of resemblance is like a ‘projection’: pain 
or colour are projected on the vibratory plan of matter” (2006, 109). For immanent reading, the 
percept here is expressed in just such a manner. The moss in Annihilation is not a 
representation, it draws a projective line that gathers a series of instances of moss, after which 
the act of contraction forges the resemblance (at once with the author’s composition, and with 
the reader-body). In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari indicate that the writer or the 
writer’s characters are themselves part of a field of sensations (as I indicated previously) which is 
what enables them to distinguish percept from perception. Deleuze argues in Bergsonism 
(1991a) that perception happens in a field of sensations, albeit also noting that these sensations 
are distinct from the process that perceives them – there are “differences in kind” between the 
                                                          
28 See Deleuze (1991a, 41). See also the analysis on Deleuze’s use of the Bergsonian notion of image, as 
real, see Sauvagnargues: “realism of the image means that the image is movement and matter, a force 
relation, a vibration of movement from matter” (2013, 47). 
29 See Deleuze (2006): “macroperception is the product of differential relations that are established 
among microperceptions” (108). Microperceptions compose a plane of relations, the threshold of the 
macro and micro being imperception which observes the movement of one to the other.  
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intuitive process that has an experience and the process experienced which are reached through 
observing the differences in degree (22). On a mutual plane of expression, where degrees of 
endoheterogenesis ensure differential expressive compositions (by degree), the percepts of the 
written-body and the perceptions of the reader-body act upon one another or otherwise go on 
living in other compositions. The percept never fades, it may be folded away, although this just 
puts it into another composite. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments that art is the creation of a “pure being of sensation” 
(1994, 167) is a somewhat misleading statement considering Deleuze’s expressionist 
metaphysics (which is relied upon in this thesis to remove ontological necessity for reading). 
That is, Deleuze’s metaphysics is expressionistic, a “becomology” according to Anne 
Sauvagnargues, rather than an ontology.30 As I have alluded to in this thesis, it is furthermore a 
matter of some speculation as to whether or not Deleuze has an ontology, or what his stance on 
ontology is, since being has no stable definition in his works. There is a degree of uncertainty in 
his use of “beings”, to put it briefly, and what it constitutes in this statement pertains to a similar 
uncertainty. But what Deleuze allows here is for this statement to take on new codes and I have 
already begun in this thesis to use compositions of sensations in order to distance myself from 
the possible reintroduction of the ontological imperative in immanent reading. One step further, 
that would preserve the Deleuzian position as above with composition, is the possibility of 
understanding “beings” as events which enables me to claim for written-bodies that they consist 
of events of sensation.31 
Using events of sensation is not a necessary transformation of Deleuze’s language, but is 
rather a speculation on a possible transformation. Which is to say that it is necessary insofar as 
the concept of written-bodies is concerned. It is, however, consistent with Deleuze’s 
metaphysics to say that art is the creation of events of sensation since life expresses events. 
Indeed, pure immanence (see Chapter Six of this thesis) is little better articulated than as the 
immediacy of life: “the life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that 
releases a pure event freed from accidents of internal and external life” (Deleuze 2005c, 28).32 
                                                          
30 “Becomology”: the term is introduced by Anne Sauvagnargues to counter the notion of ontology, or a 
logic of being, with a logic of “becoming”. She has argued for this at the Australasian Society of 
Continental Philosophy conference in 2016, as well as the International Deleuze Studies in Asia Conference 
in Manipal, India, 2015 (Sauvagnargues 2016b). 
31 On the expressionist notion of events with regards to sensation in Deleuze see von Tuinen (2010, 170) 
who pays particular attention to the process of plication (folding) while also acknowledging a debt to 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
32 Consider also the “indefinite article” as “indetermination of the person” (Deleuze 2005c, 30) and that 
this indetermination is the giving way of an individual to “an impersonal and yet singular life” (29). 
“Indefinite article” also constitutes an indexing of “the One” as a broad non-numerical but “certain 
singularity” or Event (Deleuze 2006, 86).   
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And so too is it acceptable to critique this on the basis of lack of exception of “events” in 
contrast to Badiou’s situational defining events.33 Sticking with Deleuze’s statements on the 
creation of art, it becomes clear that while he may metaphysically be capable of sustaining an 
evental logic (proceeding by any manner of synthesis) into an eternal, indefinite, and impersonal 
life, a pure life, it remains that for Deleuze events can be bigger or smaller, more or less dense, 
and so on. He reserves for art the further sense, beyond sensational composition, that artistic 
density be consider “monumental” (1994, 176). So even if there is some ambiguity about the 
artistic habituation of any particular event, the composition will be such that the event will 
distinguish itself through intensities and mannerisms while demonstrating its expressional reality 
from its milieu.  
 Events are not bodies, the language is not interchangeable, but I claim in immanent 
reading on multiple fronts that events and bodies are coextensive. This notion will be completed 
in Chapter Five of this thesis wherein I claim the deployment of evental bodies as an active 
phase of the reader-body in their relations with the written-bodies. For written and reader-
bodies the eventality is what enables the body to remain open, dimensions of other bodies being 
inscribed on the body’s surfaces, openings in pores and not arses or mouths (such is the 
perpetual fascination of psychoanalysis). I will come back to the reader, but in the case of the 
written-body their composition is at once as body and as events of sensation. By this I mean that 
written-bodies consist of sensations, and that these sensations hold a necessary though not 
representational or even contingent relation to life. The relation is nothing more than the ability 
of the sensation to be at once this (hec) sensation in the writing, and this sensation in a broader 
milieu. For instance, moss as bryophyte (scientific) and moss as “the vegetative matter forming 
an approximation of limbs and heads and torsos” (Vandermeer 2014b, 96).  Deleuze is 
forthcoming with a notion of the event which speaks to this notion of consistency, but it is 
difficult to say if it is Deleuzian (though it certainly adheres to Deleuze’s expressionism) because 
it is found equally in an analysis of Leibniz and Whitehead, and in What is Philosophy? where it 
does appear he claims the concept: 
The virtual is no longer the chaotic virtual but rather virtuality that has become 
consistent, that has become an entity formed on a plane of immanence that sections the 
chaos. This is what we call the Event, or the part that eludes its own actualization in 
everything that happens. The event is not the state of affairs. It is actualized in a state of 
affairs, in a body, in a lived, but it has a shadowy and secret part that is continually 
                                                          
33 Badiou (2000): “events are rare” (76). This is contrary to Deleuze who, as I show here, illustrates a more 
pervasive sense. In contemporary philosophy Badiou’s theory of the event, as occurring between the well-
formed situation and the open terrain of possibility, or void, competes with Deleuze for scholarly 
prominence. Since Badiou is one of the interlocutors of Deleuze I have introduced in this thesis, I make this 
note to acknowledge the difference and to clarify on Deleuze’s notion of the event. 
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subtracted from or added to its actualization: in contrast with the state of affairs, it 
neither begins nor ends but has gained or kept the infinite movement to which it gives 
consistency (1994, 156)34 
The notion of consistency here is most illuminating and organises a manner of individuation that 
arises out of Deleuze’s expressionism. Individuation is not an individual but is rather the 
metastability of a system (Deleuze 2004b, 119).35 That an individual would result is a false unity, 
the body taken as an end. But consistency brings the event to the body while maintaining a 
relation to the infinite movement of chaos. The event consists the body and allows it to stand 
(sistere) in relation or together (con) with what subsists, and more importantly, ensures its 
elements communicate in the existence of the body. Deleuze claims that “nothing other than the 
Event subsists” (2004b, 201) but in this the capitalization places “the Event” in a substantial 
relation with “the event” which lacks the capitalization in the above instance from What is 
Philosophy?. The elusion of the Event from the event means that the Event does not stand in the 
event, but that the stance shifts such that the subsistence of the Event becomes the consistence 
of the event in the existence of a body. The passage between the subsistence of the Event and 
the consistence of the event in the body is ensured by a process of insistence which recalls the 
inherence of attributes in modes, the bringing to the body of a Life that subtends it but is never 
strictly present in its expression.36 And it is the consistency of the body (existence) that allows for 
the introduction of the notion of an “event of sensation” for the written-body. As Deleuze says, 
“the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest 
difficulty is to make it stand up on its own” (1994, 164). The creation is the movement of 
sensations from subsistence to consistence, to make a body consistent in its existence, or rather 
to alter the sistere of subsistence to achieve consistency.  
                                                          
34 Deleuze (and Guattari) go on to identify Péguy and Blanchot as informative on this sense of the event. 
Deleuze’s perpetual complication of himself with his interlocutors makes finding his concepts difficult. 
Whose event? Leibniz? Whitehead? Blanchot? It is possible, I think, to discern Deleuze in the problems as 
well as the concepts which come with them. In this sense, then, Deleuze not only uses the pronoun “we” 
to claim the concept by part, but also introduces the problem of consistency of bodies which can orient 
the Deleuzian concept of the event. On an analysis of the secret in Deleuze and Guattari, see Claire 
Colebrook (2010b). 
35 The term individuation is frequently used by Deleuze and appears to be borrowed from Gilbert 
Simondon. On this relation of Deleuze to Simondon see Sauvagnargues’ Artmachines (2016a, 69) wherein 
she enters a creative liaison between Deleuze and Simondon around the concepts of individuation and 
modulation. For a more synoptic account of the relation, see Sauvagnargues (2013, 57). In the latter 
Sauvagnargues painstakingly unpacks the notion of individuation linking it to Simondon but also Spinoza 
and others. The definition she presents of the body that accords Deleuze and Simondon is pressingly 
salient: “the unity of the body as the individuation of intensive difference on a pre-individual field of 
singularities” (57). On Simondon and Deleuze, with regards to individuation, (onto)genesis, and 
metastability, see also Alberto Toscano (2009, 385-386).  
36 See insistence as the “bringing to life” of conceptual personae (Deleuze 1994, 76). Not verbatim, I see 
this as a process that works equally in any evental production. 
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It is notable here the role of sistere as a key but nascent process in Deleuzian 
expressionism, but insofar as the present thesis is concerned with creating immanent reading it 
is indicative only of a rapid incursion of an evental logic for written-bodies that allows them to 
communicate and be composed by degrees of events of sensation. The body, as existence, 
contorts signs which implicate sensations and express life as essence.37 Signs are complicated in 
the formation of the body at the same time the body achieves a degree of consistency. The 
written-body behaves as a world of signs, an accretion of signs, and this accretion is ensured by 
an evental urgency that retains its incorporeality. The event of sensation plicates itself in a 
written-body. That is, there is a specificity to the written-body that is yet an event of sensation. 
This plication is never singularly folding in one direction, nor is it a necessary sequence, but 
rather a quidi-fold function of immanent creation, a persistence of folds. In this sense, there is an 
event to a written-body that is expressed within, and which it is the expression of, a new milieu 
of sensation (as in that which includes the reader-body), wherein the sensations are expressed 
and no longer expressions of. In order to add further specification to the concept of the written-
body, I move now to consider the event of speculation in literature.  
 
The real creations of speculation 
The metaphysical claims of this thesis, concerning expression, becoming, and immanence, 
determine how speculative literature can be articulated. What I here term reality is conditional 
and relational with regards to life. From the point of view of expression, the dominant 
metaphysical concern of this thesis, reality and life constitute densities of composition in 
expression. Reality has an evental nature, only because it is the domain of relatively composed 
bodies, relative insofar as a decomposing body — such as a book that immanently fights against 
its composition  (i.e. Jeff Noon’s Falling out of Cars) — will still maintain a degree of composition. 
But the evental nature of the bodies of reality are discovered in the life that consists the 
existence. In the case of reality, the concern is composition whereby a process is more or less 
real depending on its degrees of composition. For instance, a written-body is a real body insofar 
as it is a composition of images, sensations, signs, and so on. It is no less real than a biological 
body that composes limbs, organs, breathing, and so on. From the point of view of these real 
bodies, life is also implicated insofar as life is the condition of the composition.38 In the written-
                                                          
37 See Deleuze (2008b), and Ronald Bogue’s analysis (2007, 54-55). 
38 Stephen Zepke’s reading suggests a formalism to Deleuze and Guattari given the notion of composition 
(Zepke 2009, 184). Following Raymond Ruyer, this is a notion of form that avoids a definitive sense but 
maintains a relational sense as a type of priority of relations. I prefer here to maintain the language of 
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body, life is implicated insofar as it is folded into the real composition. Reality implicates life, but 
life explicates reality or is the explication of reality where it is life and life alone that can unfold 
itself as a real composition. 
 So, it is, then, that when regarding the speculative written-body, and the sensations it 
creates, the life and reality of the expression must be attended to. It is prudent here to work by 
example. Take, for instance this passage from “The Tombs of Atuan” in The Earthsea Quartet 
(1993) by Ursula K. Le Guin: 
She set off silently on the way she now knew so well … There, of course, she never bore 
a light; if she carried a lantern, from going from the Labyrinth or in the dark of night 
above ground, she extinguished it before she came near the Undertomb … in the 
passage now she blew out the candle in the lamp she carried, without slowing her pace 
at all went forward in the pitch dark, easy as a little fish in dark water (224).  
Here through the percepts and affects a composition of sensation unfolds – a real expression. 
The creation is one of darkness, of light, and of rapid movement. Without context there is no 
real understanding of the “Labyrinth” or “Undertomb”, and there is no need to associate these 
with something otherwise known. That is, there is no need to assume a construct “Labyrinth” 
exists somewhere outside of the writing to which we can associate the image. Doing so, as I 
persistently claim in this thesis, inflicts a sadness (limitation) of comparison on the image. Adding 
context, by expanding the quotation or adding more images from this instance, will contribute to 
the sensation of the Labyrinth and its immanent expression. However, as it stands, the 
composition or reality of the Labyrinth is muted and without much sense.  
 On the other hand, in Le Guin’s composition above are further percepts and affects. 
There is an absence of location for the sensations, and so “she” sets off into an environment 
without definite qualities. Certainly it is darkness, the light is problematic to hear movements in 
the darkness, there is a lamp and there is a passage. Enter into this a character without basis, 
since there is presently no context except it is “she”, and the affect of the image begins to gain a 
dispersed dream like dimension. Materially the composition has few signs which are voided and 
given no qualities. It is known that there is darkness, but the “pitch dark” does not expand its 
expression and so it is only pitch dark – no fear, no anxiety, no emotional affect. However, the 
character’s movements, “easy as a little fish in dark water”, which briefly expands the darkness 
(adding the viscosity of fluid), expand an affective degree of the body that is not emotional. 
There is in the character’s movements only those which suit the environment, no more or less, 
and she in this image is comfortable in the affective and perceptive environment. What becomes 
                                                          
composition, supplemented by the language of consistency, since it avoids a redesign of the notion of 
form for the projected expressionism of this thesis. 
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of these percepts and affects relative to a reader-body will be explored later in this thesis. For 
now, it suffices to observe the sensations as real and not representational. 
 In “The tombs of Atuan”, Le Guin’s composition is one of subtle sensation. There is no 
extravagance taken with the expression of darkness, it is just about the relation of light. There 
are no baroque accoutrements adorning the lamp, there is no stink to her breath when she 
blows out the candle. The image is a flat surface, as flat as the paper it is written on, but it never 
ceases to move down a dark passage without light. As a real process, this movement is peculiar 
since the words themselves are relatively stationary (relative to the movement of the page, the 
book, molecules of the paper). The real movement, then, is not necessarily linked to the 
immediate material object, or its status as printed entity. And yet, the sensation is real insofar as 
it is composed and in relation to something else (such as a reader-body, a world, the written-
body, etc.). As a speculation, in that it does not necessitate a corresponding fact or statement 
somewhere else in reality, it is the reality of extended expression. In itself this enables a written-
body to explicate life, while preserving the absurd as a challenge to finitude. There is, then, the 
possibility of an “easy” movement in life amidst the fluid darkness. Whether this is a diagnosis or 
prescription remains to be observed. 
 Speculation instantiates an experimental presupposition and outcome. This is not a style 
of experiment to test hypotheses, to determine any sort of correspondent truth, but is rather an 
experiment without necessary determination.39 Le Guin herself has claimed that the process of 
speculation, in science fiction, can be read as a “thought experiment” insofar “thought and 
intuition can move freely within bounds set only by the terms of the experiment” (Le Guin 2010, 
xiv). For written-bodies this clarifies the context, because the experiment of speculation in 
written-bodies has no definite end, no determined result, and nor does it “predict”, which would 
only determine the experiment in some manner (in structure for instance).40 Since no fact is 
given, and no cause is assumed, anything that is created from experimentally aggregating 
sensations is bound to a greater degree of chaos. And, indeed, it contorts itself to the Deleuzian 
questions on both bodies and literary production: what can it do?; what happens?; what is 
possible? The presupposition of such creations has a radical openness since it has no definite 
limitation set by a transcendent operator, principle, idea, or so forth. But it is not at the level of 
                                                          
39 For a vitalist take on truth as non-correspondent, avoiding the mirroring (representation) of the world as 
truth, see Claire Colebrook (2010, 49).     
40 There is potential here to investigate “experimentation” further and consider problems associated. 
Philosophically oriented approaches tend in several directions. Joshua Knobe (2011) has effused 
“experimental philosophy” to which I here portend no connection. If there is anything of experimental 
philosophy, it should be in the capacity to generate new thought alone, to which the thought experiment 
coincides. On the problem of experimentation versus predication in speculative literature see Le Guin 
(2010).  
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absolute chaos, whence no immanent life has become present, nor that life res extensa a life. 
The experimentation presupposes only its material, not necessarily just thought but sensation, 
and whence it has an existential composition then this material is real (as in post-modern 
production and the sutures of pastiche), and whence it pertains to decomposition (subsistent, 
though not necessarily inconsistent) then this material is living such as in Virginia Woolf’s ‘living 
writing’ in The Waves (2000).41 Yet in each, and always in the creation of written-bodies, the 
material is then sensation.   
   The domain of reality concerns the composition wherein a consistency is achieved 
allowing the written-body to “stand”, or at least let the sensations be considered as maintaining 
a degree of consistency in their existence. The domain of reality is thus the domain of bodies. 
Speculation is not a body but, as it extends life, is an event and thus it is to the consistency of the 
body, and not the body itself, nor to its transcendental operators (genre), that any study of 
speculation should be concerned. The real creations of speculation are the bodies that accrete 
given the mobilisation of events of sensation, of consistencies of percepts and affects. I have 
claimed that speculation is a style of expression, style allowing for the identification of bodies 
with regards to the immanent expressiveness of the body itself (and with regards to the essence 
it implicates). But the immanent expressions themselves are speculations, consistencies of 
sensations that establish a single trajectory of life into a body. It is therefore apparent that the 
speculation does not totalize, and that the achievement of a style is only a comment on its 
density (in number or degree) of events that satisfy a nature. Speculation appears in literature as 
rising and falling waves, sensations such as the “darkness” of Le Guin’s Tombs are the 
consistency of those waves, but they are sensations that are composed at once in this written-
body. And yet, despite the specificity of events relative to bodies whence the composition is 
concerned, one can find new events of the same sensation in other styles. There is nothing 
significant about Le Guin’s “darkness”, insofar as it does not run the gamut of signification, but 
there is something specific which contributes to a speculative consistency in the broader body of 
the Tombs. As an event of a real creation, the percept of the darkness is matched only by the 
affect of the character (her movement), and by the percept of the dimming candle. This goes 
nowhere beyond the page, beyond the writing, insofar as it does not speak to a universal 
condition, does not apply to “our” world, and generally does not signify anything in particular. 
For its immediacy, it is the real expression of a labyrinth as an event of sensation within the 
written-body. This delivers the sense in which I speak of speculation; as an experiment with the 
                                                          
41 See Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 294). 
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consistency (events) of bodies.42 There is no correspondent labyrinth to attribute the sensation 
to, although there is an event that subtends it from the world beyond the immanent event, to 
which the immediate sensation of the labyrinth adds another vector, or another fold. 
Reading the written-body places this real body (and its events), into a composition with 
the reader-body. Since expressionism keeps these bodies in perpetual plicatory movements, 
they remain open or unfolded to some degree and the life they harbour and express necessarily 
encounters other real bodies and other lives. This encounter is becoming, and will determine a 
radical affective and perceptive modification of both bodies. It is to the concept of becoming I 
now turn in the following chapter.  Although the concept of becoming will be argued as one of 
the instances in which Deleuze displays a strictly Deleuzian expressionism, the focus of the next 
chapter is the articulation of the relation between bodies.    
                                                          
42 I thus oppose myself to the several definitions of speculation that have become popular in recent years. 
Colebrook (2014) makes a clear summary of this trend, and its philosophical lineage, in her own opposition 
to it through deconstruction. Although a clear picture is given by Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser (2014). 
The speculative events I speak of here are real only by means of the body in which they inhere, and from 
within which they inaugurate becomings, thus allowing me to eschew the realism of “speculative realism” 
(Colebrook 2014, 127). Nor do I propose a “speculative idealism” since I am concerned only with the 
immediate contemplation of sensations, in the Deleuzian sense, “without knowledge”. Perhaps the 
notions of speculative empiricism, speculative expressionism, or “speculative constructivism” would be 
suitable insofar as there is, here, an attunement to evental sensation (see van Tuinan 2014, 438).    
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4. Attributes of becoming for immanent reading 
 
So far in this thesis I have produced the broad spectrum of expressionism with relation to 
immanent reading which has allowed me to indicate something of the metaphysical 
individuation, and indeed the nature, of the written-body and the reader-body. The 
expressionism expounded shows a dependence on plication and from Spinoza and Leibniz to 
Deleuze this process of folding has seen an ongoing development. Indeed, the written-body has 
engaged expressionism due to its ability to account for immanent sensations as folding a life into 
writing, and the unfolding of life from the writing. The introduction of bodies to the concept of 
the written-body has so far demonstrated this process of plication, and the introduction of 
events too demonstrates a plicatory process. The eventality of the written-body, the events that 
are immanent to its complication, I have so far argued, announce a properly Deleuzian sense of 
expressionism insofar as it gains the inscription of Deleuze (even as Deleuze is often writing in 
collaboration). But Deleuze’s expressionism reaches its highest density with the concept of 
becoming, and it is in this chapter that I present the articulation of Deleuze’s expressionism. The 
concepts I create in this thesis, such as the two bodies of reading and the process of immanent 
reading, are made possible by the full spectrum of expressionism insofar as plication explains the 
movements of life and reality beyond any presuppositions of substance (such as text). Becoming, 
which I argue is an expressionist concept, here constitutes the relation of the reader-body and 
the written-body. For immanent reading, I further argue, becoming is the relation or is the very 
process of reading.    
This chapter begins by introducing the concept of becoming and its metaphysical logic 
which Sauvagnargues has called a becomology but which I wish to retain as expressionism per 
relations (Sauvagnargues 2016).1 I argue here that immanent reading is, then, a process of 
becoming, a particular process of becoming, that further destabilizes any stable conception of a 
reader-body or a written-body but also sets up degrees of transformation for both bodies. This 
chapter necessitates the creation of a concept of becoming following on from the English 
translations of the Deleuzian (and DeleuzoGuattarian) concept of devenir.2 In the translations of 
                                                          
1 Becomology is coined by Anne Sauvagnargues as referring to the use of the concept of ‘becoming’ as a 
metaphysical logic, potentially in contrast to ‘ontology’ (Sauvagnargues 2016b). Sauvagnargues has begun 
the construction of this logic in multiple seminar and conference papers. In this chapter, I will address 
becomology only as a useful quiddative process for immanent reading.  
2 The concept appears in his solo works but is mostly developed in collaboration. To the extent that the 
concept of becoming can be Deleuzian, despite its production in collaboration, I propose that the 
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Deleuze’s writings, becoming is the privileged translation of devenir and I here propose no 
conflict with the translation. However, when devenir is translated it does not automatically 
transport all its conceptual dimensions into becoming. This is due, following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s claims regarding the creation of concepts in What is philosophy? (1994), to the 
necessary influence of a milieu upon the concept. As a concept is produced in a new milieu, or 
travels to a new milieu, the conditions of that milieu will necessarily modify its composition – its 
reality. Concepts, Deleuze and Guattari argue, cannot be borrowed or handed down at will as if 
they transcend their environment and can migrate freely into other environments pre-packaged 
and ready to be plugged in for use. They claim that “concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, 
like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or 
rather created” (1994, 5). Indeed, to make the importance of the environmental conditions in 
the creation of concepts clear, they argue that “concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame, a 
spinal column rather than a skull, whereas the plane [of immanence or consistency] is the breath 
that suffuses the separate parts” (36 my addition). This means that the concept has a stability 
proper to the situation or place within which it occurs or is created. I can conclude that this 
relative stability or individuation of the concept is undermined during a change of environments 
or a change of the circumstances that determine its composition. And, while the change of 
environment may not be a new environment altogether, as with French and English sharing a 
Latinate history, there persists some degree of modification. Becoming, as I will thus argue here, 
is not the same concept as devenir but in translation a logic is revealed belonging to both that is 
still expressive and that further articulates the relation of bodies in immanent reading. The 
expressionist logic that emerges, through my own creative intervention and through the 
common attributes of each concept (devenir and becoming), is dependent on these notions: 
duration, transformation, and encounter. Throughout this chapter, the praxis and theory of 
immanent reading is shown to gain these same attributes insofar as the relation of reading is 
itself conceptualized as becoming. 
 The present chapter proceeds through a discussion on the problem of translating devenir 
into ‘becoming’ by addressing some of the dimensions that are applicable to both ‘becoming’ 
and devenir while pointing to some sites of possible dissonance between the concepts.3 This 
                                                          
persistence of Deleuze in relation to the concept is what qualifies it as Deleuzian. Guattari and Parnet both 
contribute to the concept of becoming, and the two crucial instances (A Thousand Plateaus and Dialogues) 
are necessarily collaborative since becoming, as argued in-text here, necessitates at least two vectors. 
Deleuze also, however, picks up becoming elsewhere when writing as himself, although he is writing on 
other writing, notably in his essays on literature titled Essays Critical and Clinical (1997).  
3 Anna Helle has noted a similar problem in translating devenir into Finnish. To explore whether or not an 
aspect of the concept could be more of a guide, in order to avoid connotations not wanted (such as the 
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delineation of devenir from ‘becoming’ begins the process of creating a concept of ‘becoming’ 
that is relevant to reading in immanence. As this chapter will make clear, there are three 
relevant dimensions of becoming for immanent reading. First, it consists of degrees of time as 
expressed in the Bergsonian concept of duration (following Deleuze’s use), which assumes that 
time plays a role indicating becoming is an open multiplicity or a complexity of dimensions that 
only ever becomes total relative to the movement and interaction of its parts and the suffusion 
of its environment. The second is that becoming is a transformation, not of a body into a body 
that defies its expression (as if a rock could suddenly be a cat), but a transformation in relation 
or an increase or decrease of the body’s dimensions relative to another expression. The third 
dimension is that it necessitates an encounter wherein the preservation and expansion of bodies 
(including their dimensions) are ensured by alliance (symbiosis). The last of these demonstrates 
a risk of breaking the becoming and inflicting a sadness upon the bodies insofar as an alliance is 
missing and one body actively decreases and/or decomposes the dimensions of the other. The 
creation of a concept of becoming is crucial at this stage of the thesis since it articulates the 
manner in which the reader-body and the written-body interact and complicate their dimensions 
in immanent reading. For instance, I will show in this chapter, contributing to the broader scope 
of immanent reading, the manner in which an affection of the reader is transformed by the 
affects of writing (one degree of the evental sensations of the written-body) by means of 
becoming.  
 
Devenir n’est pas encore Becoming: Devenir is not yet becoming. 
In Brian Massumi’s translation of A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2013), and in Smith 
and Greco’s translation of Essays Critical and Clinical (Deleuze 1997) the term devenir is 
translated as becoming.4 Observing how becoming is further developed in the English 
translations of these writings will indicate the degree to which the concept of devenir can pass 
into, or transform into, the concept of becoming.5 A Thousand Plateaus is suffused with 
                                                          
notion that “to become” is eventually “to be”), Helle indicates that muutos has been used previously to 
address the dimensions of “change” (2010, 7). She also notes it has been rejected for various reasons.  
4 See also Dialogues (Deleuze and Parnett 2006), and Kafka (Deleuze and Guattari 2012) which see devenir 
translated as becoming. It is notable that of these works. which constitute the sites where devenir and 
becoming are most developed, only Essays Critical and Clinical is written by Deleuze alone. The others are 
to some degrees collaborations which will speak to the concepts themselves, becoming and devenir 
involve multiplicities (of bodies) and an output.  
5 On reading Deleuze as a translation theorist see Barbara Godard (2010) who utilises the notion of 
becoming to plot her investigation. Godard does not, however, address the problematic of the 
devenir/becoming translation. Deleuzian expressionism is, however, hinted at in the process of translation 
in the use of implication (59). 
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becomings in the explication of a concept of becoming, the communication of different instances 
of becoming, and hidden and implicit becomings. Notably it is Plateau 10, titled “1730: 
Becoming-intense, Becoming-animal, becoming imperceptible …” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 
271-360), that makes the greatest contribution to the concept of becoming by incorporating this 
broad spectrum: from devenir-femme (becoming-Woman), to devenir-tortue (becoming-turtle), 
and devenir-révolutionnaire (becoming-revolutionary).6 This plateau, then, is decisive in 
instructing on the becomings of A Thousand Plateaus, in addition to contributing to the creation 
of the concept itself. Despite the many hundreds of instances of the term, and the attention 
payed to the concept (Plateau 10 is the equivalent of a small book), Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion here necessarily avoids a definition that might limit its expression to a form (either 
transcendent or numerically).7 This is a necessary avoidance since the concept fails, is finalized, 
once it is subsumed by a definition and so Deleuze and Guattari in translation create the concept 
relative to the instances they use it. Further still, the creation of the concept amounts to a sort 
of chemistry that articulates the compound of necessary dimensions rather than seeking to affix 
a definite end to its understanding and ability to function under its own conditions and that of its 
milieu. Similarly, in Essays Critical and Clinical, the essay titled “Literature and Life” explicates 
the concepts of becoming and devenir with specific relevance to writing. From these two broad 
instances of the concept of becoming it is still possible to discern consistent dimensions and 
shared attributes. These would be requirements for the concept to the point that, unless they 
are operational in some manner, the concept fails and/or there is simply no becoming. Again, 
the persistent dimensions of both devenir and becoming across Deleuze’s writings are: the 
presence of a duration which individuates the process, and the transformation of bodies 
involved in the becoming; and the logic of an encounter (through symbiosis and/or alliance). 
Each of these dimensions has a specific manner of plication given their situation in Deleuze’s 
philosophy and indeed in light of his philosophical lineage, e.g. Bergsonian ‘duration’.  
 The French term devenir translates directly into English as ‘to become’ and ‘future’ 
depending on the context of its usage. Devenir operates as an action without an object, an 
                                                          
6 Since in this chapter I am drawing upon the original French and the English translation I will cite the 
French separately but only in those instances that call for an elongated explanation. Also worth noting is 
the sense in which I deploy devenir here. It is necessarily confused so as to produce an evental sense of 
the concept, and in a sense to remain faithful to its expression. That is, at once I speak of devenir and 
becoming as the same concept (confused) so as to note their singular expression of the same attributes. 
But, on occasion, I also speak of them in different terms to show the degrees of heterogeneity that 
permeate the concepts. I do this to avoid the necessity for a transcendent concept that might gather both 
in one, although a portmanteau of the French with the English would be an interesting exercise in theory 
itself (decomveniring?).   
7 On the problem of definitions for immanent reading see the Introduction to this thesis. 
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intransitive verb, when considered as ‘to become’. This means that, when considered as ‘to 
become’, devenir is a process that does not presuppose an object for its application. In this sense 
I could not say that any particular thing “becomes” any other thing since it is not linked to an 
object or, strictly speaking, is not linked to a state of being. Alternatively, when devenir is treated 
as a masculine noun it resonates with both avenir and venir. With avenir, devenir draws upon a 
notion of ‘future’ and with venir the concept begins to gather the spatiotemporal condition of 
something ‘to come’ and a degree of potentiality. However, in Mille Plateaux (1980) Deleuze and 
Guattari foreground an explicit distinction between avenir and devenir while making a case for 
devenir-révolutionnare: “Contrairement à l’histoire, le devenir ne se pense pas en termes de 
passé et d’avenir. Un devenir-révolutionnaire reste indifferent aux questions d’un avenir et d’un 
passé de la revolution ; il passe entre les deux. Tout devenir est un bloc de coexistence” (357).8  
Becoming is certainly an adequate translation of devenir insofar as it exceeds 
identification with a strictly linear temporality of an object in transformation from one being into 
a future version of that same being. In the above passage, de passé refers to a past, and d’avenir 
refers to future.9 The danger is that devenir might be applied to an object or a thing that is in the 
process of transforming from one end (such as a written object), to another end (ash, mulch, 
compost, fancy hats). This strict temporal regime of past-future for devenir would be a 
normative approach in that it adheres to this specific sense of time incorporating, presumably, 
past-present-future. Of course there is little doubt that devenir, due to the presence of venir 
which speaks to the infinitive ‘to come’, concerns time. But, as stated above, it eschews the past 
and future of time for a fixed object. That devenir-révolution is “indifferent to questions of a 
future and a past of the revolution [de la revolution]” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 340) means 
that there is no future or past being of the revolution to which a becoming-revolutionary would 
be bound. A revolt against pervasive reading practices hinged on the ontological imperative, for 
                                                          
8 The translation in English in A Thousand Plateaus reads: “Unlike history, becoming cannot be 
conceptualized in terms of past and future. Becoming-revolutionary remains indifferent to questions of a 
future and a past of the revolution: it passes between the two. Every becoming is a block of coexistence” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 340).  
9 Immanuel Kim (2008) notes the connection of á venir, Jacques Derrida’s concept usually translated as “to 
come”, to Deleuze’s concept of devenir. Kim argues that devenir delivers a notion of “the Other” for 
Deleuze that allows for some resonance with Derrida (38-39). Insofar as “Other” persists for Deleuze, I 
must indicate that it is not “the” Other. Deleuze and Guattari: “the becoming-other of the animal is real, 
even if the something other it becomes is not” (2013, 278). Note the missing capital letter for “other” and 
the conceptual absence of an anterior subject or object as the ontological vector of a becoming. There is 
becoming-other because there is transformation, not because there is a real object to become. In any 
case, that Derrida thinks there is or should be a real object is debatable. Text offers a possibility, but as 
seen in my first chapter, it is little more than a risk, and text is closer to substance. On the relation of 
Deleuze and Derrida, Between Deleuze and Derrida (Patton and Protevi 2003) is indispensable. Of relevant 
note, with regards to the notion of á venir, Patton suggests that this illustrates a shared concern with the 
“future” and a people “to come” (Patton 2003, 25).     
108 
 
instance, does not need to take stock of a history or a future of a revolution. What matters is the 
bloc de coexistence (block of coexistence) which, as I have indicated in the previous chapter, 
concerns an immediacy of bodies (existere) standing in relation. So it is in translation that time, 
in the manner of ‘to come’, persists for becoming. Although, this is not time concerned with the 
future and past of a present being, or even a being that moves from past to future. The block of 
coexistence is standing in relation to the future, and to the past. Venir brings to the concepts of 
devenir, and consequently to be(coming), the sense of a transformation or of a change of a body 
in relation, a body to come relative to the relation it holds with another body. Bodies, of course, 
are not fixed in expressionism, but are permeated by events that hold the body’s dimensions in a 
relative stability. What is to come of the body is what the body becomes, and this constitutes a 
modification of the body’s relations (including those that are implicated in its stability). 
 In English it would seem the same normative function persists for becoming. In English, 
becoming might be expressed as “the reader is becoming…”, or “I am becoming…”, and when 
done so it seems to commit the verb to an object and to a definite future. As terms of well-
defined categorical linguistic systems, devenir and becoming both have the guise of being 
operations applied to things in order to be thinkable, a guise which makes them seem 
dependent on the existence of well-defined objects. The conceptual terrain is different from the 
terminological, if for no other reason than the complicated relation of concepts to problems. As 
concepts, both devenir and becoming escape the contingency of well-defined objects whence 
they are thought directly. Indeed, the concepts still pertain to the problems of time and real 
processes such as bodies, yet the degree of finitude in any particular instance is relatively 
decomposed. Deleuze brings devenir to its immanent thinkability, its immediacy. He uses it as 
one of the functions that change the understanding of well-formed bodies or entities of various 
orders. He also brings devenir to the essential operation of those bodies. Becoming is certainly 
capable of performing similar conceptual work and potentially without some of the 
terminological presuppositions, although only if the be- of becoming avoids the fixation of being. 
Further still, as a concept becoming is not bound to the linguistic, but must be considered for its 
broader milieu or ecology of problems, conceptual personae (the “I” of “I am becoming…”), and 
indeed to thinking as such.10 In this sense then becoming can be informed by the concept of 
devenir, and carry many of the similarities, but each concept has its own milieu (formal or 
                                                          
10 The inclusion of the conceptual persona in the problem/concept composition is important for Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of concept. See Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 2). See also Gregg Lambert whose 
analysis looks at both the conceptual personae Deleuze criticises, and that he himself uses in the 
production of his concepts (2017). 
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informal linguistic processes, broader socio-ecological contexts) which create different 
conditions for each concept.  
 To produce the concept of devenir (and becoming) the dimensions of the concept need 
to be clearly articulated, although communicates only its power as a concept and not its 
definition or determination. I will persist in this relative to both concepts with attention directed 
to their influence or potential for immanent reading. So far two implications persist in the above 
analysis of the translation; venir pushes the line of ‘to come’ and thus transformation, while the 
encounter of bodies is also presented in the bloc de coexistence. In Deleuze’s expressionism, the 
concept of durée, translated into English as ‘duration’, further articulates a displacement of the 
linear temporality of future-past but retains the problematic of time ensuring transformation. 
Deleuze and Guattari write that “there is a reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea of a 
coexistence of very different ‘durations’, all superior or inferior to ‘ours’, all of them in 
communication)” (2013, 278). In an important sense, the “reality” specific to becoming (and 
indeed devenir) is an acknowledgement of the specific composition of becoming. Duration 
further emphasises a temporal dimension for becoming, but it is a specific sense, and one that 
requires sober elucidation since the normative axis of history and future dissolve in its 
expression. 
For the praxis and theory of immanent reading I am building, reality is of the degree of 
bodies and existence, following an expressionist lineage that is further seen in coexistence. The 
reality of a becoming is nothing more or less than the composition incorporating a coexistence, 
and I claim for immanent reading the process of becoming as the composition connecting 
written-body to reader-body. Becoming passes between bodies, but it is specific to those bodies 
and it is of their coexistence in a manner that suggests contingency. What constitutes the 
“coexistence” of durations as the “reality specific to becomings” (2013, 278)? In The Logic of 
Sense (2004b)11 Deleuze distinguishes between ‘existence’ and ‘subsistence’. In the case of 
existence it is illustrated as a ‘present’ time: “only the present exists in time and gathers 
together or absorbs the past and future” (8, my emphasis). What subsists, in the temporal sense, 
is a trans-directional future-past that is deconstructed or, indeed, produced in the immanence of 
the present: “only the past and future inhere [subsist] in time and divide each present infinitely” 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that in this work Deleuze has indicated a disjunction between bodies and events 
wherein a body may produce events, or may itself embody events. Events, in this instance, appear to 
belong to the domain of ‘subsistence’ (see following note). In later works, as I show in this thesis, the hard 
differentiation shown here between events and bodies is no longer maintained. Further, in this same 
work, Deleuze introduces eventum tantum as a purely immanent process to the production of life and 
reality which already problematizes any sense of a body having specific stability – although it may still be 
meta-stable (see my consideration of ‘individuation’ in this chapter for the broader sense of ‘metastability’ 
from Gilbert Simondon). 
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(8 modified).12 What this means when articulating a reality of becoming is that it has at present 
multiple durations in time, composed together (co-) although this duration is conditioned by an 
immediate relation.13 Having eschewed the past and future of a stable being for the concept of 
becoming, it is rupturous to have them appear again here. However, the infinite division of the 
present by the past and future can here be understood as the complication of events and bodies, 
of the subsisting with the existing, in a zone of pure immediacy or immanence.14 Duration at this 
point only yields a sense of time, and indeed of different senses of time (different durations), 
composed in a present which is infinitely divided. But its necessity in articulating the concept of 
becoming is clear since the dimensions of transformation and encounter only reach so far. The 
dimension of duration, for becoming (and, by extension, immanent reading), constitutes the 
clear announcement of an evental temporality for becoming. In this, also, the expressionist 
Deleuze becomes more visible.  
 There is little choice for Massumi than to translate durée as ‘duration’ in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Both terms, without conceptualisation, behave as markers of a logic of time. Any 
thinkable process (such as an ‘object’) compresses dimensions, including time, to create a 
duration. A moment may last and endure, a band will play for a set time even though that time 
may be eternal (to the fanatic or the LSD user), all constituting a duration. However, these are 
not terms alone in a void with no environmental influence on their composition. They are 
concepts for Deleuze and they are composed amongst a field of other concepts, conditions, and 
problems. As concepts, especially following Bergson, duration and durée concern not only the 
compressed time of a “living present” (Williams 2011, 149), but an entire a-temporal (other than 
time) compossibility. Further still, even if becoming is a perfectly suitable translation of devenir, 
the above claims regarding durée and the possibility of an a-temporal influence — all concepts 
                                                          
12 In James Williams’ (2011, 147-149) reading of Deleuze on this point he makes the link of inherence and 
subsistence which is absent from my 2012 translation of Logic of Sense. It is, however, a reasonable 
addition to this passage since Deleuze himself makes the link only lines before: “effects … are not things or 
facts, but events. We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere” (Deleuze 2004b, 7). 
On another point, Williams’ reading supposes that this is one sense in which a single eventality, that 
captures subsistence and existence, is present in Deleuze’s philosophy (or at least his philosophy of time). I 
make it clear in this thesis that my reading notes the possibility of a single reality, that of composition, that 
is created and destroyed by the ongoing fluctuations of a subsistent ‘life’. This life includes a compositional 
process that also tends to re- and de- composition (one can continually produce prefixes and suffixes to 
modify the metaphysical process). See the previous chapter for my analysis of sistere as a further evental 
logic of expressionism.  
13 Note the use of immediate rather than present, since the language of the present becomes untenable in 
its infinite divisibility. 
14 See Chapter Six of this thesis on the notion of “pure” wherein this discussion is held in a broader sense 
relative to the notion of immanence.  
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have a milieu — show that the concept will not automate its dimensions but that it must be 
persistently constituted relative to its own dimensions and the surface it plays upon.   
   In English, the term ‘becoming’ constitutes the process of changing from one thing or 
state into another. As has already been noted, this can be presented a number of ways such as 
in “I am becoming a book”, or “the liquid is becoming a solid”. However, as the term gains 
conceptual dimensions from devenir, as with the supplementation of duration into the concept, 
the English ‘definition’ of the term is no longer sufficient. It does, however, remain as one of the 
concept’s dimensions which will always modify how it is read. For instance, in the above two 
expressions of becoming it is notable that becoming is a transformation that is not yet composed 
into the next/other state. The addition of duration to the concept of becoming, alongside the 
persistent dimension of the singular passage of an individual that would literally transform into 
another individual (from the English meaning of the term), produces two further degrees to the 
concept. These dimensions that are added are that of transformation, and becoming as a 
process of encounter. The insistence that duration be transported into becoming ensures that 
there is an individuality specific to becoming, or rather, there is a sense in which becoming can 
be considered as a specific metaphysical process. This is not dependent on its possible ends (as 
with liquid – solid) to draw out such an individuation, rather, the individuation is affirmed as a 
“temporary or local stability” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 291), or is metastable.15   
 
The transformation and duration of bodies in becoming  
I will soon explicate becoming as encounter, but will first persist along the argumentation for the 
involvement of transformation and duration in becoming. This section portends a necessary link, 
due to the temporality of transformation, to my previous claims on duration. As such, I am 
afforded the chance here to expand on the concept of duration. Consider the following claim 
from Deleuze and Guattari: 
This is the point to clarify: that a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself; but also 
that it has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of 
which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first. This is the 
principle according to which there is a reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian idea 
of a coexistence of very different “durations”, superior or inferior to “ours”, all of them 
in communication). (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 278) 
                                                          
15 For a thorough reading of metastability in Simondon, that hinges on the notion of a super saturation of 
potential in a “functional ensemble”, see Daniela Voss (2018, 94). In this thesis I also link the notion to 
haecceity following Anne Sauvagnargues. See Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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What is interesting to note here is that duration serves to specify the different processes 
involved in becoming.16 It is not simply that, in a becoming, two or more individuals assemble 
themselves in relation to one another. This would privilege the terms of that becoming as the 
creators of the becoming: as if liquid and solid are found first and everything else is a variation of 
those two states, or the reader-body and the written-body as the defining characteristics of a 
becoming which they have created. Becoming is itself a creative process that produces the 
imagined ends of its statements. It has a specific reality, itself a process that can be grasped in 
some sense as an individuality, or with a degree of individuality, from its own internal process of 
individuation. Not simple but ‘complex’ insofar as there is a variation of different speeds, of 
different life spans, a complex of relations that indicates a degree of finitude to any becoming 
insofar as the dimensions of a body in relation may be drawn away from this becoming by 
others. But, also, affirming again the expressionist metaphysics running from Spinoza to Deleuze, 
a relative and suffusing eternity that bubbles into the becoming from its environment.17 Further 
complexity is present in becoming when the necessity of its possible ends is removed and 
replaced with the duration of the becoming itself and indeed the durations involved in 
becoming: there are becomings, these produce their ends insofar as those ends are becomings 
themselves, and are engaged in yet other becomings, all of which have a specific temporal 
extension – durations participating in a duration that gathers them up and disperses them.   
 The imagined ends of a becoming, such as the written-body and the reader-body for 
reading in immanence, are produced as bodies but these singular expressions are as compressed 
and complex as the becoming itself, such that, as I have noted above, they themselves will be 
viewed as becoming/s. But attending to the individuation of becoming, its local or meta-stability, 
requires further expression of the temporal and (multi)dimensional implications. Bergson, who is 
a major inspiration for Deleuze (and Guattari) on the concept of durée and on whom Deleuze has 
written much,18 attends to the manner in which duration produces this local temporal stability 
while also noting the ongoing production of multiple dimensions — “a pack, a band, a 
                                                          
16 On the notion of duration, in explicit relation to Deleuze and Bergson and the concept of becoming, see 
Elizabeth Grosz: “Duration is the ‘field’ in which difference lives and plays itself out. Duration is that which 
undoes as well as what makes: to the extent that duration entails an open future, it involves the fracturing 
and opening up of the past and the present to what is virtual in them, to what in them differs from the 
actual, to what in them can bring forth the new” (2006, 4). 
17 It is difficult to speak of ‘relative’ here since it may be read as the relation of one individual to another as 
the strict sense of the relation. Relative in the sense presented in this instance only stands to articulate the 
necessary relationship between a concept, indeed any body, and its environment.  
18 Not including numerous essays, and the instances in his collaborative works with Guattari and Parnett, 
Deleuze has committed himself to three major works that directly engage with Bergson: Cinema 1 (2005a), 
Cinema 2 (1989), and Bergsonism (1991a). On Deleuze’s cinematic writings, Bergson, and Perception, see 
Gregory Flaxman (2000). On Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, that notes his difference from Bergson and the 
vectors of inspiration, see Paul Atkinson (2009). 
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population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 279) — in a 
becoming. Bergson claims that “in reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to 
imagine many different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or 
relaxation” (2001, 207). Bergson’s claim indicates that duration does not perform in a 
numerically singular determinate temporal manner, that of sustaining a constant singular 
rhythm within which reality can be categorically logged as a sequencing of well-formed moments 
(i.e. I do not read for five minutes and then stop, I am caught in many other rhythms). Rather, 
duration ensures that the event is grasped in terms of its ability to modify time, through its 
tension and relaxation of the enduring dimensions. In the case of immanent reading — reading 
whence the becoming is freed and not halted by any ontological imperative to designate a well-
defined or necessary being — the duration of the becoming presents a rhythmic and modulated 
time, a compressed time.19 But also, from Bergson, the multiplicity of dimensions that suffuse a 
duration is apparent in the fluctuations of degrees of compression. These are the fluctuations of 
torsions and contraction, of tension and relaxation. By extension, too, the endogenic (internally 
generative or genetic) dimensions of becoming, which can be as molecular as fluctuations in the 
breathing patterns of a reader or as molar as the intrusion of other parties (sounds on a bus), or 
existentially marking a break down in the relative stability of the becoming, are also presented 
as implicitly multiple. 
 In Deleuze’s reading of Bergson he indicates the metaphysical relevance of Bergson’s 
claims on duration, which is useful to qualify the role of duration in becoming and its 
contribution to my earlier point on becoming’s degrees of transformation. Deleuze, in 
addressing Bergson on fluxes, argues that “there is only one time (monism), although there is an 
infinity of actual fluxes (generalized pluralism) that necessarily participate in the same virtual 
whole (limited pluralism)” (1991a, 82). Every becoming can be coded upon this logic in order to, 
at least, monitor the persistence of duration. That there is only the time of a monism, a singular 
notion of time, does not restrict the transformation of a becoming. This is because durations are 
not strictly indicators of time but are modifiers of time, and because time is a heterogeneous 
process and spreads in all directions. This singular time is modified by an internal heterogenesis, 
what I am calling broadly in expressionism an endoheterogenesis, that produces actual 
                                                          
19 On the notion of a “free reading”, see Hillis-Miller: “A free reading would try to identify the way a poem 
or other literary work mirrors the future. Such a reading, it follows, is anachronistic. It takes possession of 
the old work for present uses and in a new context” (2016b, 179). The avenues to avoid here are the sense 
in which the writing might mirror the future as representation, and the inherent usability of the sensations 
of writing. Hillis-Miller’s “free reading” comes close to my own uptake and development of immanent 
reading, insofar as the transformative relations of the new context (and the opening to the future) are 
concerned.   
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fluctuations. These fluxes are the immediacies of which I earlier spoke and characterise the time 
of becomings. But becomings are not entirely actual and must, as Deleuze notes, “participate” in 
a virtuality which constitutes their environment. This is not in the strict sense of the “unnatural 
participation” of an alliance (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 282), which is the configured relation of 
bodies from different domains (such as the reader and writing both accreting different matter), 
but rather in the sense of a conditional world.20 This virtuality is what escapes immediate 
capture but haunts the actual becomings like a ghost that is both here but entirely incorporeal. 
Durations are shown here as not being suspended in a void wherein the void would characterise 
the negative of duration (i.e. Either something is becoming (is a duration), or it is not (no 
duration)). Rather, the effect of Deleuze’s reading of Bergson is indicative of a participatory 
reality wherein any duration is connected not only to a broader context of tensions and 
relaxations (actual fluctuations with/and virtual durations), but is also permeated by a material 
dimension of which it is a modification (time). I can consequently say that becomings, upon this 
line of argumentation, individuate at the same time as those individuations pass into relations 
with others, and a broader process, with which they constitute torsions. Or, in direct terms, 
duration affirms a multiplicity which extends itself from the immediate dimensions of a 
becoming to the domain of the becoming – a domain which has its apogee in the sectioning of 
chaos or plane of consistency.21 
 Given that becomings are individuated as processes that defy strict well-formed 
identifications, such as subjects or ends, duration begins to demonstrate that becomings are 
individuations of transformation. Duration has a temporal sense that is unavoidable in this 
discussion of individuation. Instead of indicating a uni-directional understanding of time, that 
there is a future that comes after a present which has followed on from a past event, duration 
rather demonstrates that time is malleable through a condensation and contraction of reality, 
and indeed conditions a relaxation and tension of time. Past, present, and future are 
compressed and take part in an intra-folding, are implicated, in a process that is capable of 
seeing events of the past or future as being conducted, rebuilt, and constructed from an 
immediate composed reality. It is this conditional sense of duration that allows Deleuze to claim 
that “duration is essentially memory, consciousness, and freedom” (2011, 51). In this sense, 
individuation that proceeds via the concept of duration is transformative insofar as no 
becomings are essentially finalized. A becoming will be both meta-stable in that it is a 
                                                          
20 On the notion of “participation” in Deleuze, and its relation to Plato, see D.W. Smith (2012a, 8-9). 
21 See Chapter Three of this thesis for the primary argument on consistency, and indeed the present 
chapter. “Sectioning of Chaos” for the plane of consistency is from What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 42) 
115 
 
contraction, tension, or torsion of dimensions (even if this is only at the level of the concept) 
preceding a relative stability, and a becoming will also be a-stable (other than stable), producing 
at once a fluctuation between phases. There is no need for stability that results in a numerical 
individual, and indeed becoming will persistently break apart any fixed stability indicating that it 
is at once multiple and singular (although not numerically so). The individuation of a becoming is 
thus also both metastable and a-stable meaning that it has the shifting of conditions and phases 
inscribed as endogeneous and is therefore transformational.  
 I have already indicated above that the English use of ‘becoming’ is often used to denote 
a ‘transformation’ of well-formed states into other well-formed states, as with liquid becoming 
solid (ice cubes do this). That a reader-body becomes a written-body, which I claim for 
immanent reading, appears absurd and would require that both bodies be considered as 
belonging to a single line of development (we do not evolve into books, but we are involved with 
books). Deleuze and Guattari address this by stating that, and I claim this equally for immanent 
reading, “to become is not to progress or regress along a series” (2013, 277).  The English term 
becoming must divest itself of devenir, if it is to operate in its written English context, while still 
privileging transformation, although without it constituting a transformation by development. I 
have so far recognised one extra dimension to becoming that allows transformation to persist – 
duration, and indeed from this is the process of time (albeit without a present). Duration brings 
time to becoming, making time something which is manipulated in becoming (condensing or 
contracting, flexing, tensing, cutting). Yet, Deleuze and Guattari make it problematic to indicate 
the presence or role of time in relation to becoming. Specifically, they claim outright that 
“becoming cannot be conceptualized in terms of past and future” (2013, 340), that “becoming is 
antimemory” (342), and is linked to the “Untimely” (345). The reason that they are capable of 
making these claims and yet still allow for the persistence of a temporal means of individuation 
(duration) in becoming is that considering memory, history, future, and past in becoming is 
submitting becoming to a system of points, stasis, and hierarchy, a “punctual system” (345) that 
imposes ontological cardinality and serial progression. Where the punctual system attempts to 
fix states of being for becoming, coming from some other transcendental level to determine the 
ends of becoming, the individuating process of duration as an endogenic operation works from 
inside becoming constantly modifying its dimensions and degrees of expression. Becoming 
indeed cannot be thought in terms of future or past except insofar as that future and past 
constitute a virtual whole that is implicated in an actual becoming rather than cardinal points of 
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a fixed system.22 This is a virtual whole of movements which perpetually transform becomings 
and connect them to fields of other becomings of various degrees, mix them, and fold them 
together.23 Nevertheless, transformation persists in becoming, beyond serialization and the 
progress of a line from point to point, in the modification of dimensions of bodies or otherwise 
“by transversal communications between heterogenous populations” (279). 
 Individuation comprises other dimensions that exceed discussion on temporality but no 
less constitute the composition of becomings as transformational. Deleuze and Guattari are 
elusive on making any claims on devenir that would fix the concept to a definition. I will say the 
same of the concept of becoming, in translation and here, that there is no definition but rather 
an arrangement of dimensions that persist in becomings or are aspects of their consistency. 
Indeed, the discussion early in this chapter that favoured the concept over any terminological or 
definitive claims is reflective of the above claim and is thus able to express the dynamism of 
becoming. Deleuze and Guattari do, however, condition an argument for the reality of 
becomings even if this reality has no ontological necessity or certainty and is not in servitude to 
being. They claim that “a becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a 
resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification” (2013, 277). Here the relational 
aspect of becomings is addressed and, by extension, the individuation relative to transformation. 
Here it is claimed that a becoming, beyond being a specific duration implicating disparate 
durations, is not built out of some form of relational resonance. It is not a correspondence 
between the relations produced by each final state where liquid and solid each are woven based 
upon their own site as a producer of relations. A becoming, then, cannot be expressed in the 
statement “solid is to liquid”, or vice versa, since it denotes a correspondence of relations – 
liquid is enslaved by its relation to a corresponding term. Further, that a becoming is not an 
imitation also extends an illustration of becoming that seems to hold onto a notion of 
transformation while also dismissing a particular sense of transformation (as in that of mimesis). 
For instance, I am not compelled to change myself due to an identification with some sensation 
in a written-body (such as the Saturn-event), and should I imitate these sensations I am not 
becoming.24 Whatever the bodies involved, whatever they define themselves as, there is no 
hope for their becoming insofar as they slave themselves to interactions of a mimetic nature. 
Thus, if transformation is to persist in becoming, it is not a manner of transforming one body 
                                                          
22 On the time of becoming, with specific regards to duration, Bergson, and minor links to the notion of 
plication, see Elizabeth Grosz (1999). 
23 This claim regarding cardinality (punctual systems) versus movement echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s 
distinction between arborescent systems and rhizomatics as seen in “Introduction: Rhizome” (in A 
Thousand Plateaus 2013, 1-27). 
24 On the “mimological vision” of becoming see Deleuze and Guattari (2013, 274). 
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into another, of modifying the form, as though becoming articulates a single line. Nor can that 
transformation be effected by a change of behaviour where one body comes to resemble 
another body. 
 Becomings create a reality of their own, a composition of their own, creating only their 
own selves amongst an immanent field of forces. A reader, understanding itself as an ongoing 
distribution of becomings (becoming-animal, becoming-shaman, etc.), creates itself with the 
attitude of being only metastable and persistently modifiable given an increase of becomings. 
Indeed, using “reader” is problematic in the current expressionist metaphysics since not only 
does it carry a system of preconceived connotative baggage but it also risks fixing a stable 
identity rather than maintaining the level of particular individuations. This is why, in the next 
chapter, the reader is given the full articulation of reader-body to denote the persistence of the 
reader in a bodily sense with an evental consistency. For transformation to persist in the concept 
of becoming, then, this notion of a “bloc” of becoming, of metastable individuals that are 
composed together and in themselves by relations that directly exceed their individuation, must 
be brought to the fore. This is the sense in which time is no longer privileged alone in becoming, 
as the development of a duration, and is no longer necessary for identifying the degrees of 
transformation. Becomings compose reality, their local and extended realities, and this ability to 
compose necessitates individuation as “the prior condition under which specification, and 
partition or composition, function …” (Deleuze 2004a, 97). 
 Where the concept of becoming achieves transformation, beyond the stage of the 
temporal which is sufficient for an elementary introduction, is through movement, affect, and 
the alliance of a multiplicity in a given encounter. When speaking of an individuation, Deleuze 
and Guattari claim that it can be located by its “longitude and latitude” (2013, 304). This invites 
an individuation to be found in terms of its environmental or even global situation, not from a 
point of transcendence or essence, but by its relative position on a plane, or rather by a zone of 
consistency. Individuations traverse an environment, can be located amongst and are distinct 
from that environment, and are affected by other individuations which create dimensional 
transformations. Reader-bodies exemplify this well: she walks among rows of books, she stops at 
a shelf marked science fiction and fantasy, these books and shelves are composed of different 
matter, the books and the shelves transform her as she transforms them and is herself already 
transforming (something is always decaying on the body, something is always being added, 
someone is always moving). While movement and multiplicity speak clearly to the 
transformation implied in becoming, by adding or taking away dimensions, by modifying one’s 
location in a contingent environment, it is the dimension of affect that most clearly indicates 
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becoming’s transformation and this is distributed throughout the mobile and allied event.25 I 
have two more sustained expressions of affect elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapter Three and 
Five) but it will suffice here to indicate that: affect is a capacity to influence other compositions 
of reality and are the productions or (malleable) signs of bodies in the world, affection 
constitutes the immanent expression of a body (which responds to the affects of the world, or to 
the out-going affects of one’s own body), and the affective constitutes the field of relations of 
affects and affections. If individuations comprise an affective dimension then transformation is 
immanent to becomings (given there is an individuation of becoming). I can thus say that 
becoming’s individuation presupposes an internal operation of transformation in the play of 
affects and affections. To expand this claim into new territory I now turn to an articulation of 
encounter which will account for the affective composition of becomings, and which accounts 
for the manner in which specific heterogeneous individuations (such as reader-body or written-
body) are involved in the individuation of a becoming (such as reading).  
 
Encounters 
When I speak here of reading as becoming, and of immanent reading as a manner of reading 
that preserves and seeks out becomings with literature, it is a claim into the ethics of reading. It 
inherits this ethical sense from Deleuzian expressionism, following the expressionist line 
developed in Spinoza, insofar as the ethical concerns a composition of bodies (as was discussed 
in the Introduction). Where Spinozist expressionism, according to Deleuze, deploys bodies and 
passions (sadness and joy) to determine an ethical composition, Deleuze’s own expressionism 
places the same ethical problematic of encounters in terms of becoming. In Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza, which voices the nascent expressionism in Spinoza, he makes a claim that synthesises 
his own concept of becoming with Spinoza’s claims on the actions and passions of bodies:  
The good is when a body directly compounds its relations with ours, and, with all or part 
of its power, increases ours. A food for example. For us, the bad is when a body 
decomposes our body’s relations, although it still combines with our parts, but in ways 
that do not correspond to our essence, as when a poison breaks down the blood. 
(Deleuze 1988, 22)26  
                                                          
25 On the notion of affect in becoming, of becoming as “a form of affective capture”, see Simon O’Sullivan 
(2007, 55). O’Sullivan’s reading of Deleuze (and Guattari), with its emphasis on the notion of encounter, is 
closest to my own. Although, I deem it necessary to generate the concepts in order to avoid their 
representation, a repetition of the Deleuzian method regarding concepts, which given my situatedness, 
generates its own novelty (or difference). I would also note the emphasis on expressionism, by means of 
plication, in the present thesis. This notion is explored in minor terms in O’Sullivan’s study of encounters.  
26 See also Spinoza in “Letter 18”: “just as I found therein many things which appealed very much to my 
taste, so I also encountered some things which I found difficult to digest. It would not be right for me, a 
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Here the composition of bodies Deleuze describes of Spinozist expressionism foreshadows his 
own (and with Guattari) claims regarding becoming insofar as the increases and decreases of 
power are modulations of a body’s affections. Deleuze speaks again to Spinoza in a claim 
regarding becoming: “to the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there 
correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or diminishing its power to act” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013, 299). In each case a theory of encounters is proposed as the most immanent 
vector. Bodies may not differ essentially, insofar as they share in the attributes of Nature, but 
they differ in reality. Again, for immanent reading, I have claimed reality as the domain of the 
existence of bodies and the present synthesis thus applies. The encounter is of bodies, occurs 
only in the domain of reality, but nevertheless implicates the consistency that existence inheres 
(as essence). Indeed, the encounter that concerns becoming maintains the differential force that 
prevents one body from transforming absolutely into another body. But the degree of encounter 
that transforms, by promoting the variable composition of dimensions of bodies in relation, is 
affective. It is in this sense, then, that I propose a theory of the encounter that both subtends 
becoming, and also configures a degree of the relations of reader-body and written-body in 
immanent reading.  
To return briefly to the ethical, the modulation of degrees of power of the body that is 
implicit to both Spinozist and Deleuzian expressionism, it is important to be aware of the manner 
a body is diminished in becoming. Deleuze and Guattari write that “to break the becoming-
animal all that is needed is to extract a segment from it, to abstract one of its moments, to fail to 
take into account its internal speeds and slownesses, to arrest the circulation of affects” (2013, 
303). This is the sense in which the relations of a body are decreased or decomposed by another 
body. That becoming can be broken under such forces indicates that to become is necessarily a 
“good” process insofar as there is an increase of dimensions or power of both bodies (which may 
indeed draw upon not just their shared existence but also their mutual consistency). This is, 
again, a qualification of the affective composition of an encounter, and an observation of the 
                                                          
stranger to you, to raise these matters, the more so because I do not know whether or not this would be 
acceptable to you” (2002, 805). Far from being mere politeness in a letter to an interlocutor, this phrase 
compresses an ethical theory and praxis which Deleuze explains in the passage cited above. In the 
encounter of bodies, there is the possibility of agreement or disagreement the result of which will be an 
increase or decrease in the actions of either body. Spinoza is aware that disagreement with his 
interlocutor may well not be acceptable and will thus decrease power the power of either of their bodies, 
just as some of the things he found therein are “difficult to digest”. See also Spinoza’s “General Definition 
of Emotions” in Ethics (2002, 319) where he argues for establishing the basis of emotions in desire, then 
pleasure and pain, finally explicating the greater or lesser force of existence” (319) given the power ideas 
(internal or external) inflict on the body.    
120 
 
manner in which relations modulate other relations.27 For immanent reading the breaks in 
becoming constitute a breakdown of one of the bodies, and it will be of little surprise why, then, 
some readers cannot maintain a relation with certain works of literature. From here I proceed 
now to articulate the notion of encounter as it appears in the logic of symbiosis and alliance that 
Deleuze and Guattari imbue into becoming.  
In A Thousand Plateaus (2013) Deleuze and Guattari outline becomings of various 
modes: becoming-woman, animal, molecular, imperceptible, intense, and so on. Each becoming 
has its own particularities and is unique in its specificity but these becomings are not processes 
of transforming one individuation into another. Becoming-woman, for example, is not a matter 
of transforming from a point of man into a point called woman.28 These individuations are not 
part of the same linear spectrum but are still captured and distributed by a broader field of 
gender and expression. Rather than transforming from one being into another, or from one 
cardinal point into another, becomings are produced as encounters of individuations of different 
magnitudes as when a reader-body encounters a written-body. Indeed, there is a specificity to 
encounters such that I must say that not all encounters are becomings, and, as I have previously 
indicated, becomings can be broken. Strictly speaking, becoming and encounter are not 
equivocal (voicing the same thing) and nor are they equivalent (of the same valence) since 
encounters at least can tend toward a bad composition of relations. Nevertheless, perhaps some 
qualification is required here since it is possible for all encounters to produce a degree of 
becoming, but this is not necessarily going to guarantee a transformation of any of the 
individuations that would be noticeable or important. In such situations it would be a matter of 
considering and plotting the affective distribution in the becoming, such as considering the 
preconceived attitudes a reader-body may bring to a written-body (are people so repulsed by 
some books?). Before I can say more on the notion of the affective in encounters, which requires 
                                                          
27 On the notion of modulation in Deleuze and his indebtedness to Simondon see, broadly, Sauvagnargues 
(2013). 
28 Deleuze and Guattari: “becoming-woman, more than any other becoming, possesses a special 
introductory power” (2013, 289-291); “it is perhaps the special situation of women in relation to the man-
standard that accounts for the fact that becomings, being minoritarian, always pass through becoming-
woman” (339). Subjects and beings are swept away in becoming, and the subjective standard of “man” is 
decomposed in becoming-woman. Deleuze and Guattari also claim that women too must enter a 
becoming-woman so as to decompose both the masculine imposition of subjectivity, and the minority 
status relative to the majoritarian male state. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, in their 
translators’ preface to Dialogues (2006) note that “the sense is not of something which ‘becomes woman’ 
where ‘being woman’ is the result of the becoming but rather of a ‘pure woman becoming’, without 
subject or object” (xi). The becoming divests itself of presupposed ends, even if they are there to begin 
with. A man’s becoming-woman consequently loses the imposed end of ‘woman’ as minority (imposed by 
the man-standard) and ‘man’ as majority since it determines a new and specific affective relationality. See 
also Colebrook (2010b). 
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nuance, I will plot some of the elements to consider when thinking of encounters and how they 
begin to modify the becomings beginning with the notion of alliance.  
 The notion of encounters appears, for the concept of becoming, when Deleuze and 
Guattari articulate the presence of symbiosis which they understand as a process of alliance. 
Symbiosis, they argue, brings “into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms” (2013, 
278). These beings for the present argument are imagined or are, again, metastable. Insofar as 
the claims of this thesis are concerned, ontological necessity is redundant for expressionism, and 
so it must be noted that these “beings” are not the same as the bodies of reader and writer, 
although their distribution has some equivalence.29 I have already posited the existence of 
multiple durations and there is the possibility of durations forming alliances in their shared 
participation in the influences of a surface. But here what is important is not only the shared life 
of a duration, it is that in having different existential magnitudes the encounter is not one of 
conflict but an alliance in difference. It is in this manner that Deleuze and Guattari use the “tick” 
and the “wasp” to articulate two types of encounter that are, despite the individual desires of 
involved bodies, constructive, pragmatic, and creative. That becomings are encounters, clearer 
in some circumstances, extends my previous claims that the individuation of becomings is 
transformational but with an emphasis on deferring the question of time. It is not enough, for 
example, to argue that a reader-body is a temporal contraction if I am to illustrate its 
transformative individuation. Rather, what is required is the manner in which a becoming is able 
to modify its dimensions – to add, to take away, to recompose, to destroy, to reframe, etc. What 
is suppressed, although not destroyed since it has some conceptual functionality, in placing 
some emphasis on becoming as encounter, is the idea from becoming (which is a result of its 
standard English use) that individuations transform completely into other individuations. A 
reader will not turn into a book, for example, and nor will they transform into a woman or an 
animal or an incorporeal colour. 
 Becomings are not strictly determined by their temporal coordinates, their duration, 
insofar as these would only account for the existence of a becoming at a minimum, remaining in 
part (in)determinate. An important spatial aspect to becomings is also present under the 
conditions of the materiality and multiplicity of their dimensions. Deleuze and Guattari make the 
claim that “becoming and multiplicity are the same thing” (2013, 290) which must be carefully 
                                                          
29 This is purely technical to maintain consistency for the immediate thesis. I do not firmly support an 
overall removal of ontology from the scholarship of Deleuze’s expressionism. Rather, that Deleuze (and 
Guattari) often call upon “beings” to articulate certain things illustrates to me that Deleuze is inconsistent 
with the full realisation of metaphysical expressionism. But lest expressionism speak to an absolute, its full 
realisation should be persistently stalled.  
122 
 
considered. In the first case, it is clear that there is some equivalence between becoming and 
multiplicity. However, “thing” belongs to a different metaphysical regime than Deleuze and 
Guattari otherwise create in expressionism. This ontological regime, which again privileges being 
over becoming, stabilizes becoming and multiplicity as the same thing. But within the domain of 
this thesis, and within one of the quidditative pulses of Deleuze’s philosophy (expressionism), 
“thing” is an inadequate marker and anything that has the status of a thing is only a metastable 
individuation.30 Strictly speaking, the above claim makes them equivalent such that when 
observing or analysing a becoming it must be taken also as a multiplicity, and a multiplicity as a 
becoming. What this accounts for is the spatial claim that becomings are made of many 
dimensions, of a multiplicity of dimensions. Deleuze and Guattari affirm this by noting: “A 
multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor by a center of unification or comprehension. It is 
defined by the number of dimensions it has; it is not divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension 
without changing its nature” (2013, 290). Here is the sense that a becoming, understood in 
terms of multiplicity, is a complicated encounter of dimensions and of encounters with signs of 
other bodies.31 A becoming has a degree of stability given the interaction of its dimensions and 
the permeations of the plane that these dimensions occupy. In immanent reading, which is 
always tending toward becomings, it is possible to draw a list of dimensions specific to a 
becoming of the reader-body with a written-body. For instance, in a more general becoming 
such as becoming-sensational, which it is possible to say of nearly all becomings with writing 
since writing is a composition of sensation, I would take note of the syntax, of the rhythm of the 
writing, of the colour palette, of the sounds, and then of the plane of the writing such as its 
contemporary environment (social) or its immediate environment (table, lap, bus…), and then of 
the attitudes, feelings, sensible abilities, deformities of the reader-body. Less generally, less 
macroscopically, a survey of the becoming will advance to the infinite but may be brief – an 
immediate encounter with the specific sensations of a work of writing. It is always a matter of 
encounters even if the encounter itself produces the relations between bodies.  
                                                          
30 There is a remarkable inconsistency in Deleuze’s writings. One thing to note on this is that, as well as 
producing sustained arguments for specific logics, and explorations of problems with concepts, Deleuze’s 
concepts and writings are immanent firstly to their specific eventality. There is thus a greater consistency 
within A Thousand Plateaus than there is when those concepts are compared as to their presence and 
function in other writings. This claim around “thing” is indicative of the problems of Deleuze’s consistency. 
It would perhaps be more prudent to note that Deleuze presents multiple consistencies for his concepts, 
each anew and real. On the inconsistencies of Deleuze’s thought, conceptual and concerning the 
inconsistency of concepts, see Ray Brassier (2000, 207 n.16) See also Claire Colebrook (2010a). On the 
“definition” of “thing” see D.W. Smith (2012a, 247).  
31 See Lecercle (2012, 78). 
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There is another vector to becomings present here that clearly introduces 
transformation to immanent reading. Precisely, the bodies involved in any becoming are going to 
be themselves becomings of various orders and degrees. The reader-body, for instance, is 
herself a becoming of heterogeneous dimensions (a multiplicity) such as woman, man, social, 
colourful, an entire arrangement of dimensions that are exposed in further becomings as sites of 
possible loss or addition. There is no centralized stability to the reader-body, no axis of 
experience. Reader-bodies will transform in reading, losing dimensions and gaining others, 
changing their nature. If becomings are composed of many dimensions then these constitute the 
endoconsistent thresholds of the becoming, the consistency determined by the dimensions 
therein. The dimensions themselves constitute the matter of becoming, the materiality of 
becomings, such that a survey of the dimensions maintained by encounters (inclusive of the 
eventality of the plane) will then reveal the exoconsistency of a particular becoming.32 It is upon 
this that Deleuzian expressionism unfolds in the concept of becoming.   
Moving further along this expressionist logic reveals the plication that is inherent in 
becoming, and it is with symbiosis that Deleuze and Guattari are most clear. It is observable in 
biological systems that one creature can exist alongside and with the support of another 
creature while also contributing to the existence of the other creature. This is an instance of 
cooperative evolution which is not about the strong prevailing, or the strongest, but identifies a 
symbiotic encounter lacking hierarchy.33 The bird on the crocodile’s back, despite having a 
completely heterogeneous individuation, is engaged in activity that ensures the comfortable 
existence of the crocodile. It is not a bind that draws the bird into servitude of the crocodile. The 
bird also benefits from the relationship by gaining easy food. How is it that the relationship 
between reader-body and written-body is conditionally similar? Or, at least, how could it be 
similar? The image above does not give us anything other than the relation of cooperation. It is 
                                                          
32 The notions of endo- and exo- consistency are found in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the concept 
(1994, 19). They concern the manner in which a concept stands relative to its own internal composition of 
forces (endo-), and the play of its milieu on its surfaces (exo-). See also D.W. Smith (2012b, 69). 
33 On Deleuze and evolution Claire Colebrook makes the following claim: “Deleuze’s vitalism at once 
recognizes, following Bergson and Ruyer, a form of creative evolution in which mutations and changes are 
not merely statistical but possess a certain tendency. To consider life as desire, as Deleuze does, at once 
installs change and transformation in life, while also accounting for the ways in which change – though not 
determined by any final form – nevertheless occurs as an engagement with milieu, or a positive 
production of relations in which a desiring potential that undergoes an encounter (or is affected by 
another power) will vary according to its range of potentiality” (2010a, 16). I have restricted discussion of 
life and involution in this thesis to the problems of inherence and immanence (following plication in 
Deleuzian expressionism). A result of this is that a discussion of the concept of desire is largely absent 
here, despite being a critical concept for Deleuze. For a sustained exploration of the notion of desire in 
Deleuze, especially in regards to a reading praxis that can be extrapolated from Deleuze, see Erika Gaudlitz 
(2011). Further, Guadlitz’s articulation of the Deleuzo-Guattarian “schizo”, the schizoanalytic reader sans 
schizophrenic, is comparable to one of the modes my own reader-body could subsume. 
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an example of becoming, not a model or representation. In the case of reader- and written-
bodies it would be a foolish move to link one body to an image of a creature, and the other to 
another creature. Indeed, using another example such as the pollinating bees and their 
cooperative relationship with flowers would still deliver the same situational conditions. The 
bodies are not exchanging materials in an economy, they are not dependent on one another 
(there are many flowers), one does not consume the other, there is no degree of filiation or 
descent. Deleuze and Guattari thus introduce into the concept of becoming, along this general 
line of argumentation, the notion of involution, carrying expressionism into becoming by means 
of the plicatory volution.  
Deleuze and Guattari argue on two levels that the symbiotic understanding of 
encounters is an exemplary becoming. Firstly, they note that in older evolutionary theory, which 
would carry Charles Darwin as its herald, there are operations of resemblance and mimesis that 
have been used to articulate the relationships between animals.34 This is further linked to other 
domains such as Carl Jung in psychoanalysis using “analogy” (2013 275). The argument at this 
level is to designate a regime of relations that privilege representation. For Deleuze and Guattari 
this is problematic and results in the privileging of relations of descent, filiation, and systems of 
“the great molar powers of family, career, and conjugality” (272). Molar, in this instance, can be 
understood as a definition for well-defined homogeneous points. It is on the second level, 
beyond the filiation of evolution, that they move from evolution to involution:  
If evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of symbioses that bring 
into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation […] the 
term we would prefer for this form of evolution between heterogeneous terms is 
“involution”. (278) 
Involution here refers to the acknowledgement that relations create a composition immanent to 
the terms, immanent to the bodies in relation and the life they are caught in, rather than 
relations of dominance or hierarchy. Again, there is a degree of Deleuze’s expressionism 
available here in the notion of “involution” which carries with it the sense of “involve” which 
                                                          
34 This is a complex argument Deleuze and Guattari make in order to create affects in several domains 
including the natural sciences but also in such spaces as linguistics. For instance, they are addressing 
problems of structure and series (2013, 273) which are hallmarks of structural linguistics. However, there 
appears to be a flexible use of the problem of mimesis which is to indicate a metaphysical alternative. I am 
leaving arguments on mimesis open to a degree. This is because, while I think it is a concept indebted to 
representation, I acknowledge its mutability as a concept. See Zornitsa Dimitrova (2017) for a sustained 
engagement with the notion of mimesis and a reading that contorts Deleuze into a specific mimetic logic 
insofar as mimesis operates as expression. That is, Dimitrova creates the conditions by which mimesis no 
longer necessarily a process of replication, imitation, or representation: “having its origins in drama, 
mimesis is thus more of a performance or a transmission” (7).   
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rolls or folds the terms as an expression of a milieu.35 Deleuze and Guattari qualify the term, 
noting that “to involve is to form a block that runs its own line ‘between’ the terms in play and 
beneath assignable relations” (278). With the above etymology it becomes apparent that 
involution plicates, or folds upon a singular vector, heterogeneous dimensions that have no 
reason to be considered together, but are nevertheless persisting in their composition together.   
In symbiosis neither body is depleted in the encounter, nor diminished. Indeed, it is even 
worth submitting the logic of intent to critique in this realm. For instance, it may be argued that 
a flower takes on its specific shape, colour, pattern, in order to behave as a lure for a specific 
species, it may even adapt to the presence of the other species (as in the case of orchids). 
However, this is to extrapolate an intent or cause from an effect (the presentation of the flower). 
Conversely, the flower does not hunt the bee, the vegetables that are pollinated do not intend 
to attract the bee. The composition is purely incidental, constituting a becoming in the specific 
and particular sense, and constituting a becoming of entire species. Deleuze and Guattari submit 
the case of the wasp and the orchid to this logic, claiming “there is a block of becoming that 
snaps up the wasp and the orchid, but from which no wasp-orchid can ever descend” (278). That 
the block of becoming “snaps up” indicates the immanence of a relation that unfolds the 
coexistence of bodies, the relation alone holding them together.36 This immanent relation, 
beyond being “assignable”, as seen earlier with the relations of descent or representation, is in 
fact an alliance or otherwise an unnatural participation (301). In the case of “descent”, the body 
of the mother is depleted in giving birth (and she must recover), whereas in alliance there is no 
depletion of bodies. The same event, giving birth, can be viewed differently with the relation of 
alliance showing that the mother grows (in affection at least) as does the child in response to the 
event (birth) which is the consistency of both their bodies. Speaking to an alliance between a rat 
and a man, Deleuze and Guattari ensure this sense of the symbiotic alliance is compatible with 
all sorts of configurations by placing the relations under the aegis of affect: “it is a composition 
of speeds and affects involving entirely different individuals, a symbiosis” and “an affectability 
that is no longer that of subjects” (301). I claim such an alliance equally for the reader-body and 
the sensations of a written-body.  
The symbiotic or involutionary encounter that constitutes the reader-body and written-
bodies is distributed in the same way, carrying the same mannerism. It is asked in immanent 
                                                          
35 See Chapter Two of this thesis where involution is linked to expressionism by means of being an aspect 
of implication. 
36 See Lynn Margulis (1998). Here she presents a case of a bloc of becoming in the form of the “protoctist” 
Mixotricha Paradoxa which is a body that is composed from the symbiotic alliance “at least five 
organisms” (62-63). 
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reading, therefore, that the reader orient herself to the writing in order to sustain a symbiotic 
relation, one that benefits all and is cooperative, is an alliance. The sensations produced within 
the written-body stick to the reader-body as pollen sticks to the bee: both instances are 
becomings and not analogies of one another. Thus, it is not by analogy that the reader-body 
approaches such sensations as are produced in Jeff Vandermeer’s writing: “W chose that 
moment to burst open and a tiny spray of golden spores spewed out” (2014b, 25). The 
encounter is with a living process, W, the words configuring the both the sense and reality of the 
body encountered. The symbiosis of the reader-body with this sort of image, then, is only 
assured insofar as the words themselves do not become a poison, a pathogen, but are composed 
in relation as a stimulant. 
 Further, the reality of the written-body is in no way conceivable as kin to the writer, or 
the descendent of the writer. If it is consider so, this will potentially break the field of possible 
becomings, turning sensations into phantasms of the filial sort (lest the necessity of an altered 
view be introduced). Reading is always an encounter. It is an encounter of two or more 
expressions of reality that do not formerly maintain a relationship, by descent or representation. 
But, it is an encounter (a relation) that constitutes a reader-body and a written-body, the 
particular expressions of that writing (sensations), the manner of its presentation (paper and ink, 
or pixels and screen), anterior forces of the milieu (the desk the text sits upon, the chair the 
reader sits upon, the mood of the room) and reality as such (the compositions and life that 
suffuses these). None of these processes obtain a hierarchical necessity because their presence 
in the act of reading is due only to the encounter. They are arranged within the encounter as a 
result of the encounter itself, not from a single hierarchical decision to assemble. However, all of 
these processes are necessary to constitute the encounter. 
 The presence and importance of the affective in becoming, and indeed in the sense in 
which becoming is symbiotic or allied, illustrates a final manner in which expressionism comes to 
bear on the concept. Of course, there is more to be said of the encounter of one body with 
another, not least with regards to the necessity of a sense of a threshold. Deleuze affirms the 
sense of the affective constituting the threshold of encounters in two moves: firstly by noting 
the role of the passions in common notions through his reading of Spinoza, and secondly by 
illustrating the notion of the fibre (in A Thousand Plateaus) which carries with it a sense of 
proximity and indiscernibility. As I proceed, I will include the aspect of symbiosis and alliance 
that are consistent and specific to the reader-body and/or written-body.  
 On the relationship of passions and affections in Spinoza’s expressionism, Deleuze 
writes: “Joyful passions are ideas of the affections produced by a body that agrees with our own; 
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our mind by itself forms the idea of what is common to that body and our own; from this flows 
an idea of the affection, a feeling, which is no longer passive, but active” (1992, 283-284). 
Deleuze is here guiding the body to a phase in its composition that can be properly active. To 
achieve this, the body requires at least some degree of agreement with another body, although 
Deleuze does note otherwise that even with bodies that disagree this cannot be  an absolute 
operation since “the common notion will simply be very universal, implying a much more 
general viewpoint than that of the two bodies confronting each other” (286). To become active 
is to create an adequate idea of those dimensions which are common to both bodies, which 
means that whatever is in agreement amongst the bodies be understood. Deleuze claims that, in 
expressionism, to understand is to submit those common dimensions to reason (283). It is here 
that a threshold begins to establish itself between bodies and it is, remarkably, both internal to 
either body (insofar as it is an active movement), and between the bodies. The agreement 
between bodies is, first of all, a passion that, viewed from one body, inflicts itself upon that body 
as a passive affection. Insofar as one is mobilised by this without understanding, one’s own 
affections are also passive. Whence the mind creates the idea, this new creation turns the 
passive affection into an active one. One gains control over the common dimensions and any 
mobilisation that follows (from this adequate idea of the common dimensions) will constitute 
the pragmatic creation of affects. In short, bodies suffer disagreements as much as agreements, 
but the agreements are no longer suffered once they are understood.37 The threshold remains 
unclear but is nascent on the line of affection as it turns from passive to active. Deleuze indicates 
induction as the threshold of transformation here. 
Deleuze finds the threshold for Spinoza’s expressionism by indicating that “when we 
encounter [rencontrons] a body that agrees with our own, when we experience a joyful passive 
affection, we are induced to form the idea of what is common to that body and our own” (1992, 
282).38 That bodies are induced means that they are guided or lead to a transformation. The 
threshold is thus not one of a limit or line that cuts across the affective flow, but is only a 
modulation or transformation of the same dimension. And since it is a formation of an idea, it 
consequently occurs as an expression of the mind, and yet further, is conditioned and made 
active by reason (and finally understanding). The agreement allows for the suppleness of the 
                                                          
37 On the notion of suffering in expressionism see Deleuze (1992, 223) where there is a reduplication of 
the notion of passive as suffering. 
38 The French term rencontrons also has the sense of a rather informal meeting, while also having a 
pluralistic sense (-ons). I note this here since the everydayness, sans complex metaphysics, is still 
somewhat present in Deleuze’s original French but gains a degree of formality in English. This is perhaps to 
do with an exaggerated presence of Spinoza’s stylistics in the translation. On the implication of “joyful 
passive affections” given the logic of expression, with a greater emphasis on difference, see Simon Duffy 
(2009, 183).  
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affect to be exposed, disagreement on the contrary making the affection firm (or well-defined). 
It is thus a threshold of variable intensity in the dimensions themselves wherein the variations 
move together in accord. If a body disagrees, they solidify any variation and transformation and 
reason does not lead to any further modifications of the body’s dimensions including the 
creation of the adequate idea of the joyful affection that exceed this body.       
   The only major changes when moving from Spinozist expressionism, per Deleuze, to 
Deleuzian expressionism occurs insofar as encounter can now be articulated as becoming, and 
the threshold is no longer a rather simple induction but also deploys a sense of transduction 
embodied in the notion of the fibre (though this still presents a modification of intensity).39 For 
immanent reading the above claims regarding passions are thus retained, though they face 
expansion upon the concept of becoming. The written-body produces dimensions which are not 
the reader-body’s own affections. These dimensions, which include the affects and percepts of 
the written body behave as passive passions on the reader-body. She may be able to gather 
these passions produced by the written-body, but insofar as she does not understand them the 
reader-body does not transform her intensity. The reader-body becomes active by composing 
herself of these new dimensions, by finding common degrees between herself and the written-
body, such that mobilising those new dimensions imparts no resistance from her own body, but 
rather explicates her power to exist. In this sense it is an alliance of agreement, even if it must be 
taken to an extreme degree such that the only agreement is of a shared nature. With events of 
sensations, such as the speculative events of concern to this thesis, the question becomes: to 
what extent do the reader-body’s dimensions agree with those of the speculative events of 
sensation in written-bodies? My answer to this is fully explored in Chapter Seven and Eight of 
this thesis, but for now it suffices to note that, given the conditions set for speculation, the 
agreements between the reader and written bodies occur well before “the most universal” 
(Deleuze 1992, 281), but also well after “the least universal” (281).    
 The fibre constitutes the threshold of encounters in becoming and postulates this 
threshold as a delimitation. The threshold is only complete in the transformation, in the 
modification of intensity and so it appears that there is, properly speaking, no limit threshold 
between bodies in becoming. There is a sequence in Deleuze and Guattari that plots this sense 
of the threshold beginning with the meeting of bodies. The first instance of the sequence begins 
here: 
A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. A becoming is 
neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between, the border or line 
                                                          
39 On the notion of encounter, see also Deleuze (1994, 23). 
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of flight or descent running perpendicular to both. If becoming is a block (a line-block), it 
is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s land, a 
nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one 
into the proximity of the other – and the border-proximity is indifferent to both 
contiguity and to distance. (2013, 342)  
That a becoming is not a “relation of the two”, and is yet a “nonlocalizable relation” speaks to 
the problem of multiplicity insofar as it must be said of any system that the relation exceeds 
those bodies involved. Where I here propose a written-body and a reader-body, it is understood 
that they are distinct insofar as they are different compositions. Reading constitutes their 
relation, but it is a relation that exceeds them and draws others in, especially insofar as a body 
will plunge into its own multiplicity revealing more bodies. In the case of the written-body, as we 
have seen, signs can play this role. The threshold emerges in the above claim where the “border” 
is proposed, but this border is at once qualified to exclude the necessity of a contiguous (touch) 
or distant relation that would indicate the numerical dimensions of the border. The border, 
rather, is a movement that ensnares bodies and moves them around, modulating their own 
relations. Deleuze and Guattari call it a “zone”, which indicates its immediate and immanent 
domain, and, insofar as the threshold is here partially determined, it is determined again as a 
modulation of intensity, the body of either position becoming indiscernible in the relation that 
exceeds them, as if a new body exists in the consistency of the former pair. The zone of 
indiscernibility also exposes the subsistence of a life in the immediate relational vector. For the 
written and reader body, they enter this indiscernibility so as to nurture this life and bring it to 
the surface (perpetually).  
Despite the sense that in this encounter a break-down in the conceptual separation of 
the bodies is in effect, a new threshold emerges that articulates the dimensional transformation 
of both bodies. This is the fibre and is the second instance in the sequence of the thresholds in 
becoming:  
Each multiplicity is defined by a borderline functioning as Anomalous, but there is a 
string of borderlines, a continuous line of borderlines (fibre) following which the 
multiplicity changes. And at each threshold or door, a new pact? A fibre stretches from a 
human to an animal, from a human or an animal to molecules, from molecules to 
particles, and so on to the imperceptible. Every fibre is a Universe fibre. A fibre strung 
across borderlines constitutes a line of flight or of deterritorialization. (291)40 
The “anomalous” here is a point of view considered as the change in vector given the uneven 
distribution (284) of forces in any event. The reader-body and the written-body engaged in 
immanent reading will find their dimensions splayed across this anomalous instance in the active 
                                                          
40 On this notion of fibre see Eugene W. Holland (2013, 106). 
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sense of the becomings underway. Insofar as the fibre is a borderline, it unfolds between the 
bodies, and thus in excess of the bodies. Yet, in the above claim, the instance of a fibre strung 
across another fibre implicates a transformation in the sense of deterritorialization which is both 
a change of the territory itself, in regards to the presence of new dimensions, and a change in 
the processes that traverse that territory. And, so, an extra threshold persists that is not just the 
unevenness of an unnatural participation (280), the likes of which are seen in symbiosis merging 
large and small bodies of variable trajectories in a single event, but also a transformation in the 
orientation of one body in relation with another. The sense of a weave, which is argued for 
elsewhere in A Thousand Plateaus, is present, and insofar as text is still deployed for immanent 
reading it can only be in this sense (which privileges above all the composition) and not to 
designate the body of writing itself and alone.41 Whence Deleuze and Guattari conclude upon 
the “universe fibre” the zone of indiscernibility is in full effect and the bodies implied begin a 
play of dimensions. But the universe fibre makes available the sense of a threshold that is 
inherently creative. This draws links across the vectors of difference that hold bodies at a 
distance and preserve a degree of their composition, while also producing new vectors at 
different angles. Thus, the threshold that enables the modification of dimensions of bodies in a 
becoming is no more than a shift in a particular intensity that passes between the two (passe 
entre les deux). This intensity, for immanent reading no less than any other becoming, is 
affective. However, it is my claim here, following Deleuze, that writing composes sensations and, 
as such, sensation is the second degree of intensity flows between the bodies in immanent 
reading. 
 Finally, it is with transduction that Deleuze and Guattari are capable of articulating the 
specificity of transformations of intensities that constitute the thresholds in becomings: 
The development of the stratum into epistrata and parastrata occurs not through simple 
inductions but through transductions that account for the amplification of the resonance 
between the molecular and the molar, independently of order of magnitude; for the 
functional efficacy of the interior substances, independently of distance; and for the 
possibility of a proliferation and even interlacing of forms, independently of codes 
(surplus values of code or phenomena of transcoding or aparallel evolution). (2013, 69) 
Consider here that bodies are compositions, modes of existence, but that every composition has 
implicit degrees of variation which can be called strata (56). The written-body, for instance, is 
stratified insofar as it is composed of affects and percepts. It is admitted, however, that this 
simplification of the logic of strata risks undermining the importance of the logic in other 
                                                          
41 Recall on this point that in Chapter One I argued that the weave for text makes it a fabric, suggesting 
substance, whereas plication articulates the movement of the fabric. 
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domains. Regardless, in this sense it is possible to then say that there are molecular and molar 
bodies, the passage between being constituted by the multiplied vectors of the universe fibre. In 
the above passage, transduction accounts for the only degree of modification insofar as it 
imparts an “amplification of the resonance” between bodies of varying degrees (molecular and 
molar), “independently of magnitude”. In this sense, then, transduction constitutes an increase 
not only in the dimensions of a body through a becoming, but also an increase in the affective 
intensity of the body. Bodies may suffer the passions of other bodies, but a transductive process 
takes over when these passions become active. Affections become active in the reader-body, 
then, by amplifying in the relation given some degree of resonant behaviour.  
Again, it is important to avoid breaking the becoming by reintroducing centres, and so 
the resonance itself cannot be of a well-formed affection that persists in either body (such as 
would produce sympathy or other emotions of representation). The resonance is only, then, a 
resonance of movement, whereby the affections assaulting the body are understood, cease their 
assault, and become allies in the growth of a body. Where the reader-body encounters a 
written-body that includes speculative events, such as the trans-evental sensation of the planet 
Saturn (see my Chapter Eight) which produces an array of affects and percepts, the threshold of 
transduction, which leads the body of the reader to a greater magnitude, is generated only by a 
change in the intensity of that body’s own affections (one does not increase their dimensions in 
a sad encounter). It is thus claimed now that an expressionist concept of becoming, implicating 
specific dimensions from the prior concept of devenir, while also acknowledging the degrees of 
transformation, and the manner of that transformation in a logic of encounters, is fully 
operational in this thesis for the theory and praxis of immanent reading. The following chapter 
now proceeds to place the reader-body fully into the relations of immanent reading. 
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5. The eventality of the reader-body 
 
An emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in itself, and not as necessary, 
possible, or contingent, is the greatest of all emotions, other things being equal. (Spinoza 
2002, 367 [Ethics, Pr.5, V])  
 
While immanent reading produces a sense of the written-body and its specific expression, and 
therein its expressions of life, it is an unachievable praxis without awareness of the reader or 
reader-body. Immanent reading produces becomings, complexes of relations, of bodies that are 
not well formed or definite. As previous chapters have demonstrated in this thesis, the process 
of reading in immanence observes the immanent creations of any writing taken as a body – what 
I call written-bodies. But the process of reading itself also produces other bodies of that specific 
event. The reader-body, or body of a reader, is the other important vector involved in immanent 
reading. It is a “reader” insofar as it is the reader in a destabilized and indefinite phase, not a 
single numerical entity but yet in a process of singular individuation. Deleuzian expressionism 
has already been used in this thesis to demonstrate the existence of bodies for immanent 
reading, illustrating the corplication they endure as folding bodies, while also foregrounding the 
consistency of bodies (their evental composition).  I thus use body in this chapter in order to 
maintain the expressionism of the reader. This is a salient means of expressing this body in its 
undefined phase, which I argue here in this chapter, is as evental. The present chapter, then, is 
concerned with articulating the reader-body through its eventality. But given my claim that 
immanent reading also modifies the reader-body, given the process of becoming (as seen in 
Chapter Four), this chapter poses what these dimensions consist of and how they constitute an 
increase in the power of the reader-body. I propose that the reader-body consists of perceptive 
and affective complexes that are modulated by the percepts and affects of the written-body. 
This consistency of the reader-body is, again, an extension of Deleuzian expressionism into the 
domain of immanent reading.   
A generalised account of the reader-body will unnecessarily produce insufficient 
universals to its individuation, making it grounded (being) or a well-defined subjectivity for broad 
application. Any notion of there being a specific evental composition subtending the body would 
be diminished and the reader-body would be returned to a numerical identity – the purview of a 
closed “I”, of a quantified and qualified well-defined individual. I here offer an account of the 
eventality of the reader-body, of the reader as a phase of expression and removed from the 
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ontological necessity of form. This chapter is oriented toward providing an analysis of the 
reader-body’s evental nature and with an awareness of the effects of an evental body on the 
sense of a well-defined reader.1 A turn to immanent reading will automatically produce this 
eventality of the reader, it requires only a shift in the presuppositions to acknowledge the 
eventality of the body. The first degree of this argument positions the reader in the metastable 
state of the haecceity which recalls Gilbert Simondon’s individuation. I explore here the 
dispersed individuation of haecceity by means of the swarm while elaborating an expressionist, 
which is specifically Deleuzian, concept of event that persists of the body. In doing so the notion 
of consistency re-emerges with a specific regard to its plications or folds. Since immanent 
reading addresses the alliance of a reader-body and written-body to propagate the unfold of 
becomings of sensation, explained in Chapter Four and executed in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
the present chapter articulates this alliance from the point of view of the reader-body. Here I 
turn to the affections and perceptions of the reader-body, showing that the capacity of the body 
to transform in an alliance inheres in these expressions. The short passage that provides an 
epigraph for this chapter, along with the claim that the orientation of the reader-body toward 
the written-body is necessarily joyful, produce the final claim of this chapter that immanent 
reading is a (com)passionate expression of all bodies involved in reading, or a composition of 
active passions. As I have claimed in the previous chapter, an alliance of bodies does not 
necessitate an agreement in terms of filiation. Rather, what is required is the composability of 
heterogeneous processes insofar as their own growth perseveres. With this, then, I will 
foreground the contemplation and understanding of speculative sensations as a composition 
that, despite the resistance of speculation to truth, ensures the growth of the reader-body 
without the depletion of the written-body.   
 
Haecceity; or the plicatory eventality of the reader-body 
Deleuze and Guattari anticipate a sense of the evental reader-body in their creation of the 
concept of the haecceity. In their writing the haecceity is the evental counter operation to the 
notion of the human individuation as being, or subject, insofar as it tends toward multiplicity (for 
instance, that the reader is composed of many processes), evades finitude (the reader has no 
single determined end or outline – i.e. Form), is created (not discovered), and is unstable in its 
ongoing change relative to its environment (milieu). All of these are beneficial for the becomings 
                                                          
1 An expressionist metaphysics motivates the philosophical works of Brian Massumi. Concepts that persist 
for Deleuze, such as event, are amplified in Massumi’s writing and the sense in which they inhere 
movement is notable and in accord with my own thesis. See Massumi (2011). 
134 
 
of reading in immanence and I claim alongside Deleuze and Guattari here that a subject that 
opens itself to events will obliterate its being and release its eventality:  
We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as though there were on the one hand 
formed subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal 
coordinates of the haecceity type. For you will yield nothing to haecceities unless you 
realize that that is what you are, and that you are nothing but that (Deleuze and Guattari 
2013, 306). 
Deleuze and Guattari here place expressionist metaphysics at an immanent degree in the 
subject. In the case of a reader, if they hold themselves as a subject in the relation, it must be 
realised that subtending that subjectivity is an expression that determines their real 
composition. One does not stop being a subject and start being a haecceity, one is already a 
haecceity and subjectivity is a code that has come to bear on the haecceity, endowing it with 
form and closing its transformations down to the simple degree of linear development. Where 
an I is composed from relations of bodies in immanent reading, it is an I that coexists with figures 
of writing, and this is indicative of the broader sense of the haecceity insofar as it is this specific 
body consisting of this distribution of events. Haecceity may indeed be a useful tool to break 
down thinking by means of the (problematic) subject, although this is not my primary aim, and in 
any case it has already been successfully achieved by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus (2013). Primarily, I am concerned here with thinking of the reader-body as a means by 
which the written-body can be encountered. Further, I propose thinking this encounter in a 
manner that preserves and nurtures the existential force of the sensations as they are released 
in immanent reading and by which transformation can be undertaken. For this novel 
composition of the point of view of the reader as an a-subjective individuation, haecceity is 
entirely suitable. 
In the above passage from A Thousand Plateaus the concept of haecceity gathers the 
sense of longitude and latitude or “spatiotemporal coordinates” (306). However, the concept of 
haecceity is a term of individuation that has its clearest and most well-defined origins with John 
Duns Scotus, and it is with this sense of individuation that the haecceity as spatiotemporal 
coordinates can be located.2 Duns Scotus’ scholastic metaphysics attempts to articulate the 
individuations of reality and the manner in which they are individuated. Individuation is given its 
                                                          
2 Anne Sauvagnargues has claimed that haecceity owes an equal debt to Simondon’s concept of ecceité 
since it can “determine individuation as a process… an event…the appearance of a singularity at any level 
it is defined” (2013, 197n.1). This is a useful addition for understanding the evental individuation of 
haecceities alongside the sense that Duns Scotus (1973) — writing at the start of the fourteenth century 
— brings to the concept. On the relation and use of Duns Scotus by Deleuze and Guattari see Nathan 
Widder (2009). 
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most basic sense by Duns Scotus as the study of individuals or, rather, what processes constitute 
the individual as “this” individual (1973, 629). Or, in Duns Scotus’ (translated) words, what 
pertains to its “determinate singularity” (624). This is not what makes the individual unique, but 
how it is that one individual can be distinguished from another. For Duns Scotus, the 
argumentation proceeds both at the order of real bodies (as conceived here), and at the order of 
God insofar as a determinate singularity of God is conceivable. Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 
haecceity is in some senses the same as Duns Scotus in that it is an attempt to individuate. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari have a different set of problems that force them to deliver new 
articulations of the concept of haecceity. Indeed, the most important of these is at the level of 
individuation which, as I have claimed in the previous chapter, is about creating or identifying 
individuals as open multiplicities and not closed sets (such as with subjects, things, and objects). 
The difference in the problems being dealt with by Deleuze and Guattari and Duns Scotus is that 
the latter is concerned with teleological metaphysics and the creation of beings, whereas 
Deleuze and Guattari are more concerned with the interactive nature of the human with its 
environment.3 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of haecceity is different from that employed by Duns Scotus. 
Before Duns Scotus there is no use of the concept and it is fair to say that in many ways Duns 
Scotus was the first to create the concept.4 The most relevant aspect that Duns Scotus 
configures in the concept is the Latin hec (haec) which does not have a direct translation but is 
used to convey the notion of “this”.5 The suffix “-eity” can be taken in several ways, each of 
                                                          
3 Consider that this milieu includes two stages in the valourisation of the subject: Cartesianism and 
Freudianism. The latter of these is a concern that is approached and decoded directly in Anti-Oedipus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004). 
4 Deleuze and Guattari claim that it is Duns Scotus’ invention (2013, 633n.33). 
5 Duns Scotus’ thesis on “this” is difficult to unpack and I make no claim to interpret the argumentation as 
equivalent to Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s). Consider the following: “that being which is of itself ‘this’ is a 
different being from quidditative being, and it thus cannot constitute a whole of which it is a part in 
quidditative being, but rather in being of a different character…” (Duns Scotus 1973, 631); and “this is 
formally the being of a singular, and that is formally the being of a nature. And these two realities cannot 
be as thing and thing, as can the realities from which genus and differentia are taken, from which specific 
reality is taken; but in the same thing, whether part or whole, they are always formally distinct realities of 
the same thing” (631). It is notable here that “thing” is problematized, which, in A Thousand Plateaus, 
provides a mode of argumentation for using haecceity rather than “the thing or person type” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013, 306). It is also notable that the term “this” is deployed by Duns Scouts both stressed and 
unstressed however the compression of “this” to being appears to be important. There is “this being” and 
“quidditative being” which I observe here as also being expressed as “the being of a singular” and “the 
being of a nature”. The claim that they are both realities of the same “thing” (note the interpretive 
difficulty that “thing” introduces here) is telling. I think that here is the observation that the manner of a 
processes composition, as “this”, is distinct from its essence. This would suit the expressionist logics of my 
thesis, and indeed speaks to the individuation of a process as distinct from its essence. The influence of 
Duns Scotus on Deleuze should not be overlooked since not only is the concept of haecceity present in 
Duns Scotus but also the important notions of virtual and actual which Deleuze utilizes heavily, beginning 
in Difference and Repetition (1994), as well as the concept of univocity.   
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which will determine a specific metaphysical presupposition. Ronald Bogue’s reading of 
haecceity is indicative of the general definition for both Deleuze and Guattari and for Duns 
Scotus. Bogue reads the “-eity” as “-ness” making haecceity “thisness” (Bogue 2010, 27).6 This is 
a compelling reading since it responds to Deleuze’s suggestion that the term be used for a third 
or fourth person apprehension of the human being in its eventality: “counter to any 
psychological or linguistic personalism, they [events] lead to promoting a third person and even 
a ‘fourth’ person singular, the non-person or It, in which we recognize ourselves and our 
community better than in the empty I-You exchanges” (Deleuze 2007, 95). The utterance of the 
“I” when I refer to myself, or any assumed self-identity, is a reference that takes on a secondary 
role in the identification. One cannot seemingly utter the “I” without putting it outside of oneself 
and having it turn back upon the process that utters the word. When it is assumed that the “I” is 
not uttered by a well-defined and determined entity, the “I” becomes a function equivalent to 
another process making the utterance in reference to myself. Further, given that the one 
uttering is not well-defined and the quantity of its dimensions is unknown (except insofar as 
there are many), it is both impossible to fix the reference to a specific thing and the singular 
source of its utterance. This is where haec becomes a useful tool since it wants to say only “this”, 
meaning thereby this cloud, this swarm of molecules and cells, this cluster, this body, this storm, 
this weather, this brain. If the storm, for instance, is taken as a body or mode of existence, “this” 
constitutes its individuation as standing before the body and suffusing it. I will shortly explore 
this further with reference to the reader-body, as evental. For now, it suffices to indicate the 
problematic aspect of self-reference in the absence of well-defined boundaries, and the 
potential of the haec in haecceity in dealing with this problem. The -eity understood as “-ness” 
also presents a potential problematic for reader-bodies because it assumes the ontological sense 
of being at the heart of the concept. Nevertheless, the ontological imperative is already unstable 
given the force of expressionism in the present thesis, and “this”, insofar as it designates 
eventality, is no less pragmatic for immanent reading. 
Deleuze and Guattari bring the concept of haecceity to bear on the problem of personal 
individuation in the absence of subjectivity. On this point Deleuze notes that “Félix [Guattari] 
                                                          
6 Used in reference to becomings. The term haecceity also gets other interpretations from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use and elsewhere. See, for instance, Holland (2013) who claims it as “this-here-now” (111), or 
Beistegui (2012) who recalls Simondon’s notion of individuation or “pre-individual singularities” (55). It 
should be noted, however, that singularization and individuation are distinguished by Deleuze in 
“Immanence: A Life…” where he notes “a haecceity no longer of individuation but singularization” (2005c, 
29). It is worth noting that singularization appears to carry the eventality of “A Life” that is expressed 
wherein its essence as a life subtending all processes is concerned. Individuation appears less concerned 
with the essential factor. See also Anne Katrine Hougaard who brings the concept to bear on the notion of 
affect and the process of folding (2012).   
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and I, and many others like us, don’t feel we’re persons exactly. Our individuality is rather that of 
events, which isn’t making any grand claim, given that haecceities can be modest and 
microscopic” (1995, 141). It is worth noting the affect present here, that they “don’t feel” they 
are persons, and I will soon return to this since it is important for haecceities to retain an 
affective composition. Moreover, haecceity still concerns the reality of individual processes, or 
the composition of individual processes. In regards to the reality of composition, for both Duns 
Scotus and Deleuze and Guattari, haecceity is a process that marks the intensity of a composition 
while noting its inability to be defined or determined with borders. In this thesis, then, haecceity 
is capable of individuating the composition of a reader-body, while preserving its indeterminate 
dimensions. Haecceity indicates the indeterminacy of the body, while retaining the operation 
and functionality of the body.  
An account of the reader-body for the process of immanent reading requires that the 
metaphysics of expression, those internal to reading in immanence, be observed and activated in 
the reader. When life expresses itself into reality as the composition of a body, that body retains 
at least a degree of its nature as an expression of life. What this means is that a reader-body is 
not a thing, nor a subject, nor an object, but is rather evental. It is only through the habitually 
sad ontological act that the reader has become a subject, object, etc. Expressionist metaphysics 
is evental, it constitutes the plication of events where a plication itself also constitutes an event, 
an event that subsumes further events. What remains to be claimed, then, for the reader-body, 
is the manner in which Deleuzian expressionism, specifically the movement of plication, 
influences the concept of haecceity. 
Deleuze and Guattari indicate that haecceities inhabit the “plane of consistency” and it is 
through this claim that the process of plication finds its role in the concept of haecceities: “For if 
the plane of consistency only has haecceities for content, it also has its own particular semiotic 
to serve as expression” (2013a, 307). Herein lies the necessary vectors. In the first place is the 
“plane of consistency”, and consistency has already been claimed in this thesis, in Chapter Three, 
concerning the stance of events. This affirmed that a greater amplitude of event, called Event 
(emphasis on the capital), folds from a univocal operation into a specific bodily operation, 
folding from subsistence to consistence. That there is a plane of consistency suggests that there 
is a phase in the composition of reality wherein events and bodies are taken together. Note that 
it is not a plane of existence, which would attend only to the body, nor is it directly the plane of 
immanence which would only portray the Event in its pure immediacy (see Chapter Six of this 
thesis). Thus, the plicatory process is present to haecceities insofar as they necessarily constitute 
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the folding together of events and bodies in a singular phase – the plane of consistency.7 In the 
second place, the plane of consistency, which distributes haecceities as its content, complicates 
the planes of content and expression (307). The planes of expression and content are not 
contingent, but are rather two distinct phases that concern the same process, a complication of 
variable movements. As Deleuze and Guattari say, recalling the theory of signs: 
The independence of the form of expression and the form of content is not the basis for 
a parallelism between them or a representation of one by the other, but on the contrary 
a parcelling of the two, a manner in which expressions are inserted into contents, in 
which we ceaselessly jumping from one register to another, in which signs are at work in 
things themselves just as things extend into or are deployed through signs (2013a, 101). 
A haecceity that inhabits the plane of consistency not only plicates a body with eventality, but 
also demonstrates the amorphous plication of its status as content of that plane with the 
expressive force of its actions, “ceaselessly jumping from one register to another”. In any case, 
content and expression goes little further than body and event except insofar as the inflection of 
content and expression is capable of demonstrating an incorporeal transformation. This will be 
noted as the transformation of bodies given linguistic events (100). With the plicatory movement 
of expressionism emboldened in the concept of haecceity, I now proceed to conceptualize the 
reader-body with regards to its specific dimensions. Haecceity has shown so far the plicatory 
eventality of that body, but it remains to be determined the dimensions which become 
complicated with the percepts and affects of the written-body in immanent reading.  
 
The affections and perceptions of the reader-body 
In the previous chapter, I have claimed that the reader-body is transformed in its becomings 
with the written-body, and, more importantly, the sensations of the written-body. What follows, 
then, is how contemplation of events of sensation constitutes this transformation of the reader-
body’s affections and perceptions. Deleuzian expressionism has brought the process of plication 
                                                          
7 Claire Colebrook is succinct on the notion of plane indicating it as “the virtual space produced through 
and alongside the events of connection and spatialisation… specific to the events or organisation or 
assemblage from which it can be intuited” (2002, 107). She is here referring directly to the 
DeleuzoGuattarian concept of the “body without organs”, which is itself a “plane”, but her articulation can 
be extrapolated more generally. That a plane, even an immense plane of Nature, is specific to the events 
and or assemblage is what is important here. I choose the term “phase” to articulate the plane since it not 
only deploys the idea of phase-locking, which can be seen in Deleuze’s reading of Simondon’s 
individuation as per an earlier note in this thesis, but also since it demonstrates the specificity and 
malleability of the plane in response to subtle shifts in the phasiology of any specific process. Thus 
sensations, thoughts, and so on, can immediately alter a plane and even change its nature so that the 
plane of Nature, for instance, might take on the phase of plane of consistency (or even plane of 
organisation if transcendental codes come to bear upon it).   
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to the body, showing how, as above, bodies and events are complicated. Of course the 
metaphysics here also shows the implication of consistency, of an evental milieu, that the events 
of a body imply or fold in. Events of sensation for Deleuzian expressionism are no different in 
regards to this plicatory process. In immanent reading the events of sensation that stand 
(sistere) away from the haecceity of the reader-body implicate the reader-body in their 
expression, just as the reader-body complicates them, and explicates their “own” sensations. 
Contemplation will demonstrate a process of compression or contraction of sensations, of 
percepts and affects, as they pass into the dimensions of the reader-body. This process of 
contemplation demonstrates that sensation operates without a necessary link to knowledge but 
rather emphasises a passage of (vital) life which, as Deleuze and Guattari say, appears as “pure 
contemplation without knowledge” (1994, 213).8 Sensation is also equated with “pure 
contemplation” (212) and in this way Deleuze’s expressionism takes up an empirical vector with 
an emphasis on articulating the power of bodies and the non-subject-contingent nature of 
sensations or its pervasive immanence to reality.9 In this section I will thus show how 
contemplation constitutes both the passage of sensations and the creation of sensation with 
regards to the affective and perceptive complexes that inhere in the reader-body.  
  In this thesis I have already established Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz’s notion of 
perception and microperception. Chapter Two demonstrated how conscious perception 
implicates an infinity of microperceptions. Deleuze’s return to Leibniz in What is Philosophy? 
constitutes an extension of expressionism into this phase of his writing. And, in What is 
Philosophy?, it is notable that the theory of perception and affection is entangled with a theory 
                                                          
8 See Branka Arsic on Deleuze’s notion of contemplation in relation to “thought”, and as the synthesis of 
past and future that “produces time” (2005, 137) through contraction of expressions. Arsic’s analysis of 
Deleuze brings his notion of contemplation into relation with Henry David Thoreau, and she considers the 
notion that time is spatialized, in Deleuze, by the movement of thinking. See also, Protevi (2012).   
9 Empiricism here does not equate to the attainment of knowledge through sensation and on this D.W. 
Smith is most concise (2012a, 62), while noting Deleuze’s debt to Hume. See also Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) where they propose knowledge as a function (science) rather than concept (philosophy) or 
sensation (art) (215). Further, if the Kantian schemas of reflection and contemplation are in Deleuze, they 
are transformed and no longer constitute sensible impression (see, for example, Beistegui 2012, 7). The 
notion of sense data does not persist for Deleuze insofar as the content of one well-defined and 
established system (the world) might make its imprints on the closed nervous system of the human 
(subject). On Deleuze’s empiricism, which is called transcendental empiricism, see Sauvagnargues (2009). 
Specifically, Sauvagnargues indicates Deleuze’s debt to Hume and Plotinus with regards to contemplation. 
Moreover, she identifies contemplation operating internal to the temporal “passive” synthesis of actuality, 
conditioning habit, and composing individuations (88). Her analysis is localized to Difference and 
Repetition (Deleuze 1994) and Logic of Sense (2004b), and her analysis of “contraction” with regards to the 
individuation of wheat in the latter is notable: “the individuation of wheat must be understood through 
separation on/in its associated milieu, as an entirely external contraction of constituent elements, woven 
through encounter in the formation of this plant individual” (Sauvagnargues 2009, 250 my translation). On 
the broader influence of Hume on Deleuze see Constantin Boundas (1993), and Jon Roffe (2009; 2016).  
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of sensation. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the affect goes beyond affections no less than the 
percept goes beyond perceptions” (1994, 173), distributing an equivalent logic for both 
processes (insofar as they are distinct). And, further, stressing that this logic is again a becoming. 
The percept is not resembled in perception, it does not constitute the data of an object that is 
consumed or processed by the subject just as becoming-woman is neither an imitation of a 
woman nor transforming into a woman. They also say, in reference to another becoming, that 
“becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance or, 
on the contrary, in the distance of a light that captures both of them in a single reflection” (173). 
The percept that is created outside of the haecceity passes from its own body to the haecceity. 
That it passes indicates own its material stance, but sensation in the haecceity takes over in a 
different fashion as pure contemplation. The expressionist notion of sensation thus takes on two 
phases expressed at different instances in either body. Insofar as sensation is the expressed of a 
body, it is the elements or dimensions of that body. Insofar as it is implicated in another body, it 
becomes contemplation. The logic, or indeed the process, of becoming conditions the 
transformation of phases, firstly in a singular passage of a sensation that passes in the relation of 
bodies, in the modulation of a percept to perception. And, secondly, in the process of 
contemplation that is sensation specific to that body. The haecceity is thus able to contemplate a 
sensation insofar as this contemplation is itself a further process of sensation, albeit in a 
different phase of expression. Deleuze and Guattari, in presenting this confusion of sensation, 
note a role for the haecceity as the third or fourth person here which is “a light that captures 
both of them” (173). 
The reader-body is in this way composed with regards to perception. The reader-body 
exhibits the power of contemplation as pure sensation, sensation at an immediate phase, while 
also inhering in a milieu of sensations that includes the written-body (and its inherent percepts 
and affects), thus resulting in the expression of sensation in the phase of percepts. Deleuze and 
Guattari summarize, in reference to the existence of written characters as much as authors, that 
they “are themselves part of the compound of sensations” (1994, 169). This is a “bloc” of 
sensations, or “zone of indiscernibility” (173) which, as I have shown in Chapter Four, are ways 
of articulating the relations of becomings. In this instance, they are becomings strictly of 
sensation (not of concept, nor of Idea). I have claimed of the written-body that it is a bodily 
composition of percepts and affects, and importantly that these constitute events of sensation. 
For immanent reading, it has been claimed that the percepts and affects of the written-body are 
added to the reader-body and consist as elements of its transformation. But the creation of the 
written-body, as a “monument” or a “bloc of sensation” (164), implicates, in this sense of the 
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bloc as becoming, the entire milieu of transformations effected in the reader-body. Writing the 
sensations of a written-body is thus writing a phase of the sensations of a reader-body. Deleuze 
and Guattari call this sense the “enterprise of co-creation” (173) housed in “creative fabulation” 
(171), in each case claiming the necessary relation of art to life: “life alone creates such zones 
where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate them” (173); the artist 
“composes the percepts of that life, of that moment, shattering lived perceptions into a sort of 
cubism, a sort of simultaneism” (171).10  
Contemplation, for the reader-body, is then sensation on sensation and it remains only 
to be claimed the manner in which the reader-body contemplates. Deleuze and Guattari raise 
the “brain” to this task of contemplation, or, properly speaking, “the brain as art” (211), since 
the reader-body I am here concerned with is engaged with sensations of written-bodies. The 
brain of art concerns itself with the “I feel” of the perceptive and affective complexes, rather 
than the “I conceive” of philosophy, or the functional (excitation-reaction) brain of science 
(211).11 It is this brain that I hereby install into the concept of the reader-body for immanent 
reading.12 Here there is no call for the systematic computational or nutritional models of the 
brain that pervade certain strands of analytic cognitive philosophy (209). Deleuze and Guattari 
express the brain as a “junction” of the three domains of thought: art, science, and philosophy. 
These are nothing more or less than planes, and in each instance the domains themselves can be 
constituted variously and briefly by computational or nutritional matter such that the models 
would not provide sufficient basis for a brain to unfold, nor would such models exhaust the 
plane they presuppose.    
That the brain embarks on contemplation is claimed by Deleuze and Guattari through 
the sense of an immanent universal force: “the force of contracting or of preserving, that is to 
say, of feeling, appears only as a global brain in relation to the elements contracted directly and 
to the mode of contraction, which differ depending on the domain” (1994, 213). Prior to this 
they claim that “sensation is pure contemplation, for it is through contemplation that one 
contracts, contemplating oneself to the extent that one contemplates the elements from which 
                                                          
10 On the notion of fabulation in Deleuze and Guattari, related and deployed in a broad display of 
becomings, see Bogue (2010).  
11 The concept of the “microbrain” is also present but accounts for all those modes of contemplation that 
are not anthropic (see Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 213).  
12 Deleuze and Guattari’s reintroduction of the subject by means of the “brain-subject” is curious. It 
appears as if the notion of “subject” is given new purchase in Deleuzian expressionism by the brain-
subject. But I contend that the brain-subject is quite different from the subject of “I think” or the 
subjective viewpoint resulting from a process of subjectivation that Deleuze and Guattari reject in A 
Thousand Plateaus, not least of all because of the presence of the eject (1994, 215), and inject (212) as 
modulations of the brain-subject. Further, the brain subject is described as “force” rather than viewpoint 
(211). 
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one originates. Contemplating is creating, the mystery of passive creation, sensation” (212). 
Through these two instances the thesis on contemplation is revealed to concern itself with the 
modulation of sensation, rather than the intuition of ideas and concepts, and indeed is 
conditioned by the process of contraction.13 There are domains of sensation that are composed 
(mode of contraction) that implicate material sensation (elements), and although these are 
heterogeneous growths they are specific interactions. The process of contraction subtends one 
in the other without either disappearing or yielding to the force of the other by way of 
destruction. In this way, the sensations of the world cut across the sensations of a body. It is the 
same fibre of becoming. Whence they pass through the body the body distorts, or otherwise 
implements a process of torsion, upon the through flowing sensations altering their vector and 
distribution (shape, vibrance, and so on). Sensation as contemplation acts upon sensation as 
matter (percept and affect).  
Pure contemplation is affirmed in the immediate evental resonance of “vibrations” that 
constitute a monument (1994, 211).14 It is the pouring of sensations into the body, and from the 
body, modulated by degrees of sensation that inhabit the body, in as much as it modulates those 
sensations itself. It would be a nexus point in the body except that the elements of sensations 
themselves are vitalized by an eventality that consists in all iterations. As such, the reader-body 
of immanent reading consists of the events of sensation they encounter in their becoming 
inasmuch as they consist as haecceity. Deleuze and Guattari’s claim on the persistence of 
sensation through the process of contemplation applies: “contraction is not an action but a pure 
passion, a contemplation that preserves the before in the after” (212). The time of becoming is 
here again, but it is the notion of “passion” that is notable. Passions, as has been persistently 
argued in this thesis, are the active and passive phases of a body: active insofar as an adequate 
idea follows an agreement between bodies; passive insofar as the agreement is not transformed 
or amplified in the body by the body. For immanent reading, the reader-body encountering the 
sensations of a written-body is imbued with a creative force. At once the sensations inbound 
                                                          
13 See also Bergsonism (Deleuze 1991a) where Deleuze criticises contemplation as the intuition of ideas 
from sensations: “In philosophy itself, there is still too much alleged contemplation: everything happens as 
if intelligence were already imbued with emotion, thus with intuition, but not sufficiently so for creating in 
conformity to this emotion” (111-112). Deleuze is here criticising numerous points, for instance creative 
knowledge is counter to received knowledge. But, most importantly, contemplation is “alleged” and this is 
because it is only operating under the conditions of the intuition of ideas. Deleuze is not arguing against 
himself when he comes to write What is Philosophy?, it appears rather that he wishes to organise a 
different sense of contemplation removed from the planes of science or philosophy. See also Deleuze’s 
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature (1991b), where Deleuze 
addresses sensation and contemplation in regards to Hume. This is not the same thesis he extends in 
What is Philosophy? but the early sense is present. He recalls Hume in this latter work to make his 
arguments regarding contraction. 
14 See François Zourabichvili on the notion of “contemplative becomings” (2012, 119). 
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may agree with the reader-body, but the latter is passive insofar as the reader-body does not 
attempt to amplify the sensations, to deliberately modify them in the body. The active passion of 
creation belongs to the artist or writer, the reader starts at the agreement of sensations, the 
alliance. The reader-body that becomes active is in a strange phase, to create could be to 
contemplate sensations in such a way as to make them new and deliver a new monument. This 
exercise moves beyond immanent reading, if for no other reason than because the immediacy of 
the sensations being complicated in the body will be (re)presented. Immanent reading provokes 
becoming with sensations, and as such sensations constitute evental material for the expression 
of the reader-body itself. The reader is passively creative insofar as the becomings are 
preserved, the sensations preserved as they pass through the body, but it is a passivity that still 
increases the degrees of the reader-body, that make the affections of that body contort and 
swell, that add new degrees to the perceptions of that body. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 
“sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other 
(while continuing to be what they are), sunflower or Ahab” (177). The subtle act of transduction 
inheres in becomings with sensation, an act that is creative but not with the necessary transition 
of Ideas, from inadequate to adequate, but through an active contemplation.15                        
Therefore, for the reader-body of immanent reading, the complicated sense of an 
eventality that consists in the existence of a body is established. This composite is regarded as a 
haecceity rather than a subject (although Deleuze and Guattari offer the inject as another 
possible replacement with regards to art). Inhering in this reader-body are the vectors of 
sensation (comprising affections and perceptions) which are phasiologically individuated from a 
milieu of sensations and monuments of sensations that occupy that milieu. The sensations that 
are experienced by a reader-body are done so by contemplation which is an act of sensation on 
sensation, suggesting that the contraction of sensation is not the excitement of stimuli on the 
brain. The brain is a junction that distributes thought with regards to the immediate 
environment. And, finally, sensation consists in the reader-body as a vector of pure immediacy 
expressed in the direct apprehension of reading sensations. This final claim is developed further, 
with regards to (pure) immanence and life, in the following chapter. What follows, then, given 
that so far I have articulated the two bodies of immanent reading and the complex of relations 
that suffuse them as degrees of becoming, is the move to the immanent phase of the thesis. This 
comprises the theory of immanence (including the Deleuzian expressionism that persists 
therein). Following this, the expressionist theory of immanence is deployed in the two final 
                                                          
15 It is not present in Deleuze’s writings but one can begin to ponder the notions of adequate and 
inadequate perceptions and affections. I believe this is simply the transitions of affect/affection, or 
percept/perception.  
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chapters that compose a series of encounters with speculative sensations through an emphasis 
on the praxis of immanent reading. Chapter Six will thus be observed as a transition phase, 
insofar as the ethical praxis of the theory and praxis of immanent reading expands to 
incorporate the process of life that is involved (without, of course, losing the theoretical 
development that is explicated in praxis).    
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6. One degree of immanence: Life 
 
In this chapter I am exploring immanence, and life, in order to create the conditions for 
immanent reading. For Deleuze, immanence is the expression of a life in the process of its 
expression and nothing more. It is not a metaphysical category or principle. Instead of 
proceeding from a ground, immanence as metaphysics concerns how processes consist as a 
composition of relations whereby the relations have no external limit except the composition of 
their immediacy. When immanence is thought, thought constitutes the immediate vector, from 
which it necessarily follows how immanence is internal and presupposed in the process of 
thinking. When immanence is experienced (no longer thought, or just thought) it is, again, 
concerned with the implications that are presupposed for experience. For instance, I have shown 
with the process of contemplation (in Chapter Five), via Deleuze and Guattari, that if it is 
presupposed of the reader-body, this presupposition must be extended into the domain within 
which the reader-body exists. This is because I implicate the reader-body in an expressive, 
though not ejective, reality. Immanence is thus a metaphysics of presupposition that concerns 
encounters with the immediate, although unknown, (in)consistencies of reality. To experience 
immanence is not necessarily to think it, but to think immanence presupposes immanence, 
creates it, makes it internal to itself, and imbues it with a consistency that at once composes a 
reality in the manner of a life that, in the same immediacy, implicates that very thinker. It is not 
so much that what is real is what is thought, but that through immanence one is capable of 
experiencing life in its full immediacy, as both local and eternal. For Deleuze, immanence is the 
singular concept that enables bodies to be expressed as life, and to remain within it. As such, 
immanence concerns presuppositions as they are displayed from any particular point of view. 
And it is this that I explore and develop in this chapter. I am first concerned with the concept of 
inherence, then Deleuze’s use of the variations of immanence, before I conclude upon the 
vertigo of immanence instantiated by involution. 
What I persistently call immanent reading, or a variant thereof, is reliant on both the 
metaphysics brought about by inherent (ethical) natural conditions (as set out in Chapter One, 
Two, and Four), and the immanent creations of the bodies involved (see Chapters Three and 
Five). Where I seek the immanent reality of a written-body, I seek the life it is an expression of, a 
life that takes on this immediate sense of reality or composition. I propose for immanent reading 
an encounter with the vital creation of sensations inherent to any particular instance of writing. 
This takes the speculative events of sensation that are involved in the written-body as “evidence 
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of an expression of life” (Colebrook 2010a, 8). But in immanent reading there is still yet novel 
life, and there is no search for some meaning hidden behind the veil of words. A written-body is 
a life, and it is a life insofar as it is a local expression of all the forces of existence, from 
composition in reality to decomposition in an unrelenting chaos.1 A written-body is living insofar 
as it is immanent to life, a life insofar as it is an expression of a life that constitutes the vital 
power of bodies. It is a surge of life, an expansion of life in a specific composition that does not 
exhaust life, nor bring its entirety to bear on the reader-body. There is, then, only one degree of 
immanence, that of “a life” (Deleuze 2005c, 27), and it is here that I reinforce these claims on the 
nature of immanence.2 Yet, and this will necessarily follow in the proceeding chapter, 
expressions and events of sensation, constitute the multiplicity of this life, the expansion of its 
dimensions, and an increase in its degrees.  
 I have made claims so far on immanent reading, immanent life, immanent creation, 
sensation, ethics, reality, and so on. In doing so I have avoided defining immanence or saying 
anything particular on what it is. This is because immanence is an altogether different 
                                                          
1 Claire Colebrook, in a reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the secret relative to Derrida, identifies 
their “immanent mode of reading” (2010b, 287). She claims that for Deleuze and Guattari, “Life is not 
reducible to the extended and recognisable terms that it produces, but this does not mean that there is an 
absolute secret so much as a proliferating secrecy, the emission or unfolding of relations the virtual force 
of which can never be given once and for all” (298). Access to this life, which can never be entirely 
experienced, is by means of an experience of relations, not such that the relations will resonate, gel, or 
have any correspondence with one’s own whatsoever. Rather, the relations reveal the differing 
compositions of perceptions and points of view (worlds) on relations as such, to which the reader is 
presumably added, and can be taken away. In my theory of immanent reading, I am concerned with an 
emphasis on the reader-body as a point of contemplation of sensations.     
2 There is a concept of immanence well under development in the history of philosophy. I come to it in this 
thesis with the intention of adding further dimensions, including various plications such as application in 
the mobilisation of immanence in the process of reading. The primary contemporary progenitor of a 
concept of immanence is Gilles Deleuze, but Michel Henry also appears to develop a concept of 
immanence in his phenomenological works. Deleuze and Henry constitute the main voices of the concept 
of immanence in the 20th Century. They produce different concepts, summarized by John Mullarkey: 
“where Henry forwards an immanent theism, Deleuze follows an immanent naturalism” (2006, 50). 
Whether or not this is an adequate claim on their concepts (is Deleuze a naturalist?), the difference is 
oriented with the matters that concern each thinker. For Deleuze I will say that the concept of immanence 
is produced with regards to the “lived passage” between states even if these states are not entirely stable. 
For Henry, the concern appears as the failure of transcendentalism to deal with phenomena as it orients 
itself to human life. John Mullarkey notes: “according to Henry, phenomenology is materialised in his work 
by being based on immanent, embodied affectivity” (2006 50). The emphasis here is on phenomena as 
material which would contribute to a broad thesis on immanence including the role of consciousness. It 
seems, then, that either Deleuze or Henry could be perfectly useful for immanent reading. Since Henry has 
no established influence on expressionism in philosophy, though he is a reader of Spinoza, and since this 
thesis orients itself from a Deleuzian expressionism, Henry constitutes a tangential pathway – though 
potentially powerful and useful. It stands, then, to claim for Henry an alternate possibility in the 
development of immanent reading. Such a project would require considerable labour though the question 
of what a concept of immanence does to the relationship a reader holds with writing would be a useful 
orientation. Another site to explore the question of immanent reading, from the point of view of the 
concept of immanence, is François Laruelle’s developments of “radical immanence” (2013, 3).     
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metaphysics, proceeding in no necessary relation to physics, or, importantly, to being, Being, or 
any ontological determination. “Metaphysics” may be of some use to help in the present 
exploration of immanence, and its relevance to immanent reading, but the prefix “meta” or 
“after”, and the “physics”, plot a necessary relation in the contemporary milieu to science which 
I wish to avoid here – I am here in no necessary relation to scientific notions of physics. At all 
costs, I desire to avoid presenting immanence as a first principle. Consequently, the term 
metaphysics can be scrapped in favour of another proper name, or presented with a heavy 
caveat, or further still, metaphysics can be redefined. I hear opt for the caveat and reserve the 
redefinition of metaphysics for more sustained critique and creation.         
Deleuze’s concept of immanence is as complex as the use I have made of it here in this 
thesis. For instance, in Deleuze’s “Immanence: A Life …” (2005c) he posits “a pure plane of 
immanence” (26), “pure immanence” and “absolute immanence” (27), a “plane of immanence” 
(30) and “the immanence of the transcendental field” (32). With Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus 
(2013) he presents “a plane that works by immanence” (329), as well as “the plane of 
immanence or consistency” (328), and “field of immanence” (179).3 This is not of course the 
extent of his claims on immanence, it is a persistent and recurring concept in his work from his 
early works, to his Cinema works, to his end works. These particular instances demonstrate the 
complexity and the multivalent expression of the concept in his oeuvre. By way of Deleuze’s use 
and explanation of immanence, and by way of my own uses of the terms in this thesis so far, I 
here articulate a concept of immanence that trades preferentially on the lineage of the 
Deleuzian concept, with and without Guattari.4 At the level of concepts, the logic of inherence 
will provide my initial passage into the exploration of immanence.  
 
Inherence of a life 
In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1992) Deleuze identifies a philosophy of immanence 
with use of the complimentary concept of inherence which, along with the three movements of 
plication, constitutes one of the components of expression. Christian Kerslake suggests that 
immanence becomes “the problem inspiring [Deleuze’s] work” (2009, 2). It is certainly a problem 
that persists in Deleuze’s work, appearing in his collaborations (with Guattari 1986; 1994; 2004; 
2013; and with Parnett 2006), his writing on Bergson (1991a), his Cinema books (1989; 2005c), 
Difference and Repetition (1994), his works on literature (1997), his writings on Francis Bacon 
                                                          
3 On the relation of life to the plane of consistency see John Protevi (2012, 257). 
4 As shown, the concept of immanence appears in both Deleuze’s collaborative works and his solo works. 
The sustained development of a concept of immanence for Guattari appears to be absent. 
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(2005b) and Leibniz (2006), and in his “final” published essay “Immanence: A Life…” (Deleuze 
2005c).5 That it is the problem inspiring his work is reasonable but it is also reductive insofar as it 
reduces Deleuze to a metaphysician of the standard order, a producer or seeker of first 
principles, and unnecessarily connects his constellation of concepts to a single problem. For 
Deleuze, immanence ceases to be a problem immediately, starting its life as functional concept 
relative to transcendence, before gaining those further sites of expression that constantly add to 
the concept. Immanence articulates a movement for Deleuze, a movement of relations 
(plication) already under way in any composition. It is a concept that Deleuze creates but it 
develops nascently, in Deleuze’s philosophy, to the component of expression called inherence 
and thus to Spinoza.6 
 Deleuze makes the following statement in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 
regarding immanence and expression: 
Expression comprehends all these aspects: complication, explication, inherence, 
implication. And these aspects of expression are also categories of immanence. 
Immanence is revealed as expressive, and expression as immanent, in a system of logical 
relations within which the two notions are correlative. (1992, 175) 
I have previously marked the expressive degrees of plication for a praxis of immanent reading 
(Chapter Two). Therein inherence had little demonstrative force for the process of plication in 
expression. In Deleuze’s articulation, inherence returns the process of plication in expression to 
its heterogenic relations. In the above passage, expression and immanence are complementary. 
Expression is indicative of the manner of creation, immanence is indicative of the sites and 
means of expression and, indeed, the relations of expressions which create, albeit without 
determination, an expressor, an expressed, and an expression. Inherence suffuses the expressive 
coordinates with a call to interiority. And yet, the components of expression break the presumed 
necessity of an interior/exterior dichotomous relation by demonstrating the active and 
persistent processes of collapsing, reforming, undulating, and distributive folds which inform all 
                                                          
5 “Immanence: A Life…” (Deleuze 2005c) appears in French as “L’Immanence: Une Vie” in 1995. It is often 
touted as his final work from which some significance is drawn on its central role in his work. Yet reading 
Deleuze’s works never brings about a sense that he be read with a beginning and an end, nor with a static 
central concept around which all his other concepts orbit, nor a grounding concept from which all his 
others transcend. In fact, several of his own concepts problematize this linearity and centralization. In this 
thesis alone, consider the concepts of “event” (Chapter Five) or “becoming” (Chapter Four). I contend that 
Deleuze neither has a “final” work, nor does that last work he published in 1995 constitute his final work. 
It is also curious that the English translation has an ellipsis in the title when the French instance does not. I 
am unsure what to make of this, although Giorgio Agamben’s reading (1999) is of note.      
6 It is an accident, or at least unwitting, that Spinoza invents a concept for which he has nothing to say. 
Immanence also has a significant development in Scholastic philosophy, as does the problem of inherence 
(see Marc Rölli 2004).  
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relations. Deleuze states of Leibniz that “the monad as absolute interiority, as an inner surface 
with only one side, nonetheless has another side, or a minimum of outside, a strictly 
complementary form of outside” (2006, 127 trans. modified). This complementary exteriority is 
not a dichotomous binding, it is only a threshold of a degree of interiority, in this (event) monad, 
the creative minimum of a monad. As such, inherence cannot be reduced strictly to the 
interiority of expressive relations. Relation and interiority persist, but inherence also portends to 
genesis. 
  The concept of immanence changes fundamentally as it is picked up by Deleuze in 
subsequent works, is worked upon, and is set to task relative to the problems of transcendence. 
It changes fundamentally because, at successive undetermined points, the substance articulated 
by Spinoza, which benefits in its clarity due to its absolute saturation of Being, vanishes in 
Deleuze’s writings. Without reliance on substance, Deleuze persists with an expressionism of 
what I call endoheterogenesis, a still immanent but an-substantial expressionism. There is no 
decision in Deleuze to claim the substance conceptualised by Leibniz or Spinoza as his own, nor 
to reject Descartes’s notion of substance. Endoheterogenesis means that relations always 
exceed determined ends (difference is always sited in relations a priori), expression persists by 
means of persistent creation (genesis), and nothing stands outside or transcends compositions 
of relation (which involve their own decomposition). It is with this that inherence finds its utility 
gaining force from its etymology (in-haerere from haerere in Latin) as a complication of 
interiority and binding or bonding. There is a persistent and non-interventionist infusion of 
relations to expressions, of immanence to all forms of transcendence.  
 Deleuze instantiates the relations of life and immanence far more explicitly than he does 
for life and inherence. Deleuze’s commentators are yet to contribute an exploration of the 
notion of inherence. As a component of expression, however, inherence necessarily has a 
function that does not strictly determine it as another name for a concept already present. 
Inherence cannot be equated with immanence, even if they do both constitute vectors of a 
complex notion of life for Deleuze. Neither does inherence equate to the process of 
differenc/tiation, since inherence must act as a descriptor for this process.7 It remains, then, to 
discover in what manner inherence works relative to an expressionist notion of life, and further, 
that life necessarily includes written-bodies, reader-bodies, and the relations of immanent 
reading. 
                                                          
7 On the notion of differenc/tiation, as the individuation and expression of difference, see Sauvagnargues 
(2013, 59). Sauvagnargues explains the complementary nature of the processes of differentiation and 
differenciation as the individuating manner of difference insofar as it can be composed as virtual and 
actual.   
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 Inherence is active and descriptive in its movements while retaining the sense of 
interiority and inhesion. It is thus relational, is only ever relational, and, even insofar as it can be 
decoupled from the other components of expression as a concept, it only demonstrates further 
the interior relationality of concepts as such. Its relational expression interstitial in several ways.8 
In the bodies of Deleuze, his many written-bodies, inherence appears directly and can be 
quantitatively apprehended in cardinal points but it suffuses his bodies without that quantitative 
apprehension necessarily indicating any quidditative functionality. For instance, in Logic of Sense 
(2004b) the concept of inherence (and the variant “inhere”) has little over ten instances. Yet this 
indicates nothing of the quidditative function of the concept, nor of any degree of its 
apprehension (quidditative force). Nevertheless, given the links to life and immanence it appears 
to have its own conceptual importance. 
 Regarding the aspect of inherence that is internal, or which posits interiority, it is useful 
to observe how Deleuze picks up the concept from Leibniz. There is interiority to inherence but 
there is no exteriority in the sense in which there is an inside to any particular process, and then 
an outside, vice versa, or via coexistence of interior/exterior relations. The relations of a written-
body, for instance, are always interior to the terms the relation produces. The relations 
composed in the written-body, between a speculative image and a narrative, and the relations 
of the written-body that articulate its composure with a broader environment, as with a 
speculative image and its potential as virtual truth (to come or otherwise), are persistently 
interior. The logic of Deleuze’s Leibniz posits inherence as “the final cause of the fold” (2006, 24) 
wherein the plications, regardless, constitute mutable and malleable “points” insofar as these 
points are not taken as cardinal. The folds may be taken as interior or exterior to one another, 
but this is by a relation that transcends the terms – a relation of comparison upon which the 
“points” are posited first. Whereas inherence is relation that suffuses the plications, is producing 
them as relatively (meta) stable ends, and so what is external to inherence is necessarily 
transcendent but not a strict necessity. This is the case insofar as the ends of a relation can vary 
without the relation itself changing. The interiority of inherence is present to each of the folded 
points and is the condition of their inclusion in a broader environment.     
 In writing of Leibniz’s persistent monadic “expression of the present” (2006 80), Deleuze 
makes the following claim: 
This privilege accorded to the present clearly refers to the function of inherence in the 
monad: the function does not include a predicate without giving it verbal value – that is, 
                                                          
8 See Steven Shaviro on the notion on the notion of interstitial as hinge (2012, 98). This same notion is the 
inflection in a fold, or the wet membrane of the skin or interstitium. 
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the unity of a movement in the act of being made. Inherence is the condition of liberty 
and not of impediment. (80)     
Inherence loses any equation with life in this claim although its functionality is preserved. The 
function works since the monad, an individual and simple substance of which there are many, 
implicates both the degrees of its expression and the manner of its expression. These do not 
constitute extra elements or dimensions that would turn the monad into a complexity. This is 
because inherence is not a substance itself. Rather, it is the means of the monad’s self-, or auto-, 
expression. “The unity of movement in the act of being made”, as Deleuze puts this, constitutes 
this auto-expression insofar as movement is not a supplement to the simplicity of the monad, or 
the act of its creation. This unity, or uni(vocity) since the verbal or vocal degree is maintained, is 
presupposed. Movement is inherent in the monad. Inherency becomes the vital force of the 
monads existence, as a capacity to increase its movement or decrease it, to modulate itself 
relative to the world, to contort or distort itself, to maintain an internal life without a complexity 
of further bodies. The liberty of the monad is its inherent mobility, the same inherence that 
conditions its creation since the monad is inherent in its milieu.  
 Yet life suffuses the notion of inherence precisely by means of inherency. Inherence is 
not life, or does not behave as a linguistic substitute for life. But life, for Deleuze and insofar as 
expressionism is concerned, is inherent and so inherence is presupposed and is thus the 
differential and subsistent condition of the concept of life. Deleuze develops the notion of life in 
his works with regards to Bergson, and it is also with Bergson that a primary link between 
inherence and life is made. Some resonance persists with his claims from Leibniz insofar as 
freedom or liberty is concerned. Deleuze writes on Bergson that “Duration, Life, is in principle 
(en droit) memory, in principle consciousness, in principle freedom” (1991a, 106) where this 
being in principle is a virtual production that conditions the actual or is modified by it.9  This 
coordination of life and freedom corresponds to the liberty of inherence in the monad insofar as 
the virtual principle, which is not the same as a transcendental principle, constitutes the 
distribution of inherence beyond the specificity of its action in the monad. There is duration to a 
monad, which is inherent to the monad, subsists within it, and makes it inherent to the virtual 
plane, the milieu, of the monad (if monad here stands for actual). 
                                                          
9 It is one of the most persistent themes of Deleuzian scholarship to critique and unpack the virtual/actual 
relations, these being a source for much confusion, especially for brief interactions with the concepts. The 
main claims on virtual and actual are in Deleuze’s Bergsonism (1991) and in Difference and Repetition 
(1994). It certainly pervades other sites in his work, right through to What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994). On the virtual and actual see D.W. Smith (2012a). Brian Massumi (1992) performs a 
demonstration of the virtual, attempting to sculpt it in a virtual “phase” to produces degrees of virtuality 
(70). 
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 Before I return to consider Deleuze’s development of inherence as a component of 
expression, I will situate the present state of this logic in immanent reading. The bodies of 
concern are the reader-body and the written-body. Inherence so far demonstrates the 
subsistence of internal freedom, and consequently a liberty of bodies relative to their milieu. 
Inherence pertains to interiority, and to relation, and then to freedom in the same sense that a 
monad is free in its expressivity of a world to a world – all of which a body will implicate (even in 
its explications). The reader-body has a historical claim to life, being privileged in the taxonomies 
of living creatures, or otherwise being the model of life upon which all others are based 
(anthropocentrism). This historical claim is relevant since it constitutes a memory for the reader-
body as an articulation of its relative production in a milieu (virtual-actual). But the claim to life is 
not the same as the inherence of life since in the former case life is purely categorical, lacking a 
nervous system, given certain distributions in reading the reader-body would slip free of the 
category of life. But life subsists in the reader-body even when it fails categorically, which means 
that, regardless of the complexity of the body, it still maintains inherent movements, i.e. of the 
order of torsion. That life is inherent to the reader-body means that inherence persists, but also 
that the reader-body inheres in life. This constitutes the subsistence of the single degree of life 
that finds itself everywhere due to inherence, without developing by definitive properties.  
 Deleuze cites Bergson in a note: “there is a certain hesitation or indetermination 
inherent in a certain part of things” (1991a, 133 n.21). Several levels are posited here in that 
there can be: (a) things, (b) parts of things, (c) several degrees of certainty, (d) a process of 
inherence that positions hesitation and indetermination in parts of things. The final level can be 
decomposed, and each result decomposed again. However, that there is a process of inherence 
is the logic of the entire operation to the point that the terms of the statement no longer matter, 
especially since the written or reader bodies have forsaken things for events and processes. 
Indetermination and hesitation undoubtedly shape the sense of things, and considered as 
inherent they fulfil the injection of life into things. What is present that informs immanent 
reading is the genetic production of the ends of indetermination, and indeed of the levels of the 
claims: things, parts of things, degrees of certainty, and so on. Inherence here is contingent 
insofar as it is a necessary relation producing hesitation in things, indetermination in things. The 
ontological claim of any-thing, which is itself a bad habit, reveals only the metaphysical necessity 
of inherency.10   
 So far I have claimed inherent life for the bodies of immanent reading, except that the 
relation of inherence and life is not tending toward definiteness. Nor is life interchangeable with 
                                                          
10 See Chapter One for the sad habits, or bad habits, of ontology.  
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inherence as though the terms are equal, in Deleuze’s works or elsewhere. In saying “life is 
inherent”, it is not a matter of bringing life to ontological certainty through the “is” which fixates 
on the being. That life is inherent claims no necessary being for life, although life is necessary for 
being. Life takes on a persistent and pervasive sense, a subsistence, that appears (from an 
abstract point of view) in beings while simultaneously escaping and setting to movement the 
actions and passions of bodies. Inherence is the final cause which demonstrates the instability of 
a ground of being, showing at once the univocal vitality of an evental consistency that escapes 
ground and supplements by motivating both and slipping away quietly in the night.  
 Deleuze continues to develop inherence in its metaphysical functionality in The Logic of 
Sense (2004b). Here it becomes an explicit sense of univocity and a manner of suffusing life 
amongst being as “extra-being”, as “aliquid”, and as “sense” or event (9, 25). Deleuze claims: 
“(sense) is this aliquid at once extra-Being and inherence, that is, this minimum of being which 
befits inherences” (25). Inherence here evokes the expressionist logic from Deleuze’s readings of 
Spinoza and Leibniz. There is still no inherence in itself, it remains as a relational production 
creating Being, or, at least, expressing being as a (uni)vocal attribution for broad application. 
Sense resides with being as an excess insofar as being exists. But sense is not being, rather, it is 
an evental “extra-being” that permeates beings and allows them to commit to a collective 
ontology, a sense of being one. It cannot be said that sense exists, Deleuze argues, but rather is a 
manner of composing Being in the act of expression.11 To wit, Deleuze claims, “it [sense] inheres 
or subsists” (24 modified). Again inherence slips the noose of being and it becomes apparent 
that if life and/or immanence suffuse reality, as per my own arguments regarding immanent 
reading, and insofar as inherence is a component of immanence, then it pertains not to 
ontological certitude and existence but to subsistence. 
 To continue, “the minimum of being” (Deleuze 2004b, 25) which is appropriate to 
inherence is not non-being but nor is it directly being. Inherence will compose both positions as 
relative to one another and is the very condition of the relation, a line that defines points but is 
not itself defined by those points. Inherence composes being from a degree of extra-being, a 
bare minimum of existence that is shot through with subsistence that ordains being with its 
univocal force. Insofar as being is no longer concerned, as at the level of language (univocity), 
inherence persists thus allowing a transverse operation that continues to involve the logic of 
expression and immanence. It continues to institute a relational autohesion of internally 
expressive realities, of which there is no properly external reality that would ascend its relation. 
                                                          
11 Deleuze notes “sense” as both expressed and expressible in a broad retention of a logic of expression 
(2004b, 25). 
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Deleuze’s qualification, “Which befits inherences” (25), denotes inherences beyond the domains 
of being, beyond the domains of existence whereby inherence subsists existences (however 
many), but is also a condition of subsistence prior to its expression as minimum being. Minimum 
being, when observed through the logic of expression that Deleuze lays out with Spinoza, refers 
only to a threshold which is not that of an exteriority but rather a zone of transformation and 
decomposition which enables the affective relations with other bodies to be composed.12 
   As a consequence, it is possible now to claim that sensation inheres in the written-
body, and life inheres in sensation, the written-body having the ethological nature of a 
composition of sensations.13 The written-body is a specific reality of sensation, to which the 
inherence of life constitutes the subsistence of life in its composition (of sensations). But since 
the ontological imperative has proved problematic for reading, as per Chapter One of this thesis, 
the being of the written-body remains as a potential code and not as an inherent one, nor as a 
necessary one. No doubt there is the possibility for a being of the written-body, but there is no 
necessary being, either for Deleuze or for the logic of my present thesis. As a composition of 
sensations, like all art, the written-body is necessarily composed of internal relations, relations 
which indicate its immanence to life and make life inherent in its composition. This is the sense 
in which inherence is involved in immanent reading. Inherence positions life in the writing — in 
existence or reality — but it also expresses the relational sense of life that is observed at all 
degrees, the sense in which the material of writing is life (via sensation) such that it is gathered 
up and deployed but sets about spreading itself through the entire domain and eventually 
exposing the composition back to decomposition. 
  Inherence fades as an explicit concept in Deleuze’s work following its brief 
foregrounding in The Fold (Deleuze 2006). But it persists insofar as it functions in Deleuze’s 
expressionism which finds its voice in the concept of the “plane of immanence” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013; 1994) and in “Pure Immanence” (Deleuze 2005b) each of which displays the 
internal relationality of inherence, and the concept of life. Before I continue with my arguments 
on the differing deployments of immanence, relative to immanent reading, the genetic (or 
creative) sense of inherence which articulates life as endoheterogenic requires some final 
                                                          
12 Deleuze on ethology: “for each thing these relations and capacities have an amplitude, threshold 
(maximum and minimum), and variations and transformations that are peculiar to them… they select what 
affects or is affected by the thing, what moves it or is moved by it” (1988, 125). On the notion of the 
threshold with regards to life, albeit with an expanded focus beyond Deleuze and Guattari, see Isabelle 
Stengers (2017, 336). 
13 See my Chapter Three for my elaboration of the written-body and its events of sensation. 
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elucidation. This is recognized again in The Fold by way of claims regarding the soul and inherent 
freedom.14 
 Deleuze argues: 
If inclusion is extended to infinity in the past and future, it is because it concerns first of 
all the living present that, in each instance, presides over their distribution. It is because 
my individual notion includes what I am doing in the present moment, what I am in the 
process of doing, that it also includes everything that pushed [pousée] me to do it, and 
everything that follows from it, to infinity. This privilege accorded to the present refers 
precisely to the function of inherence in the monad: it does not include a predicate 
without giving it the value of a verb, that is, the unity of a movement in process [le 
movement en train de se faire]. Inherence is the condition of freedom, and not its 
impediment [empêchement] … the perfect, completed act is one that receives from the 
soul that includes it the unity proper to a movement in process. (Deleuze 2006, 80 trans. 
modified)15 
Inherence is presented here as the “condition of freedom” in “the living present” which both 
draws the past and the future into its composition, but also displaces it without rebuilding it as a 
necessarily exterior reality. Inherence is also presented with its “functional” capacity of involving 
movement in the expression of a “predicate”. Finally, regarding the argument’s positioning of 
inherence to life, a genetic function is revealed beyond the strict movement of a verb (which 
would constitute a genesis, for instance, in language). Note that the verb is implied and is not 
explicitly announced in the predicate. The genetic function constitutes a relational unity. An act 
inheres in the soul or, otherwise, the soul includes the act. The act is not functionally genetic 
insofar as the soul has innate genetic power as a lived or living process. Rather, that the soul is 
capable of the inclusion of processes that reside without (the completed act is undertaken in a 
world that includes the soul but is not entirely that soul – future/past), is indicative of its 
expressive power of the reality it is created within. And, yet, the soul gathers this composition of 
reality as a new degree of expression by way of completion. It is then that the subject and the 
object of these statements is redundant, and even the predicate is speculative (to its benefit). 
But the persistent component of inherence, insofar as one dimension may be included in 
                                                          
14 See also Deleuze and Guattari on inherent variation to which freedom in linguistic expression, via Labov 
and contra Chomsky, is affirmed: “when he brings to light lines of inherent variation, he does not see them 
simply as “free variants” pertaining to pronunciation, style, or nonpertinent features that lie outside the 
system and leave the homogeneity of the [linguistic] system intact… it is variation itself that is systemic, in 
the sense in which musicians say that ‘the theme is the variation’. Labov sees variation as a de jure [by law 
– nomadic] component affecting each system from within, sending it cascading or leaping on its own 
power” (2013, 108-109, my additions). This accounts to a notion of immanent variation in linguistics rather 
than transcendental “variables” that homogenize linguistic systems. This argument has transverse 
implications for metaphysics. The direct relation between immanence and inherence is not, however, 
made explicit in A Thousand Plateaus. 
15 Modified translation is from Daniel W. Smith’s unpublished translation of the same work. It is included 
here for the emphasis it places on the French terminology and the final claim on the passage. 
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another without collapsing either identities, denotes an expressive notion of movement as 
necessary. It denotes a freedom in the living present by displacing the determinism of a 
motivating reality as a determined point and strict causal influence, and, indeed, of a future that 
drags the present forward with the same causal lineage. By claiming that “this is in this” (recall 
that “this” is the evental language of haecceities), movement is necessary. 
 
From univocity, to planes, to purity 
There is a philosophy of immanence in Deleuze that belongs in its instantiation to Spinoza. It is in 
Expressionism in philosophy: Spinoza that Deleuze’s identifies a philosophy of immanence in 
Spinoza, not yet his own, claiming: 
The philosophy of immanence appears from all viewpoints as the theory of unitary 
Being, equal Being, common and univocal Being. It seeks the conditions of a genuine 
affirmation, condemning all approaches that take away from Being its full positivity, that 
is, its formal community. (1992, 167) 
In this claim, Deleuze is indicating the very internal nature of immanence, the suggestion that it 
does not stand outside of Being or beings, that it is not an abstract principle and that it is 
generative and synthetic. The term ‘univocity’, which Deleuze borrows from Duns Scotus, 
removes any notion of an abstract cause for Being. Deleuze argues that with Spinoza’s 
philosophy of immanence, Being is univocal, voiced as One. Being is unified as Oneness and has 
no exterior, because the cause of beings is within Being as such (165), which is to say that the 
voice of Being that claims it as one is inherent to Being (which indicates Being’s multiplicity, 
despite being said as One). This logic of univocity is based upon Spinoza’s thesis on substance 
and modifications. Deleuze repeats Spinoza to make this clear, claiming that “substance is in 
itself, and modifications are in substance as in something else” (165, my emphasis). If substance 
and Being are taken as equivocal, equally voiced, and beings (note the small ‘b’) and 
modifications are equivocal, this statement makes sense. Being does not emerge in beings, as 
though beings stand outside Being, but rather Being generates beings and is expressed within 
them. Indeed, Being is self-causal, but only insofar as it is not caused in the same sense as the 
generation of beings. Beings are immanent to Being, they are within Being, while Being, or 
substance, is in immanence. Deleuze concludes that the philosophy of immanence in Spinoza is 
the re-interpretation of Duns Scotus' univocity. 
Deleuze’s reading of immanence in Spinoza allows him to delineate himself from the 
theological argument, God as substance, in order to preference the role of expression. Deleuze 
argues for a view of Spinozism, or Spinoza’s philosophy, as the complete removal of 
157 
 
transcendentalism as abstract producer or “emanative or exemplary causality” (1992, 180). 
Processes in the world no longer mimic or represent a Being exterior to their own position. If 
there is a cause it is one that resides within the world itself or, simply, “there is no remote 
causation” (173). Immanent reading calls upon this univocity. The written-body can also be said 
to have a single voice for all its expressions: the poem or the book, the short-story, novella, 
novel, and so on, are written-bodies. But there is no transcendental cause to these bodies, 
certainly not the same singular impetus that could result in such diversity. The univocity of the 
written-body, as the voice that affirms their body, is entirely writing and beyond this is nothing 
more or less than sensation. That is, writing is not the supreme cause of written-bodies, it is the 
voice of the written-body as found within the bodies themselves. This notion will also attend to 
the complete sense of particular bodies of writing so that it can be said that prior to any 
intervention, via interpretation or similar transcendental apparatuses, the book expresses itself 
as complete and a composite of life. 
Deleuze argues that immanence is “inseparable from the concept of expression” (1992, 
180). To find a manner within Deleuze’s metaphysics of immanence to communicate his 
aesthetic propositions on sensation – and thus an aesthetic individuation for written-bodies, and 
finally speculative literature – can, as I have shown, be found in part through his work on 
expression. For Deleuze there is expression that is immanent prior to ontology. That is, 
expression exceeds the determination of Being and beings operating prior to production. A 
primary expression will not appear to produce the world or the things that lay within; rather 
expression is the manner in which, in Spinoza’s ontological term, substance is composed. 
Deleuze claims that “[s]ubstance first of all expresses itself in itself” (185) meaning that when 
substance distributes an attribute, the attribute – which is not remote from substance or does 
not leave substance for an abstract ground – redeploys substance as its essence.16 Expression, in 
an immanent logic or manner, makes a reality of substance. It composes substance.  
Beyond the univocity of being announced by immanence, Deleuze and Guattari (1994; 
2013) propose planes of immanence. Importantly, for written-bodies, they produce a sense of 
writing that creates a plane immanent to its own existence. They argue that “the writer’s 
                                                          
16 See Deleuze’s discussion on “attributes” relative to expression, made in his Leibniz seminars: “Leibniz 
already gives himself a very hard task; he commits himself to showing in what way all propositions can 
be linked to the judgment of attribution, notably propositions that state relations, that state 
existences, that state localizations, and that, at the outside, exist, are in relation with, can be 
translated as the equivalent of the attribute of the subject” (1980, para. 21). This posits another 
version of claims of the order “this is this”, and “this is in this”. Inclusion and inherence are again here 
in this seminar, but Deleuze makes the unusual claim of allowing inherence to be supplanted by 
expression as though inherence may no longer be a component of expression. This confusion appears 
resolved in The Fold but it is notable and the logic is sound in his seminars.  
158 
 
position is no different to that of the painter, musician, or architect” in that it is a process of 
creation through the composition of affects and percepts to form sensations (1994, 167). This 
claim cements a critical relationship between literature and art in the endoheterogenesis of 
immanence. Deleuze and Guattari also note that there is a special relationship with chaos that 
art, philosophy, and science build. Specific to sensational composition is the establishment of a 
plane of composition upon chaos where chaos appears to be “immanating”.17 The particular 
relation that the artist shares with immanence is that of composing a plane such that the infinite 
is let into the plane as a passage to an unrestrained life or chaos. Literature achieves this in a 
privileged manner, argue Deleuze and Guattari, when they claim that “it is literature primarily 
that has constantly maintained an equivocal relationship with the lived” (170). This means that 
life and literature are of the same voice, in some manner, or that when I am reading or writing 
literature there is no negative separation between that particular process and life as such. The 
primacy of literature is not denoting an exclusive relation, but rather a unique creative relation 
that persists. That art sets up a passage to chaos through its compositions is in order, so argue 
Deleuze and Guattari, “to render it sensory” (205), or to place its affects and percepts into such a 
state (composition of the indeterminate elements) that they can be transformed in affections 
and perceptions.  
The argument for planes of immanence is instantiated in A Thousand Plateaus (2013) 
well before Deleuze and Guattari make explicit the role of writers, in What is Philosophy? (1994), 
as those who will have and will draw up a plane of immanence. In A Thousand Plateaus, planes 
of immanence are presented relative to becoming, and it is thus no surprise that Plateau 10 – 
titled “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…” (2013, 271) – 
becomes the site of its most sustained expression. This site constitutes the plane of immanence 
specific to becoming, but in What is Philosophy? it is constituted with regards to the creation of 
the plane from chaos, and the creation by thinking: “the plane of immanence is not a concept 
that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what 
it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (1994, 37).18 It is 
                                                          
17 The term 'immanating' appears to be an attempt to respond to the problem of emanation (and thus 
emanating) that Deleuze overcomes in his Spinoza (1992). To emanate is to become transcendent in some 
manner which is counter to Deleuze's claim of Spinoza's entire work being anti-hierarchical. Immanence, 
while traditionally configured in relation to transcendence, is here opposed to emanation which produces 
transcendents. To “immanate” is to be produced within. See Agamben for commentary on “immanation” 
(1999, 223).    
18 Despite this claim it can be said that the “plane of immanence” is a concept insofar as it is built upon a 
further plane. That is, it can be said that Deleuze and Guattari have a concept of a plane of immanence but 
taking up the status of concept it becomes distinguished from its own plane of immanence. There is, then, 
a plane of immanence to a conceptual plane of immanence which is not a (re)semblance. This will be 
discussed in this section by means of “pure immanence”. 
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clear that immanence suffuses reality as a degree of presupposition. Insofar as there is thinking, 
as in the creation of a concept as a real or composed process, there comes with it a domain of 
presupposition. Deleuze and Guattari’s insight that “The image thought gives itself of what it 
means to think” constitutes a significant aspect of this presupposition. The thought is produced, 
and a concept created thereof, but it presupposes a situation where thought is producible. The 
plane of immanence is an image not in a visual sense, but an image insofar as it pertains to a 
degree of composability or sense in face of chaos (which is not to say that a plane of immanence 
does not carry chaos, nor that it may at times be indistinguishable). Immanence is conceived by 
Deleuze and Guattari in a manner that displaces its necessary apprehension in terms of being or, 
rather, there is nothing definite about immanence even if it is pervasive and productive. But, 
also, immanence is created as a vital condition (even by its mere presence) of reality. The 
concept of inherence supports the productive and pervasive sense. Immanence is not a 
substance, but neither is it the essence of substance. It is the manner in which substance 
becomes self (re)flexive, and the manner in which essence is in modes, and the manner in which 
substance is in its modes, and the manner in which substance becomes essence, and so forth. 
How then does immanence take on the sense of a plane?  
  Deleuze and Guattari indicate that “the plane of immanence is like a section of chaos 
and acts like a sieve” (1994, 42). It has to be “drawn up” by a thinker, laid out, or “stretched over 
the chaos” (43). In this sense, a plane of immanence is indebted to a thinker and pertains to a 
specificity of thinking with no spatiotemporal necessity. As an image of what it means to think, a 
plane of immanence is brought forward in the act of thinking as the presuppositions of that act. 
As such, a thinker, even if they are not concept producers (philosophers) and are rather 
borrowing them, takes a section of chaos and imposes upon it the conditions for thinking. It is 
also not necessary to actively produce the plane, as in the case of one who does not claim to 
know what it means to think (for their thinking), but it is created nonetheless in this case by 
accident and in ignorance. Chaos takes the sense of “infinite speed” (42), but there is no sense of 
a pure and indeterminate chaos. It cannot be assumed that this chaos is a domain of “nothing in 
particular” and since some planes are drawn up as if by accident, it must be the case that what it 
means to think can call upon a chaos that already has determinate aspects. This is so even if 
these determinate aspects, these consistencies, are deposited there by another thinker: “from 
chaos the plane of immanence takes the determinations with which it makes its infinite 
movements or its diagrammatic features” (50). The sequence of creation for thinking 
presupposes a diverse environment of material (sensations that are contemplations in 
consciousness, and those that are contemplations that exceed thought), then presupposes a 
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manner in which this is sectioned off as what thinking means (plane), upon which thinking has 
already begun (up to and including concepts), while the plane and chaos are retroactively acted 
upon in perpetuum (there are fogs of chaos on planes of immanence) (51, 160). There are 
degrees of thinking that enact the plane differently. The writer of sensations will take the plane 
as one of composition (without undermining its immanence), for instance, but the process of 
presupposition and action remains. 
Deleuze, occasionally with Guattari, also proposes fields and zones of immanence which 
carry much of the same logic as planification. Planes has a specific connotation frequently noted 
in Deleuzian scholarship regarding translation from French to English, on the one hand having 
the imposed sense of the “plan”, on the other the sense of a flat surface or plateau.19 “Fields” 
and “zones” operate upon chaos in the same manner as the plane insofar as they create sections 
of immanence that implicate chaos while composing something novel. In Deleuze’s brief article 
on Maurice de Gandillac’s research, titled “Zones of Immanence” and collected in Two Regimes 
of Madness (Deleuze 2007), he articulates the identification of immanence amongst Being in the 
history of philosophy.20 As Deleuze states, “zones of immanence seemingly proliferate at the 
various stages or levels [of being], even establishing connections between levels. In these zones, 
Being is univocal, equal” (Deleuze 2007, 266). Where the history of philosophy throws up Being, 
and generally a hierarchy to the first One, immanence pervades and flattens. It is not a counter 
theory to the concept of Being, but one that hides amongst Being and only becomes clear in 
announcements of univocity. That is, immanence voices being as univocal, while remaining 
untethered to being and mobile throughout any particular and well-defined system of levels. 
These levels or sections are “zones” insofar as they are recognised amongst instances of being, 
spatiotemporal or otherwise, without a necessary link to a greater substructure or substance 
that would unify immanence into an “in-itself”. Note that one can section up Being, slave it to its 
own logic, only to find a logical immanence in its midst that works against its own structure. But 
insofar as chaos is concerned, zones of immanence will be laid over it as the presupposition of 
                                                          
19 On the notion of the plateau, which serves as an image through which to engage with a stratified and 
flat mode of thought, see Holland (2013, 56-57). Regarding planes as plans, as images, and with an 
expanded analysis of what this means for Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, see Beistegui (2012, 8-12). 
20 Maurice de Gandillac was Deleuze’s thesis supervisor. Deleuze claims that de Gandillac contributes to an 
expressionist philosophy in his book on Plotinus by means of the familiar expressionist components 
“explication” and “complication”. Deleuze certainly exhibits praise in this article on de Gandillac and as 
such it would be a worthy task to investigate the influence he had upon Deleuze, especially insofar as 
Deleuze is himself an expressionist. Charles Stivale (2008) has made the first attempt with regards to 
“friendship” in Gilles Deleuze’s ABCs: The Folds of Friendship. One note Stivale makes is regarding the 
French title “Les plages d’immanence” where plages might be also translated as expanses or zones (2008, 
11). Interestingly, not noted by Stivale, plages has etymological influences that link it to plague¸ wound, 
and even weave.  
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Being, sectioning it off in order to produce the end point of Being. With the written-body, zones 
inform the individuation of instances within the body, sectioned off of the composition, insofar 
as they constitute the expression of an event of sensation.  
Regarding “fields of immanence”:  
The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at the 
heart of production itself, and conditioning this production. Here we discover a new 
determination of the properly capitalist field of immanence: not only the interplay of the 
relations and differential coefficients of decoded flows, not only the nature of the limits 
that capitalism reproduces on an ever wider scale as interior limits, but the presence of 
antiproduction within production itself. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, 256 my emphasis) 
The field of immanence operates much the same as zones or planes, where “this is in this insofar 
as it is observed here”. The sectioning of chaos is apparent again (relations are identified as 
beings or components) to produce a zone (nature of limits and expanding internal limits) 
whereby a logic will emerge of one process within another (“the presence of antiproduction 
within production itself”). The field, however, may carry something of a different spatial sense 
insofar as fields are conceived (the pastoral sense should not be ignored). Deleuze and Guattari 
introduce the ”field of immanence” relative to Capitalism, as above, and to the Kantian 
“Subject”: “Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the 
transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a 
Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily 
represents such a subject to itself (reflection)” (1994, 46). In this manner, the “field” of 
immanence is an attribute of a domain of personal experience and sets about defining the limits 
of a transcendental body. It is what Deleuze and Guattari indicate as the problem of immanence 
being taken as always immanent “to” and not being a strictly immanent and expressive process. 
The field, spatially, thus appears more boxed in insofar as transcendental operations such as a 
Subject appear. Its limits are more well-defined, fenced, than the plane which is only defined by 
a modulation of surface, dips and troughs. The fence of the field of immanence of the Kantian 
Subject is its representational production. If chaos is preserved in the field, allowing any sense of 
variation to be preserved from chaos, it is only insofar as this chaos and variation are a mirror for 
a body attributable only to that body (which is not the body as an event, but a well-defined 
body).  
   Planes, zones, or fields all indicate that there are certain limitations to the presence of 
immanence in any body. But these limits are always internally conditioned to any particular body 
and are not determined from without except insofar as what is external to the body is implicated 
in the body presenting the body as a haecceity or event, and not a Subject. When immanence is 
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a field, the problem of reading immanently becomes one of finding immanent attributes such as 
“principles”.21 Immanent reading, however, to retain immanence without transcendence, 
requires that the expressions of the written-body be encountered which do not amount to 
attributes or principles that would hover over the pages and provide transcendent references to 
which the sensations might assign themselves. The body does not transcend chaos or an 
immanent plane, at least insofar as it does not become caught in the delirium of the ontological 
imperative. The plane of immanence, and indeed the zone of immanence, are thus more suited 
to the task since they preserve chaos and expression and avoid the trappings of elevation and 
attribution.  
Immanence announces a univocity of being, and in doing so attempts to bring the 
domain of transcendents back into the world of immediate forces and problems. Which is not to 
say that it is univocal being, but it is being’s univocity, the voice of being as One. And, again, only 
insofar as Being is concerned. There is thus no ontology of immanence, but immanence subsists 
amongst all domains, announcing itself at times, becoming oppressed at others. It is the 
condition of relationality that avoids attributing more to the relation than the nature of the 
relation itself. There are zones of immanence that constitute the movement of planets, the orbit 
of the moon relative to the Earth and the Sun, and the relations of a grain to a pile. There are 
planes of immanence that suffuse all compositions, from planetary accretion to the composition 
of sensations, and which attends to their reality, and suffuses them with life. There are many 
planes, infinities produced in instances, which do not behave as expressions of a grand 
immanence that pervades all reality. And yet Deleuze suggests a “pure immanence”, “A Life…”, 
that infuses and confuses these planes without being their ground. Strictly speaking, there is no 
ground, not even groundlessness, nor chaos, for even chaos has its domains of composition and 
consistency. For instance, in the speculative proposition that prior to the composition of the 
Earth and the Moon, an orbital composition, a pre-composition (and collision) between Earth 
and Theia was extant and this was nonetheless a composition.22  
There persists a difference between the plane of immanence and the plane of 
composition so long as the creation of concepts or sensations are concerned. Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest that the two planes are different insofar as they are instituted and laid out by 
                                                          
21 As in the case of “immanent critique” which arrives from Marxist critical theory, inspired by Marx, 
Adorno and the Frankfurt School (Stahl 2017). Immanent critique proposes, as far as literature is 
concerned, that the principles of the text reside in the text itself and should define its reading, and further 
that the social milieu of its construction is its truth (Larsen 2009). These principles thus become 
transcendents of the text and not expressions. Immanent reading, as I construct it here, does not adhere 
to the same logics as immanent critique.   
22 Known as the Giant Impact Hypothesis, see Canup and Asphaug (2001). 
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different processes of creation, by different plans or diagrams: plane of immanence for 
concepts, plane of composition for sensation. For immanent reading the distinction is 
meaningful since it is always uncertain in becoming, a priori, what the reader will become. That 
is, the reader cannot proceed with the assumption that what they are encountering is a 
conceptual persona or an aesthetic figure, a concept or a sensation, or if there is a mixture of 
these at any degree. The discovery is made in the encounter, in the becoming, rather than being 
brought to the encounter from the reader’s own world as a transcendent overcoding. The 
domain of speculation, at the very least in literature, complicates the plane of immanence and 
the plane of composition, mixing concept and sensation, but this is attended to within the 
becoming of the written-body and the reader-body itself. Its determination as mixture is a 
flexible conclusion, an evental a-limit, its finitude allowing persistent degrees of infinity to 
flourish. Pure immanence, and the passage of the lived, compress or involve the planes of 
composition and the planes of immanence such that it is no longer a matter of observing the 
milieu of the sensations, for instance, to determine the presupposed plane of composition, but 
becomes about observing the manner in which a body is an individual life. For immanent 
reading, this constitutes a domain of immanence, not obscured from sensation but operating in 
a transverse manner as a different set of vectors for consideration that are complicated in the 
same event. For instance, reading the sensation of “salt” in The Road (McCarthy 2009), is folded 
with the living instance in writing of that sensation, its status as expression of body.   
When pure immanence enters into Deleuze’s conceptual lexicon, it no longer consists of 
the “plane” that would situate it as the presupposition of any particular body (such as a 
concept).23 However, the sense that pure immanence consists as a living suffusion of reality, the 
inherence of life in (composed) reality, is still within the claims regarding the plane(s) of 
immanence, especially insofar as immanence relates to nature. Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza 
                                                          
23 There is also the notable absence of Guattari. See Dosse (2010) for arguments concerning the influence 
of Guattari on Deleuze’s concepts. There is a becoming-Guattari for Deleuze insofar as Deleuze is 
transformed by Guattari and his concepts, for instance Dosse notes transversality as a Guattarian concept 
adopted by Deleuze (157). As such, a reminder of the still indeterminate influence of Guattari on Deleuze’s 
solo works is worthwhile. In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988) in the chapter ‘Spinoza and Us’, Deleuze 
also articulates the “plane” of immanence. The original French publication that includes this chapter, in 
1981, occurs the year after Deleuze and Guattari publish A Thousand Plateaus (1980 in French). It is 
reasonable to suggest that the plane, sometimes conflated with “plan” to indicate a diagrammatic sense in 
the noological expression of the plane, has a Guattarian touch to it. But separating concepts by author in 
their collective works is a problematic task. As Dosse notes in his introduction to Chaosophy: Texts and 
Interviews 1972-1977 (2009): “a genuine work machine was born, and from then on it was impossible to 
identify what belonged to one or the other because this machine was not a simple sum of two individuals” 
(Dosse 2009, 10). Dosse notes it as a “between-two”, using Deleuze and Guattari’s own language. But the 
carryover of concepts into solo works does portend some interest and develop some understanding of the 
concept’s environments (their presuppositions and sites of accretion). 
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implies that to become situated on a plane of immanence, for Deleuze it is Spinoza’s own plane, 
is to instantiate a “way of life” (1988, 122). The sense of life Deleuze delivers here situates life, 
through individual or body (evental), upon a plane of immanence “as a complex relation 
between differential velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A 
composition of speeds and slownesses upon a plane of immanence” (123).24 The plane still 
sections chaos, and decomposes chaos in order to set free the infinites it has captured as 
materials for composition, these infinites observed as “differential velocities”.25 But if these are 
isolated, life still fails to find its surface. It remains between the relations that compose bodies, it 
is not even the relations taken as themselves. Rather, it is the affect of these relations that 
define it not only as individual but as life. The inherency of life to the body is not at the level of 
ordinates (measuring the physical body, or counting how many thoughts it is capable of), nor is it 
strictly the relations, but is suffused deeper into the complexity of the body between the 
relations. It is upon this single degree of immanence that pure immanence becomes observable, 
not as a life directly, but as the presupposed suffusing of Nature into bodies, as the plane of 
immanence that “interleaves” or implicates all planes in a grand evental gesture (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 50). 
Deleuze’s thesis on pure immanence implicates his thesis on life such that any 
conceptual understanding must proceed along both lines: “We will say of pure immanence that 
it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is 
itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, 
complete bliss” (Deleuze 2005c, 27). Insofar as immanent reading is concerned, this is the 
optimal degree of immanence within which the reading moves while persistently throwing up 
becomings, observations of relations in an ethology of the sensations of written-bodies, and 
evental modifications of the reader-body and her environment. That is, immanent reading 
intends the life of the bodies involved. The above sense of pure immanence or absolute 
immanence to articulate “a life” echoes claims Deleuze and Guattari make on immanence “to 
itself” regarding the plane of immanence. They say that “immanence is immanent only to itself 
and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which 
it could be immanent” (1994, 45). And, following this, the language of an “event” returns. 
Without expanding too far, and consequently returning to an earlier chapter, I will dispense with 
the language of the event except to note inherent movement (and rest) as the minimum of 
evental occurrence.  
                                                          
24 Note that “upon” here does not directly or necessarily indicate a transcendence of the body since the 
exterior/interior relation is complicated rather than dialectic.  
25 See also, O’Sullivan (2007, 42). 
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By means of absorption of the All-One, and the instituting of A LIFE, to articulate pure 
immanence, Deleuze activates a subsistent nature (not Being/Thought, nor Mind/Matter), that 
suffuses both the composition of bodies (evental or organised – to different effects), and further 
suffuses the relations that compose these bodies. To seek out pure immanence is thus not to 
attend to a ground, historical or material, but to see it vitalising the immediate environment, 
radiating from a saturated milieu as the breath of the living. Pure immanence is a movement of 
immanence relative only to itself, but realised in an instantaneous or immediate expression, and 
a life, that slips amongst its own relation producing an infinitely variable and creative milieu. But 
as with the planes of immanence that imbricate pure immanence, transcendents are potentially 
everywhere (Being for instance), meaning that if immanence is glimpsed then habit will 
immediately attribute it to something else other than immanence itself. But immanence decodes 
this immediate encounter as much as it produces it in concert with its own creations. When 
Deleuze says life is “complete power, complete bliss” (2005c, 27), this is presupposed of an 
actual body in any becoming (even the detrimental becomings that transform into imitation). An 
immediate empirical situation arises that carries with it both the plane of immanence that offers 
bodies a composition, and pure immanence that suffuses the instant with an absolute sense of 
life, along with all its expressive components (plications). On the one hand, given the immediacy 
of a non-existent (but subsistent) yet absolute event in any encounter combined with the 
intensity of the encounter’s sensations (power), it is surprising that Deleuze chooses bliss as the 
descriptor. On the other hand, the attunement of a life to A LIFE, to a plane of nature so 
conceived by Spinoza albeit with an over emphasis on the Substance and Thought distinction, 
disperses the immediate effects of such a violent domain ad infinitum. To be clear, pure 
immanence is not chaos, for chaos is cluttered with compositions and pure immanence operates 
in nothing just as easily as in the domain of the composed (reality). For immanent reading to 
attempt this access to pure immanence the emphasis on sensations is paramount. Holding on to 
the affects and percepts of the written-body as a life raft in the void is the only thing preventing 
the reader-body from stumbling out of the encounter with the written-body itself, and beginning 
upon a vastly different encounter no longer concerned with the immediacy of writing, but with a 
deferred or referred transcendental reality. 
The language of purity appears as a provocation by Deleuze, certainly since it carries 
connotations and historical connections that problematize its use: racial purity, for instance, or 
essentialism. Further still, it appears an odd term of potential homogenization to be attached to 
the endoheterogenic process of immanence. Nevertheless, it provides a final point of clarity for 
pure immanence. The sense in which Deleuze uses pure for immanence can be unpacked in 
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terms of his logic of expression and immanence. For pure immanence, Being is taken as One in 
Spinoza, but this “One” is only the manner in which it is said. That is to say, there is no necessary 
cardinal ontology, or it does not need a numerical sense to its singularity. But the same is said of 
pure immanence when it is given its sense as “A Life”, as “absolute”, and indeed as “a” plane 
which interleaves all planes that suffuse reality in an infinite flow of variability. The first manner 
to apprehend the pure of pure immanence in expressionist logic is by means of the simple and 
the complex. Insofar as immanence is concerned, not having any claim to reality by way of being, 
the simple and the complex as movements of evental folding (plex, pli) are flattened into a 
mutual expression. What is simple has no parts, it cannot be separated in any radical sense that 
would produce a second simple. Neither does it produce distinct attributes that exist in isolation. 
It consists of a single fold. And then again it is complex insofar as in the same single fold there 
are the expressions of a multi-fold nature.26 There is, then, pure immanence whence the folds of 
immanence are taken as One and multiple. There is not One “thing” composed of many things 
(which can happen where Being persists), since this only amounts to complexity. Nor are there 
many things of real distinction composed together. Nor is there just One indivisible atom. At 
once, immediately, many processes unfold in a single sense without ever releasing or being 
released from simple-complex immanence. The term immediate will deliver the final sense of 
purity for pure immanence, while contributing to its singularity. 
Deleuze says: 
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that 
are measured by lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or 
singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects. This indefinite life does 
not itself have moments, close as they may be one to another, but only between-times, 
between-moments; it doesn’t just come about or come after but offers the immensity of 
an empty time where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the 
absolute of an immediate consciousness. (2005c, 29) 
Subjects and objects can be placed at the degree of expression that allows for Being, and thus 
present a degree of redundancy to the above claim. Deleuze is here offering a pathway for 
Subjects (and Objects) into pure immanence, but they are not necessary starting points and are 
merely types of viewpoints among many. Moments too are bound by a cardinal logic, potentially 
closed off from one another, as Subjects are distinct from one another, but at least appearing as 
well-defined instances of a consciousness that inheres a time which is easily divided.27 A life is 
                                                          
26 Chapter Two of this thesis contains a sustained argument for the logic of expression, by means of 
plication, and indeed its lack of reliance on Being. 
27 In Logic of Sense Deleuze’s arguments on time are delivered on several fronts. He plots a distinction of 
aion or “the pure empty form of time” (2004b, 189) that acknowledges only future/past without anything 
strictly specific for a notion of “present”, from that of chronos delivered in both a “good” and “bad” sense 
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equated to an “indefinite life” that appears for all its vitality suffused through a substrate 
capable of throwing up moments (or a present), or suffused into the interstices of time and 
movement sans definiteness. Life subsists, and thus stretches out from the “immediate” 
consciousness that is both its expression and that is capable of seeing, empirically or as 
sensation, that life extended ad infinitum as a single event. Immediacy is constituted by its 
access to both the process of thinking, and of sensation, as a torsion or fold. Whence Deleuze 
notes the “immensity of an empty time”, this is not a voidal time lacking in virtual (stretched) or 
actual (torqued) movement, but an evental time that bleeds haecceities into yet greater events, 
and that decomposes subjects into haecceities. Such is empty of objects and subjects, retaining 
movement as its precondition.  
A life, which is pure immanence at a single degree, lacks nothing and is entirely active 
since lacking nothing is the absence of nothing. It is not something, nor is it nothing, but is a 
movement or vital activity between, without definition. Deleuze has articulated this 
indefiniteness in multiple ways, and at multiple sites in his oeuvre, especially with regards to the 
indefinite article. For instance: “the indefinite article does not lack anything; it is not 
indeterminate or undifferentiated, but expresses the pure determination of intensity, intensive 
difference” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 191). It becomes pure insofar as it attains an absolute 
movement and complexity given the empirical realities (compositions) of a single event. The 
reader-body, for example (and this is explored further in Chapter Seven), has its becoming-
sensation relative to another evental body (the written-body). When the reader-body is 
expressed as “absolute immediate consciousness”, or when it moves in pure immanence, it fuses 
with these sensations as expressions of an absolute event that suffuses all events: sensation 
contemplating sensation. Pure immanence will cast the reader-body adrift where the immediate 
                                                          
which has a “present” where past and future behave as relative dimensions to an ongoing present, a 
divine present that hides within it a broken present of succession (186). Good and bad are not here in the 
Spinozist sense I have argued relative to habit, but merely indicate the degree of relativity for the present. 
With Guattari, Deleuze revisits the distinction but circumscribes aion with “non-pulsed” time, and chronos 
with “pulsed time” (2013, 305) to present a rhythmic sense (see Bogue 2007, 42-43 for an analysis of this 
musical sense). In this, becoming appears to favour Aeon (note the change in spelling between works) or 
“the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that 
which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here” (305). In this sense 
something is retained in a persistent folding (which is itself multi-fold) of past into future insofar as 
consciousness has access to or is an expression of that fold. Aion is a wave that never reaches a shore but 
unfolds from the surface given effects of density, movement, and subnautical environments. What 
constitutes the surface of the wave is not a mobile present, but what Deleuze elsewhere calls the 
becoming-actual of the virtual. The waves of aeon are its degrees of actualization, but they are never 
separate from a virtual environment that constitutes it and decomposes it. Just as a wave is shot through 
with oxygen, salt, water, movements, and so on, so too is the ocean that plicates it. For Deleuze’s notions 
of virtual and actual see his early works including Difference and Repetition (1994), Logic of Sense (2004b), 
and indeed Bergsonism (1991a), where the materiality of time is more obvious. For analysis see Daniel W. 
Smith (2012a, 250).  
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sensations of an encounter, the writing of a colour or texture, are torsions of a life that exceeds 
their expression but is nowhere apprehended as solid and definite. A life is determined as 
inherent, but only through the deployment of an indefinite. 
 It is thus apparent that pure immanence is endoheterogenesis in an absolute sense 
insofar as it can be said to have singularity, but only the singularity of multiple infinities. The 
pure of pure immanence affirms the lack of a mixture of objects without attending to a single 
substance. It is pure insofar as its singularity is affirmed in a between movement that subsists 
despite the forming and collapsing of objects, the presence or absence of forms 
(something/nothing). And it is pure insofar as access to immanence occurs in a radical 
immediacy of sensation and consciousness. Finally, the purity of immanence taken in the 
absolute provokes “bliss” and awe, “complete power” (Deleuze 2005c, 27), unhinged from the 
necessities of form. The reader-body of the speculative written-body is distributed anew and 
given new dimensions by the affective power of pure immanence insofar as the written-body’s 
sensations disturb definite sense. Indeed, pure immanence has no representation, but wherein 
the sensations strip form away from the surface, laying out their own plane, this immanence 
reverberates throughout the entire body.    
 
Involution 
The Deleuzian notion of life proper to immanent reading, or at least immanent reading as it is 
expressed herein without recourse to the production of principles (immanent critique), is, as I 
have shown, endoheterogenic and is thus capable of expressing both the reader-body and the 
written-body, both flesh and writing. The endoheterogenesis of life, the sense in which life 
enacts a differential creative process without ever becoming numerically distinct from itself, is 
affirmed through the concept of involution rather than evolution. If evolution is to be retained, it 
is only by means of a cooperative evolution, a symbiotic rather than competitive evolution. And 
such is the case with symbiosis and cooperation that their evolutionary terms, by means of 
philosophical expressionism, amount to involutionary terms. This, again, returns to the “one” 
event within which an infinite variability unfolds and folds again, and again, ad infinitum. The 
following short section articulates the endoheterogenesis of immanence relative to involution. In 
this I then turn to present the “plane of nature” as a facet of immanence rather than the 
transcendental field, articulated above in terms of immediate consciousness, in the sense that 
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Deleuze and Guattari claim “the plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, 
as Nous and Physis” (1994, 38).28  
 Involution has three significant appearances in the works of Deleuze and Guattari, each 
with regards to expressionism. Deleuze links the concept to its appearance in the work of 
Desargues. 29  In The Fold Deleuze notes that the geometric sense of involution articulates the 
optical relation of a point of view and variation (2006, 22). This will have some relevance for the 
reader-body’s becomings. But the concept gathers a less synoptic and more creative sense in 
Expressionism (Deleuze 1992) and A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2013) where, 
while still retaining the sense of The Fold and its plicatory announcements, is positioned as a 
degree of expression akin to evolution and is unfolded in the sense of life and living bodies.30 In 
Expressionism Deleuze proposes an equivocal relation between involution and implication: “to 
explicate is to evolve, to implicate is to involve” (1992, 16). In this sense the concept moves no 
further than implication except that it is now given a relation to evolution, a relation that alters 
its vector and links it with life. As Deleuze continues to explore the problem of causation in 
Spinoza, he shows a fusion of Aristotelian logic with Spinoza, with a continued emphasis on the 
process of folding. In his claim that “knowledge of a thing itself depends on knowledge of it 
cause” (133), Deleuze notes that this means a cause is involved or folded into the “thing” itself.31 
To obtain knowledge, the involvement of the cause in the thing itself must be further unfolded 
or evolved (otherwise, explicated) from the thing. When this is raised to the properly Spinozist 
level of bodies, Deleuze explains that involution designates “the mixture of external body and 
our own body in affections of which we have ideas” (147). That is, involution designates the 
shared immanence of affections in a plurality of bodies.  
In drawing a relation of contrast to evolution, to evolve, Deleuze here enables a 
qualification on the notion of life, especially insofar as the written- and reader-bodies of 
                                                          
28 Regarding the transcendent relative to immanence in Deleuze, see Sauvagnargues (2013, 154-155). On 
transcendental empiricism, see, broadly, Sauvagnargues (2009). 
29 On Deleuze and Desargues see D.W. Smith (2012a) who presents Desargues as influencing Deleuze with 
regards to mathematics and specifically on the trajectory of problematics, although indicating the more 
historical mathematical tension between “axiomatics and problematics” in mathematics ) (291-292). While 
in D.W. Smith there is only a brief engagement with the projective geometry Deleuze employs for the 
theory of involution, Duffy (2010) presents a detailed synoptic account of the relevant aspects of 
projective geometry for Deleuze’s claims in The Fold (2006) regarding “point of view” (141). Curiously, 
these two instances are indicative of a limited engagement with the concept of involution in Deleuze 
scholarship (especially with regards to Desargues). Duffy’s focus on the notion of inflection is a proximal 
and relevant study for involution. More research on the Deleuze/Desargues relation is warranted.    
30 See Joughin (1992, 7) for an observation of the relation of folding to involution, and the problems of 
translating the term from French. 
31 I stress “thing” to note that it is both unsuitable for the expressionism of this thesis, and is tenuous in 
the philosophy of individuation that arises from Deleuze’s expressionism. 
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immanent reading are concerned. The involved mixture of affections, and the involvement of 
the cause in the thing caused (the body), indicate the immediacy of a point of view for observing 
the immanence of relations. Furthermore, if life is to inhere in bodies, it must do so in the 
alliance of affections (capacities or powers of bodies). It makes no sense to settle upon an 
evolutionary theory that favours a core site for the evolution of a species, nor to focus upon life 
in strictly causal genetics. Life must be apprehended for its evolution and its involution, for how 
it unfolds and how it enfolds. In the written-body and reader-body it is sensation that is 
composed both immanently to each body, and as the vector of their alliance, or, rather, the zone 
of their becoming. And, I claim, sensation inheres a life that subtends all expression. As such, the 
living expression of written-bodies and reader-bodies adheres to a serialisation of life that is 
involutionary. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari take the process further in a way which will clarify the 
final sense of involution for immanence and, for the present thesis, immanent reading. Further, 
for immanent reading, this will constitute the minimum of life that attends the becomings 
therein. Deleuze and Guattari call upon a “plane of Nature” (2013, 311). This plane, they claim, 
“never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it” (311). They are careful 
to point out that nature and artifice are dissolved upon this plane, and that the perpetual 
movement of the plane and the events that traverse it perpetually increase or decrease its 
dimensions. However, that a supplementary dimension is not introduced means that nothing 
can be added to it. There appears to be no progression, or regression of forms, but rather “an 
involution, in which form is constantly being dissolved, freeing times and speeds… absolute state 
of movement” (311). But further qualification of involution is made earlier, where they will note 
that it is creative given that it composes “heterogeneous terms” (278). The plane does not 
oppose another plane but can be said only to be a different conception of the organisations that 
are already experienced. Different conceptions constitute ways of upsetting this organisation or 
formalisation as well, if this is how the plane is conceived, which will result in the plane of 
Nature. As above, it is not a matter of saying “I am no longer evolving, now I am involving”, but 
rather “I see now my evolution is also an involution”.  It is in this way that indefinite articles, 
bodies of the haecceitic variety, are capable of exposing a life despite consisting of different 
materials. There is no need, on the plane of Nature, for specifying biological life, nor zoological.32        
                                                          
32 On the non-Aristotelean take on Deleuze’s notion of life, including distinctions regarding possible 
hierarchies such as zoē and bios, see Agamben (1999, 233). Agamben’s reading of “Immanence: A Life…” 
extends from the punctuation Deleuze uses into the deliberate encounters he makes with Charles Dickens. 
Agamben also takes note of possible correlations with Foucault and his final writings on life. Throughout, 
Agamben deploys his own concept of “bare life”, presumably in order to make it clearer what Deleuze is 
speaking to. However, despite acknowledging the necessity the lack of definiteness, Agamben still seeks it 
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 For immanent reading, the plane of nature is the involvement of bodies. Bodies are 
involved in the plane in such a manner to be expressed as its speeds and slownesses, as its 
populations. But this is only insofar as they have an evental distribution that allows this 
involvement to be clear. The reader-body, insofar as it is concerned, is involved in the same 
plane that expressed the written-body. As the proximity and contiguity increases in a becoming, 
the reader-body becomes involved in the written-body, the written-body involving the reader-
body in turn. This is not strictly the entire process of implication, such that the reader-body 
disappears and becomes the essence of the written-body. Rather, it remains an involution 
insofar as they are heterogeneous bodies, an alliance, whereby the involvement is at the level of 
their affective and perceptive expressions. There persists in this a life, or rather there subsists a 
life, that is evental and displays itself only through the presentation of an indefinite element. 
But this goes further than the Event of consistency. When Deleuze claims that 
“immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy” (1992, 80), there is no longer a standpoint from 
which to fall into the abyss, the stance (sistere) of a concept is shown to be already unstable, the 
ground is shown to be slipping away, and the sensational distribution of the plane, equally 
unstable, makes those conceptual bodies engaged in the pure immediacy become dispersed and 
at risk of radical decomposition (if having an evental distribution wasn’t already enough to make 
the body tremble). For the pragmatic involutions on the plane of nature, for the force of life that 
inheres in the folds, bringing the body to a phase of pure immanence suspends them between 
life and death. The vertigo of philosophy is becoming swept away on the involutions of the plane 
of Nature, by the forces of a life, and consequently becoming entangled in unnatural alliances: “I 
undo the folds of consciousness that pass through every one of my thresholds… in order to 
unveil in a single movement this unfathomable depth of tiny and moving folds that waft me 
along at excessive speeds in the operation of vertigo” (Deleuze 2006, 106).33  
 The process of immanent reading therefore comprehends these elements of immanence 
to articulate the relations, and to expose the forces at play in reading. It is shown that the bodies 
of immanent reading inhere a life, but that this constitutes a textured threshold of plication in 
the final force of an involutionary plane. The plane that is laid out for immanent reading is a 
plane of composition, but a life subsists throughout this plane and makes it a dangerous place to 
                                                          
out and “bare life” is symptomatic of this. It is my understanding that Deleuze is not attempting to identify 
a concept of life, but rather to make one in light of pure immanence. Further, Agamben’s attention to the 
“spark of life” makes it an object and a definite article in the apprehension of life, while, by Deleuze’s own 
terms it requires consideration as an indefinite “empty” between times (past and future).    
33 See Kerslake who suggests an affective notion of vertigo is brought forward in the rediscovery of life 
(2009, 212). I think, and argue here, that the vertigo concerns the immediate experience of life, not its 
rediscovery. 
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manage a self-interested composition. For the reader-body to persist, this evental force of a vital 
life must be persistently cut into that which allows for new planes to emerge. These, of course, 
always emerge as conditions of relations between bodies (well-defined or otherwise). Events are 
encountered as indefinite articles, and these announce or mark immanence. Consciousness 
comes to bear on nature by means of pure immediacy, pure immanence constituting the 
suspension of a body in phase between life and death. This is not a static suspension, but rather 
the absolute movement of immanence, the dizzying force of immanence in a state of infinite 
collapse and re-consistence. While dimensions of bodies float free in immanence and enter into 
new compositions, sensations being the dimensions of present concern for this thesis, no 
dimensions come or go from a life. One, rather, changes one’s perceptions and affections, 
changing how one experiences life, given the compositions one enters into on the plane of 
immanence. It is this impetus that drives immanent reading. What now follows in this thesis is a 
work of speculation on speculative sensations as they are encountered in a process of immanent 
reading. The first of these encounters, constituting the entirety of the next chapter, is with 
Cormac McCarthey’s The Road (2006) and the immanent sensations therein made available for 
becoming. The second of these encounters (to be unfolded in Chapter Eight) is with a broader 
scope of events of sensation in written-bodies, including but not limited to the Saturn-event.  
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7. Reading immanently: Sensation desaturated 
 
From a random encounter of bodies, we can select the idea of those bodies that agree 
with our own and give us joy, that is, that increase our power. (Deleuze 2007, 144) 
 
Reading is not just a process of mobilisation and creation of the reader-body, but is also a 
process of composition. The notion of reading has its etymological roots in composition, prefix 
re- being a variant of ar- meaning “to gather” or “to compile” linking it to artistic composition. 
But beyond the helpful orientation of the word’s etymology, reading as an act of becoming is 
more illustrative of what is at stake. Immanent reading takes the becoming of reading as one of 
its vectors, the others being the reality of various involved bodies and their immanent events of 
sensation.1 Immanent reading understands the becoming in reading as a cross pollination and 
modification of bodies in the act, a symbiosis or alliance of bodies. Written-bodies are artistic 
compositions of words, and as such they configure monuments of sensation – appearing as 
images although these can be haptic as well as visual, olfactory, and so on. This is, of course, not 
the limitation of the immanent productions of writing. The immanent reality of any piece of 
writing is also revealed in immanent reading, meaning that a realm of presupposition comes to 
bear on the reading. Reading the sensation will necessarily make claims on the essence of that 
sensation, the sensation therein unfolding its essence. Like all becomings, immanent reading is 
rendered mute by acts of imitation such that dressing like a fairy upon reading about a fairy can 
amount to a sadness for the written-body. Immanent reading, then, as a becoming, and as a 
process of compiling or contemplating sensations at the site of the reader-body, places no 
necessary configuration upon the reader, such that she will not be told how to dress or behave, 
but nor is it simply a subjective of reader determined response. Immanent reading is neither 
subjective, nor objective, but is rather pragmatic and distributed. Necessity, and correspondent 
truth, are displaced by experimentation with real matter that will create claims on the essence 
of sensation, of writing, while generating a creative modification of the reader-body and its 
perceptions and affections. The present chapter is thus concerned with this praxis of immanent 
reading, taking Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2009) as the written-body of the encounter. Here 
my theory of immanent reading is still present and developing, but now by means of the praxis. 
The immanent reading of The Road that follows is preceded by a summary of the process of 
                                                          
1 The becoming of reading is discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. The involved bodies of reading are 
discussed in Chapter Three and Five. 
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immanent reading. Then, the specificity of the reading proceeds with the sensations explicated 
by this written-body: (1) desaturation, (2) of light, dark and colour.     
 
The praxis of immanent reading 
Imitation portends a poor encounter for reader-bodies. If a reader-body were to imitate 
sensations from Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2009), then images such as “a charred human 
infant headless and gutted and blackening on the spit” (212) would be extrapolated and used as 
a model, a method. This is obviously absurd, but the image itself is no less real for its lack of 
imitability. As an experiment with sensation, the image opens a novel territory that confronts 
the reader-body, testing both their desire to continue reading, and affectively recomposing their 
movements. The image may have its correspondents elsewhere in life, as with drowning children 
on broadcast news or Jonathan Swift’s satirical essay “A Modest Proposal” (1729), but here in 
writing it is a monument. A horrific monument that complicates the preparation of children for 
eating with the boy’s reaction “Oh Papa”, and again with the Man’s observations “He didn’t 
know if he’d speak again” (212), and further with the “headless and gutted and blackening” 
infant (212).2 Several paragraphs earlier the mother of the infant “walked with a waddling gait 
and as she approached he could see that she was pregnant” (208). This complication of the 
mother of “whatever black thing was skewered over coals” (211) explicates the presuppositions 
of the image. That is, a world of signs now exists, even if it had not before, wherein a mother 
could eat her child, be it due to famine or the pressure of the “three men” she was tramping 
with (207).3 The reader-body is not asked by the written-body to do anything other than to have 
this encounter with its own eventality, there is no call for imitation, no call for response.4 The 
monument is real, it consists of life and thus pertains to life, while also being the composition of 
a speculative sensation (these issues are discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis).   
 As is now clear, reading in immanence involves a comportment of the reader-body to 
the written-body that is, in ethical terms, beneficial to the growth of each body insofar as it 
increases the power of either. Decisions to perform analysis on narrative, character, story, and 
so on are not inherently detrimental to the written-body but in doing so there can be a 
                                                          
2 “Man” and “boy” are the persistent names given to the protagonists. 
3 See also the marching blood cult: “wagons drawn by slaves in harness and piled with goods of war and 
after that the women, perhaps a dozen in number, some of them pregnant…” (McCarthy 2009, 96). This 
draws the image of the pregnant woman into a greater servitude, in the monument of The Road the 
multiple instances of the pregnant women inform each other and implicate each other. 
4 On the notion of McCarthy as writer of “the event” see Alan Bourassa (2009). Bourassa’s reading of 
Deleuze in relation to McCarthy is heavily dependent on the notion of event, although at times it appears 
as if McCarthy is not producing events rather than representing (or reflecting) Deleuze’s notion of them.    
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transcendental limitation imposed upon what is immanently expressed. Where the written-body 
is in its full growth is through the sensations it presents as internal monuments to the milieu of 
the writing, as the milieu of sensations therein, and the compositions that protrude from the 
written-body configuring becomings. What this means, and The Road is a valuable site for this 
claim to unfold, is that the reading can proceed from anywhere in the writing. In this case, then 
it makes little sense to indicate the story, to perform a secondary summary of the narrative. In 
fact, the process of summarizing, which is part of analysing narrative but not its entirety, 
exemplifies these restrictive transcendental impositions that would come from a reader. Given 
the metaphysics of expression I have developed in this thesis, and the ethics that follows, this 
would again be a problem to the conatus (or striving/power) of the written-body. What is done 
with reading in immanence is that the sensations are privileged since they constitute the images 
and signs that go into the composition of the written-body. It takes on a level of selection that 
may at once seem aleatory, but through observing the complication of sensations internal to the 
written-body, immanent reading can illuminate other degrees of sensation in that body. This 
casting of a zone of immanence demonstrates the manner in which the sensations immediately 
contemplate one another and share their sense. That is, it provides a manner to unfold 
(interpret or explicate) and interact with the affections of the written-body through the 
composed affects and percepts that consist that body.5 The becoming of immanent reading, 
which produces the selection of the sensations through an immanent will, or a zone of 
immanence (that involves but exceeds the reader), makes some sensations more obvious and 
others recede but at no point is the coming forward or receding made permanent. 
Transformation, after all, is inherent to becoming. The reader-body is configured in regards to 
these sensations, in a specific and technically un-repeatable becoming – although a second 
staging of the event in writing is possible (note that this provides a new set of becomings at a 
distance from the becoming-sensation of that particular reader-body). This specificity should not 
however be regarded as a subjective experience, nor as denoting some sort of privileged access 
(interpretosis). Neither can any claims made in the becoming be called objective truths because 
both subject and object are redundant, and because truth (correspondent) will also constitute a 
limiting concept for reading.  
                                                          
5 On the encounter with signs see Ronald Bogue: “only through a chance encounter with an unsettling sign 
can though be jolted from its routine patterns, and only through such an encounter will the object of 
thought cease to be arbitrarily selected and attain the necessity of something that itself chooses thought” 
(2007, 55). I agree with this reading, except insofar as the “object of thought” is concerned since my 
reading of sensation displaces the notion of objects, not least of all the objects of thought, preferring the 
processual modifications of thought. 
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It is, then, through specific becomings that the logic of reading in immanence is 
revealed. This specificity entails an awareness of the sensational milieu of the written-body, the 
internal sensational monuments, the written-body as monument, and the milieu that constitutes 
the written-body (as in neighbouring bodies producing sensation, as well as the reader-body). 
But since such awareness, which accompanies an openness to the sensations on behalf of the 
reader-body, would have to be omniscient to provide access to the infinitely upgrading 
sensational compositions (as in when one changes trains while reading a book, or the stiffness of 
pages in cold weather), there is, then, a selectivity that the becoming coordinates which is 
indicated by the immediate sensations a reader will choose. This choice, however, is still 
configured by the becoming and is not strictly indicative of a free will capable of making any 
choice whatsoever. Given my own comportment to The Road, being a father of young children, I 
might be compelled to use my sympathies to access the written-body. This would mean that 
moments such as when a baby is found roasting over a small campfire on a spit would be 
confronting and be an obvious collection of sensations to explore. But sympathy, like imitation, 
despite being a part of the becoming, is an affect produced by the reader that codes The Road. 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to this as a “subjective reverie” (2013, 301). In coding the written-
body is given a regime of restriction – a state. Reading in immanence avoids such readings.  
Reading in immanence avoids restrictive reading by promoting a process of becoming 
that sweeps the reader-body and the written-body into a consistent configuration while still 
assuring the heterogeneity of each body. However, despite retaining different/ciation between 
the bodies, such becoming necessitates a transformation of the reader-body. The comportment 
of the reader-body cannot rely on this, however, and knowledge of the transformation can be 
fleeting or go unrecognised. Consequently, how the reader-body consists in relation to the event 
of sensation is important. If when the body into its own existence, she determines an ontological 
necessity, as in “I am being” or “I am subject”, then the corporeal modifications of the becoming 
are limited. But a reader who is attuned to their reality as body, and indeed their evental reality 
as haecceity (“she is this event”), is aware of their ongoing transformation requiring only their 
consistency as an event, their evental “I”, and so is already open to becoming and 
transformation. As outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis, the sense that becoming is a 
transformation is not contingent upon an end result (in time or composition). So, when a reader-
body reads The Road, for example, it is not expected that her transformation is into a blood-cult 
member “wearing rad scarves” (2009, 96), or a traveller “small and bent… with a peeled stick for 
a cane” (171), or a post-apocalyptic survivor. The transformation is of her own body, but it is a 
transformation “with” and not “into” the sensations of the written-body. Such becoming makes 
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the dimensions of the written-body available to the reader-body such that she might easily 
assemble some of those sensation into her own composition, modulating her affective and 
perceptive expression, thus changing her feelings and perceptions. For instance, red now having 
the relational affection of a blood cult (or other composure). This chapter will, of course, explore 
this intra-relational composition of sensations, and the way they offer becomings, with further 
specificity in relation to colour.  
Consider the following familiar claim by Deleuze and Guattari relative to Spinoza and a 
logic of becoming: 
we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into a composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful 
body. (2013, 300) 
In this treatment of a logic of becoming, which is the manner here in which immanent reading 
engages a good affective relation with a written-body, Deleuze and Guattari promote the 
development of an ethology (2013, 299). By this they mean that a body be encountered through 
its affects, through its manner of expression, and not through its categorical attributes. This 
allows them to claim, by attending to the affects of the various bodies, that “a racehorse is more 
different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox” (299). A manner of expression that 
makes the workhorse and the ox compatible is their orientation to reality or what they do 
relative to their environment. Where the racehorse and the workhorse share a genus, Equus, 
this does not make them affectively similar. A workhorse will be slower and be oriented to 
labour, like the ox, whereas a racehorse is oriented to a track (or circuit) and its magnitude of 
expression relative to speed is greater: they do different things in different relations. Insofar as 
immanent reading coordinates becomings, this ethological take on the expression of the body 
provides a focused praxis. To observe what a written-body can do, and to attend to its 
becomings, “we will seek to count its affects” (299), or “make a list of affects” (300).  
 Deleuze, on Spinoza, claims that an ethology is created when a “study of the relations of 
speed and slowness, of the capacities for affecting and being affected” (1988, 125) is produced. 
Attending to the body of any process, and producing its definition, is here not attended by the 
creation of categories. As Deleuze says, “you will define an animal, or a human being, not by its 
form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of 
which it is capable” (124). Thus, with immanent reading, it is a matter of moving on from 
ontologically categorical and decisive articulations of writing, ones that, for instance, privilege a 
study of narrative, character, setting, and so on. Immanent reading prefers the affects (and, 
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more broadly, sensations) as a zone or site of study insofar as there is an internal composition 
belonging to the event of the written-body, and a modulation created in the reader-body. 
Narrative and character can account for the “organs” of the written-body, although not all 
written-bodies will have such organisation, whereas the affects of a written-body are unfolded 
through and between the organs by degrees of sensation in a complication of immanent 
relations.   
However, it is not enough in immanent reading to attend only to the affects since it has 
become clear that written-bodies are compositions of affects and percepts by degree of 
sensation. What the written-body can do is its affective dimension, but this is still expressed and 
subsequently encountered as a percept as a complementary vector. Consequently, a list of 
affects must be accompanied by a list of percepts, each considered relative to the other in their 
local becomings, in order to attend to their expression as sensation. Once composed, the reader-
body gains access to sites or zones of becoming-sensation that will thrive or be depleted due to 
the immanent expressions themselves. In this manner, the immanent reader enter into the 
expressionist ethical encounters with the written-body, the encounters “that increase our 
power” insofar as (sensational) dimensions are added to either body in their becoming that 
allow for this increase in expression (Deleuze 1997, 144).  
The comportment of the reader-body, then, is arranged by both the becoming and the 
bodies of the becoming. This condition illustrates that selection is still relevant since the reader-
body can easily shy away from the becoming, and, indeed, be ignorant of what constitutes a 
sensation. But a willingness on behalf of the reader to transform, to not be opposed to 
transformation, and to make their body available to an affective and perceptive transformation 
– and consequently to the dimensions that are mobile in the becoming – is necessary. The 
comportment of the reader-body needs only to make its own eventality available to the actions 
and passions (affects) of the written-body to engage a becoming. Or, in Deleuze’s words, “not to 
be unworthy of what happens” (2004b, 169).    
It has noted that reading in immanence is a process of becoming, but it is not entirely 
singular in the numerical or cardinal sense. In the case of The Road, for example, there is a 
becoming-desaturated available, and indeed this desaturation has a large composition. But this 
becoming is also configured by an ongoing list of other becomings: becoming-snow, becoming-
cold, becoming-apocalyptic, and so on. Further still, becoming-desaturated with The Road also 
constitutes an indeterminate number of degrees more intimate to the bodies and more 
characteristic of general becomings as in a becoming-literary, -writing, -syntax, and so forth. 
Indeed, while becoming-desaturated has a specificity that implicates the reader-body, my own in 
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this case, there is a transverse operation that allows other readers into the becoming, or, rather, 
allows other readers to be configured in and by the becoming. This threatens the naming of the 
becoming, but since the sensations are non-anthropic and belong to the written-body the 
naming is performed on the sensation. In doing so the assumption is that in naming, and also in 
articulating the sensation, that a becoming be transveral and configure a range of other bodies – 
including more readers. There are always many becomings: subterranean becomings that only 
speculation expresses as events of sensation, incorporeal becomings that modify bodies but are 
not themselves bodies, invisible becomings, and obvious becomings that are difficult to 
untangle.  
There are many becomings that are experienced by the written-body, however, it is 
impossible to know how these are experienced by that body. What this thesis is presently 
showing, and has delivered so far a theory in support of, is that the written-body transforms in 
any encounter and that these are becomings. This transformation may be sad in the sense that 
the conatus (power of the body) is restricted, or in turn, joyful in the sense that it perseveres and 
expands. Becomings may result in burned books, interpretive overcoding, or even a becoming-
reader of the written-body (even if it bespeaks no necessity of such a name). But insofar as 
reading in immanence is a good ethical process, and so long as the reader is composed in such a 
manner as not to lead to the destruction or restriction of the writing, then it matters little what 
the written-body experiences.    
  Speculative sensations have other productions than a programmatic morality. The above 
image of the charred baby is not a warning to a contemporary world of what is to come. If the 
written-body presents, internally, some sense of the contemporaneity of the narrative, then it is 
possible. At least temporally, this does not happen. The Road is speculative literature insofar as 
it does not repeat the images of a world outside of it verbatim and insofar as it experiments with 
sensations. This is present in the image of the infant, but it pertains broadly to the composition 
of the entire written-body. Speculation comes for McCarthy in his use of colour, or more 
precisely, the desaturation of colour and the gestural rupture of colour. I argue here that the 
immanent reader can go further than this claim on the immanent creation, its speculative 
production, standing (consisting) itself as reader-body of a becoming with the written-body. This 
opens the affective force of the desaturation onto other domains of the living and decomposes 
real bodies. Such is the focus of this chapter, an immanent reading of The Road.  
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Immanent desaturation of Man 
A man and a boy are asleep in a barren wood, covered by nothing save a blue tarp, amidst a 
desolate wasteland:  
He was half asleep when he heard a crashing in the woods. Then another. He sat up. The 
fire was down to scattered flames among embers. He listened. The long dry crack of 
shearing limbs. Then another crash. He reached and shook the boy. Wake up, he said. 
We have to go. 
He rubbed the sleep from his eyes with the backs of his hands. What is it? he said. What 
is it, Papa? 
Come on. We have to move. 
What is it? 
It’s the trees. They’re falling down. 
The boy sat up and looked about wildly.  
It’s all right, the man said. Come on. We need to hurry… (McCarthy 2009, 102) 
Cited at length above is an extract, or zone of immanence, from The Road. It is an image within a 
monument that is created by McCarthy composed entirely of percepts and affects: sensations.6 
There is a deterritorialisation that occurs where McCarthy’s syntax refuses the presentation of 
neatly allocated pronouns. Where “he” is used, it is difficult to immediately affix the pronoun to 
a character, resulting in a complication of characters. The boy and the man here, and at other 
sites within the work, are barely distinguished. If I read this psychoanalytically, and thus attempt 
to oppress it in a flow of interpretosis, I would have much to say on the father/son dichotomy 
and the implications of having a malleable border between their identification or indeed their 
existential individuation. I could go further with psychoanalysis and read the forest of falling 
trees as a field of falling cocks that frame and threaten the father/son duality: “I will never be 
daddy”. Further still, and this is the implicit freedom of the psychoanalytic despot, the field of 
falling cocks reinforces the father/son dichotomy. But beyond such ontological imperatives, or 
the fixation of reality to being, the complication that returns from the “he” is a literal “bringing 
together” of the man and the boy where there is an immediate flicker of indiscernibility between 
individuations which is quickly resolved in the dialogue. But the ambiguity that results from the 
presence of the pronoun, such as “he rubbed the sleep from his eyes with the backs of his 
hands” (102), is amplified even further once the reader is composed into the sensations. The 
presence of “he”, and the vagueness that persists in allocating this to a character, produces an 
opening for a reader whereby they are given “he” as a sensation – and indeed as a dimension 
they can attribute to their own body – at the same time as it configures relations in the written-
body. It is, then, a becoming with “he”, a becoming-man or/and a becoming-boy, becoming-
                                                          
6 See discussion of percepts and affects in Chapter Three where I consider the consistency (standing on its 
own) of the monument. 
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masculine, that has nothing at all to do with a field of falling cocks. The degree that is at a 
distance from these initial becomings, and is attuned to the syntax, might find in this the 
production of a becoming-pronoun.7 
 Deleuze accounts for becomings with characters by noting their immanent reality. 
Characters in writing are nothing more or less than conceptual persona or aesthetic figures. The 
conceptual persona is an identity, though not definite in its dimensions, that is created in the 
building of a concept. Deleuze argues that “concepts need conceptual personae that play a part 
in their definition” (1994 2) and that conceptual personae are implicit and created between the 
presuppositions of the concept, its “plane”, and the concept itself (61). Aesthetic figures, 
Deleuze continues, are “not the same as conceptual personae” since they organise a becoming 
with sensation and not with concepts (177). He does note several caveats on this distinction 
including the possible passing of one into another whence the presence of a sensational relation, 
of variable orders. Characters themselves are not necessarily either of these but are to a degree 
determined in the relations given their disposition, their pathic relation, to the sensations or the 
concepts in the writing. In each instance, the persona must be configured by the reader, a 
necessarily creative act for the reader-body, such that their potential becomings are exposed. 
With aesthetic figures, however, it is not enough to linger on pronouns to determine their 
reality. Deleuze notes that aesthetic figures, as sensations, can be “landscapes and faces, visions 
and becomings” (177), and so it does not suffice to find a character to individuate an aesthetic 
figure. Or, at least, landscapes and other sensations must be able to take the mantle of 
“character”. Persona is an adequate tool here, indicating that whence it has been identified or 
singled out in some manner, it transforms into a passage to and from the written-body.  
In the above passage from The Road (2009), then, “he” is a site for becoming and “he” 
here has a relation to the sensations of the written-body.8 As such, “he” is an aesthetic figure, at 
least until a concept is individuated in the writing. “He” is composed with the “long dry crack of 
shearing limbs”, “scattered flames among embers”, “a crashing in the woods”, and rubbing 
“sleep from his eyes with the backs of his hands” (McCarthy 2009, 102). It stands at first to say 
                                                          
7 Of course there is no becoming-man for Deleuze and Guattari. This will be discussed momentarily. I 
concede on this that the use of pronouns, too, might be considered a majoritarian or state site but this 
would only account for the work not gaining a category of minor literature (and the process of categorising 
is problematic with expressionism). 
8 On the notion of becoming in relation to Cormac McCarthy see Alan Bourassa regarding the “nonhuman 
becoming” (2009, 105). Bourassa presents one of few Deleuzian readings of McCarthy and his work is 
notable for its attention to affect and event. Where my own reading emphasises the inherent reader in 
the process of reading McCarthy, Bourassa appears to localise the reading to demonstrate how McCarthy 
has a singular Deleuzian level of expression. I would contend that most writing more or less has an evental 
degree, allowing, of course, the claim that McCarthy is “more” evental than most.   
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then, that “he” is an aesthetic figure in this instance. Either side of the cited quote further 
sensations are present which expand the sensational milieu and zone of immanence of “he”, but 
until these are recomposed by the reader-body, “he” remains a vector of becoming as an 
aesthetic figure, a passage into the sensations of the written-body, and a passage out of the 
written-body for the sensations.9      
What the immanent reading makes available, then, is a cooperation between reader and 
written-body. Where the psychoanalytic regime subsumes writing under the triadic categorical 
system of mother-father-child, or otherwise father-son-holy spirit, the immanent reading 
subsumes nothing save the immanent reality of the evental sensation in writing itself. It 
responds only to the possibility of growth in the written- and reader-bodies, a tempered 
approach that does not contain the writing but push and slip past the unnecessary limitations 
that may persist from the ontological imperative. In this instance, the ontological imperative 
refers to the learned habit of assigning being to metastable processes. In the above citation from 
The Road, the developing immanent reading produces a dimension amongst the syntax that 
invites cooperation, that is mobile and openly re-composable (which is novel even if only 
temporarily). “He” certainly has a power, as pronoun, but this is strictly linguistic. That is, it is 
functional under its necessary conditions when it is made to do so by the creative processes of 
language. Innately, it has no necessary operation. Even as a modal identifier, the metaphysics of 
the pronoun does not necessitate any role, any function, or manner of operation. But, it is 
important to keep these processes as part of a broader scope, which is its creation and density in 
time. That is, the formal aspect of the pronoun that arrives from a scientific and categorical 
approach to language is one instance of broader temporal creation.  
And so, in The Road, “he” carries both the construction of implicit meaning, and a virtual 
(in the sense of the non-actual future – though it is broader than this) potency which can be 
                                                          
9 Hannah Stark (2013) offers a reading of The Road and the role that the male protagonist plays in 
emphasising the anthropocentric “vision” or “witnessing” of the end of days. Her analysis is frequently 
concerned with the sensations, especially insofar as they are composed relative to one another in the 
writing itself: “The first time that the man looks through the binoculars they provide a textual strategy to 
describe the surrounding countryside, which is revealed to be a colourless and ashen landscape of dead 
trees and bits of road” (Stark 2013, 75). This Deleuzian sensibility to the reading of The Road that Stark 
offers is in accord with the notion of immanent reading insofar as the immanent sensations, percepts and 
affects, are concerned. The other degree, the becomings that this would make available, are also hinted at 
without being explicit. This is another rare example of a Deleuzian reading of The Road, and is exceptional 
for its implicit deployment of the ethological aspect of Deleuze’s expressionism, albeit with some trace of 
representation still permeating the discourse. See also Claire Colebrook on this notion of witnessing the 
apocalypse in The Road and its implications for post-human theory (Colebrook 2012b, 203). In my reading 
of The Road in this chapter, given that I have brought the thesis to this point on immediacy and 
immanence, I deem it important to restrict other readings of the written-body unless they are in direct 
conversation with that sensation of process that I consider.  
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realised and even expanded upon in immanent reading – the cooperative becoming: “He” the 
boy, “he” the man, “he” the reader, “he”… and so on. Importantly, this is a complication of 
individuations that are complicated by the pronoun, even as the pronoun, as seen above 
amounts only to a marker of a possible aesthetic figure, and thus a site of becoming. This means 
that the pronoun performs a synthetic operation that produces a fourth person point of view 
whilst also stabilising the sequence of “he” and its existential weft. Amongst the “he”, regardless 
of biological or sociological gender identification, “he” is woven with the haecceity of the reader-
body, but only given how it consists in its relations in the writing. “He” becomes an extra 
dimension of that dispersed but dense individuation of the reader-body. It is in this manner that 
the pronoun, as an affective modifier, produces the plication of real processes: of writing, of 
reader, of sensation.   
 The relations of the aesthetic figure “he”, which has provided an affective passage 
between the reader-body and the written-body, is expanded to its immanent reality in the 
writing. That is to say, “he” is a relation with several vectors amongst the sensations of The Road 
(2009). For example, in the above passage it is notable that there is no colour. I soon propose a 
wider sense of this desaturation, but in the present instance the desaturated sensational milieu 
has a troublesome effect. There is no colour to “the dry crack of sheering limbs” (102), no colour 
to the embers or the fire. By association the fire might have some degree of colour, since there is 
fire outside of this written-body to which a reader-body may have access. The embers too, but 
the association is not necessary nor is it proposed in the passage. It does not say to the reader: 
“imagine a fire in your hearth, this is that fire verbatim, colour and all”. The written-body is its 
own real body, it composes its own sensations, its own percepts and affects, and as such it 
herein composes no colour. In the passage there is not even dark and light, which removes vision 
from the becoming except insofar as the fire persists, despite consisting as colourless. The 
passage of “he” between written- and reader-bodies allows for this sensation to become present 
to the reader from which it must then be said that our reader-body has a becoming with the 
desaturation. There is no light, there is no dark, there is no colour; vision fails for the reader-
body in this becoming. 
 There are, of course, sounds in the passage as in the case of the “the long dry crack of 
shearing limbs” (McCarthy 102). These provide an additional vector for the becoming of the 
reader-body, via the “he”, which configures an aural becoming. The long dry crack of shearing 
limbs is composed upon a plane of visual decomposition. As with the colourless fire, sound is a 
privileged sensation for the becomings of the reader-body and the aesthetic figure who provides 
passage. The crack is clear and intrusive on this plane, an abrupt actuation of aural sensation 
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whence the visual has retired its centrality. The reader-body can compose this with their own 
individuation, given the passage, such that degrees of their own sensational milieu become 
visually desaturated and aurally rupturous. It doesn't necessarily equate to an imitation or a 
hallucination, such that a reader-body literally begins to hear the long dry cracking of shearing 
limbs. An imitation kills becomings, or at least limits them. Rather, the reorientation and 
recoding of the visual and aural sensations available to the reader-body, which at once configure 
themselves as dimensions of the reader-body, make the privilege of sight over sound redundant. 
Attached to this percept, and its perceptual distribution, is the affect of recoded sensations 
which is where the troublesome aspect begins. To find oneself oriented in the world by sounds – 
and here it is the abrupt actuating sounds of falling trees and cracked limbs – where vision is in a 
state of desaturation and limited real distinction, is configured in this event of sensation with 
regards to fear, and a desire to flee, as passive affections.10 It is okay, “he” says, keeping his 
composure, but we have to leave. As was discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, the 
modulation of the reader-body is transductive and, by means of this, the reader-body 
transforms. At the level of the percept, the sound of the cracking limbs, for instance, is 
contemplated and in doing so is contracted by the perception of the haecceity of the reader-
body. The effect in the reader, as it implicates this cause is, while it is suspended in immanence, 
without metaphor or other reference, to hear the living force of that sound.    
  There is a mixture already present to the reader-body, in general, that coordinates 
gender but struggles to fixate upon anything specific. That “he” in The Road is a site of 
becoming, becoming-masculine or otherwise, does not presuppose the determinate ends of the 
reader-body or written-body. Deleuze and Guattari argue that a becoming “is not defined by 
points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it 
comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to 
the localizable relation to distant or contiguous points” (2013 341-342). Points also have other 
names for Deleuze and Guattari, such as the molar-entity (contra molecular), to which “Man” is 
considered the exemplar (341). The becoming-man of The Road is threatened insofar as the 
written-body is a point in relation to another point. Further, it is threatened where Man is 
majoritarian or the point of orientation for thought in any encounter.11 Becomings are not the 
                                                          
10 See Chapter Five, specifically the Affections of the Reader-Body, and Chapter Three. Here I explored the 
contemplation of sensation as consisting of active and passive degrees. This becomes relevant in this 
section due to the manner in which the reader-body is invited, by me, to engage the becomings.  
11 There is historical relevance here. At the time of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing a second surge of 
feminist thought was reaching apogee. Insofar as the patriarchal coding is concerned, little has changed in 
this now second decade of the 21st Century. One finds man and the masculine is still the deep coding of 
subjectivity and experience. This is a claim on the majoritarian state of thought itself, as despotically ruled 
over by masculinity, as coding and oppressing all other minds in a masculine mentality. See bell hooks 
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relation to, of point to point, but in a multivalent production are at once a middle composing 
(rather than composed) and deterritorializing molar and molecular entities. The reader-body and 
the written-body are both produced in this sense, the reader-body having no individuation 
beyond reading, the written-body too, although both bodies have other worlds and 
individuations, gender being one. “He” in The Road presents a becoming-man whereby “man” is 
constituted, from the middle, by the becoming and through the becoming. Further still by means 
of its relational production in the written-body. The reader-body does not encounter “man” as 
an idea in The Road, or as a transcendent figure, only as a deterritorialized figure of limited 
discernibility, shifting between man and boy. It is a speculative becoming, devoid of being’s “is”, 
that determines an immanent molecularity to “man”. Man, that is, without definition or 
distinction. Deleuze and Guattari indicate that “there is no becoming-man because man is the 
molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular” (2013, 341). Speaking in visual 
terms, man is desaturated in The Road constituting a decrease in definition and/or description. 
Or rather, man is becoming-desaturated since he must traverse these sensations therein. If there 
is a becoming-man of the reader-body, it is a desaturated version of man. So it is, then, that the 
reader’s becoming is a becoming with masculinity, a becoming with a minor configuration of the 
“majoritarian” par excellence insofar as he is desaturated, consisting only of the sensations that 
inhere in the milieu “he” inhabits. To paraphrase John Dudley, one of McCarthy’s readers on 
masculinity, masculinity is the trial (ritual) of man, not its definition, a trial with which 
McCarthy’s protagonist struggle and which makes of their subjectivity an “abject” (Dudley 2013, 
185).12 And, further, a becoming-masculine insofar as “he” is a persona composed of sensation 
that render him in a state of mobility, fleeing from the cracking and shearing limbs that rupture 
the desaturated plane of sensation. 
 
                                                          
(2000) for a distinct observation of masculine, or patriarchal, existential coding and the historical counter 
narrative to patriarchy. Deleuze and Guattari propose that all becomings pass through a becoming-child, 
and a becoming-woman, as a way to counter the coding of “man”, and further that there is no becoming-
man (2013, 340-341). This is sensible but insofar as “man” is not well-defined, and thus not transcendent, 
and is itself a becoming-child (“he” is both child and man in The Road even while there are two different 
characters), it offers a becoming that can be stated exhaustively as becoming-this-particular-man. Or, in 
other words, only a deterritorialized man is present in becoming-man.    
12 It is my sense, from the point of view of immanent reading, that Dudley compresses McCarthy’s 
characters too easily across written-bodies: as if the same persona appears again in the new instances of 
writing. I would contend that if this is the case it is only because they operate as extensions of the same 
event that subtends them, not as new iterations. In any case, Dudley’s use of Kristeva’s concept of the 
“abject” correlates to haecceity, the preferred expressionist decomposed subject. Indeed, its use to 
designate men in McCarthy’s works is insightful. The absence of The Road in Dudley’s reading, in no way 
indicates that the analysis does not apply equally to the “he” therein.  
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In light of darkness and a little colour 
It is a potential indictment of contemporary literary theory’s ontological imperative that in 
readings of The Road (2009) any reference to the dark, to the light, to the colours is immediately 
recoded. That the man awakens in a dark wood is understood as alluding to Dante (Mundik 
2016, 288), the presence of a pendulum refers to Foucault (289), and fire is a “central motif for 
the boy’s sacred nature” (Josephs 2013, 137). Such readings persist along the standardised paths 
of narrative, theme, idea, and so on which are immediate steps away from the materiality of the 
writing. The dark, the light, and the colours of The Road are not evidently experienced as 
sensations for McCarthy’s academic readers, a pathic semiosis ensuring that The Road does not 
exist in its own composition.13 The immanent sensations of the written-body are cast into a mass 
of exterior instances, becoming a representation of some other instance, and only 
comprehendible under such terms. There is no chance for them to compose their metaphysics 
and consequent ethics for the reader-body, there are no becomings, only a play of references. 
Literary theory seems implicated in this move, even in the presence of Roland Barthes, to put 
the immediate words into play with symbols. The reader has produced a “text” insofar as the 
words plug into other worlds which will, somehow, retroactively explain what is happening here 
in this written-body. It is absurd that given the interest that many of McCarthy’s critics show, 
they are want to leave his writing in order to “explain” it. Do these readers not feel disgusted by 
the black thing over the flames? I have claimed that for immanent reading, at the level of 
sensation in written-bodies, it is possible to read without resorting to associative processes such 
as representation.14 This means that the above readings constitute a limit on the written-body, 
what I argue is a sadness. 
 Immanent reading and the expressionism that beholds it composes a different sort of 
relation, not of transcendents and allusions to other ideas elsewhere. Rather, immanent reading 
is, again, with and amongst the writing itself. Principal to this is the level of sensation. So far, I 
have indicated how the desaturated visual domain of The Road explicates a decoding of the 
primacy of vision, allowing the aural (amongst others) to compose the affective levels, rendering 
the aesthetic figure of “he” desaturated and available for becoming. So, too, have I explicated 
                                                          
13 Paul Patton (2012), a Deleuzian philosopher, offers a reading of the sensation of fire in The Road but still 
concludes that it is “an indication or a sign that humanity in its present and past incarnations will be 
succeeded by an “overhuman” being freed of ressentiment” (2012, 143). On the one hand it dispenses 
with the representation of the fire, arriving at the conclusion by means of an observation of the eventality 
of the work. On the other hand, the fire only spuriously maintains its effects of sensation, as a potential 
affect (in the notion of ressentiment).   
14 Deleuze and Derrida, as well as several decades of theory, proceed without necessarily reading 
representation (even if deconstruction’s deferrals have their own problems). On this, see Lucy (1997). 
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from this a transformation of the reader-body insofar as the sensation of the aural rupture, the 
dry cracking limbs, is contemplated in the reader-body. I will now return to the visual in order to 
configure this differently. The visual degrees of the written-body are here desaturated by means 
of a series of persistent tones. It is not a colourless body, although as I have indicated, there are 
events in the writing to which vision, and therefore colour, has no access. However, the 
familiarity of the “man” as a possible avatar, and therefore not as a passage but as a 
representation for the reader, can threaten to reclose becoming. Consequently, I move my 
immanent reading to other zones of immanence and becomin, beyond the familiar and the 
sympathetic image of man (and its possible molarisation lest its desaturation be misunderstood), 
and into the speculative and experimental sensations: becoming-dark and becoming-light, both 
of which implicate becoming-colour as an essence. 
 The introduction of desaturation produces an awareness of the gradient of light. The 
desaturated body does not reflect a source of light foreign to it. Rather, it expresses light by 
degrees, always at higher and lower intensities spread across a perpetually created spectrum. 
Words, mixed and individually, are producers of light insofar as they are components of 
sensation. The Road is an expressor of desaturation whereby the writing composes light while 
limiting its expression of colour. It is not an allegory, nor is it symbol. McCarthy has, as his 
material, sensation as it persists beyond the composition, as sensations of life. But if sensation is 
a material, then it is so only insofar as it is a material contracted through a writer as novel (new). 
When a writer picks up a colour, any mixes and modifications corrupt that colour in the world. 
The red mark of the painter is made with paint, they paint it strong and from then on red is 
strong. Another painter paints red vivid, and so it is in life, until it is desaturated by another, and 
mixed by another. The writer has the same problem, in a sense. Where a writer writes red they 
write into a world of preconception, where too the word appears distant from what it is trying to 
articulate. “On the grey snow a fine mist of blood” (2009, 30) writes McCarthy. The grey snow is 
presented without excess, but on the grey snow a fine mist of blood – colour unknown. By 
association and familiarity with blood it might be assumed that the reader-body conjures red. 
But the written-body itself makes no claim on this specific colour, this blood on the grey snow is 
void of colour. With association it might be red, and context may give other hints, but with no 
specific expression of colour in the percept it remains voidal, colourless, desaturated blood. 
Despite this void of colour, it does not become completely desaturated, a desaturation that 
would extend beyond the drain of colour to greyscale, into a desaturation of life itself as 
expressed herein. The viscosity and density of the blood, a fine mist, is articulated and as such 
the life of the blood percept persists, albeit colourless. 
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The Road is engaged in a process of desaturation of sensation, as indicated here with the 
blood percept where the instability of its possible redness is enough to render it colourless. But 
the individuation of blood has let in something of a composition with its density accounted for 
by the “fine mist”. A greater desaturation is underway in this written-body. Taken as a broad 
work, from cover to cover, and not attending finely to the details of McCarthy’s images, The 
Road is a desaturated body. The dominant palette is grey, black, and white with some of the 
genius of McCarthy being his diversity in the creation of grey. Amidst the dominant palette are 
ruptures of colour but they are sparse, and sparser still that the process of association is broken 
in the immanent reading practice which will require the written-body to speak itself into reality. 
The greater desaturation appears affectively in The Road through which the void, the absence of 
living expression, is expressed. For the immanent reader who undertakes becomings with this 
body, they are tasked with at the very least suturing this voidal expression, to their own 
individuation. In short, through the process of desaturating sensation, via percept and affect, the 
desaturation of life itself is undertaken. 
Becoming-dark, becoming-light, and becoming-colour configure the desaturation of the 
reader-body in its immanent reading of The Road. That is, upon these three becomings is the 
becoming-desaturated of life itself. This is a life inherent in the written-body, but it also inheres 
in the reader-body, a life present to all degrees of sensation. It follows first the percepts of light, 
dark, and colour, as they are present in the written-body. When the becomings occur with a 
reader-body, then these percepts, which are images of the affections of the written-body, 
compose an affective weave with the reader-body. Consider the following instance of light in 
The Road’s opening sequence:  
Nights dark beyond darkness and the days more grey each one than what had gone 
before. Like the onset of some cold glaucoma dimming away the world… In the dream 
from which he’d wakened he had wandered in a cave where the child led him by the 
hand. Their light playing over the wet flowstone walls. Like pilgrims in a fable swallowed 
up and lost among the inward parts of some granitic beast (2009, 1) 
The reader-body’s becoming is now not held with light by means of “he” or “the child”. Such a 
site has already been presented in this chapter. Here the bodies of each are instead sources of 
light “playing over wet flowstone walls”. To engage the becoming-light, to be composed 
amongst that becoming, is to place “the child” and “he” at a distance. Light is an effect of the 
child, of “he”, but it is light that is read as an effect and the cause is now redundant. What 
matters is the relations with other sensations that light composes. Light, then, configures a 
relation to the granitic beast that swallows them up, to the flowstone walls, and to a dream. 
Experiencing no more than what is present in the quoted passage, the level of the percept 
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composes light as a play, as the speculative (im)possibility of perception, and the compossibility 
of the impossible (granitic beast). It also delivers a colour spectrum for this written-body phasing 
between a “dark beyond darkness” and “their light”. Neither is absolute, the night is dark insofar 
as it is not the diminishing grey of day. The light is light insofar as it is neither the dark of night 
nor the grey of day. Though it suffuses each in its absence, dark, and its waning presence, grey, it 
is in the dream that its presence continues to reinforce the desaturation of life. It does not 
portend illumination of anything growing, of anything that could be said to inhere life in a 
positive or saturated sense. The becoming-light is coded with a wet and slippery horror, a horror 
of internality, a horror of the dream.15 This becoming-light adds light to the dimensions of the 
reader-body in an immanent mode. Wherein the reader-body now says, “I emit light” given this 
becoming, they can also say “I reveal the inward parts of some granitic beast”, and “by day I 
wane and become-grey, by night I disappear”. This imaging is taken up as a source of a 
modulation of the sensational complex for the reader-body. It has indeterminate ends, even as 
all attend to degrees of desaturation.16  
 The becoming-light of the reader-body is a persistent becoming available in The Road 
relying upon the immanence of the sensation. Light pervades the writing, inheres in it, but it 
never grows. There is little sense in The Road that light will take a traditional semiotic role, 
providing wisdom, or revealing truth. The granitic beast is not a correspondent truth available to 
the reader-body beyond the writing, even though it may well be a truth created internal to the 
writing itself. In the latter case, there is no revelation only production. Whatever light does in 
the writing, it does as an action of creation, and this is the cooperative creation of a Sun, and not 
the despotic creation of a God. To which another instance of light extends the becoming-light of 
the reader-body, one that increases the spectrum of dark/grey to orange: 
He woke all night and got up and coaxed the fire to life again. He'd unfolded the tarp and 
propped one end of it up beneath the tree to try and reflect back the heat from the fire. 
He looked at the boy's face sleeping in the orange light. The sunken cheeks streaked 
with black. He fought back the rage. Useless. He didn’t think the boy could travel much 
more. Even if it stopped snowing the road would be all but impassable. The snow 
whispered down in the stillness and the sparks rose and dimmed and died in the eternal 
blackness. (McCarthy, 101)  
The instances of the sensation of light, at the degree of the percept, are broadly spread across 
this written-body but seldom do they configure colour. The instances are phases of growth of a 
speculative event of sensation that embeds itself in the writing, the sensation of light itself only 
                                                          
15 This understanding extends to the end of the paragraph: “on the far shore a creature that raised its 
dripping mouth from the rimstone pool” (2009, 2). 
16 Imitation, on the other hand, will claim “I am light, and thus I am child”… or vice versa. 
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occasioning the percept, while the affect remains subterranean and suffuse awaiting 
composition with the reader-body, awaiting becomings that will provide it passage to the 
surface and from there a play upon other surfaces. Seldom does this light configure colour but 
when it does the colour enters into the becoming-sensation, the becoming-light, eventually 
arranging its own becoming. In the above passage light expresses the colour orange which, as a 
site of becoming, is a rupture in the grey and bleak milieu of this written-body. While it is a 
rupture, it spreads itself across the face of the boy, imbuing that surface with depth in the 
“sunken cheeks”. The orange light, too, spreads streaks of black across the boy’s face, not as a 
revelation of the boy’s trauma, but as a composition of his individuation.  
 The becoming-light of the reader-body in this instance takes on an orange hue even as it 
expands upon other lines in an expressive logic. Orange is composed amongst a milieu of other 
visual sensations as well others such as the haptic warmth of the fire. Indeed, the inherent life of 
the fire (“back to life”) is composed with the orange, as is the mention of “he”. From this the 
becoming-light necessarily ordains fears of the boy’s inability to “travel much more”, an image of 
the impassable snowy road, and the image of rising, dimming, and dying of sparks “in the eternal 
blackness”. But in this ordination the orange light conditions the depletion of the characters’ 
existence, the absolute state of blackness beyond the orange, and the death of light itself in the 
dimming and dying sparks. Becoming-light, for the reader-body who encounters this image and 
is composed with it, does not appear to tend toward the positive and the standard cooperative 
symbiosis of a becoming. Nor to any general sense of light providing some illumination and truth 
or knowledge. Here the orange light speaks of death, of the weary, of the dread of traveling 
further upon The Road. Light contemplates the sadness of the body, the sunken-cheeks, the 
possible destruction of becoming itself. And it is this dimension that becoming-light produces for 
a reader-body as one possible new expression of their body. The reader-body needs to ask in 
what manner this composes with her own, or in what way she can compose her affections and 
perceptions with this image. It is in the percepts that the becoming is created, but it is in the 
affect that it orients the body of the reader in their own world beyond the words. An 
understanding of the limit of light, its ability to only compose despair, dismisses hope. The 
reader-body is thus able to add despair, even if she risks a disagreement of despair with her own 
passional composition. Becoming-light and the configuration of despair could only increase her 
power if it is found in her haecceity to be in agreement, and, indeed, if from this sensation she 
can compose an adequate idea. Insofar as she remains passive, despair depletes the body.    
 Something of the colour orange is learned in the above passage, and is taken as a new 
dimension of the reader to do with what they will. Orange clothes on their back, a flickering 
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campfire and its dying sparks, all now potentially express a version of despair and becoming-light 
as it appears in The Road. But this is only the case insofar as those processes exhibit the 
sensation under the same proper name, and can be named Orange. It befits the becoming to 
determine if the same can be said at other instances, to determine whether the becoming-light 
will only have the same effect, and thus configure the same affective interaction with the 
reader-body. The colour blue also persists in the written-body of The Road, occasionally finding 
vibrancy as with “the ring of blue teeth in the burner of the stove” (McCarthy 155) that sits 
alongside a warm bath, but its fate is to be composed with grey, and its fate is to be driven back 
into the subterranean materiality of the written-body taking the light with it. Blue thus has a 
broad instantiation in this written-body, its evental expression bringing it into relations with 
other sensations. 
 Three instances suffice to observe the movements of blue through The Road and its 
eventual surrender to desaturation. I have presented the “blue teeth in the burner of the stove” 
as one site for the expression of blue. In this event “the boy”, “scrawny and filthy and naked”, 
steps into a bath of warm water (McCarthy 155). Blue is the colour of light in the scene, not 
orange, and it adds no detail except to display itself as teeth (and what are these?). Yet the other 
sensations that it is composed with include warmth and water. Blue, here, then portends a 
positive becoming for the characters, a tendency to warmth, to the possibility of cleanliness as 
the filthy child bathes. But elsewhere the colour is problematic. In the man’s dreams the sky is 
“aching blue” and part of a siren world from which he forcibly awakens himself, to awaken from 
languor and death (17). Their shelter is a blue tarp that filters light sources producing a “blue 
gloom” (44) or otherwise “the frail blue shape of it looked like the pitch of some last venture at 
the edge of the world” (49). Further along, blue is found in the man’s memory (19), and returns 
repeatedly in composition with images of the ocean. However, in each instance blue is swept 
aside, such as when the man wakes, or compressed into a fine point as a buffer against grey: 
“they pushed on together with the tarp pulled over them. The wet grey flakes twisting and 
falling out of nothing. Grey slush by the roadside. Black water running from under the sodden 
drifts of ash” (15). Blue becomes in this way the persistent but frail colour capable of traversing 
the oppressive grey of this written-body. However, there is no success for the colour and the 
worlds of its possible saturation are alienated from the desaturated palate of this body. This is 
clearest with the final display of sensations in the book, the sensations of the sea. 
 The boy asks, “is it blue?” (McCarthy 194). The response is, “the sea? I don’t know. It 
used to be” (194). The sea is the arbitrary destination of the characters, arbitrary since it is not 
known exactly why they are travelling there, just that they are. But it may as well be the colour 
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blue that they seek, a connection of the blue of their tarp and of their dreams with some 
semblance of the colour in the world. But the desaturation of this written-body is more 
pervasive than blue, and the becoming-light that accompanies the blue is as deceptive on hope 
and truth as the colour orange. Amongst the final images of The Road is the following of the sea:  
Then they came upon it from a turn in the road and they stopped and stood with the salt 
wind blowing in their hair where they'd lowered the hoods of their coats to listen. Out 
there was the grey beach with the slow combers rolling dull and leaden and the distant 
sound of it. Like the desolation of some alien sea breaking on the shores of a world 
unheard of. Out on the tidal flats lay a tanker half careened. Beyond that the ocean vast 
and cold and shifting heavily like a slowly heaving vat of slag and then the grey squall 
line of ash. He looked at the boy. He could see the disappointment in his face. I'm sorry 
it's not blue, he said. (230)  
Here their tarp is absent in the immediate sensations. Any sense that blue, and light, may 
awaken in the world as anything more than grey is dashed. The sea is not blue as it was in 
memory, instead it is “slag” and “grey squall”. It is a sensational milieu entirely devoid of blue 
and productive of disappointment. Other sensations are present such as the sound of the “slow 
combers rolling dull and leaden”, the alienation of the image from the memory of the image 
(alien sea), and a careened tanker. All of which are desaturated, colour being entirely absent 
from the image, description too, while light appears only in the spectrum of grey that is present 
therein. If association returns, as it did before with the orange embers, following a retreat from 
the immanent contemplation without knowledge, the milieu of the reader-body does not 
suddenly return to a plane of known colours. There is a gradient in the transition.  
 The immanent reading of The Road, proceeding by a becoming-light, even as there are 
many other becomings awaiting activation and production, yields a becoming-desaturated of the 
reader-body. Blue and orange, as creations immanent to becoming-light, portend only the 
destruction of the world, and its flat spectral palette. Everything is grey, or ash, or some minor 
variation in a gradual movement to and from absolute darkness. The affective composition that 
weaves the reader-body into the becoming suffuses the body with this desaturation. There is no 
exterior meaning in becoming, and there is precisely no meaning in the becoming-light of The 
Road and the reader-body. But, as I have suggested, the becoming-light adds the observation of 
vibrant and waning colour to the dimensions of the reader, and the connection of this to other 
sensations landing eventually upon a desaturated body. If the reader were to enquire into her 
own existence at this point, she can ask herself of the nature of the blue scarf she wears, or the 
light she produces, and this is necessarily connected to those sensations in The Road as a result 
of her encounter. This is because of the affective and perceptive complex that suspends her in 
the becomings of the written-body. The pure immanence of the encounter forces the 
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perceptions and affections to change, and what she now feels and perceives is complicated not 
only with her relation to the writing, but to the life that subtends them both. The affective 
carryover given the colours and the light is likely only to push the reader-body further from the 
written-body, as the depletion and the trauma of the writing bleeds into her world. Becoming-
light with The Road is a retreat to the subterranean and the obscured expression that hides in 
the desaturated gloom. It is a becoming with life that has no foothold on the earth, but is cast 
adrift in a confusion of light without ground.  
In initiating here one possible immanent reading, moving by turns through a suite of 
becomings, this chapter has not, of course, presented the complete and absolute claim on The 
Road. Nor its becomings, nor on the reader-body’s becoming with the sensations of The Road. 
Further studies of this written-body would benefit from an expansion of the sensations, into the 
olfactory for instance, contemplation of which might benefit from observing the distribution of 
the sensation of salt. Or, indeed, a haptic reading that takes account of heat and cold. For now, 
however, in order to expand the speculative power of immanent reading along ever more 
speculative sensations, this thesis must turn away from the becoming of The Road as a single 
vehicle of becomings. In the final chapter that now follows, I rather turn to the events of 
sensation that occur and develop across multiple written-bodies, sensations that contemplate 
encounters with planetary processes and create becomings-cosmic and imperceptible.   
 
194 
 
 
8. Becoming-imperceptible in the opening of Wild Speculation 
 
In speculative literature, though not always in speculative fiction of the order of “fantasy”, 
“horror”, or science fiction, there subsists a life capable of distributing novel sensations. As 
previously proposed, speculative literature is a stylistics of sensational creation that often finds a 
voice in speculative fiction. However, the genre of speculative fiction – which is an extremely 
malleable genre (as far as genres go) – has its limits, not least of all in the capitalist surges of 
book markets, and the well-defined audiences that are transported along with the genre, but 
most significantly in its presuppositions. While speculative fiction genre studies presupposes 
genre, and consequently reveals its presupposition of the ontological imperative, speculative 
literature studied immanently presupposes a metaphysics of expression. The consequences of 
this alteration at the level of presupposition, which is both the immanence and the life of 
writing, distribute a radical shift in the ethical relation readers hold with writing and the relation 
of writing to life. In the sense of the latter, the relation of writing to life, writing appears as an 
expression of life even when its sensations do not correspond those external to the writing. 
Deleuze indicates how this can be understood when taking the plane of immanence, which is 
again the expressionist sectioning of chaos (infinite speed and movement), as the 
presupposition. He notes:  
It should be clear that the plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes 
affects, does not make any distinction at all between things that might be called natural 
and things that might be called artificial. Artifice is fully part of Nature, since each thing, 
on the immanent plane of Nature, is defined by the arrangements of motions and affects 
into which it enters, whether these arrangements are artificial or natural (Deleuze 1988, 
124)  
While I have addressed the problem of “things” in the ontological imperative, as having a 
presupposition of being possibly well-defined, it is here only symptomatic of a habit that appears 
exceedingly difficult to break. That “artifice is fully part of nature” responds to expressionism 
and settles for speculative creation a lack of necessary distinction from reality. Insofar as 
“Nature” can be called a life, as it is argued elsewhere in this thesis, what is created in artistic 
composition has no distinction from reality. Composition determines the real material, such that 
it is possible to speak of flesh, blood, and bones as having a composition distinct from writing, 
syntax, and so on. They are distinct expressions, distinct creations of reality, but they are 
suffused with a subsistent life that gathers them up. In the domain of writing itself, the same 
degrees apply. One cannot claim that one written-body, i.e. book or poem, is more or less real 
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than another insofar as it tends toward a natural expression or an artificial one. The biography is 
no more or less an expression of life, nor more or less composed as real, than the wildest of 
speculative literature. Representation is still several degrees above, having left the plane of 
immanence to become a transcendental operator attempting to ordain an inordinate (non-
numerical) expressionistic environment. What the lack of distinction between artifice and nature 
in immanence entails for written-bodies is the loss of categories, with the biggest loss being that 
of a definable “fiction”.  
 I have opted, then, for speculative literature since it attends to problems of composition 
at the level of material, and does not seek a transcendental distinction such as “fiction”. The 
consequences, of course, make for some joyous combinations of comparable bodies. I have in 
the previous chapter explored The Road (McCarthy 2009) and the sensations therein, the 
possible becomings, and the becoming-sensation of the reader-body. And while The Road is 
speculation of a singular degree, completely stripping colour from the real only to return it in 
intermittent splashes amongst a largely desaturated perceptive zone, the bodies of its 
characters, its weather, its emotions, its conversations, and so on with its sensations are not a 
difficult challenge to the perception of the reader-body. The immanent grey leaches from its 
words and its aesthetic figures and conceptual personae, and there is affective power in this 
speculation, but much of its compositions have resonant fleshy counterparts. It is speculation, 
but it is subtle speculation and although it harbours confronting instances, such as roasting 
babies, and cannibals, it is still safe speculation.  
 Beyond this safe speculation, safe because the reader-body can be at ease slipping into 
the habit of representation (proposing questions on the future, such as “what if?”, and on 
society such, as “is this us?”), there persists a domain of what I am terming wild speculation.1 It 
is important to recall that the plane of immanence considers all compositions as pertaining to an 
affective relation, and a relation of movement that articulate a “definition” of the thing. 
Expressionism will drop “definition” in favour of individuation, as in Deleuzian expressionism, in 
an attempt to note a persistently pre-individual sense of a composition – to say of it that it is this 
one, but that that is not all and sundry. Wild speculation has the same absolute plane of 
immanence, the same pure immanence, as any other body. But it is the radical degree of 
speculation that has abandoned sensations of a correspondent other reality to such a degree 
                                                          
1 This notion has a root in Deleuze and Guattari: “you don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by 
wildly destratifying” (2013, 186). I would propose, on this front, that in immanent reading it is possible to 
undertake this wild destratification, which is decomposition and dispersal of consistency in the body. This 
would put the immanent reader, and the reader-body, into a similar vein as the body of the drug user 
(192). But Deleuze and Guattari say that “in fact the plane must distil its own drugs” (334), and I consider 
the written-body to be an equivalent distillation.  
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that the reader-body struggles to transport any of their familiar presuppositions into the 
reading.  
Wild speculation is the domain of sensational creation that produces magic (N.K. 
Jemisin) that creates dragons (Le Guin), alien worlds and bodies (Stephen Baxter), living artworks 
(China Miéville), malleable dreams (Emmir Itäranta), cities on Mercury and gravity surfers (Kim 
Stanley Robinson), and cities of perpetual light (Jeff Noon). I link these to the proper names that 
mark the written-bodies, but it behoves these sensations to have a sense unhinged from their 
body. This is because they are internally inconsistent with a plane of organisation and 
representation, and this unhinging from their own bodies invites the manner of their existence 
to step into question. “The future” of the solar system, the actual of which we live in a temporal 
immediacy, can, for instance be decoupled from the singular aetiology of the past producing a 
future that could never become temporally actual as though it were prediction. Rather, it retains 
a speculative sense (even when future dates have long passed) while becoming actualized given 
an affective relation with a reader-body: a becoming. Certainly these sensations have instances 
defined in genre, magic belongs to fantasy for instance, speculations on gravity abound in 
science fiction, but this is most often attended to in theory as “themes” or “tropes”. Themes and 
tropes are repeatable, sensations are not, and immanent reading demands an attention to the 
particular events of a sensation, to its own becomings. It is such that it becomes possible to say 
this sensation, speaking in isolation at an unhinged but contingent sensation, without 
extrapolating and applying to a general principle.  
The following chapter continues the work of articulating the theory and metaphysics of 
speculative literature but moves into one of its more extreme senses, that of the sensations of 
wild speculation. Most important, however, is the perpetuation of immanent reading and its 
inherent logic of becoming which will consist in the survey of affects and percepts, or the 
sensations, of the written-body. Indeed, this is plotted on the encounter with another body, the 
reader-body, with a display of resultant transformations. Herein is the exploration of weird 
bodies sans correspondence, of future events that are perpetually in the future and share in an 
immediate actuality via becoming. This is explored initially through an encounter with the solar 
system as it appears in a trans-evental expressionism of speculation. Wild speculation 
immediately involves the sensations of disparate bodies sharing some dimension wherein the 
sensation itself is expressed as composing the same life, but as a different event: trans-evental. 
Wild also contemplates the plurification of radical degrees of endoheterogenic sensations in 
written-bodies capable of rapidly distributing the reader-body in a phase of pure immanence. 
That is, wild denotes many events, amongst which are many sensations behaving as an upspring 
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of strange life composed in writing. Speculation, of course, follows the expressionistic sense of 
creation insofar as it perpetuates sensations as being positive expressions of life. Tracing some 
of these vectors of wild speculation, this chapter explores an immanent encounter with the solar 
system by means of Voltaire’s Micromégas (2014) and Robinson’s 2312 (2013), specifically with 
the sensations of a Saturn-event that consists in both of these bodies as trans-evental. By means 
of the speculative events of sensation that occur in these written bodies, I aim in this chapter to 
demonstrate how immanent reading can bring the reader-body to the domain of the 
imperceptible and the cosmic.  
 
Encounters with planets and surfing the rings of Saturn  
Christiaan Huygens has the claim of first mathematical, or functional, encounter the rings of 
Saturn in 1655 (Dougherty, Esposito and Krimigis 2009, 631). But it is Voltaire who first brings 
speculation to the rings by means of sensation and by means of an aesthetic figure. In his story 
Micromégas (2014 [1752]) a voyager from the star system of Sirius embarks on a journey that 
brings him into the planetary system that includes Saturn, Jupiter, and Earth. “On” Saturn he 
encounters a Saturnian philosopher, the pair share knowledges and indeterminacies, speculate 
on Nature and God, and collectively decide to journey from Saturn to Earth via Jupiter. The 
becomings that Voltaire invents with Saturn, becomings experienced by the character of 
Micromégas and the Saturnian philosopher, are speculative sensations. It is for this reason that 
Voltaire must be considered as the first explorer of Saturn, the first to create a becoming-Saturn, 
the first to invent an empirical event upon Saturn. It is easy to become distracted in this early 
work of speculative literature by referents and allusions, or (re)presentations, and forget that 
one is having a becoming with a planetary body, a becoming-Saturn. This distraction is fuelled by 
some dimensions of the conversation on Saturn between Micromégas and the philosopher of 
Saturn. Consider the following exchange:  
“I do not want to be pleased,” answered the voyager. “I want to be taught. Tell me how 
many senses the men of your planet have.” 
“We only have 72,” said the academic, “and we always complain about it. Our 
imagination surpasses our needs. We find that with our 72 senses, our ring, our five 
moons, we are too restricted; and in spite of all our curiosity and the fairly large number 
of passions that result from our 72 senses, we have plenty of time to get bored.” 
(Voltaire 2014, Ch. 2) 
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Micromégas indicates a desire for knowledge and truth, not being content with the 
philosopher’s use of metaphor and simile regarding nature. The distraction from becoming 
begins here insofar as truth is concerned: one can dismiss the writing if Voltaire is proven wrong 
(as with the number of moons around Saturn, or the lack of plurality regarding the rings), 
demonstrating a preoccupation with the (correspondent) truths of the writing. The second 
degree of distraction is produced in the relation of sense to knowledge insofar as the 
philosopher’s senses are too little to satisfy the imagination. Finally, the logic of representation 
appears by casting allusions, first to the apparent excessive image of the human thirst for 
knowledge exceeding sensation (pushing the allegory to a proposition on “Ideas” or 
“rationality”, as a version of the debate of empiricist and the rationalist), and later an allegory of 
the human relation to extra-terrestrial notions of Gods (Micromégas, and the Saturnian 
philosopher, who is a comparative “dwarf”, eat mountains for lunch on Earth). This is not helped 
any further by the allusion of Saturn to the Roman god of the same name.  
 What amounts to a distraction of representation and interpretation above requires 
some external logic to prevail. It is easy, then, to forget that Micromégas is not “Saturn” (God or 
Planet), and that the Saturnian is from Saturn and is not himself Saturn, even if it could be 
argued that some events match with an external expression of something sharing the same 
name. The allusion thus has to be invented and grafted to the expression of writing, to the 
expression of Saturn and its ring, to Micromégas and the philosopher. Immanently, however, the 
expression reveals only a sensation with no requisite for allusion. Voltaire is thus able to express 
a brief exploration of Saturn through an act of pure speculation, but upon doing so he invents an 
encounter with Saturn and with its ring. This invention is not speculation insofar as it remains at 
a real or numerical distinction with the planet Saturn, it is one and the same Saturn named so as 
to produce a novel expression of an event that has multiple occurrences in a production of trans-
evental sensation: hovering in the Earth sky with hazy ring as viewed through telescope, on 
computer screens in images from the Cassini-Huygens probe and lander, in the writing of 
Voltaire, and the writing of Kim Stanley Robinson.2 Voltaire creates a becoming for Micromégas 
with the rings of Saturn, produces a point of view on the rings, with which other becomings-
Saturn occur both in the immediate writing, and elsewhere.  
 Regarding the expression of sensation in language, implicates becoming and the reality 
of all expressions for an expressionist metaphysics, Deleuze cites Chrysippus: “as Chrysippus 
says, ‘if you say ‘chariot,’ a chariot passes through your lips,’ and it is neither better nor more 
convenient if this is the Idea of the chariot” (Deleuze 2004b, 153). What passes through the lips 
                                                          
2 See also, Arthur C. Clarke’s “Saturn Rising” (2001, 733-741). 
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upon the utterance is a sensation, even if that sensation is connected not to a physical chariot 
but to an Idea. But Chrysippus’ chariot is lacking in power if it is not understood that the chariot 
potentially chokes the speaker as it exits. The lack of power is due to the minimalist expression. 
That is, no other percepts are presented. Voltaire’s Saturn and rings are not distinct from the 
chariot in this sense. An idea of Saturn is not necessarily drawn upon, but the sensation is taken 
up and developed (there is a potential reference to Huygens regarding the rings). The Saturn 
that passes through the writing of Voltaire as percept and affect is populated by massive beings 
(albeit dwarfs to Micromégas), has a research institute, produces bodies that claim 72 senses, 
bodies that extend no further than 500 revolutions around the Sun, and has two bodies (plus 
servants and instruments) upon its rings. Of these bodies, the philosopher continued:  
“our two explorers left all the same; they alighted first on the ring, which they found to 
be fairly flat, as conjectured by an illustrious inhabitant of our own little sphere; from 
there they went easily from moon to moon. A comet passed by the last; they flew onto it 
with their servants and their instruments” (Voltaire 2014, Ch.3).  
The sensation is not complicated in the manner of contemporary speculative literature, as with 
Kim Stanley Robinson in 2312 (2013), but there is an immediacy to the speculation available for a 
novel becoming in immanent reading. To explore Voltaire’s Saturn further in this thesis only adds 
to the sensation, but the reader-body might take note of a point-of-view from the ring(s) of 
Saturn, from its moons, and the passing comet, all of which compose the sensation of a 
becoming-Saturn with which a reader becomes. The observation produces a knowledge of the 
body’s sensations, and these sensations are composed with the reader-body if by nothing other 
than the modification to the reader-body’s affections. The reader here feels the flatness of the 
rings, feels the passing comet as if she were alighting on Saturn’s moons awaiting transport. The 
becoming-Saturn is not made explicit in the affect, in the feeling, here as it is with Robinson. 
Nevertheless, the sensation takes part in moving the reader-body. 
 While Voltaire invents an encounter with Saturn’s ring(s) by placing a point-of-view on 
them in the form of Micromégas, Kim Stanley Robinson (2013) invents the rings with a degree of 
playfulness, mobility, and disturbance. With Voltaire, the sensation is a simple affirmation that 
“yes they are flat…”, true or not. Robinson, however, takes a different measure of the rings for 
his speculation by introducing a gravitational wave phenomenon that distorts a particular ring, 
the “F Ring”, making it surfable. The composition of sensations that Robinson deploys include 
the placement of a point-of-view within the sensations capable of experiencing them, multiple 
persona and landscape expressions. But further to this is a technological speculation in the 
sensations, and a virtual speculation or speculation on the future and history of the year 2312. 
Thus it is that with the creation of a compound of sensations in the writing of the written-body, 
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Robinson also invents a further Saturn-event in an act of pure speculation adding to the wild 
speculation of a trans-evental Saturn. This is a becoming-Saturn different to Voltaire’s but which 
is still an unfolding or explication of a broader event of sensation for becoming-Saturn in a trans-
evental mode. It is incorporeal, since it consists only as an event, and is a real speculation.  
 Robinson’s surfable gravity wave in 2312 (2013) sits amongst a broader milieu of 
sensations that compose this Saturn-event immanent to the immediate written-body. Of course, 
as has already occurred in this thesis, entering a phase of pure immanence for the reader-body 
will open them onto the life that subsists in the consistency of events, regardless of the degrees 
of evental expression. Notable vectors for the compositions that contribute to this Saturn-event, 
and the particular speculation on the rings in 2312, are the city on Iapetus (one of Saturn’s 
moons) including its architecture and view of the planet, a mission to dive into the clouds of 
Saturn in search of a ship via a massive polar storm, a wave of ice chunks, the gravitational effect 
of Prometheus on the F-Ring, and surfers – each immediately displaying a percept and an affect 
capable of modifying and modulating the reader-body. Some pervasive distractions that will lead 
to representational logic persist, and indeed Robinson cannot help but to draw some allusions to 
add to the percept of the gravity wave. Consider the image of comparison: “she focused on the 
approaching wave, which was lifting up and over her like Hiroshige’s wave; this one was ten 
kilometres high, and rising fast” (Robinson 2013, 275). Here Robinson summons Hiroshige’s 
wave to add to the percept of the wave, the allusion being drawn by simile. Presumably, 
although without specific reference, the reader-body is supposed to be aware of The Sea at 
Satta, Suruga Province (1858), and to then connect that to this event. The reader-body not 
knowing this may instead draw upon the landscape wave of Hakone (1833) by the same artist. 
The allusion is unreliable.3 Immanently, the sensations presented in 2312 present their own 
novelty and it befits immanent reading to attend to these. The immanent reading builds a 
becoming following the becomings of the sensations themselves. The reader-body adds the 
dimension of surfer to their own event, and further yet a view of Saturn and a ride on a gravity 
wave, seeking to be moved by the immediacy of these sensations, and to alter one’s 
perceptions. Seeking the allusion forces a reader-body to become the allusion, thus leaving the 
immediate sensation behind, and returning the reader to Earth in search of an artefact rather 
than remaining in the wake of the moon Prometheus. 
                                                          
3 Something is in turn argued for “Hiroshige’s wave”, insofar as it becomes possible to say that Hiroshige’s 
wave is an event that carried through his works. Compare The Sea at Satta (Hiroshige 1858) to Hakone 
(Hiroshige 1833). This is interesting, no doubt, but lacking in the immanence of the immediate sensations. 
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   Robinson creates the Saturn-event of sensation along several vectors, each of which 
consist of a mix of percepts and affects. The image of Saturn is established from the point-of-
view of a humanoid occupied city on Iapetus (moon).4 Robinson writes: 
The city was concentrated at first on the hemisphere facing Saturn, which looms 
overhead four times larger than Luna from Earth. This was felt worth having in one’s sky, 
especially since Iapetus’s orbit is at a seventeen-degree tilt from the plane of Saturn’s 
rings, giving it a perpetually changing view of the gorgeous mobile. Almost all the other 
moons see the rings only edge-on. From the Iapetus bulge one also has a view down to 
the rest of the moon’s surface, twelve or sixteen kilometres lower than the bulge, so 
there is always a broad icescape below to balance the sublime ringed pearl above. (2013, 
248) 
The internal relations of the sensations require attendance to reveal the living reality of the 
sensations themselves.  By way of the percept, the first becoming is of the city on Iapetus with 
the “looming” planet beyond its horizon. The city itself is given little detail and the lack of 
specificity allows it to slip from having a particular evental occurrence to being an expression of 
the term “city”. There are no colours to the city, at least not until the survey of the sensations of 
the written-body are expanded, an expansion of the zone or plane of immanence of observation. 
Nor are there sounds to the city. The percept is a simple image meant to evoke a city-event that 
allows some slippage in connection with cities beyond the written-body. The city is at once this 
city, and it calls upon the eventality of all cities, although only as a “concentration”. At the level 
of the immediate sensations, however, it presents little by way of percepts and so is reliant on 
the looming planet overhead. The city becomes the planet, not by turning into it, but by 
transforming in relation to Saturn. It is thus this city with a giant planet overhead, not every city 
with a giant planet overhead. The other sense, the affect, of this immediate becoming of the city 
on Iapetus and Saturn is the value with which the city is placed in its sensations by its sensations. 
That is, the relation to Saturn is a necessary composition for the creation of the city, Saturn at a 
particular angle with the reclined plane of the rings exposed is “worth having in one’s sky”, and it 
is felt to be this way. The city thus gains an affective dimension (value) as a point of view, by way 
of orientation, that draws an aesthetic (sense) line between Saturn and the city. This degree of 
affect modulates with “the perpetually changing view of the gorgeous mobile” such that to 
occupy this point-of-view, or to otherwise have a becoming with it, is to exist in a modulating 
affective relation. The becoming of the sensations that compose the Saturn/city relation is 
affective in nature. To bring the reader-body to this becoming, to pass into the relation, is to be 
transformed by the affect of the becoming. Thus, the reader-body does not see Saturn in her 
                                                          
4 Arthur C. Clarke (2001) also uses Iapetus as a view-point for an image of Saturn, thus developing a 
further event for Saturn.  
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sky, but the sense of Saturn is added to her own event such that she feels Saturn in her sky, 
reclined, perpetually changing, modulating her affections.   
 Following the immanent reading of 2312 back into the percepts of the city on Iapetus, 
reeling back from the grand affective relation to Saturn, a coral and sea-shell architecture is 
invented. The written-body here is encoded with a rapid deployment of images and novel 
creations. The architecture of the city is an immense invention:  
They then began to use seashell genes to shape the structures of the equatorial city … 
most of the bulge is now covered by a long clear gallery tent, placed over buildings that 
line the great boulevard of the High Street, alternating with farms, parks, gardens, and 
forests. As the air under the tent is always kept warm, the interior architecture can be 
very open, with Saturn often left visible, framed by gaps in ceilings and roofs. Seashell 
bio-mimicry allowed the builders to extract and deploy calcium under mantles, and 
these soft living tissues were genetically engineered to shapes that allowed architects to 
layer bioceramic structures one on the next, building structure on structure, like corals, 
until the area under the tent by now is almost full. Like most bioceramics structures, the 
bevelled and layered shapes have been induced to produce scalloping, fanning, 
notching, and other conchological features, so that the buildings look like great seashells 
stacked one on the next. (2013, 249) 
Saturn is “often left visible” amongst the architecture of the city which means that the 
affectionate relation with Saturn is accompanied by the percepts of Saturn. The seeing and 
feeling of Saturn is inherent in the architecture in a development of the previous becoming of 
the city with the looming planet in the sky. The percepts of the architecture itself are 
“bioceramic” and configured with a relation to “seashell genes”, to calcium, to mantles, to a 
clear tent that encases the city, and indeed to bevelling and layering. The reader-body does not 
need any further expansion on this image to evoke the grandeur of the invention. Robinson 
posits the image through a rapid deployment of percepts and the growable city unfolds amongst 
the words. Importantly, the city is a city that appears less built than grown. Further still, the 
expression of the “bioceramic” structures, the evocation of the corals and shells, is suggestive of 
perpetual genesis that draws a line to the perpetually changing image of Saturn in the sky.  
The presuppositions of the percepts’ reality are a degree of genesis, the genes have 
made the city viable, have allowed it to grow. There are modulations of the image that emerge 
in line, wherein the bevelling occurs, and from which the fanning and scalloping can occur. But 
the ceramic does not appear to “set” insofar as it adapts to an imposing form, or even that its 
genes might predetermine its final form. Rather, the structures of the city persistently grow and 
must be tended like gardens, farms, and parks. The forms themselves are open, not so as to let 
all flows into the buildings, but so as to absorb the affection of Saturn. There is, then, a tense 
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relation in the growth of the buildings between a point of absolution, a predetermined point or a 
final point, and an ongoing composition of the matter that composes the building.  
Again, there is a becoming for the reader-body that is instantiated by the written-body. 
This is implemented by the manner in which the sensations become one another as with the 
immanent logic I have explored in the previous chapter. There is a becoming-Saturn of the city, a 
becoming-shell of the city’s inhabitants, wherein the reader-body begins her own 
transformation. There is furthermore the presentation in the written-body of the sensations of a 
“living tissue” in the modulation of inhabitable structures which imbues not only the written 
sensations with something living, en vie, but also deliver a living sense to the written-body in this 
immediate sensation. For 2312 this is not the only implication of life into the sensations, see for 
instance the suite of alien biota from Enceladus, but it is one of its instances. From the 
immediate event of this percept, it is not even apparent if the presuppositions can be carried 
across the surface of the written-body, nor that they will be revealed amongst the other 
instances of shell sensations, let alone completely heteronegenous sensations. Nevertheless, 
herein with this event the percepts are configured with a living tissue. And, given this, the 
becoming of the reader-body with this event of sensation is a becoming with the living tissue 
that supports its expression. The implications for this mark wild speculation: wherein Saturn is 
felt looming in the sky, its affect being constantly let into the habitat by an open conchological 
architecture, perpetual change is lauded and praised in all expressions but must be maintained 
less it no longer fits its space. The affects and the percepts are modulated as they encounter the 
reader-body becoming increases in dimensions, as new dimensions added to the affections and 
perceptions of that body through contemplation, such that Saturn is felt in the sky, is seen 
through windows, and the architecture grows in strange lines around the reader. This is not a 
metaphor, but is closer to the real influence on a life given a hallucination, a recomposition of 
one’s sensational relations to their environment by means of the affects and percepts of a 
written-body. The affect of a Saturn-event stirs the affections of the reader-body, is added to her 
body. 
The affects and percepts of the city and its becoming-Saturn, the ringed pearl viewed 
above from within the shell-scape ceramic architecture, are left behind momentarily in 
Robinson’s Saturn-event as the characters drive the narrative into the clouds of the pearl 
(Saturn) and back out to its F-Ring and the moon Prometheus. The narrative itself is in excess of 
the possible becomings that are arranged with the sensations. The narrative is a redundancy, 
and is not necessarily a plane of immanence for the created sensations. It is not a presupposition 
of the becoming-Saturn of a reader-body, for instance, since they may well open to any of the 
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appropriate chapters and read them as episodes (in a schizophrenic or rhizomatic manner) 
which would pertain to neither an increase or decrease as privileged methodology. 
Nevertheless, alongside the becoming-Saturn of the city (which emboldens further becomings as 
the intensity of the becoming increases, the orientation of the planet in the city’s sky has not 
been fully considered, for instance), and the becoming-shell of the city’s inhabitants (further 
considerations might include the ambulation through the city of the character Wahram), further 
becomings with sensations of Saturn may be involved which again provide sites of becoming for 
the reader-body.  
The encounter with Saturn in 2312 includes becomings with the sensations of gravity 
foreshadowed by a dive from orbit into the polar storm on the planet. The characters’ mission is 
to find a space craft that has taken to the clouds of Saturn to obscure some fact relevant to the 
narrative (a redundancy insofar as the sensations are concerned). Consider the following evental 
vectors for the sensations of a dive into Saturn’s polar storm: 
there were no radiation fields created by the smaller giant, so over years a not-
insignificant population of floating ships had taken refuge in the upper clouds of Saturn; 
also some platform habitats, hung from immense balloons…  
now their little diver flew among thunderheads a hundred kilometres tall, and though it 
was commonplace to say that perspective was lost in situations like this, it wasn’t really 
true: these thunderheads were clearly as big as entire asteroids, rising out of a deeper 
array of flatter cloud formations so that they saw below them masses of nimbus and 
cirrus, cumulus, festoons, barges…  
all snarling through and over and under each other and constituting what passed for the 
surface of the gas giant…  
they flew over a slower funnel and could look deep into the blue depths of the planet, 
gaseous for as far as they could see and much farther…  
“does anybody fly these cloud canyons in birdsuits?”…  
“yes, a few”…  
“will you go flying down here with me?”…  
“I don’t know how to fly”…  
“you could let the birdsuit’s AI do it, merely be a passenger making requests”… “people 
fly any space in the solar system that can be flown. Our bird brains demand it”… 
(Robinson 2013, 266-267) 
The above compositions of percepts and affects, albeit with some omissions which are nothing 
more than significant distractions to the sensation, are concerned with the immanent immediacy 
of a sensation of scale and mobility. The “smaller giant” is at once both large and small, “their 
little diver” is little and given no sense of largeness, but relative to one another the scale is lost. 
Contrary to the announcement in the writing, perspective is lost insofar as there is no referent 
available while reading in an immanent mode. For instance, “as big as entire asteroids” does not 
make a certain claim on the possible sizes of asteroids (although outside of these vectors in the 
book there will undoubtedly be claims of this nature). Herein, the claims that result in a sense of 
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scale are distorted, and it is upon the relation of the clouds to one another that a percept is 
revealed that indicates the inherent sense of scale: “all snarling through and over and under 
each other and constituting what passed for the surface” (266). It is with this non-correspondent 
sensation that the scale of the image is presented contrary to its own claims since this is the 
expression of a specific becoming internal to the sensations themselves. It can go by multiple 
names, but it consists nonetheless as becoming-cloud. 
 The rest of the relations of this selective event, within the Saturn-event, are also 
coordinated with this becoming-cloud. The percepts of the becoming-cloud return under the 
becoming-cloud of the reader-body. Faced by the affective addition of a snarling cloud array, 
unscaled but a “through and over and under” surface, the reader-body takes a dive into the 
clouds. Expanding the sensation along the percept adds the “blue depths” in the “slower 
funnel”, adds birdsuits with AI control for flying amongst the cloud canyons. Adding these to the 
reader-body in her own becoming is an even greater speculation and is dependent on the 
environment. Immanent reading takes all immediate vectors into account, including the site of 
reading, for instance the seat on a train heading to work, the deck overlooking a farm, or the bed 
at night. It is not a subjective addition of the sensations such that it is different for each subject, 
for it should be clear at this point of the thesis that subjectivity is inadequate for dealing with 
events: imitation is a risk. But it is a specific addition of evental dimensions to the event of the 
reader-body, to her haecceity. A reorientation of her relations, to gravity, to planets, to her own 
sky, to her seat on the train, to the clouds, to blue. The same relations that produce her, produce 
her differently again given the introduction of a different composition of those relations. 
 “Our bird brains demand it”, demand that we learn to fly any space in the solar system. 
In the written-body here the desire to fly is built, and indeed is grafted upon the reader-body. As 
a dimension of the Saturn-event, firstly in Robinson, and then in the greater eventality of Saturn, 
flying is insurmountable. It is a must. And while the reader-body does have the necessary 
sensations available for flying the cloud canyons, she is yet to be offered the becoming. Flying 
comes in another manner, or, as Robinson says, “there is a different kind of flying you might 
enjoy, in the rings” (2013, 271). The joy should not be understated here. Expressionism finds a 
voice in all events and here the joy is no less than an affective joy, an increase of the power of 
the body: reader-body, written-body, the character, and so on. This is the enjoyment of the 
reader-body engaged in flight. 
 Deleuze and Guattari argue that all becomings draw a line into a phase of radical 
expansion, never beginning with a fixed or cardinal form, but rather a relation of relations. The 
maximal degree, the acceleration of becomings without an end-limit, “[rush] toward becoming 
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imperceptible” where “the imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula” 
(2013, 325). To achieve this “end” they indicate that a subject must cease the acts and 
participation of organisation, a well-defined existence, and become a haecceity (329). In this way 
what is perceived will be indiscernible from the perception that perceives: “perception will 
confront its own limit; it will be in the midst of things, throughout its own proximity, as the 
presence of one haecceity in another” (329). In the present theory and praxis of immanent 
reading, the reader-body has already configured herself as haecceity, the perceptive complex 
already contemplates an open flow of sensations that pass along an evental trajectory and are 
modulated in the reader-body. But this also gives a sense of the imperceptible, that is, as the 
contemplation of movements of percepts. This is not strictly, again, the percept becoming added 
to the reader-body. But the percept itself in a movement of contraction, at once presenting 
becomings closer to form (although without ever attaining this absolute limit, which 
encompasses subjectivity) and becomings in a state of complete indiscernibility, a becoming-
cosmic. In this way, then, the event of sensation of the clouds in the becoming-cloud of the 
Saturn-event contemplates the degrees of: the sensations as they modulate the affective and 
perceptive complexes, the sensations as they modulate themselves, the bodies of reading, and 
the cosmic extension of absolute movement. For the immanent reader that attempts to 
compose reading in pure immanence, the Saturn-event changes the perceptions and affections 
immediately, giving her a cosmic composition in the immediacy of her encounter, in the zone of 
her body suspended (as infinite movement) in a cosmic extension of sensation.5 
 From traversing the great surface of the polar clouds on Saturn, I now return the Saturn-
event to the rings, although Micromégas’ claim of the flatness of the rings is now given 
turbulence and colour by the sensations in 2312. This does not claim an opposition, since there 
is no concern with knowledge, only the composition of sensation. The flatness of the rings is 
perfectly compatible with the turbulence of the rings, they simply constitute different phases of 
the sensation, different contemplations of the speculative event of sensation that subsists them 
both. Where Micromégas alights on the ring(s), finding it flat (Voltaire 2014, Ch.3), 2312 
explicates not only the plurality of the rings (Robinson 2013, 258), but also the inherent colours 
of the rings and their turbulence. The sensations of the rings are both perceptive and affective:  
from behind the Sun the rings were peach in tone, the circumferential scoring so finely 
etched and yet so vast that one could not help being a bit taken aback. Even on their 
                                                          
5 On the dangers inhered in becoming-cosmic see Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion’s of the refrain (2013, 
407), and on the positive potential of becoming-cosmic as a release see their claims on musical becomings 
(360). On becoming-cosmic in art, through sensation as such, see Elizabeth Grosz (2009, 95-96). Grosz 
draws on a particular relation of the becoming-cosmic in Indigenous Australian Art (specifically Western 
desert artists Kathleen Petyarre, and Clifford Possum Tjapaltjarri). 
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dark side the rings were far brighter than the nightside of the planet, making for an aura 
or halo effect of eldritch beauty, all framing the deep blue of Saturn’s winter north. 
(Robinson 2013, 265) 
Here it is notable that the rings are necessarily composed relative to the colour blue, which is in 
turn related to Saturn’s winter, and that this colour blue is haloed by a peach tone, and the 
undecidable sensation of the Sun. This composition of colourful percepts is added to the finely 
etched score of the rings, that are at once fine and “vast”, with an even further composition 
being made with the sense of brightness and darkness that implicates the planet and its rings. 
The image is folded up in this manner. Explicating any particular sensation from the monument 
here allows for the unfolding of a becoming. The affect here is “being taken aback”, the aesthetic 
composition that results in “eldritch beauty”. To become with this eldritch beauty does not call 
upon H.P. Lovecraft’s “eldritch” (or any other), only upon the immediate sensations. Becoming-
Saturn then, here, is “being taken aback” by the vastness and delicacy in the play of colour and 
scale, of contemplating the aura of a planet that reverberates with “eldritch beauty”. To become 
suspended in this image through immanent reading, to become these sensations, adds the 
eldritch beauty to her haecceity (evental body), allowing her to become-cosmic, to unfold the 
entire cosmos in an immediate movement. In the same immediacy, the reader-body is 
indiscernible, through the contemplation of fine scores, of peach and bright haloes, of deep 
blue, with this event. As such, she becomes Saturn, while becoming eldritch, not insofar as she 
turns into these sensations, but insofar as these sensations pass through her and she is taken 
aback by the colour peach. Never leaving her room, or the park, or the bed, Saturn has a 
becoming-peach, just as the reader-body has a becoming-Saturn, her peach walls and bedside 
lamp now implicating the rings of Saturn. 
 And, finally, before I conclude this opening onto the domains of wild speculation, 
opening the sensations of speculative literature up to absurd alliances, I will finish this section in 
the turbulent sensations of Saturn’s F Ring. The sensation of surfing the F Ring of Saturn is 
created in 2312 by noting that a small moon, Prometheus, has mild fluctuation in its orbit that 
brings it close to the ring and then further away. The effect of this is to distort the ring through a 
composite of gravity where “here one saw its effects in a pure state, unobstructed by wind or 
solar radiation or anything else – just the sling of spinning Saturn and a few small competing 
tugs, all creating this particular pattern” (2013, 274). The pattern is a wave, detailed as a 
“braiding” of “billions of ice chunks into complex streamers” (273): “streamers of denser clusters 
of rubble were braided and kinked, but the entire mass was extremely flat” (275). The percepts 
expand, “a temporary agglomeration” and then “coming apart even as she spotted it”, “and now 
a white curl” (275). The sensation of Saturn becomes “of no interest at all” (275), and in the 
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becoming the reader-body undertakes it is true enough, too, that that the becoming-Saturn has 
expanded to another degree, rushing toward the imperceptible. Following these is an accretion 
of sensations for the reader-body, bringing together in a mode of pure immediacy the affections 
and perceptions of cosmic becoming as composed in the surfing of the F Ring. That is the 
contemplation of absolute movement and suspension in immanence. Suddenly: 
she was at speed with the wave, her head emerging from it so she could look around … 
she was flying in a wave of ice ten kilometres high … she hooted … she felt she could get 
lost in there … she could feel the wave lifting her and casting her along. It was not only 
being struck by ice chunks, but also being tugged by gravity … to cast yourself out into 
the spaces you breathed, and although motionless be flying at speed, slung forward… 
faster than ever … the wave was still surging up … dissipate without ever breaking … 
time to dance … a gravity wave, throwing her through the universe. The howls of the 
other surfers sounded like wolves. (276-277) 
This is a speculative event of sensation that now modulates the affections and perceptions of the 
reader-body in a becoming-gravity. Again, in her immediate milieu, she feels and perceives these 
affects and percepts. They pass into her haecceity and modify her, and they themselves are 
modified. The speculations take on a wildness, sensations having an evental capacity that shows 
them subsisting here and in her own room. The peach of her walls gathers the evental force of 
the gravity wave, the turbulence of the F-Ring makes her affections tremble just as she is 
modulated. She experiences herself or, rather, her haecceity, “being tugged by gravity”, 
“motionless” but “flying at speed”, all of the sensations contemplated in her body as they 
contemplate her and modify her accordingly. The immanent reading of the written-body by the 
reader-body results only in these becomings whence modes of referral are extinguished or 
otherwise shown to be unnecessary abstractions that come to code these immanent bodies and 
their events. In this specific instance, immanent reading creates a becoming-Saturn that 
increases and hosts a gamut of becomings with sensations immanent to the composed bodies of 
the reading, a becoming-gravity that forgets the becoming-Saturn from which it was propagated. 
I would propose, however, that one would struggle to forget the events that subsist in the 
consistency of her haecceity. In this sense, then, the wild speculation of the Saturn-event calls 
Micromégas back onto the flat ring of Saturn, this time as a ghost on the face of the wave. 
The ethical reading is to be worthy and to add those dimensions which agree with one’s 
own body in order to increase their power. It is to plicate one’s events with the events that 
agree, to compose unnatural alliances between the affections and perceptions of the reader-
body and the affects and percepts of the written-body. This is the complexity of reading involved 
in immanent reading. Reading in this manner, in this instance, places the reader-body in a state 
of suspension in the contemplation of sensations. There is no moral prescription, and the 
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immanent reading of speculative events of sensations is of a positive rapid degree, allowing one 
to pass from the becoming-sensation to the becoming-imperceptible and cosmic in swift 
movements of sensations. When experienced immanently these sensation will, just as with the 
becoming-gravity of 2312, allow the reader-body to be thrown through the universe. This is a 
real sensation, attending to the life of the writing and the life of the written-body, in an alliance 
that composes them both through an event of sensation. As I have claimed, this is unachievable 
with the ontological imperative to reading practice, and only becomes real by the orientation of 
the same forces from the point of view of expressionist metaphysics. This is, then, an opening of 
reality in light of its plications, and its immanence, and its eventality, and its wildest speculative 
sensations.           
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Coda 
 
The theory and praxis of immanent reading that I have expounded in this thesis progresses from 
the problematic domain of the ethics of reading, which broadly plots the relations inherent to 
reading, toward the transformation of the reader-body and written-body given the process of 
reading. Expressionism provides reading with a novel metaphysics, allowing for the problems of 
maintaining a necessary ontology to be exposed and subsequently circumvented. The 
ontological imperative, or the sense in which a written-body and reader-body risk the stasis of 
objects, things, or subjects, is given over to the plicatory processes of expressionism. In this way, 
at the level of presuppositions a new configuration of the relations involved in reading is 
explored and its implications for reading unfolded. An economic sense of reading, which includes 
transaction and numerous other reading praxes (deconstruction, for instance), is displaced with 
the processual and evental vectors of reading becoming the salient domains of observation and 
experience. In supplanting the habituation of an ontological assumption that assures the stability 
and countability of objects in reading, I have here been able to bring forth a novel praxis of 
immanent reading. Rather than labouriously test the presuppositions to show the problematic, 
the theory and praxis of immanent reading is then brought under consideration and the logic of 
the novel praxis is explored. I consider this a significant development in reading of which, while I 
have not had the pleasure of naming (as this belongs to Claire Colebrook), I have at least been 
capable here of unfolding one pathway into immanent reading.   
 Adjoined to the inspirational vector of the ethics of reading in this thesis, I have 
deployed an expressionist metaphysics. This has been done in a conceptual collaboration with 
Gilles Deleuze, responding to and developing the theory of expression in relation both to 
reading, and to the speculative events that populate some written-bodies. A major contribution 
of this thesis is to the ever developing domain of Deleuze Studies and scholarship. I have, 
following Deleuze’s reading of the expressionism that he unfolds in Spinoza and Leibniz, been 
able to plot and utilize a Deleuzian expressionism throughout this thesis which I have argued (in 
Chapter Two) consists as an alteration of the vector of a continuous logic of plication. While I 
acknowledge the risk of making definitive statements on Deleuze, and/or of making his concepts 
appear as transcendental objects that are ready-made and available for application, I have 
nevertheless been able to show expressionism as a consistency (or an event) that reoccurs in 
Deleuze’s (with and without Guattari and Parnet) conceptual creations. This I have done by 
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continually revisiting the logic of plication, and indeed corplication, that I explicate in Chapter 
Two of this thesis. Importantly, I have shown how plication comes to inform the logic of the 
concepts of becoming and immanence while also attending to the degrees of eventality that 
belong to the accretion of bodies in these concepts. In this way I have been able to claim and 
then put to use an expressionism as it inheres in Deleuze’s writings.  
 The first vector of immanent reading I have composed in this thesis, beyond the 
suffusing metaphysics of expressionism, was a concept of written-bodies. While this is a 
response to the problem of text, or the broader problem of the object of writing which I believe 
text has a limited ability to destabilize, its novelty is autogenic. Undoubtedly it responds to the 
metaphysics of expressionism and is consequently indebted to Deleuze, Spinoza, and Leibniz. 
This is particularly the case with regards to the manner in which the written-body becomes a 
body, its evental composition of signs and sensations, and its inherence of a life. But the concept 
of the written-body becomes an individuated concept, and I have shown here that the 
sensations that are composed are the most important observations, and observation and 
experience of these sensations necessitates an articulation of the nature of those sensations. 
Speculative literature was thus argued to consist in events of sensation. While the initial uptake 
of speculative literature was to ensure life could still be observed in sensations that do not 
necessitate a representation, the eventality of speculative sensations demonstrates a new and 
unique locus of investigation for speculative literature. From this I must conclude that, in 
immanent reading, the concept of a written-body be persistently composed in order to observe 
the sensations that are specific to that body. Although there will be considerable resonance 
between all written-bodies, at least insofar as they are composed, the analysis of their specific 
sensations will begin to unfold unique sensations as expressions of life through writing.  
 The above point is due largely to the process of becoming that inheres in reading, given 
the sense in which becoming produces the bodies of the encounter as dimensions of itself, while 
itself constituting a new composition that exceeds all those dimensions it composes. Although in 
this thesis I have argued along a linear trajectory, structured on the Deleuzian arguments 
regarding problems and concepts, with a further linearity positioning the written-body as a 
potentially primary vector, immanent reading, like all becomings, is a process of beginning in the 
middle. This is the sense in which it interrupts other praxes. The shift from reading through a 
transaction of affects, for instance, to an immanent reading of affects requires less of a decision 
to act and more of a letting go of the identities of the reader and the writing in order to expose 
the becoming that is already underway. In this sense then Chapter Four of this thesis could just 
as easily begin this thesis, end it, or inhere precisely in the middle where all becomings occur. 
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Chapter Four, of course, has allowed me to show the expressionist logic of plication in becoming, 
contributing to Deleuzian scholarship through an analysis of the translation from devenir into 
becoming, and by situating the process of symbiotic encounters in relation to reading. For 
immanent reading, these developments begin an infinite process of sensational composition and 
contemplation insofar as symbiotic encounters demonstrate the contraction of sensations both 
in the written-body, as it contemplates the sensations of life, and through the reader-body (as 
outline in Chapter Six) as it further contemplates the sensations of life that are composed within 
the written-body. 
  Since this thesis engaged speculative literature, and necessarily exposed the speculative 
events of sensation that are found in en masse in speculative literature, but also presumably 
elsewhere, what followed the concepts of the reader-body, the written-body, and the 
complicative becoming that produces them both, was an acceleration of immanent reading into 
a mode of praxes with a greater emphasis on immanence. Immanence was shown to prefer the 
inherence of life in sensation, the endoheterogenic composition of events to bodies, the 
involutionary vertigo of symbiotic evolution (further characterising becomings), and importantly 
the immediacy of experience in the contemplation of sensations. For immanent reading the 
praxes must, then, avoid going beyond the events of sensation that are contemplated by the 
reader-body. There is at once a radical immediacy, explored in the becoming-light, colour, man-
masculine, and so on in The Road (2009) by Cormac McCarthy (detailed in Chapter Seven of this 
thesis), that informs a sense of a sensation beyond that written-body, but does not represent 
them. While exposing a degree of limitation, at least on the level of composition, this invites an 
awareness of the immediate sensations and an exploration of the immanent experience of those 
sensations as they are composed amongst and by the writing. Further still, these sensations 
modify how those sensation consists beyond the immediacy of the written-body. While the 
habits of allusion tempts the reader away from the immediate contemplation, the essences of 
the sensations that are composed are able to be explored in depth. This is not delivered as the 
meaning of the representation, but given the composition of certain affects with certain 
percepts the immanent sense of the sensation is explicated. By scaling the zones of immanence, 
by selecting focused passages and then comparing instances, it becomes clear that percepts such 
as colour can persistently be linked to affections, or the terrain of composition can be more 
unstable, gaining an increasingly multivalent composition such that new affections become 
composed with the same percepts. While this immanence shows how affects and percepts 
configure vectors in the process of becoming, immanent reading also expands beyond the bodily 
immediacy of the instance of writing. The speculative events of sensations begin to resonate 
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with other events, or at other levels of increasing univocity begin to coordinate trans-evental 
compositions. Further to this, as the most salient and transformative degree of immanent 
reading, is the manner in which the affections and perceptions of the reader-body are changed 
by the affects and percepts of the written-body. Contemplation again comes to bear, allowing 
for the transduction of affects in affections, and percepts into perceptions, as an alteration of 
the flow and an active distribution of those forces as new dimensions of the reader-body.  
The final two chapters of my thesis began the process of immanent reading by the above 
means with a particular attention to speculative events of sensation. The execution of an 
immanent reading of speculative sensations resulted in the reader-body entering becomings 
that tend toward the imperceptible, but along the way can introduce increasingly expansive 
effects in the evental composition of the reader-body, all while avoiding the infliction of a 
sadness on the written-body. The becoming-Saturn of the Saturn-event, the push and pull of the 
rings of Saturn as the sensations of surfing those rings is modulated by the reader-body given an 
encounter with 2312 (Robinson 2013), accelerated the reader-body toward a universal 
movement, dragging her across the universe at ever increasing speeds and without limitation. In 
this sense, then, it is impossible to draw a final line around the theory and praxis of immanent 
reading and the unnatural alliances that are involved. I thus offer in this coda, in lieu of a 
conclusion, an expansion of the possibilities of immanent reading with regards to the speculative 
events of sensation. I have contributed here to the studies of both Cormac McCarthy and Kim 
Stanley Robinson, and Voltaire, and have had the opportunity to make minor claims regarding 
the immanent reading of sensations in Ursula Le Guin, Jeff Noon, and Jeff Vandermeer. In some 
instances these explorations tend toward a safe domain of speculation insofar as the sensations 
they complicate do not implicate and explicate, to a radical degree, the possibilities of life 
through speculation. The instances of The Road (McCarthy 2009), and “The Tombs of Atuan” 
from Le Guin’s The Earthsea Quartet (1993), are examples of this. The becoming-Saturn I 
introduced moves into a more radical speculative mode, wild speculation, and it is upon the 
open sense of wild speculation that I wish my own reader to depart this thesis. I here then offer 
a rapid deployment of speculative events as an invitation both to engage immanent reading, and 
to engage, through immanent reading, the events of sensation that are so vibrant in their 
amplification of the affections and perceptions of reader-bodies into the immanent expressive 
eventality of life. The contemplations of these sensations, the becomings of these sensations, 
consists in the power of the body to become-impossible. That is, to be in the immediacy of one’s 
milieu while also unfolding to eternity in the speculative events of life. 
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With N.K Jemisin’s The Obelisk Gate (2016), the reader-body experiences becoming-
orogenic, adding the manipulation of Earth’s mantle, forces and magic to one’s own power: “and 
then you are within the geode’s crystal substrate, through its shell and burrowing into the rock 
that surrounds it, flowing around the warps and wends of ancient cold stone” (360). None of 
this, of course, without being composed amongst a sentient masculine earth, as an alienated 
heterogeneous human. With China Miéville’s The Scar (2011), becoming-remade consists of 
modifications to the body, and the opening this creates to new environments, to new milieus: 
“the hardest thing for Tanner was not gill-breathing, not moving his arms like a frog or vodyanoi, 
but staring into the face of the colossal gradient of dark water below … now he swam free, 
descending towards darkness that no longer seemed to hunger for him … he struggled to 
overcome his vertigo, he made it something else. No less awe, but less fear” (230-231). With 
Ursula Le Guin’s The Other Wind (2001a), becoming-dragon is adding the power, in a modulation 
of affections, to consist outside time: “the ancients saw that the dragon’s realm was not of the 
body only. That they could fly … outside of time” (227). Or, otherwise, with the percepts: “She 
reached up her arms. Fire ran along her hands, her arms, into her hair, into her face and body, 
flamed up into great wings above her head, and lifted her into the air, a creature all fire, blazing, 
beautiful” (239). Speculative literature consists of such events of sensation, as sites of becoming, 
which compose themselves immanently amongst a milieu of sensation, all composed within 
writing. Without inflicting a sadness on the written-body, the reader-body can read in 
immanence. Composing an unnatural alliance, one’s body is moved into a state of pure 
immediacy with regards to its eternal consistency. The bodies open to transformation. Events 
are composed anew in the body, are experimented with through speculation, giving the reader-
body new sensations, modifications to her perceptions, and transformations to her affections, 
while the written-body becomes read.   
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